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FOREWORD
From the Editor

i acti have yet to receive due credit for their contribution
J to early-modern studies. The opening of the last half
of the last decade of our millennium with a meeting in
the high desert of the American Society for Eighteenth-Century
Studies made a powerful if preliminary statement about the
"egalitarian enigma" of our era. Prickly, rampant in posture,
and ever-defiant of convention, the weird botanical beings
surrounding the Arizona ASECS sprouted from a desert floor—
from a topographical image of the "level playing field" that has
transfixed the Whiggish imagination from Locke, Jefferson, and
even the Diggers to New Historicism and its offshoots. Despite
having emerged from level terrain, Tucson's community of cacti
seem to have collegially conspired in the creation of a landscape
in which novelty crowds out conformity and in which
entrepreneurial ecology emancipates the idiom of inequity and
accomplishment. Every eccentric ecoystem evidences excel
lences unprecedented elsewhere; the equal opportunity of open
spaces allows inequality to acclaim itself. Adam Smith's
invisible hand seems to be shooting craps and winning bigtime
jackpots rather than turning out the equal lines of Darwin's
botanic garden or distributing equal social justice for all.
It may not be too early or too culturally inappropriate to
declare 1996 "the year of the saguaro." True, China lacks desert
flora, but a Restoration critic like John Dryden would allow
modern authors to "imitate" ancient oriental sages by speaking
"as if Anyang's sages would have named a calendrical cycle
XV

xvi

1650-mO

after unusual desert plants if only they had had the chance to
visit the southwest. Moreover, the landscape allegory of the
Arizona ASECS is already being assimilated and understood, for
the tentative, penitent discourse of "boundaries" and "horizons"
that has characterized recent literary criticism is clearly giving
way to a more bumptious, spinous, rollicking, and ultimately
accurate approach to our era.
There can be little doubt that all the authors for this volume
of 1650-1850 are busily proving that scholars with equal access
to academic archives can all excel in equally eccentric ways. All
affirm that seemingly incongruous ideas can expose the truth
about our favorite period. Katherine Kerestman, for example,
counterpoints the enigmas of animal intelligence and cosmological compassion; Theodore E. D. Braun rides the whirlwind of
Testamental inspiration, but also takes a spin through the salon-,
Laura Rosenthal experiences a close encounter of the supernatu
ral—or at least the authorial—kind as she discusses the relations
between wispy writers and reputable ghosts. In our whirlpool
of wit we find more than a few identifiable eddies. Michael
Suarez, Sandra Sherman, and Mihaela Irimia look at the eastern
and the western aspects of Daniel Defoe, showing him both
more conventional and more exotic than anyone ever allowed.
Kathleen Swaim, Syndy Conger, Gregory Maertz, and A. C.
Elias show off the fantastic complexities that underly the rote
work of literary history and editing. Jochen Achilles,
Christoph Bode, and David Gunto tackle various aspects of the
colossal—the grand parallel history, the problem of cultural
identity, the sublime—as part of an inadvertent but enthusiastic
effort to produce a mini-series on monumentality.
Living indefinitely but avoiding growth, the modest lithops
cactus reminds us that there are many ways to achieve—and
many axes on which to measure—immensity. One of the
unexpected benefits of the erosion and dispersal of academic
resources has been the eruption of major centers of learning in
unfamiliar venues. As part of its effort to pioneer new
scholarly settlements, 1650-1850 includes in this issue a special
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section, "The Generations of Georgia State," featuring the
works of three members of an Atlantean faculty. Including the
last essay of Carl Kropf, a colleague well known for his
generous spirit as well as his keen scholarly sensibilities, this
feature segment also highlights the investigations of newcomer
Sandra Sherman as well as those of Murray L. Brown, a
seasoned researcher renowned for probing the commonalities
between eighteenth- and nineteenth-century cultures. Future
issues of 1650-18^0 will try to seek out other venerable
academic heritages in places where other journals might have
hesitated to go before.
"With this volume, 1650-1850 has achieved full administrative
momentum. With volume three, we publish a full complement
of book reviews. We are happy to report that enough reviews
remain in preparation to assure the maintenance of our
evaluation service deep into the vastness of future time. The
editorial staff of 1650-1850 would like to thank the many
colleagues in far-flung parts of the world who have temporarily
suspended their beliefs or obligations to offer an oblation at the
TEMPLE OF OPINION! We very much appreciate your
helpfulness.
It was only after many years of wandering in the culinary
desert that the pioneers of American cookery recovered the
ancient art of rendering prickly pears into delightful confec
tions. It is our hope that you discover—and relish—a similar
convergence of the established and the anticipatory, of the old
and the new, in this eclectic issue.

1650-1850

THE SHORTEST WAY
TO HEAVEN?
Moll Flanders' Repentance
Reconsidered
Michael F. Suarez, S.J.

The proper habit of repentance is not fine linen, or
any delicate array...hut sackcloth and ashes.
^Robert Parsons (1680)
reader of Moll Flanders (1722) must confront the
^1^ "memorandums" of a seventy-year-old woman who
professes to be a repentant sinnerd Moll tells her
readers that she wishes to enlighten and edify her audience by
relating the Providential progress of events that effected her
moral and religious improvement. Yet, in both attitude and
action, the ever-enigmatic Moll Flanders appears to adhere to a
system of values directly at odds with her professed status as a
' The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders, ed. James Sutherland
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), 1. All subsequent page references in the text are
to this edition.
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"true penitent" (252). Indeed, Moll's conversion and repentance
in Newgate has been called "the most problematic episode" of
the novel.^
The diverse critical interpretation of this liminal event is, in
many respects, the key to the more general lack of consensus
about our reading of the novel as a whole. Are Moll's
behavioral inconsistencies the manifestation of Defoe's ironic
intent, of his lack of artistic control, or of some combination of
the two? The widely-divergent and often hotly-contested
responses to this question have prompted Ian Watt to ask, "Is
there, then, no way out of the infinite regress in which the
debate about Moll Flanders seems to be immobilized?"^ This
essay attempts to free Moll Flanders from its elaborate critical
entanglements by situating Moll's much-discussed repentance in
its contemporary legal, religious, and ethical context and by
interpreting her conversion in light of Defoe's other related
writings. While such a procedure cannot finally resolve the
debate surrounding Moll Flanders, it may at least provide a
useful corrective to those treatments of the novel lacking a
sufficient historical grounding and supply a sound foundation
for further studies of this imaginatively exuberant and
delightfully polysemous work.

One of the most outstanding features of Moll's repentance is
that it is totally devoid of restitution. Despite the fact that
Moll was "Twelve Year a Thief (1) and well knows that she
should make some attempt at restitution, she never does so. By
any of the definitions of repentance common in Defoe's day,
restitution was a major obligation. For example, Jeremy
^ William Krier, "A Courtesy which Grants Integrity: A Literal Reading of Moll
Flanders,"/o«?7Zd/ of English Literary History 38 (1971): 398.
^ Ian Watt, "The Recent Critical Fortunes of Moll Flanders," Eighteenth-Century
Studies 1 (1967): 124.
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Taylor's Rule and Exercise of Holy Living (1650), a highly
popular devotional work in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, asserts that "it is a determined rule in
divinity, 'Our sin can never be pardoned, till we have restored
what we unjustly took, or wrongfully detained.""^ In addition,
Richard Hooker, in his Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1597), leaves
little to question: "Our offences sometimes are of such a nature
as requireth that particular men be satisfied or else repentance
to be utterly void and of no effect." Such transgressions include
"open rapine, or crooked fraud" and "injurious or unconsciona
ble dealing [where the sinner has] wittingly wronged others to
enrich himself." Hooker tells us, "from such offences we are
not discharged, neither can be, till recompense and restitution
to man accompany the penitent confession we have made to
Almighty God."^
The belief that restitution is necessary for atonement and
purging of guilt is not only a religious teaching of the period,
but is also central to the legal thought of the Restoration and
eighteenth century as well. Caspar Ziegler, Hugo Grotius, and
Samuel von Pufendorf, leading European jurists of the day, all
promulgated similar aiguments about the indispensability of
restitution as an obligation of natural law. An examination of
Defoe's works reveals that he was a strong adherent of the
principles advocated in their closely reasoned arguments. Jure
Divino (1706), for example, cites both Grotius and Pufendorf.
Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres (1652) sets forth the
principle that all men have an "obligation to restore the things
of another [even when] used in case of necessity, whenever
Jeremy Taylor, The Rule and Exercise of Holy Living (Philadelphia: Thomas
Wardle, 1831), 147; see also 151.
^ Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (London: Tegg, 1839), 200.
See also The Book of Common Prayer (London: 1721), 293. Such pronoimcements
on the necessity of restitution for repentance are a commonplace of conduct
literature in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; see, for example, the tracts
and sermons of Robert South, Wilham Law, Richard Baxter, Henry Hammond,
et al.
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restoration shall be possible." Pufendorf, citing both Ziegler
and the Corpus Juris Civilis takes Gnotius' argument one step
further when he proposes in the second book of his De Jure
Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (1672) that "restitution is also
owed by the thief or his heirs—yet not beyond the amount of
the inheritance—even when the thief has paid for the crime
with his life."^
Much of Defoe's own fiction contains considerable evidence
that demonstrates how strongly he believed in the current
doctrines concerning restitution. The often-neglected Serious
Reflections of Robinson Crusoe (1720) is most explicit on this
point:
But every trespass of this nature [thieving] requires
restitution as well as repentance; restitution as far as the
possible power of the party extends; and if the last not
be found, the first is not likely to be sincere.^
The narrator of Street Robberies Considered (1728), a reformed
thief, offers a striking example of the sedulousness with which
a convert might be expected to make amends for his past
actions:
My conscience received several wounds, which were never
heal'd till I entirely left off my vile courses; and tho' my
goods were ill got, yet heaven prosper'd me in an honest
undertaking; and it has been the business of my life for
upwards of twenty years, as near as I could, to make
restitution for all my rogueries.®
' Hugo Giotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, trans. Francis Kelsey, 2 vols,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 2:195; and Samuel von Pufendorf, De Jure Naurae
et Genitum Libri Octo, trans. C. H. & W. A. Oldfather (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1934), 2:239.
' Defoe, Serious Reflections during the Life and Surprising Adventures of Robinson
Crusoe (London, 1720), 43.
* Defoe, Street Robberies Considered: The Reason of their being so Frequent, ed.
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Similarly, in Captain Singleton (1720), the protagonist asserts his
belief that "Repentance could not be sincere without restitu
tion." Singleton does, in fact, make some restitution later in
the novel, speaking of the "miraculous opportunity I had
afterwards of applying some parts of it [his booty] to preserve
a ruined family, whom I had plundered.'"
These few brief citations should make it clear that, for Defoe
and his contemporary readers, repentance without restitution is
indeed incomplete and suspect. In sharp contrast to this
standard of conduct, Moll appears to be at least as acquisitive
after her conversion as she is during her career as a thief.
Moll's unwillingness to part with any of her ill-gotten riches by
offering some restitution would make it difficult for Defoe's
audience to believe that the seed of her conversion has taken
lasting root. Indeed, Moll herself seems to be aware of the need
for restitution in correcting illegal and unjust actions. After she
steals a bundle of plate while pretending to help the owner
rescue it from a burning house, Moll briefly reflects,
I say, I confess the inhumanity of this action mov'd me
very much...but with all my sense of its being cruel and
inhuman, I could never find it in my heart to make any
restitution; the reflection wore off and I quickly forgot
the circumstances that attended it. (180)
Moll knows what she should do in this case, but cannot bring
herself to part with the handsome booty she gains from her
deception.
When Moll finally does leave Newgate, that "emblem of Hell
itself (239), she has the opportunity to set her financial affairs
in order. Yet, what does Moll do at this juncture? During her
transportation to the New World, Moll does not make the
Geoffrey M. Sill (Stockton: Carolingian Press, 1973), 48.
' Defoe, The Life, Adventures and Pyracies of the Famous Captain Singleton, ed. Shiv
K. Kumar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 267, 270.
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journey as penitent, but rather chooses to go first class,
purchasing her comfort with the mammon of her career as a
whore and thief. She makes no attempt at restitution and gives
nothing to those less fortunate than she. Where is Moll's sense
of contrition.' When she takes stock of her "cargoe" she even
brags (lest we foi^et) that the items are "all stolen goods" (276).
Moreover, Moll subsequently bribes the captain when she
arrives in Virginia and so avoids serving the term of her
sentence (278). She who has sold herself so many times, who
remarks that "a woman is a bag of money or a jewel" (112),
now buys herself from servitude with ill-gotten money and thus
avoids performing any penance for her past actions. In a way,
then, she ransoms her "self" and so once again escapes from the
moral consequences of her wrongdoing. Moll's self-centered
world view demands that she rely solely upon her own
resourcefulness for salvation. Moll is unaware that she is
incapable of ransoming herself because the price exacted by her
life of whoring and thieving cannot be redeemed by her illgotten riches alone.
Defoe compounds this great spiritual irony of Moll's selfransom by having her state that the captain who arranged this
transaction was "abundantly satisfied" (278). In this phrase we
find one of the many instances where Defoe capitalizes upon
the possible multivalent meanings embodied in Moll's diction."
Perhaps in this "ransom" episode Defoe is alluding to Psalm 49, which addresses
the theological problem of the apparent prosperity of godless men. The seventh
verse in particular, "But man could never redeem himself or pay his ransom to
God, it costs so much to redeem his life," seems to be especially appropriate for
Moll. Moreover, we might easily see in this scene an emblem of Moll's reliance
upon the efficacy of financial resources to effect her deliverance, rather than her
faith in the grace won for sirmers by Christ's ransom for hiunankind (i.e., the
atonement). On this type of imaginative procedure in seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury thought, see J. Paul Hunter, The Reluctant Pilgrim: Defoe's Emblematic
Method and the Quest for Form in Robinson Crusoe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1966), 99-102; and Paul J. Korshin, Typologies in England,
1650-1820 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), passim, especially 369-95.
" On Moll's word play and Defoe's many instances of "coded" language in the
novel, see Maximillian E. Novak, Realism, Myth and History in Defoe's Fiction
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If we examine the various uses of the word "satisfaction" as
listed in the Oxford English Dictionary, we find the following
definitions among those common in Defoe's day:
1) The payment in full of a debt, or the fulfillment of an
obligation or claim; the atoning for an injury, offense, or
fault by reparation, compensation, or the endurance of
punishment; 2) the performance by a penitent of the
penal and meritorious acts enjoined by his confessor as
payment of the temporal punishment due his sin; 3) the
atonement made by Christ for sin;... 4) the action of
gratifying.
While Moll is mindful of only the last of these definitions, the
other senses in which the word was commonly used certainly
apply to her situation as a penitent. Thus Moll's great
atonement, her first significant act upon coming to the New
World, is to render satisfaction for her sins with "6000 weight
of tobacco" (278). Totally ignoring the imperatives of Christian
moral conduct, she not only fails to make any pretense of
restitution or alms giving, but also callously reduces the very
action by which she can save her soul and recover her moral
sensibility to yet another dehumanizing and illicit business
transaction.

Another outstanding feature of Moll's repentance is that,
although she claims to be "perfectly chang'd" (245), Moll's own
chronicle of her attitudes and actions makes her appear to be
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 85-8, and his earlier "Defoe's
Indifferent Monitor: The Complexity of Moll Flanders," Eighteenth-Century Studies
3 (1970): 252-60. In neither work, however, does he cite the present example.
" The Oxford English Dictionary, ed. James A. H. Murray et al. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1933), 9:121.
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precisely the same person after her conversion as she was before
it. In the colonies, for example, Moll no longer steals, but she
does persist in her almost compulsively mendacious ways—is
this the stuff of metanoia.^ The depth of Moll's repentance
must be evaluated in light of her subsequent conduct." If,
under the psychological duress of Newgate, Moll pledges to
reform her life and mend her immoral ways, but when released
makes little or no appreciable change in her actions, then it is
clear that her vow of repentance, no matter how sincere, has
not taken effect. It is for this reason that J. Paul Hunter notes
that
Spiritual biographies are filled with incidents of conver
sion through affliction, and most conversions are then
supported by evidence of the person's continued godliness
and righteous action."
The need for substantiating evidence in such spiritual accounts
was particularly great if the convert was known to have been
a notorious sinner, as is clearly the case with Moll. Hunter
remarks that in such instances, "these conversions could only
quiet the scoffers if they provided ample evidence of a reformed
life after conversion."" Defoe himself demanded such evidence.
In 1703, when the Reverend Paul Lorrain preached a funeral
" J. Paul Hunter makes a similar point while establishing the validity of Crusoe's
conversion; see The Reluctant Pilgrim, 164.
" Hunter, The Reluctant Pilgrim, 167.
" Hunter, The Reluctant Pilgrim, 167. In Defoe's day, the most well-known works
treating the need for post-conversion "proof by fruits" to vahdate a siimer's
repentance concerned the case of John Wilmont, Earl of Rochester. See, for
example, Gilbert Burnet's Some Passages on the Life and Death of fohn Earl of
Rochester (Lx)ndon: 1680), and Robert Parsons's A Sermon Preached at the Funeral
of the Right Honorable John Earl of Rochester (Oxford: 1680). Parsons, in particular,
makes a great effort to supply concrete evidence to substantiate Rochester's
conversion; note especially 19-21 of the 1735 edition. On Defoe's knowledge of
Rochester's life and writings, see John McVeagh, "Rochester and Defoe: A Study
in Influence," Studies in English Literature 14 (1974): 327-41.
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sermon praising the alleged repentance made by the infamous
munlerer, Thomas Cook, Defoe became particularly incensed
because Cook's "repentance" came shortly before he was
hanged.'^ In an angry response to Cook's alleged conversion,
Defoe wrote "A Hymn to the Funeral Sermon" (1703), a work
modeled after, though vastly inferior to, his "Hymn to the
Pillory" (1703). Throughout this four-page doggerel poem,
Defoe repeatedly upbraids Lorrain for hailing Cook's repen
tance because there is no evidence by conduct that the murderer
became a godly man. The author wonders.
How men of Infamy should rise.
By Ladders to ascend the Skys?
What need we Mortifie and Pray
If Gibbets are the Shortest Way.^
If a conversion that is not followed by pious deeds is just as
valid as one that is confirmed by holy action, then:
Where's the meer necessity to Pray.^
Or where's the great Reward of Honesty?
Ne're think on't more, as well ye may,
Eden lay aside all Morality
And go to Heaven the Shortest Way.^''
This aipiment of the need for "proof by fruits" was
commonly forwarded by Protestant divines. For example,
Richard Baxter's popular treatise on conversion and repentance,
A Call to the Unconverted (165/^ proposes that the major
attitudinal change that comes from conversion must be affirmed
through prayer, restitution and continued good works.
Jonathan Edwards's Faithful Narrative of the Suprising Work of
" See Robert Singleton, "Defoe, Moll Flanders, and the Ordinary of Newgate,"
Harvard Library Bulletin 24 (1976): 407-13.
Defoe, "A Hymn to the Fimeral Sermon" (London, 1703), 1, 2.
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God (1736) speaks of the need to verify the "inward labour and
struggle of a soul towards heaven and holiness." Other divines
of the era such as William Payne and Edward Waple also
profess strikingly similar opinions on the need for action in
repentance." Only when penitents incarnate their professed
beliefs through living deeds can we be sure they have not fallen
into the pit of solipsistic self-deception. Defoe himself makes
this point in The Family Instructor (1715) when the father
explains to his child that the sorrow of repentance "must always
be attended to with sincere desires of pardon and sanctification,
and earnest endeavors after reformation and amendment.""
One's actions then, will be the best indication as to whether
one's repentance has been activa contritio, a manufactured
remorse, or passiva contritio, a genuine sorrow and suffering
from the heart.^° Early in Moll Flanders, for example, we know
that the sick-bed repentance of Moll's lover at Bath is both
sincere and efficacious because he quits his adulterous relation
ship with her once he has recovered from his illness (105-08).
Against all this evidence concerning the importance of "proof
by fruits," we see Moll's conduct in Virginia. Within the last
five pages of Moll's narrative we learn a great deal that appears
both to negate her religious repentance and to call her 'secular
redemption' into serious question.^' For example, when she
" Jonathan Edwards, A Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God in the
Conversion of Many Hundred Souls etc. (Boston: 1739), 221; see also William Payne,
A Practical Discourse of Repentance (London: 1695), 338; and Edward Waple's
sermon "Of Repentance: A Sense of Sin" in his Thirty Sermons Preached on Several
Occasions (London, 1714), 154-5.
" Defoe, The Family Instructor (London: 1715), 26. Given the weight of evidence
that attests both to Defoe's own commitment to the notion of "proof by fruits"
and to the currency of this idea among his contemporaries, it is difl&cult to give
credence to Paula Backscheider's speculation that, "Eighteenth-century readers
probably did not share our skepticism" about the sufficiency of Moll's repentance.
Moll Flanders: The Making of a Criminal Mind (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1990), 27.
This terminology has been central to redemptive theology since the Reformation;
see, for example, Martin Luther's use of these concepts in What Luther Says, An
Anthology, comp. Ewald Plass (St. Louis: Concordia, 1959), 2:1210.
Pace John Bender, Ima^ning the Penitentiary (Chicago: University of Chicago
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gives a gold watch to her "new" son, Humphry, she betrays a
lack of moral sensitivity and contrition. With characteristic
aplomb Moll remarks to us that she does "not indeed tell him
that [she] stole it from a gentlewoman's side at a meeting house
in London; that's by the way" (293). Moll repeatedly lies to
her husband, deliberately deceiving him by calling her son
"cousin" (204). On another occasion, she first tells him that she
lost the above-mentioned watch, and then compounds the lie by
saying that she had sold it for the purse of pistoles she actually
received from Humphry. She also deceives Humphry several
times when she makes him think that she is not married to
Jemmy, "a gentleman who has a plantation near mine" (296).
Moll later tells him that she has now married Jemmy and "let
him believe" (296) the cargo sent from England by her old
governess actually "belonged to all my husband's estate and not
to me" (296). Finally, Moll again reflects the depth of her
moral impoverishment when she states in the final paragraph of
her narrative that she has now returned to England "having
perform'd much more than the limited terms of my transporta
tion" (297) when, in fact, she has performed none of them.
Thus, it would appear that not only is Moll's repentance made
suspect by her failure to execute even the minimally few good
deeds expected of her, but also that this doubt is confirmed by
her continued practice of evil. In Vii^inia as in England, Moll's
acquisitive drive continues to dominate her life. Still believing
that "money's virtue, gold is fate" (59), Moll is fully prepared
to deceive anyone, even those she professes to love most, in
order to pursue her own interests. Judging by the very
standards of her day, her conversion seems to be one of rhetoric
only.

Press, 1987), 46-7: "Moll's repentance, viewed from the religious perspective,
remains doubtful, but her secular rehabilitation is complete."
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Moll's protestations of sincerity and new-found virtue do little
to allay our fears that her penitence is only skin-deep. How
often does Moll wish to "put an honest face on the thing" (100)
or appear "like quality" (55).' With great tears she professes her
joy at the prospect of obtaining "the comfort of a penitent,"
(252) while after her conversion she tells her readers that it is
necessary for all women to "preserve the character of their
virtue, even when perhaps they may have sacrificed the thing
itself (120). In Moll's limited moral vision, the distinction
between seeming to be and actually being is, at best, blurred.
For example, she remarks of her tradesman husband that "not
a beggar alive knew better how to be a Lord than my husband"
(55). Moll as thief, wife, whore, and con-artist repeatedly
depends upon superficial appearances not only to subvert
reality, but also to create a new "reality." Thus, what originates
as a method of deception for Moll eventually becomes a way of
life, a mode of existence invested with a morality dominated by
expediency and appearances. From the time Moll, in her naive
emulation of the Madam, wishes to become a gentlewoman, she
looks only to externals for the ordering principles of her life;
the first moral imperative of her existence is to seem to be
respectable. As we read Moll's account of her life, we become
acutely aware of her profound, though unconscious, epistemological difficulties. Having deceived others all her life, can she
herself remain undeceived.' When her credibility as an
interpreter of events is in our eyes thus diminished, can we
imagine that Moll is even capable, much less desirous, of
changing the pattern and practice of over sixty years by telling
the truth to others, much less to herself?
Because Moll's multiple deceptions include her own selfdeception or "muddle," we as readers should not rely solely
upon her perceptions if we are to glean the full moral import
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of her story.^^ Her view is necessarily compromised by the
morally outrageous life she has led. It is for this reason that we
can read Defoe's preface not only as an apologetic justification
of his fiction in general, but also as a guide to the readers of
Moll Flanders. Defoe is telling them in what light to interpret
the "serious inferences"(6) of Moll's story, since "this work is
chiefly recommended to those who know how to read it, and
how to make good uses of it which the story all along
recommends to them" (4). To insure that we do "know how
to read" his book, Defoe plants a number of instructive
inferences in his preface. Interestingly enough, nearly all of
these are concerned with the depth of Moll's repentance. The
preface focuses upon her repentance because Defoe was anxious
that his readers understand its intended meaning. Since Moll's
story "naturally instructs the reader, either one way or another"
(4), Defoe cannot resist making sure that the reader is "led by
the hand" (6) to the truth of the tale. Despite modern critical
attempts to explain away the preface to Moll Flanders, Defoe is
deceiving neither the reader in his introductory remarks, nor is
he himself deceived when he states that he wishes to give moral
instruction to his audience, Rather, he is following the utiledulce ethic of the age, seeking to fulfill the traditional Horatian
injunction both to instruct and to delight his audience.^^
One of the first things we learn in the preface is that Defoe
must edit Moll's story and put it "in modester words than she
told it at first" because "the original had been written in
language more like one still in Newgate than one grown
penitent and humble" and that he had "no little difficulty to put
^ Howard Koonce, "Moll's Muddle: Defoe's Use of Irony in Moll Flanders,"
Journal of English Literary History 30 (1963): 377.
^ On Defoe's didactic purpose, see Maximillian E. Novak, "Defoe's Theory of
Fiction," Studies in Philology 61 (1964): 662-5. Defoe is known on at least one
occasion to have praised himself not only for the "miraculous Fancy and Uvely
Invention" in his works, but also for writing "up to the Test of moral Vertue." See
Novak and Herbert J. Davis, The Uses of Irony; Papers on Defoe and Swift (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 37.
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it into a dress fit to be seen, and to make it speak a language fit
to be read" (3). As if this were not enough to make the reader
suspicious of Moll's true attitude, Defoe adds the phrase, "as she
afterwards pretends to be," to the words "penitent and humble."
Paul Alkon has taken note of Defoe's diction in this case and
offers these enlightening remarks:
Johnson defines pretend as "to put in a claim truly or
falsely," but he adds that "it is seldom used without a
shade of censure." Although Defoe might easily have
avoided uncertainty by writing that Moll afterwards
became penitent, he chose from the onset to raise doubts
by using a word that must at least make readers wonder
whether her claim to penitence is true or false.
Alkon's argument is a sound one; in telling us that Moll
"pretends" to be penitent and humble, Defoe is coaxing us to
question at least Moll's penitence and humility, if not her very
integrity as well. Defoe deliberately diminishes the credibility
of his heroine narrator before she even begins to tell her story.
We are not to entrust Moll with the full "uses" (4) of her tale.
At the conclusion of his preface, Defoe again calls Moll's
repentance into question. We are told that Moll grew very rich
in Virginia and returned to England
where she liv'd, it seems, to be very old; but was not so
extraordinary a penitent as she was at first; it seems only
that indeed she always spoke with abhorrence of her
former life and every part of it. (7)
How are we to interpret the author's claim that Moll "was not
so extraordinary a penitent as she was at first".' As we have just
Pavil Alkon, Defoe and Fictional Time (Athens: University of Georgia Press,
1979), 79-80. It should also be noted that Moll uses the •word "pretend" seven
times in the novel, always with its sense of deceiving or play-aaing; see 61, 73, 91,
111, 127, 159, and 280.
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seen, Moll's repentance can hardly be called "extraordinary" in
the sense that Defoe uses the word here7® In fact, it is difficult
to imagine her repentance becoming less extraordinary, since
she appears to have done little but pay lip-service to it from the
very outset of her conversion. Speaking "with abhorrence" is
the closest Moll comes to contrition, and even here her pious
soliloquies fail to convince us because they are juxtaposed with
boastful chronicles of immoral incidents that Moll obviously
takes great joy in recounting.^® When Defoe writes that Moll
"only...always spoke...of her former life," he is telling us that
she did not act. Despite the fact that Moll constantly displays
great initiative in virtually all her other undertakings, she fails
to take the steps necessary to effect her own repentance.
Defoe's statement alerts the reader to the shallowness of Moll's
repentance and highlights the inconsistencies inherent in her
conversion.
Another of Defoe's prefatory remarks about Moll's
repentance focuses upon the manner in which the narrative
itself is presented. After establishing that Moll's chronicle may
be turned to moral instruction for the reader "even where the
story might incline him otherwise" (3), Defoe iterates the
common pattern of exemplary spiritual histories.
To give the history of a wicked life repented of necessar
ily requires that the wicked part should be as wicked as
the real history will bear, to illustrate and give a beauty
to the penitent part, which is certainly the best and
brightest, if related with equal spirit and life. (3-4)

As it is used in this instance, "extraordinary" is best defined as "exceeding what
is usual in amount of degree, extent, or size; over and above what is usual." Of
course, the irony here is that Moll's repentance is extraordinary indeed, though in
the sense of "not according to rule, 'out of order'" {OED, 3: 472).
^ Notice Moll's unabashed boasting, "I grew the greatest artist [thief] of my time"
(186); "The success I had made my name as famous as any thief of my sort had
ever been" (229). This is the voice of the "penitent" Moll.
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The difficulty with this passage, of course, is that the "wicked
part" is not made wicked at all by Moll, but is presented as
being both natural and pardonable. Even when Moll condemns
a deed, she consistently avoids self-indictment either by
distancing herself from the action she performed, or by
providing a casuistic justification for her sin.^^ Moll's greatest
source of pride is not her penitence, but her prowess as an
adventuresome thief, and her narrative is most joyful and
vibrant when she is depicting one of her clever deceptions.^'
Moreover, the "penitent part" is certainly not "related with
equal spirit and life." Moll's repentance is little more than a
mixture of pious formulas and spiritual jargon. She bemoans
the fact that after her initial 'false repentance' she, "had few
signs of repentance about [her]" (242). When discussing Moll's
Newgate conversion and repentance, Maximillian Novak
remarks that "here the repentant narrator is dealing with her
greatest moment."^' He could more accurately have said that
here she should be dealing with her greatest moment, but that
both the style and the substance of Moll's narrative offer
contrary indications.
Defoe makes it clear that Moll believes she is becoming a
sincere penitent; after all, we have just seen that, in Moll's
^ For example, "The last affair [stealing a gold necklace from a child] left no great
concern upon me, for as I did the poor child no harm, I only thought I had given
the parents a just reproof for their neghgence...and it would teach them to take
more care another time" (169). See also 105, 110, 152-3, 165-6, 170, 175,177,186,
189, 194, 198-9, etcetera.
See 69-75, 109-10, 120-25, 169-71, 195-7, 207-9, etcetera.
^ Novak, "Conscious Irony in Moll Flanders: Facts and Problems," CoUege English
26 (1964): 201. Starr, Defoe and Spiritual Autobiography (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1965), 138-9, argues that Moll's preliminary false repentances
"heighten the significance of the genuine repentance." It appears to this reader that
Moll's initial attempts at repentance only serve to undermine further the
"repentance" that is to come. They make us keenly aware that Moll has
consciously manipulated her own feelings to the point where she is now incapable
of trusting even herself. Thus, these half-measures and self-deceptions emphasize
her fallen condition at a liminal point in the novel. She is caught in a solipsistic
trap that heightens the acute epistemological difficulties she experiences.
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debased sensibility, seeming and being are virtually identical.
For Moll, the way to be a "true penitent" is to have felt "real
signs of repentance" (250). Notice for example that, although
she often describes her clever thefts in minute detail and even
remembers to give us the name of the merchant involved in her
trial (247), Moll in her "greatest moment" never thinks to tell
us the name of the good minister, the spiritual father and
confessor who in Newgate gave her new corporal and spiritual
life.^° What Moll omits from her narrative is every bit as telling
as what she includes.
The truth of Defoe's remark in The Review that "the end, I
say, of everything is the beginning, and you must look to the
end or you will never begin aright" should be especially
apparent to the readers of Moll Flanders?^ The author's
"beginning" or preface tells us how to read the tale by looking
"to the end" in order to make the reader wary of Moll's pious
protestations.
Throughout the narrative, Mrs. Flanders
attempts to "mollify" her guilt. In fact, it often appears that the
very purpose of her memorandum is to cultivate favor and win
approbation from the reader. Defoe's preface subtly urges his
readers to recognize Moll's inconsistencies so that they may
"begin right" and so make the best use of her story.

Because Moll's repentance is so clearly incomplete, the most
productive way to read her narrative is not as spiritual
autobiography alone. Moll Flanders should also be read in light
of the criminal confession tradition of the seventeenth and
One of the greatest iionies of the novel is fotxnd in the minister's concern for
Moll's future spiritual welfare in Virginia, "where, he said, I must have more than
ordinary secret assistance from the grace of God, if I did not turn as wicked again
as ever" (255).
Defoe, The Review, ed. Arthur Secord (New York: Columbia University Press,
1938), 8:514.
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eighteenth centuries.^^ Defoe's own experience as a prisoner in
Newgate and as a writer for Mist's Weekly Journal and
Applebee's Journal would seem to indicate that he was at least as
familiar with criminal confessions as he was with spiritual
autobiographies. The opening lines of Moll's narrative make it
clear that Moll has gone unpunished for crimes she has
committed (9). Contrary to Virginia Woolf's belief that Moll's
transgressions give her the "freedom of the outcast," Moll tells
her story in an attempt to free her enslaved will.^^ An
"outcast" is precisely what Moll does not wish to be! She
writes to justify the distinctly ungenteel manner in which she
has amassed her wealth. Moll is compelled to adopt a casuistic
stance that consistently equates expediency with necessity in
order to seek a final justification for her sordid life and so enter
into the fullness of the genteel security and respectability she
covets. Her perfunctory conversion and repentance have not
brought interior "satisfaction" or "comfort," and now the aging
Moll copies out her story as a ritual reenactment of her
turbulent life, and as an apology for the means employed in her
social ascent.^"^ If Moll's repentance were complete, she would
not wish to do the first and would have no need to do the
second.
Moll's insistence upon anonymity is a strong indication of
her abiding insecurity and constant fear of being "found out."
While many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors
published their works anonymously, Moll goes to extraordinary
See Hunter, Reluctant Pilgrim, 204.
" Virginia Woolf, The Common Reader (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925), 129.
Notice, for example, the manner in which Moll invariably telescopes the secure
periods of her life into a sentence or two: "It concerns the story in hand very
httle to enter into the farther particulars of my family, or of myself, for the five
years that I liv'd with this husband, only to observe that I had two children by
him, and that at the end of five years he died" (52). Conversely, when she is in
jeopardy or insecure, Moll writes with vivid detail and often at great length; see,
for example, the description of her theft from an apothecary's shop (165-8), or her
attempt to rob the silversmith on Christmas day (234-7). For Moll's own thoughts
on the need to confess, see 282-3.
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lengths to ensure that nobody knows her true identity. She
conceals her real name not only from the reader, but also from
Jemmy, her Lancashire husband, the man she claims to love
above all others, "still I reserved the grand secret and never
broke my resolution, which was not to let him ever know my
true name, who I was or where to be found" (138). She rejoices
in the very fact that makes such secrecy possible, "Oh! what a
felicity it is to mankind, said I to myself, that they cannot see
into the hearts of one another!" (158). Perhaps Moll is so
reluctant to reveal her name because it is the final shred of her
own identity that she is able to retain throughout her career of
repeated shape-changings as whore and thief. The maintenance
of shallow appearances has become such a way of life for Moll
that the sum total of her self-knowledge amounts to little more
than her real name, and this she protects as her final possession.
She asserts that her true name will remain unknown "till I dare
own who I have been as well as who I am" (9). True to her
word, Moll's post-repentance confession reveals neither her real
name nor her inner self.
The central irony of Moll Flanders lies in the fact that Moll
fails to confront herself both in her initial confession at
Newgate and in her post-conversion confessional "memoran
dum." Although the reality of her personal history is
inescapable, Moll's concern for the circumstantial detail in the
narrative seemingly keeps her from recognizing the implications
of her actions. By substituting factual accuracy for moral
integrity, Moll is able to order her tale to the extent that she
avoids confronting her true self. In the same vein, Moll's status
as penitent not only gives her a respectable frame of reference
in which to set down her story, it also simultaneously provides
a convenient vocabulary of temptation and sin that allows her
to label her actions with a minimum of introspection.
Moll does not tell us who she has been or who she is
because she is incapable of doing so. While there can be no
doubt that Defoe was acutely aware of the "diverting" nature of
"the wicked part" (4) of Moll's career, he structures the progress
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of her experiences and reflections so as to anatomize the fact
that Moll's lengthy career as whore and thief has destroyed her
spiritual and moral sensibility. We, as readers, are meant to see
that she has compromised herself so often that she is now
unable to recoup her loss. On those few occasions when Moll
does begin to confront herself, her attention is invariably
diverted from personal introspection to financial stock taking.
For example, upon receiving Jemmy's farewell letter, she
reflects
Nothing that ever befel me in my life sank so deep into
my heart as this farewell...! would have gone with him
thro' the world if I had beg'd my bread. (133)
With the word "bread," however, Moll's attention shifts to a
more immediate and comprehensible reality: "I felt in my
pocket and there I found ten guineas, his gold watch, and two
little rings" (133). In the same vein, shortly after dismissing
those "sordid trifles...for which we forfeited eternal felicity"
(250), Moll's "first business" with Jemmy is to "compare our
stock" (271).
Moll s invocation, "Give me not poverty, lest I steal" (166),
is particularly ironic, for she is no Jean Valjeanj the mison
d'etre of the vast majority of her crimes is not survival, but
comfort and middle-class ascendance. Her many crises of
conscience are essentially crises of strategy rather than morality.
Martin Luther discusses this very type of behavior in one of his
well-known lectures on Genesis:
There is a different repentance, not a true but false one,
which Germans call a Galgenreue [a repentance on the
gallows], when I repent in such a way that I am not
ashamed of having offended God but merely regret having
injured myself.^®
Plass, What Luther Says, 2:2110. See Crasoe's remark "that imder the dread of
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The tragedy of Moll Flanders lies in the fact that Moll's
impoverished sensibility renders her incapable of anything but
a Galgenreue.
Moll's quest for the grace of repentance is belied by her
overriding concern for respectability and security. Crusoe finds
salvation at least partly because he dares to ask, "What am I and
all the other creatures, wild and tame, human and brutal?
Whence are we?" while Roxana lives her final days so tor
mented by her past "that my repentance seem'd to be the only
consequence of my misery, as my misery was of my crime."^^
Is it possible that Defoe lets Moll go scot-free? His statement
that "we cannot say indeed that this history is carried quite to
the full end of it, for no body can write their [sic ] own life to
the full end of it unless they write it after they are dead" (6-7),
shows his concern for the last days of his protagonist.
Similarly, the last sentence of the work invites the reader to
speculate whether or not Jemmy and Moll did fulfill their
"resolve to spend the remainder of our years in sincere
penitence for the wicked lives we have lead" (297).
It is instructive to note that in the pirated abridgments and
enlai^ements of Moll Flanders, Moll's Newgate repentance is,
evidently, not taken terribly seriously, since an additional
penitence is almost invariably depicted as coming long after her
transportation to the New World. The anonymous enlarge
ments—Life of Moll Flanders (c. 1723), Fortune's Fickle
Distribution (1730), and The History of Laetitia Atkins, Vulgarly
Called Moll Flanders (1776)—for example, all tell of Moll
spending eight years in Virginia and two years in Ireland before
they include this passage which they all share with only minor
variations:
mischief impending, a man is no more fit for a comforting perfiarmance of praying
to God, than he is for repentance on a sick bed" in The Life and Strange Surprising
Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, ed. J. Donald Crowley (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1972), 163-4.
Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, ed. J. Donald Crowley 92; and Roxana, or the Fortunate
Mistress, ed. Jane Jack, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 330.
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Now being in the last stage of my life, I began seriously
to reflect on the past follies and wickednesses thereof,
truly repenting of all my former sins...praying three or
four times a day, and pouring forth an abundance of tears
in my private devotions, to show an utter abhorrence of
those vices of which I had been too frequently guilty. I
never miss'd going to church...! hop'd endeavouring to be
a true penitent would bring me into favour...thus I pass'd
my later days.

Laetitia Atkins even includes the phrase, "the duties of religion,
which, until lately, I have utterly neglected. Although works
such as these do not definitively show how a popular audience
in the eighteenth century interpreted Moll's repentance, they do
provide at least a provisional indication of contemporary reader
response, "a kind of marginal gloss," to the novel's popular
critical reception.^® We should also take notice of the fact that
these works and the various chapbook versions of Moll Flanders,
even when only eight octavo pages long, all without exception
include at least one passage providing the "proof by fruits"
evidence Defoe has omitted. The chapbooks typically speak of
Moll "relieving many from want and slavery...she bequeathed
several legacies to charitable uses."^' Similarly, the enlargements
also tell how she was on her deathbed for nine months (the
gestation of true spiritual rebirth!*) "very penitent and most
zealously fervent...not in the least minding the affairs of this
Anonymous, The Life and Actions of Moll Flanders (London, [1723J), 185-6; and
The History of Laetitia Atkins, Vulgarly called Moll Flanders (London; 1776), 277.
See also Anonymous, Fortune's Fickle Distribution (Dublin: 1730), 88-9.
" Pat Rogers, Literature and Popular Culture in Eighteenth Century England
(London: Harvester, 1985), 184. For an extended discussion of abridgments,
adaptations, and continuations of Moll Flanders, see ch. 8, "Moll in the
Chapbooks," 183-97.
Anonymous, The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders [chapbook]
(London, n.d. [c.l770]), 23-4. See also The History of Moll Flanders...Written from
her own memorandums, [chapbook] (Newcastle: n.d. [c.l790]), 23-4; and The
History of the Famous Moll Flanders (Newcastle: n.d. [c. 1815]), 8.
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world...constantly attended by some eminent Divines" and how
her death was "no small grief and sorrow to the poor." An
accounting of her generous charitable bequests is then given at
some length."*® Should the fact that Defoe includes no such
passages, (an omission which, as we have seen earlier, is in
direct contrast to the literary tradition of his day), not make us
wonder why he has taken such a course?
Nearly all scholarly discussions of Moll's repentance and
subsequent prosperity assume a causal relationship between
these two movements in her life. Moll's misfortunes are never
interpreted in the novel as being punishment for her sins, so
why should we set up such a spiritual equation of temporal
reward from above for virtuous earthly conduct now that Moll
strikes it rich in the colonies? Defoe himself was bankrupt at
least twice in his adult life (the first time for the then enormous
sum of £17,000) and he spent much of his later years hiding
from his creditors, so it is most unlikely he would subscribe to
such a system!"*^ Moll's windfall is no more the result of her
moral condition than is the fact that she mistakenly married her
own brother, was widowed by a man she loved, or rediscovered
Jemmy in Newgate. The operation of chance or fortune is a
key feature of this novel which boldly proclaims "a life of
continued variety" on its title page. The fact that Moll equates
her newfound bounty with her repentance is merely another
indication of the shallow simplicity of her counting-house
morality. To ascribe her financial success to Providence (292)
while blaming her previous difficulties on Fortune is typical of
Moll's casuistic narrative strategies and altogether in keeping
with her penchant for self-justification. Defoe himself explodes
Moll's superficial spiritual calculus with a brilliant ironic touch:

^ Anonymous, The Life and Actions of Moll Flanders, 189; Fortune's Fickle
Distribution, 90; and The History of Laetitia Atkins, 278, respeaively.
See Paula R. Backscheider, Daniel Defoe: His Life (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1989), 58-61; 198-9; 201-2; 526-7.
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Then I let him know what I had brought over in the
sloop besides all this: I mean the horses, hogs and cows,
and other stores for our plantation; all of which added to
his Qemmy's] surprise, and filled his heart with thankful
ness; and from this time forward I believe he was as
sincere a penitent, and as thoroughly a reform'd man, as
ever God's goodness brought back from a profligate, a
highway-man, and a robber. (294)

The ironic juxtaposition here of livestock and soteriology—the
basely physical realities of the barnyard and the nobly
metaphysical issue of Jemmy's eternal salvation—is masterful
indeed.
While even the most loyal of Defoe's readers must be willing
to admit that he had much of the hack writer about him, and
that Defoe was himself at times caught between mercantile and
moral demands, the weight of evidence seems strongly to
suggest that even the lowest chapbook "pyrates" on Grub Street
were aware of the lack of evidence to substantiate Moll's
repentance. How could Defoe himself not have been.^ How
can we explain the conspicuous absence of even a paragraph or
two giving us the "proof by fruits" her case so obviously needs.^
Once it becomes clear that Defoe was most probably aware of
the incompleteness of his heroine's repentance, and that he had
a conscious desire to instruct his audience, then it logically
follows that we are meant to recognize the moral impoverish
ment of Moll's consciousness."^^ Moreover, the fact that her
debased sensibility is nearly always acknowledged in the critical
To those who would here invoke the New Critical "intentional fallacy," it
should be argued that this principle is of highly questionable relevance and merit
when seeking to judge the didactic purpose or level of conscious irony in a given
work, thus suggesting that there exists an intentional fallacy fallacy. For a
philosophical grounding of this argument, see P. D. Juhl, Interpretation; An Essay
in the Philosophy of Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980),
114-52, 279-87.
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literature attests to the fact that, for modern readers at least,
Moll's decline is one of the most salient features of the text/^
Certainly there are tensions here. To argue that Defoe was
in complete control of his text is to be naive about his
compositional methods, the state of narrative craft in the early
eighteenth century, and the wonderfully complex and confused
process of poesis. Certainly Moll's energy, resourcefulness, and
cunning cause her to take on a life of her own quite indepen
dent of any moral lesson, and it is this animate appeal that
becomes the imaginative magnet of the novel. On one level
then, Moll Flanders is a wonderful rags-to-riches fable of
virtually unbounded wish-fulfillment. Moll is a survivor, and
who does not delight in her material success? Yet, when we
"know how to read it" (4), we can see the story operating on a
deeper level in that we recognize that the store of Moll's
interior and spiritual resources has long since been completely
depleted. The fact that we can scarcely help but recognize
Moll's spiritual impoverishment as an outstanding feature of the
text seems to suggest that Defoe is in some measure successful
in executing his theme. If Crusoe offers a model of Christian
repentance, then Moll provides a powerful negative exemplum.
Is it not time we abandoned the historically naive "explana
tions" of Moll's repentance in favor of making a more
sophisticated and challenging interpretation that credits Defoe
with a thorough understanding of the legal, religious, and
ethical norms of his day?
See, among others, Watt, Rise of the Novel, 128; Novak, "Conscious Irony,"
203; David Blewett, Defoe's Art of Fiction (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1979), 64; Koonce, "Moll's Muddle," 379; Dorothy Van Ghent, "On Moll
Flanders" in The English Novel, Form and Function (New York: Harper & Row,
1953), 42; James Sutherland, Daniel Defoe: A Critical Study (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1971), 220; Everett Zimmerman, Defoe and the Novel (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1975), 88, 90; Robert Columbus, "Conscious
Artistry in Moll Flanders," Studies in English Literature 3 (1963): 431; J. A. Mitchie,
"The Unity of Moll Flanders" in Knaves and Swindlers, ed. C. J. Whitbourn
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 84.
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The final balance the materialistic Moll is unable to paycomes in the form of the spiritual chaos or void that subverts
her shallow pursuit of true security. Throughout Moll's
narrative, Defoe demonstrates that a life of moral turpitude
exacts a very dear price. While Moll's sins bring her material
riches, they necessarily also effect her moral impoverishment.
The moral Defoe wishes to convey in Moll Flanders is well
illustrated in the closing lines of one of his early verses entitled
"Of Hapyness Consisting in a Contented Mind" (1681),
He's Happy who Can keep his End in View
And by right Meanes can that best End Persue,
Who all Desires Can to his reason bind.
Enjoys the liberty of Being Confin'd,
His Mind Fills up Desire, Desire Fills up his Mind:
Bounded Delights his True Content Encrease,
And This Content Must Needs be Hapyness.
With Piety, and Vertue Understood,
He Can Not be Content That is not Good.'*'*
For Defoe, there is no "shortest way." Just as surely as Moll's
chronicle shows that she has gained the world, so too does the
account of her repentance establish that she has lost her soul.'*'
Defoe, "Of Hapyness Consisting in a Contented Mind," in The Meditations of
Daniel Defoe, ed. Geoige Healy (Cnmmington: Cummington Press, 1946), 21.
The author wishes to thank the Association of Commonwealth Universities,
London and the National Endowment for the Humanities for their generous
assistance in the preparation of this essay.

THE AUTHOR AS GHOST
IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Laura J. Rosenthal

he "work," Foucault has observed, "which had once the
duty of providing immortality, now possesses the right
®^to kill, to be its author's murderer."' In response to
Roland Barthes's celebration of the author's death, however,
Foucault insists on the material basis of all such significant
institutional transformations. This death does not release
writing from limitations, he argues, but rather transforms the
system of constraint whose new mode has yet to be determined.
The work's murderous capacity, then, becomes not just a
metaphor that cracks open a new strategy of reading, but an
indication of or call for institutional change. Similarly, the
work's erstwhile power to provide immortality to its creator
also marks a particular form of discursive circulation.^
' Michel Foucault, "What is an Author.'" in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in PostStructuralism Criticism, ed. Josue V. Harari (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1979) 142.
^ See Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," The Rustle of Language, trans.
Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986). For an interesting
contribution to this problem, see Svetlana Boym, who demonstrates the ways in
which the "death of the author" can be understood as a particular authorial
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while the late twentieth century may have witnessed an
epistemic transformation represented by the author's death, the
eighteenth century witnessed, as Foucault and others have
argued, a change characterized by the literal possibility of the
author's survival.^ Writing of course could never guarantee
survival: like Scheherazade, Richard Savage spun texts to
postpone death. Nevertheless, literature became property and
the author, as Mark Rose has aipied, its proprietor. But while
authorship offered a new kind of professional life, more than
one crucial site of its aesthetic formation and proprietary
negotiation takes as its occasion, metaphor, or representation
the writer's death. Edward Young's Conjectures on Original
Composition, which self-consciously proclaims the formulation
of new values in authorship, names as the "jewel" of the essay
the death of Addison and withholds until the end a description
of the dramatist's noble passing. Young claims Addison's death
as itself the playwright's most original composition. Shake
speare, the author whom Young names, after Addison, as the
greatest original genius, also accumulates an association with the
boundary between life and death in his frequent figuration as a
construction in which the writer participates. Death in Quotation Marks: Cultural
Myths of the Modem Poet (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
' See also the important considerations of this issue by Peter Stallybrass and AUon
White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1986); Mark Rose, "The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the
Genealogy of Modern Authorship," Representations 23 (1988); Martha Woodmanssee, "The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the
Emergence of the 'Author,'" Eighteenth-Century Studies 17 (1984): 425-48; Alvin
B. Kernan, Printing Technology, Letters, and Samuel Johnson (Princeton: Princeton
Univenity Press, 1987); Linda Zionkowski, "Territorial Disputes in the Republic
of Letters: Canon Formation and the Literary Profession," The Eighteenth Century:
Theory and Interpretation 31 (1990); Laura J. Rosenthal, "^e)Writing Lear:
Literary Property and Dramatic Authorship" in John Brewer and Susan Staves, eds.
Early Modem Conceptions of Property (London: Routledge, 1995). Joseph
Loewenstein in "The Script in the Marketplace," Representations 12 (1985): 101-14
demonstrates Ben Jonson's consciousness of writing as property, but also his
attafchment to earher forms of authorship. This essay is particularly indebted to
the suggestiveness of Woodmansee, Loewenstein, and Stallybrass and White.
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ghost. Addison's moment of death represents the quintessence
of authorship for Young; the ghosts of Shakespeare, I will
arpie, serve a similar function. Since Shakespeare becomes, as
Michael Dobson has argued, the eighteenth century's national
poet,"* he provides for Young and others a figure for authorship
itself. His ghost tends to appear in places like prologues to
adaptations of his own plays, where the borders of textual
property come into question. But Shakespeare not only
provides an origin for eighteenth-century adapters and imitators;
he serves for Young and others as a supremely original author,
in spite of his extensive borrowing from other texts.
The ghost of Shakespeare and the dying Addison appear at
these crucial moments of authorial construction—the first to
guard the boundaries of textual property, the second as Young's
quintessential vision of original composition—because the
disembodied author embodies the contradictions of eighteenthcentury authorship. On the one hand, the author owned
property in writing and, unlike the patronized poet, partici
pated in market relations. But if the patronized author achieved
status through aristocratic association, the eighteenth-century
proprietary author risked no distinction at all from anyone else
who brought their goods to market. Many eighteenth-century
authors, including Young himself, put together careers through
a combination of patronage and marketplace participation.
Before Young finally achieved financial security upon obtaining
the rectory of Welwyn, he wrote numerous dedications in the
hope of support and turned to the stage, potentially the most
lucrative of literary endeavors, when he needed money the
most.^ But writing's potential material value undermined its
potential social capital.^ As Dustin Griffin has argued, the
•* The Making of the National Poet: Shakespeare, Adaptation and Authorship,
1660-1769 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
' For Yoimg's career, see Henry C. SheUey, The Life and Letters of Edward Young
(London, 1914) and Harold Forster, Edward Young: .The Poet of Night Thoughts,
1683-176S (Alburgh: Etskine Press, 1986).
' Throughout this essay I draw on the divisions between forms of capital observed
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Scriblerians represented commercial writing as a fall from grace
and looked back to a golden age in which "literature was the
province of learned gentlemen."^ Certainly by the middle of the
eighteenth century, those who wished to distinguish their
writing as the social capital of leisurely accomplishment from
the economic capital of professional writing now needed to
argue their case: the burden of proof for writing as upper-class
pleasure fell to those who would claim this position. This
contradiction between authorship as both in and above material
exchange often found a symbolic resolution for Young and
others in the figure of the author's death. Edward Young's
original composer, like the dying Addison, transcends the
material world, material need, and the material concerns for
profit. In eighteenth-century authorship, the cultural and
economic capital of writing develop into a complex relationship
of both intersection and distinction. The representation of the
author as the ghost of Shakespeare articulates, sometimes
simultaneously, an insistence upon writing as property and a
distancing from the cultural position of those who traffic in
commodities. Indeed, only a ghost could fulfill the contradic
tory authorial demands between materiality and immateriality:
in Young's construction of modern authorship, the only true
author is a dead author.

Edward Young's Conjectures on Original Composition positions
itself as a new theory of authorship, as a turning point in the
valuation of certain kinds of writing. Young declares his essay
as itself an original—as the first polemic to identify originality
as the defining characteristic of true authorship: "I begin with
Original Composition; and the more willingly, as it seems an
by Pierre Bourdieu in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans.
Richard Nice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).
' "Fictions of Eighteenth Century Authorship," Essays in Criticism 43 (1993): 183.
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original subject to me, who have seen nothing hitherto written
on it."^ The significance of Young's essay as an articulation of
an emergent eighteenth-century construction of authorship has
long been acknowledged; Ian Watt, for example, calls the essay
"epoch-making."' Young's entanglement of this theory of
authorship with the death of Addison, however, has drawn less
attention. Young frames his Conjectures with Addison's death:
in the opening, he promises to conduct the reader to a
monument "in which is a hidden Lustre, like the sepulchral
Lamps of old; but not like them will This be extinguished, but
shine the brighter for being produced, after so long Conceal
ment, into open Day" (3). He withholds the dramatic events
which the sepulchral lamps will illuminate until the end,
although his morbid images haunt the essay. Finally, Young
reveals his privileged knowledge of the exemplary moment of
Addison's death as his "chief inducement for writing at all"
(108).
Thoughts on Addison's death take up nearly a quarter of this
essay, but Young makes only a connection by occasion between
his theory of authorship and celebration of the dignity of
Addison's death: Addison had once asked him for his thoughts
on original and moral writing. The essay itself, then, stands as
a posthumous reply to Addison, as part of a conversation with
' Conjectures on Original Composition, 2nd ed. (London, 1759), 4. In his article
"Conjectures on Unoriginal Composition," The Eighteenth Century; Theory and
Interpretation 11 (1981): 58-73, Joel Weinsheimer points out that this claim to
originality of ai^ument appears only in Yotmg's revision for the second edition
and constitutes the single substantial difference between the editions. Clearly
others had argued for originality previously; Yoimg, in fact, alludes to those
argiunents. Yet he "feels compelled," as Weinsheimer points out, "for the sake of
consistency to make the claim, however ill fotmded, of originality" (59). See also
Weinsheimer's Imitation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). Weinsheimer
identifies Yotmg's "originalism" as one of three major movements—the others being
empiricism and historicism—that undermined the theoretical basis for imitation.
Future quotations from the Conjectures cited in the text from the first edition
reprinted in facsimile by the Scholar Press Lirmted (Leeds, England, 1966).
' The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1957), 14.
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the dead. But even Richardson, who had encouraged Young to
make the story of Addison's death public, found its juxtapos
ition with a theory of original composition jarring. After
reading a draft, he wrote
Let me ask, however great and noble what you say of Mr.
Addison's death is, whether it may not bear shortening?
Will it not be thought laboured? And when, from the
different nature of diseases, some of them utterly
incapacitating, and deliriums happening often, it is not, or
may not be, discouraging to surviving friends, to find
wanting in the dying those tokens of resignation and true
Christian piety, which Mr. Addison was graciously
enabled to express.^®
Richardson finds Young's focus on Addison's moment of death
confusing and distasteful. In another letter, he warns that this
scene undermines the point about originality:
I was very desirous that the anecdote of Addison's deathscene should be inserted: yet, so many admirable things
as there are in every page of the piece, was half sorry to
have that made the sole end of your writing it. Your
subject of original composition is new, and nobly spirited.
How much is your execution admired! But three good
judges of my acquaintance, and good men too, wish, as I
presumed formerly myself to propose, that the subject
had been kept more separable and distinct. They think
the next to divine vehemence (so one of them expressed
Richardson to Young, 18 December, 1758, in Henry Pettit, ed. The Correspon
dence of Edward Young, 1683-1765 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). Quoted by
Patricia Pbilbps in "Richardson, Young and the Conjectures:
Another
Interpretation," Studia Neophilologica: A Journal of Germanic and Romance
Languages and Literature 53 (1981): 110-11. Phillips demonstrates that Richardson
supported Yotmg's position on originahty.
See also Alan D. McKillop,
"Richardson, Yoimg and the Conjectures," Modem Philology 22 (1925): 391-404.
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himself,) with which original writing is recommended,
suffers some cooling abatement; which it would not have
done, had the solemn subject been left to the last."
The relationship between Addison's death and original
authorship is indeed puzzling and left unjustified by the author.
I believe, however, that the Conjectures demonstrates a
connection between these uncomfortably juxtaposed issues,
though perhaps one outside of Young's conscious control.
Death becomes Addison's quintessential moment of authorship:
"his compositions are but a noble preface," Young declares, "the
grand work is his death." In a historical context in which the
burden of proving refusal to participate in the marketplace fell
to the writer, originality and the literal death of the author
converge as complementary strategies for Young that deny or
provide an escape from the materiality of writing. Just as the
moment of death marks the difference between a body in need
and a body beyond need, so originality in Young's Conjectures
marks the difference between the market-driven hack and the
genius. And the need to distinguish those positions becomes
urgent because their difference had become entirely unclear. If
in the seventeenth century gentlemen-poets like George
Etherege and the Duke of Newcastle achieved legitimacy
precisely for their lack of dependence on or (in some cases) even
interest in earning a profit, and a writer like Thomas Hobbes
could earn social capital through the economic capital of
Newcastle's patronage, what in the eighteenth century
distinguished Pope from Colley Gibber or Young from Eliza
Heywood when each of those writers, whether "professional"
or "hack," earned a living at some point in their careers from
the sale of their copyrights or profits from performance of their
plays? Professionals and geniuses participate in exactly the same
economy as those against whom they attempt to distinguish
" Richardson to Young, 29 May 1759 (Pettit, 501-02). Also quoted by Phillips.
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themselves. In Young's essay, death and originality appear to
provide two routes of escape from the material.
In Young's Conjectures, originality has little meaning in itself,
but rather functions as a signifier of difference, permitting and
upholding the distinction between "true" authors and those who
"only" write for money. Young nearly admits that originality's
intrinsic meaning has no importance for him when he declares
that he "shall not enter into the curious inquiry of what is, or
is not, strictly speaking. Original, content with what all must
allow, that some Compositions are more so than others; and
the more so I say, the better."^^ Joel Weinsheimer, in fact, has
effectively demonstrated the numerous ways in which the
Conjectures fails to demonstrate an essential difference between
imitation and originality. Young's favorite examples of true
originals—the ancients—are only in Young's argument
"accidental originals" because their sources have been lost.
Since "[w]e cannot demonstrate the absence of precedent that
would certify an original as real," as Weinsheimer argues, then
"[t]o us there is no difference per se between real and accidental
originality, and hence none between a real original and an
imitation."" Further, in Young both originals and imitations
imitate; they differ only in their objects of imitation. To argue
that originals imitate nature and imitations imitate art, though,
assumes "not only the aesthetic and anthropological distinction
between nature and art but also the more fundamental
distinction between objects and signs."" The essential difference
between originality and imitation, then, depends upon an
unconvincing absolute distinction between sign and object as
well as an impossible assurance of the absence of precedent.
Originality thus does not hold up as a critical category. But for
Young it doesn't need to, for it performs other cultural work.
Contrary to Young's own claims, there is nothing new about
" Conjectures, 9-10. See also on this point Weinsheimer (59), who takes this
admission as a function of the weakness of the argument for originality itself.
" Weinsheimer, 60-1.
Weinsheimer, 62.
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advocating originality. What is new about Young—and perhaps
what explains why literary historians have been willing to credit
him with innovating this value rather than, say, John
Dunton—is his use of originality as marking the difference
between popular and high culture.
The importance of originality in the Conjectures lies less in
any intrinsic, definable meaning than it does in its effectiveness
as a signifier of difference, a maker of distinctions. Originality
for Young negotiates an authorial position defined against pure
social capital—the refined accomplishment of an aristocrat for
the entertainment of friends or status gleaned by association
through patronage—as well as against economic capital, insisting
on cultural capital as an independent category. Young's Essay
explicitly rejects a formulation of authorship as an elite pastime
practiced and patronized by classically-educated aristocrats.
Genius transcends the class-defined access to a literary
education: "Many a Genius, probably, there has been," Young
insists, "which could neither write, nor read" (35). On the
other hand, while any repetition—even imitation of the ancients
by the refined—proves degrading, nothing spoils language quite
so thoroughly as spreading to the lower classes: "Words
tarnished, by passing thro' the mouths of the Vulgar," Young
argues, "are laid aside as inelegant, and obsolete. So Thoughts,
when become too common, should lose their Currency; and
we should send new metal to the Mint, that is, new meaning to
the Press" (13-14). If access to a shared body of ancient texts
defines the residual form of authorship that Young rejects, an
exclusive individual access to previously unshared thoughts,
articulated as originality, defines the authorship that Young
embraces.
Another way of stating the exclusive access that originality
affords might be, as Young's own metaphor about minting
" On Young's claim to originality of argument, see above, note 12. On earlier
advocates for originality in popular culture, see J. Paul Hunter, Before Novels: The
Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth Century English Fiction (New York and London:
W. W. Norton, 1990), especially ch. 1.
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coins suggests, as property. For Young, original writing
constitutes the only legitimate form of literary property and
original writers are the only legitimate owners;
Thyself so reverence as to prefer the native growth of thy
own mind to the richest import from abroad; such
borrowed riches make us poor. The man who thus
reverences himself, will soon find the world's reverence to
follow his own. His works will stand distinguished; his
the sole Property of them; which Property alone can
confer the noble title of an Author, that is, of one who
(to speak accurately) thinks, and composes; while other
invaders of the Press, how voluminous, and learned
soever, (with due respect be it spoken) only read, and
write. (53-4)
Only property in writing. Young insists, can earn one the title
of author, and only originality ensures the claim of property.
By defining authorship through property. Young rejects social
capital—including the shared though exclusive access to classical
learning that signifies a particular rank as well as the patronage
that extends the "protection" of that rank to a few outside of
it—as the primary goal of genuine authorship. Indeed, Martha
Woodmansee has demonstrated that in Germany, professional
writers used Young's argument to support their claims to legal
rights.Young's rejection of the primacy of social capital
through the private property of original composition, though,
risks defining authorship in terms of economic capital.
While Young explicitly defines this new form of authorship
against an elite monopoly on letters, the genuine range of men
and women who might make a living from writing emerges as
an even more powerful threat. Originality legitimates property,
but property ownership itself implicates the author in the
marketplace. Young, however, deploys originality to define
" "The Genius and the Copyright."
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property and at the same time to represents true authorship as
immaterial, as beyond purchase or even articulation.
Originality alone places the author above the chaos and
multiplicity of a marketplace choked by print. The press,
Young complains in the opening of his Conjectures, has grown
"too luxuriant" (4), although there can never be too much
writing of "sound Understanding."^^ Original composition
rescues gentlemen from commonplaces and common places:
To Men of Letters, and Leisure, [composition] is not only
a noble Amusement, but a sweet Refuge; it improves
their Parts, and promotes their Peace: It opens a back
door out of the Bustle of this busy, and idle world, into
a delicious Garden of Moral and Intellectual fruits and
flowers; the Key of which is denied to the rest of
mankind. (5)
This private refuge to which only a select few may hold a key
resonates with the class distinction between the leisured author
who values his privacy and the mass of people inhabiting public
spaces. Literature not only provides safety from the common
crowd, but it can even rescue one from the materiality and
temptations of the body itself:
While we bustle thro' the thronged walks of public Life,
[composition] gives us a respite, at least, from Care; a
pleasing Pause of refreshing Recollection. If the Country
is our Choice, or Fate, there it rescues us from Sloth and
Sensuality, which, like obscene vermin, are apt gradually
to creep unperceived into the delightful bowers of our
retirement, and to poison all its sweets. (6-7)

See Zionkowski for a suggestive discussion of the perception of the proliferation
of print during the eighteenth century.
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Whether in the midst of a crowd or alone with one's body,
composition, like death, liberates the subject from physical
desires and needs.
Of all composition, though, only original writing in Young
achieves this freedom from the material, for originality marks
the difference between "noble" amusement and common
pleasures. "[DJive deep into thy bosom," Young advises,
"excite, and cherish every spark of Intellectual light and heat,
however smothered under former negligence, or scattered
through the dull, dark mass of common thoughts" (53).
Imitative composition inevitably belongs to this dark mass, for
it cannot conceal the effort involved in its production. "An
Original" on the other hand, "may be said to be of a vegetable
nature; it rises spontaneously from the vital root of Genius;
it grows, it is not made-. Imitations are often a sort of Manufac
ture wrought up by those Mechanics, Art, and Labour, out of
pre-existent materials not their own" (12).
The author's death returns at the end of the essay, newly
apparent as the only position to offer less complicity in the
materiality of the marketplace than the original composer. As
his true "grand work," Addison's death confirms his authorship
in a way that even his writing cannot: "his name would have
deserved immortality, tho' he had never written" (99) by the
example of his death. Death, like original composition, frees
Addison once and for all from the "bustle of life," from sensual
temptation, and from speaking anything that has passed through
the mouths of the vulgar. For Young, in fact, the author's
moment of death becomes his greatest literary and dramatic
achievement. Partly this emerges from a traditional understand
ing of tragedy as itself a preparation for death: "Tully's assassin
found him in his litter," Young recalls, "reading the Medea of
the Grecian poet, to prepare himself for death. Part of Cato
might be read to the same end" (89). Young further honors
Addison for his Christian philosophy.^' Yet neither of these
" See D. W. Odell, "The Ailment of Young's Conjectures on Original
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connections account for Young's implicit association of true
authorship and Addison's death, the jewel at the heart of the
Essay for Young. Addison himself, in Young's anecdote, called
in an audience, thus theatricalizing the scene of his last
moments. He apparently summoned a young man to his
bedside for a final command, and "Forcibly grasping the youth's
hand, he softly said, 'See in what peace a Christian can die.' He
spoke with difficulty, and soon expired" (103). In Young's
representation, then, Addison performed his own death, creating
a dramatic scene greater than his dramatic writing: "[all] regard
the person departing as an Actor of a part, which the great
master of drama has appointed us to perform to-morrow: This
was a Roscius on the stage of life; his Exit how great?" (111).
Thus death itself becomes in this essay Addison's greatest
dramatic achievement and most original composition. Young's
formulation goes beyond the commonplace of authorship as
immortality, for he insists that Europe "knows not half
[Addison's] title to her esteem; being as yet unconscious that
the dying Addison far outshines her Addison immortal" (110).
It is the moment of death, the passage from the material to the
immaterial, that turns out to be the monument that Young had
begun the essay by promising to the reader:
[T]his is the sepulchral lamp, the long-hidden lustre of our
accomplished countryman, who now rises, as from his
tomb, to receive the regard so greatly due to the dignity
of his death; a death to be distinguished by tears of joy;
a death which angels beheld with delight. (109)
Like an actor taking his applause at the end of a play, Addison's
ghost rises from the grave after his literary career and
performance of death to receive his due. Young, then, presents
two forms of authorship that turn out to be the same: the
original author and the author as ghost, whose originality and
Composition," Studies in Philology 78 (1981): 87-106.
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ghostliness serve as unstable signifiers of difference between the
materiality of writing for the market and an authorial position
that claims its cultural distinction by its refusal of the material.

While the ghostly return of the dead Addison and value of
original composition similarly negotiate simultaneous demands
of materiality and immateriality, the ghost of Shakespeare
becomes the more commonplace specular author, often making
its appearance before adaptations and in attacks on adapters.
Like the problem of originality and imitation, adaptation raises
the most challenging questions about literary ownership,
material profit, individual authorship, and the borders between
texts. The appearance of Shakespeare's ghost in the eighteenth
century addresses issues of the text's materiality more explicitly
than Young's subtle connection between original composition
and Addison's death: Shakespeare's ghost commonly rises to
chastise an adapter for violating Shakespearean property or
earning profits from Shakespearean plays.
Shakespeare comes to represent original authorship itself and,
in spite of the historical Shakespeare's professionalism, a
simultaneous claim of property and transcendence of the
material. The poet of nature provides Young with his most
prominent example of original genius after Addison:
Shakespeare mingled no water with his wine, lower'd his
Genius by no vapid Imitation. Shakespeare gave us a
Shakespeare, nor could the first in antient fame have given
us more. Shakespeare is not their Son, but Brother; their
Equal, and that, in spite of his faults. (78)
Jonson and Dryden, on the other hand, had too much learning
to produce original plays; more learning. Young speculates,
might actually have damaged Shakespeare's original genius.
Shakespeare further signifies an elite taste for Young; praising
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Dryden resembles "an intoxicated hoste, and his tasteless guests,
over some sparkling adulteration, commending their Cham
paign" (86). In spite of Shakespeare's extensive borrowing.
Young and others represent Shakespeare as the poet with no
significant obligations to anyone else and thus no potential
violations of property. The figure of the ghost dematerialized
Shakespeare even further, and writers commonly invoke
Shakespeare's ghost to arbitrate between legitimate and
illegitimate forms of authorship. Appearances of the spectral
Shakespeare abound so greatly that this figure comes to border
on cliche.^' I will address three examples that illustrate in
particular the way the value for originality, itself produced out
of the contradictory demands of materializing and dematerializing the text, produced a vision of the most original of authors
as (dis)embodied in the same borderland. In its oscillation
between presence and absence, materiality and immateriality,
the ghost of Shakespeare becomes a trope that expresses
emergent conflicts between the historical location of both text
and author in a marketplace, and writers' own persistent
attempts to locate themselves outside of materialism and
materiality.^®
Writing long before the value of original composition had
found extensive articulation, John Dryden raises Shakespeare's
ghost as a strategy for "authorizing" his own adaptation. But
while Dryden may not share Young's concern that professionals
have overcharged the presses, he nevertheless uses Shakespeare's
ghost to work out the property relations of adaptation.^^
" For the frequency of Shakespeare's spectral appearance during the eighteenth
century, see Dobson, 164-5. The ghost of Shakespeare had become enough of a
cliche for Charles Gildon to parody its appearance in his Comparison between Two
Stages.
For another view, see Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare's Ghost Writers: Literature
as Uncanny Causality (New York: Methuen, 1987).
Dryden's Notes and Observations on the Empress of Morocco, for example, attacks
Settle for his flights of fancy. For Dryden and his precursors, see James Anderson
Winn, John Dryden arui His World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987),
especially ch. 9. For a fine discussion of Dryden as an adapter of Shakespeare, see
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Before his Troilus and Cressida, a self-conscious alteration of
Shakespeare's play, Mr. Betterton delivers the prologue
"Representing the Ghost of Shakespear"-.
See, my lov'd Britons, see your Shakespear rise.
An awfull ghost confess'd to human eyes!
Unnam'd, methinks, distinguish'd I had been
From other shades, by this eternal green.
About whose wreaths the vulgar Poets strive.
And with a touch, their wither'd Bays revive.^^
Dryden represents the ghost of Shakespeare as an inspiration,
a figure living after his death (underscored by organic imagery)
through whom other poets bring themselves to life. The honor
of seeing its play on the new stage pleases Shakespeare's ghost,
and it praises the taste of those who recognized the greatness of
his work. Nevertheless, the ghost has some ominous words:
In this my rough-drawn Play, you shall behold
Some Master-Strokes, so manly and so bold.
That he, who meant to alter, found 'em such.
He shook; and thought it Sacrilege to touch.
Though hardly realistic, this ghost becomes slightly threatening
around the issue of its property. At the same time that the
ghost welcomes Dryden's alterations, it insists that the new
playwright did not take this potential violation lightly. This
Shakespeare, embodied by an actor but also disembodied as a
ghost, provides the conditions for the new playwright through
the ghost's own idealized originality. In the context of an
unoriginal act of rewriting, Dryden has the ghost of Shake
speare represent this kind of composition as the inspiration of
Dobson, ch. 1.
^ Troilus and Cressida, in The Works of John Dryden, ed. Alan Roper (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984), 13:249. Future references are cited in the
text.
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the living by the dead. The figure of the ghost, which provides
the image of an unworldly Shakespeare beyond material need,
represents a Shakespeare with great care for poetic lineage but
some concern to protect its property as well. Ultimately, the
ghost defines the right to rewrite as a limited privilege:
Now, where are the Successours to my name?
What bring they to fill out a Poets fame?
Weak, short-liv'd issues of a feeble Age;
Scarce living to be Christen'd on the Stage!
Late seventeenth-century playwrights themselves, however,
had developed a tremendous concern for the borders between
texts, but not the romantic insistence on originality: accusa
tions of plagiarism had become common enough for Gerard
Langbaine to devote an entire book {An Account of the English
Dramatic Poets, 1691) to sorting out who has plagiarized and
who legitimately owns their texts. In the preface to Troilus and
Cressida, in fact, Dryden apparently responds to one such
accusation when he writes of his last scene that "[t]hey who
think to do me an injury, by saying that it is an imitation of
the Scene betwixt Brutus and Cassius, do me an honour, by
supposing I could imitate the incomparable Shakespear" pCIU:
227). In an age of increasing consciousness about discursive
property, Dryden enables his own project of adapting
Shakespeare by creating a ghost to approve of his changes and
to insist on its own position as beyond the material economy
of authorship.^^
Shortly after Dryden's death, his own ghost appeared on
stage. In the prologue to George Granville's Jew of Venice, an
alteration of Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, the ghost of
" For an interesting reading of the relationship of this prologue to the politics of
the new Troilus itself, see Dobson, 74-6. Dobson aigues that "this prologue
dramatizes the adaptor's Oedipal relation to this 'awfuU ghost' in a manner which
carefuEy distracts attention from the political content of the adaptation which is
to follow" (75).
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Dryden appears alongside the ghost of Shakespeare; as in
Dryden's own prologue, the dead poets appear "Crown'd with
Lawrel."^'* Like Dryden, Granville uses the ghost of Shake
speare to legitimize his own project:
These Scenes in their rough Native Dress were mine;
But now improv'd with noble Lustre shine;
The first rude Sketches Shakespear's Pencil drew.
But all the shining Master-stroaks are new.
But as the above passage suggests, Granville more explicitly
integrates the problem of legitimation with the problem of
property. Granville's ghosts reveal their author's greater
resistance to the marketplace and simultaneous greater concern
to distinguish his own property. Granville carefully distin
guishes Shakespeare's lines from his new ones by marking all
additions with an apostrophe in the printed text. This gesture
not only separates Shakespeare's written property from
Granville's in a far more scrupulous way than Dryden's brief
catalogue in the preface to Troilus and Cressida, but it also
reveals a consciousness of the play as a printed commodity, for
such marks can only mean anything in the play's printed life.
In response to the class implications of writing for the
marketplace, Granville represents adaptation as an honorable
literary practice by recalling similar endeavors by other elite
playwrights:
Undertakings of this kind are justify'd by the Examples
of those Great Men who have employ'd their Endeavors
the same Way: The only Dramatique Attempt of Mr.
Waller was of this Nature, in his Alterations of the Maid's
The prologue was written by Bevill Higgons, Esq. All quotations from this play
from George Granville, The Jew of Venice [1701], facsimile reprint (London:
Cornmarket Press, 1969).
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Tragedy. To the Earl of Rochester we owe, Valentiniam
To the Duke of Buckingham, The ChancesT"
Granville's authorial ghosts embody this contradiction and
attempt to redefine legitimacy in cultural terms. Both the
ghosts of Shakespeare and of Dryden berate the audience for
their low, commercial tastes and place Shakespeare above and
beyond this commodity circulation by opposing his poetry of
nature (rough native dress) to the "unnatural" desires and tastes
of the audience, an opposition that organizes Granville's
representation of legitimate and illegitimate authorship.^^
" This "Advertisement to the Reader" hsts other similar efforts as well: "Sir
William Davenant and Mr. Dryden united, in restoring the Tempest: Troilus and
Cressida, Timon, and King Lear, were the Works of three succeeding Laureats:
Besides many othen, too many to mention." In his "Epistle to the Right Hon.
George Lord Lansdown," Edward Young himself somewhat obsequiously feeds
Granville's aspirations to a place in the poetic genealogy by idealizing him as the
true heir to Shakespeare:
Long may we hope brave Talbot's blood will run
In great descendants; Shakespeare has but one;
And him, my Lord, permit me not to name.
But in kind silence spare his rivals' shame:
Young also invokes the ghost of Shakespeare:
Should Shakespeare rise, unbless'd with Talbot's smile,
Ev'n Shakespeare's self would curse this barren isle;
But if that reigning star propitious shine.
And kindly mix his gentle rays with thine,
Ev'n I, by far the meanest of your age.
Shall not repent my passion for the stage.
Yotmg's ultimate flattering point about Granville's authonhip, however, repeats
Granville's own distinction between the noble pleasures of a Rochester or
Buckingham and those who write for money:
The Muses write for glory, not for gold;
'Tis far beneath their nature to be sold.
^ My discussion of these emerging distinctions between high culture and popular
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Modern, popular playwrights who, the ghosts imply, an
unschooled audience prefer bewitch spectators by twisting
nature:
Thro' Perspectives revers'd they [living playwrights]
Nature view.
Which give the Passions Images, not trtie.
Strephon for Strephon sighs; and Sapho dies.
Shot to the soul by brighter Sapho's Eyes.
The ghost of Dryden demands that the audience reorient its
desires: "You Beaux Love Ladies, and you Ladies Men," the
ghost of Shakespeare insists "These Crimes unknown, in our
less polisht Age, / Now seem above Correction of the Stage."
The ghost of Dryden's accusation and the ghost of Shake
speare's defense set up a series of oppositions between authentic
nature—which includes Shakespearean drama, freedom from the
marketplace, and heterosexuality—and perverted nature, which
includes modern, commercial writing, profiteering, and sexual
aberration. Granville carries this set of oppositions over to the
play itself, in which sexual aberration, the perversion of nature,
and profit-making become associated with the figure of the Jew.
In the same breath that Shakespeare's ghost insists on his own
stage's freedom from homosexuality, he reminds the audience
that "Less Heinous Faults, our Justice does pursue; / To day we
punish a Stock-jobbing Jew." So while being a Jewish profiteer
does not constitute the same scale of offense as Sappho dying
for Sappho, the crimes fall into the same category. And in
culture is indebted to Raymond Williams, Culture and Society: 1780-1950 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1958), and also Stallybrass and White, The
Politics and Poetics of Transgression. On the cultural politics of Granville's
adaptation of The Merchant, see also Dobson's discussion in The Making of the
National Poet (121-4). Dobson ai^es that "in the world of...Granville, real
literature, such as the drama of Dryden and Shakespeare, inhabits a contracted,
orderly space, beyond which all is grotesquerie, Frenchness, the fair, the
masquerade, the unnatural, the inverted" (122).
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Granville's alteration itself, profit-making becomes the Jew's
replacement for any form of sexuality. In a scene that
Granville adds, Antonio toasts friendship, Bassanio toasts
Portia, Gratiano toasts all women, and Shylock toasts money:
"I have a mistress," he says, "O may her Charms encrease and
multiply; / My Money is my Mistress! Here's to / Interest
upon Interest" (12). For the Jew, interest upon interest replaces
one body upon another. Granville revives this play in the
midst of the burgeoning of finance capitalism; the Bank of
England had been established but seven years earlier.^^ By
allowing the Jew to stand for all the greed and exploitation of
commerce, Granville allows the Christians to stand for only its
virtues.
Granville opposes Christians, Shakespeare, and
heterosexual love-making to Jews, homosexuality, and
profiteering.
If the ghosts of Shakespeare and Dryden can now rise above
the material, living playwrights remain mired in it. Granville's
repeated distinction between the economic and cultural capital
of writing betrays uneasiness with his own participation in the
public theater. The epilogue locates the responsibility with the
audience as much as the writer:
The Scribler, pinch'd with Hunger, writes to Dine,
And to your Genius must conform his Line;
Not lewd by Choice, but meerly to submit;
Would you encourage Sense, Sense would be writ.
Granville pictures a world in which the low tastes of the
audience degrade playwrights to lewdness at the expense of
sense, thus insisting on his own elite distinction from this
position. The need for profit forces less distinguished writers
into producing low art. Shakespeare, however, becomes a
^ See Roy Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Penguin,
1990).
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canonical figure who transcends the shame (the Jewishness, the
sexual perversion) of profit:
Shakespears sublime in vain entic'd the Throng,
Without the Charm of Purcel's Syren Song.
In the same Antique Loom these Scenes were wrought,
Embellish'd with good Morals and just Thought:
True Nature in her Noblest Light you see,
E're yet debauch'd by modern Gallantry...
'Tis Shakespear's Play, and if these Scenes miscarry.
Let Gormon take the Stage
or Lady Mary.
Granville thus holds up Shakespeare as the poet of nature
whose work transcends the crude, material world of writing for
money—a task that seems inevitably, in Granville's epilogue, to
destine a performance to superficiality and perversion.
The ghost of Shakespeare, unlike the historical Shakespeare,
escapes the possibility of trafficking in letters—a practice that
Granville represents as holding the greatest threat to genuine
authorship. The ghost occupies a place outside of the market,
and Granville defines this place as artistically and even
morally—it is Christian, not Jewish—superior to the position of
the writer in the marketplace. This immaterial state, however,
becomes one legitimate position through which a writer can
insist upon the material boundaries of literary property. Thus,
the ghost of Shakespeare rises not only to negotiate the
difference between honorary and transgressive forms of
adaptation, but to attack the property violation of foi^ery. In
an anonymous poem entitled "Familiar Verses, from the Ghost
of Willy Shakespeare to Sammy Ireland," the ghost demands to
know why Ireland, who claimed his Vortigem as a previously
undiscovered Shakespeare play, would "disturb the ashes of the
dead": "Peaceful I lay in STRATFORD'S hallowed fame, / And,
but for thee, might yet enshrin'd remain."^' Like a gothic ghost
London, 1796.
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that returns to terrorize the living because injustice disrupts his
peace, this ghost of Shakespeare cannot rest when writers
violate its property. The ghost then turns to Kemble with the
familiar anger over the altering of his plays. Yet the publication
of the Kemble texts offends the ghost in particular, and
Sheridan becomes just as guilty as Ireland because he produced
Vortigem for profit:
BURKE Sammy aids, and SHERIDAN the same;
The latter, right or wrong, is not to blame;
For well he knows, "All's grist that comes to mill!"
And VORTIGERN can't fail the house to fill.
This ghost, then, not only objects that its property has been
violated, but that it has been violated for money. Shakespeare's
plays, or anything calling itself a Shakespearean play, must not
be dragged into commerce. The ghost's final words express rage
over foi^ery and adaptation, characterize both those practices
as violent attacks on his text, and finally bemoan the ghost's
own helplessness to protect its property after death;
I'll not pretend the mystic veil to draw
Pronounce them ["new" Shakespearean plays] foi^'d,
or pass them into law:
To speak the truth, I give it on my word;
For years long past, my Muse has felt the sword,
Such hacking, slashing, cutting here and there.
Some parts press'd down, and other puff'd to air;
That I make oath, and swear it on the spot,
I know not what is mine, nor what is not.^'
See also the prologue to W. Kendrick, Falstaff's Wedding, A Comedy: As it is
Acted at the Theatre Royal in Drury-Lane. Being a Sequell to the Second Part of the
Play of King Henry the Fourth. Written in Imitation of Shakespeare (London, 1766).
In this prologue, an actor appears in a counsellor's gown and wig and mockingly
accuses the poet of forgery "With base design t'adopt [the characters] for his
own,/Tho' Shakespeare's property, and his alone."
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While ghosts of Shakespeare haunt a range of eighteenthcentury writers,^® they demonstrate a particular fondness for
David Garrick. Perhaps because, as Michael Dobson has
argued, Garrick becomes one of "two competing figures"—the
other being the Westminster Abbey statue—"which seek to
embody and thus secure the authorial spirit of Shakespeare."^^
But in Garrick's career, the tension between writing for a
market and transcending it become acute. Sometimes the ghost
praises Garrick as the playwright who rescues Shakespeare from
common adapters:
To thee [Garrick], my great restorer, must belong
See also, for example, the epilogue to Charles Gildon's alteration of Measure for
Measure (London, Cornmarket Press, 1969; 1700), in which Shakespeare's ghost
complains:
Enough 'your Cruelty Alive I knew;
And must I Dead be Persecuted too?
Injur'd so much of late upon the Stage,
My Ghost can hear no more; hut comes to Rage.
My Plays, hy Scriblers, Mangl'd I have seen;
By Lifeless Actors Murder'd on the Scene.
Later in the century, Charles Marsh begs Shakespeare's ghost to forgive his
adaptation of Cymbeline (London: 1752):
Beloved Shakespeare! may thy Shade forgive
That I, presuming, mix my Scenes with thine.
In the fond Thought they may together hve:
Alloy incorp'rates with the finest Coin....
Forgive me, for 'tis surely all the need
I e'er shall ask. Oblivion throw thy Veil
O'er those false hopes that flattered once indeed
Or, let Capricious ClBBER tell the Tale.
" Dohson, 134. My discussion of Garrick owes much to this chapter, which also
provides many more instances of the ghost of Shakespeare. Dobson emphasizes
the ways in which Garrick used "Shakespeare's own spectral authority to empower
the revision of his plays" (171) and also "to embody the respectable Shakespeare
promoted in the 1730s as the decent alternative to Harlequin" (176).
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The task to vindicate my injur'd song,...
To save me from a dire impending fate,
Nor yield me up to Gibber and to Tate
Retrieve the scenes already snatched away.
Yet, take them back, nor let me fall their prey.^^
Other poetic ghosts, however, berate Garrick for gross
materialism. In one set of verses the ghost of Shakespeare
terrorizes Garrick into becoming the terrified Shakespearean
characters he portrayed:
On such a Night great Shakespear's Shade,
Appear'd to G—rr
k, as he laid
Involv'd in serious Contemplation,
Of his dang'rous Situation.
The little Hero struck with Fear,
Like Richard look'd, or mad like Lear,
Like Romeo in Pangs of Death,
Or like sleep murdering Macbeth?^
This frightful ghost accuses Garrick of ingratitude, arguing that
Shakespeare catapulted him to fame ("Perhaps you have forgot
the day, / When in Obscurity you lay") and Garrick repaid this
debt by ignoring Shakespeare and producing profit-making
popular shows. The ghost scares Garrick by accusing him of
giving in to the temptations of material profit and ignoring
cultural capital, defined by this ghost precisely by its detach
ment from the material:
Couldst' thou, with base ignoble Mind,
To Fortune, and my Favours blind.
London Magazine, June 1750, 279.
" "The Visitation; Or, an Interview Between the Ghost of Shakespeare and D-v-d
G—rr
k. Esq" (London, 1755), 5.
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Forget I chose thee out, and sought,
To teach thee all, e're Nature taught?
Taught thee to feel, each nice Sensation,
And reign unrival'd in a Nation?
Rais'd thee from nothing to high Glory,
Making all Actors bow before ye.
Acknowledging themselves unequal
To equal you?—now mark the Sequel,
You have of late, why best you know.
Deserted those, that serv'd you so;
Contemn'd that Pow'r, you lately priz'd.
And follow'd Arts you once despis'd;
Oe'rbearing all, with haughty Spirit,
Buoy'd up by self-sufficient Merit-,
Preferr'd Toll Loll, and what's akin,
Compar'd with Drawer—Harlequin;
Aids that the Grecian Stage ne'er knew.
Aid that Dame Nature never drew.^"^

In their immaterial incarnation, the ghosts of Shakespeare
tend to share a disdain for the material, but they differ on how
they interpret Garrick's career. One ghost invites Garrick to
join it in the immaterial world of true authorship, claiming that
Shakespeare made Garrick "half divine."^' Others protest
Garrick's decision to replace Shakespearean drama with plays
that turn a larger profit. Still other ghosts protest attempts by
Garrick and his colleagues to drag Shakespeare into materiality.
In Arthur Murphy's parody of Hamlet, for example, the ghost
of Shakespeare appears as old Hamlet's ghost and accuses his
"son" Garrick of revising Shakespearean drama to make money
at the expense of art.^^ In "A Poetic Epistle from Shakespear in
Elysium, to Mr. Garrick," however, the ghost of Shakespeare
"The Visitation," 13.
" "An Epistle from Shakespear to His Countrymen" (London, 1777), 12.
Published in Jesse Foote, The Life of Arthur Murphy, Esq. (London, 1811).
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protests all attempts to degrade the disembodied spirit of
Shakespeare into any form of materiality. The ghost objects to
Garrick that:
in vain the bust
The medal's form in vain, poetic worth
Commemorate; they only greet the eye
Of ostentation, or the splendid roof
Of pomp with idle decoration grace;
Filling the antiquarian with a train
Of incoherent, whimsical delight.
What can avail the sculptor's curious art.
Embodying rich the animated stone.^^
Here Shakespeare's ghost regards such efforts to honor him—a
bust Garrick kept in his theater, a medal he printed for the
Shakespeare Jubilee, and the famous statue of Shakespeare—as
"false tributary fame, and senseless joy." Yet this ghost does
not reject Garrick himself, for it goes on to praise Garrick's
productions. The offense here is any attempt to embody
Shakespeare, to drag Shakespeare down from his immaterial
sphere into the rock-hard materiality of a statue, a bust, or a
medal. As an author, Shakespeare must remain pure spirit.
Later, the ghost tells Garrick that it only wants the trophies of
"heroic spark": "each deed / That honesty delights in, and each
worth / That fair morality would call her own" become the
only desired rewards, and ones that the ghost will not allow to
be reduced to a material form. Finally, the ghost declares to
Garrick:
THOU art my living monument; in THEE
I see the best inscription that my soul
Could wish: perish, vain pageantry, despis'd!
"A Poetic Epistle from Shakespear in Elysium, to Mr. Garrick" (London, 1752),
3.
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SHAKESPEARE revives! in GARRICK breathes again! (6)

As an author-spirit, Shakespeare can inhabit Garrick's body and
animate his performance; Garrick, on the other hand, conjures
the Shakespearean author-spirit whenever he performs.
Shakespeare's ghost can find a temporary home in the body it
shares with David Garrick. Watching Garrick perform, this
poem implies, provides an unmediated and authentic experience
of Shakespeare's essence.^^ Thus the poem, saturated with the
"true" author's disdain for the material, nevertheless ends with
a blatant advertisement for Garrick's theater. This moment
summarized the eighteenth-century paradox of authorship; the
consumer offers the quintessential symbol for material
ity—money—in exchange for what is rapidly emerging as the
quintessential experience of spirit.^'
See Dobson, 168.
" The Monticello College Foundation Fellowship at the Newberry Library
provided me with the resources and opportunity to complete this essay. I also
wish to thank Helen Deutsch for her productive suggestions.

BREAKING THE SHACKLES
OF THE GREAT CHAIN OF
BEING AND LIBERATING
COMPASSION IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Katherine Kerestman

Sighteenth-century writers, such as Samuel Richardson
jand Samuel Johnson, attacked not specific social evils so
fmuch as the root of all social evils: subordination. A
new interest in perspective encouraged writers and readers to
consider people in all social ranks from their own points of
view, rather than from an all-encompassing "divine" perspective,
and writers began to question the justifications of the hierarchi
cal nature of society—even such statmch defenders of the
establishment as Richardson and Johnson evinced a new
uncertainty about the philosophical basis of hierarchy. One of
the fiirst casualties was the Great Chain of Being, from which
one's downward gaze was directed upon the classes or species
upon whose misery the weight of superior beings rested. When
the chains were smashed, the middle class began to sense that its
legitimacy was not dependant upon its serviceabdity to the
aristocracy, whose "superiority" was doubtful anyway.
57
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Similarly, the lower classes, women, and animals were to gain
champions among the literary intelligentsia, who advocated
humane social principles based upon compassion.
This essay will examine the way in which cruelty to animals
functions as a measure of human depravity and exposes the
sadistic basis of the notion of hierarchy, in selected works of
Richardson and Johnson. Animal imagery, although perhaps
employed with strictly artistic intentions, serves to tmdermine
both writers' well-known championship of a compassionate and
well-intended exercise of power in a hierarchical world order.
Animal references raise doubts about the qualified advocacy of
hierarchy by showing that the notions of superiority and
inferiority serve both to inflame and to sanction human
tendencies toward cruelty and self-importance, cruelty and selfimportance justifying each other in a vicious cycle of increasing
depravity that leaves no room for noblesse oblige. In Clarissa,
Richardson demonstrates the flimsy nature of Lovelace's
justification of his sadistic exercise of power by employing
metaphors of the torment of animals by himters and birdcatchers to comment upon Lovelace's torment of the heroine.
Johnson, in his review of Soame Jenyns's "A Free Inquiry in to
the Nature and Origin of Evil," uses imagery of vivisection to
the same end, showing that the same hardness of heart
exemplified by Lovelace results from a life view based on
hierarchy, which Johnson tmveils as "indulging the lust of
dominion, and that malevolence which delights in seeing others
depressed," rather than any discernable inherent superiority.^
These writers are wielders of the axe with which writers of
conscience were to fell "a system [which] has been raised [and]
is so ready to tell the praises of itself that no great praise can be
derived from its destruction" (543).
' Samud Johnson, Review of "A Free Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of
Evil," by Soame Jenyns, in Samuel Johnson, ed. Donald Greene (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984): 522-43, 529. Future references are made parenthetically
in the text.
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Both of these writers equate cruelty with pride in rank and
the exercise of power that is the perquisite of rank. By means
of imagery comparing human relations with each other to
human relations with animals, they demonstrate in these works
that hierarchy is the origin of evil, even as it claims to be the
fotmdation of social welfare, and that oppression justified by
hierarchy results in tremendous suffering—rape and poverty.
Richardson highlights his villain's preoccupation with rank
and power through his repeated use of hunting and trapping
metaphors for Lovelace's persecution of Clarissa. Lovelace
writes Belfard, "Will yet not now all join to say it is more
manly to attack a Hon than a sheepi*—Thou knowest that I
always illustrated my eagleship by aiming at the noblest
quarries; and by disdaining to stoop at wrens, phil-iixs, and
wagtails."^ Here the hrmter's choice of victim is seen as an
indication of the rank of the htmter: Clarissa ranks high among
the classes of potential victims, and therefore Lovelace gains
prestige by marking her for his prey.
Penelope Biggs writes that the himt metaphor functions to
ennoble a sadistic way of life; it "focuses attention on the effort
and skill of the pursuer, who is glorified by success; and
suppresses the suffering and potential death of the pursued, for
the 'quarry' is after all not human.She continues that
Lovelace's use of cHches prevents thinking on the part of some
of his readers:
The rake is a bvilly, but is not seen as one—and does not
see himself as one. Through the image of the h;mt,
among others, he is able to "cut a figure" and present
himself as an achiever. The cliches of the "himt" and the
"difficulties of the chase" are thought-deadeners, as long as
they remain chches...We see how far into actual delusion
^ Samud Richardson, Clarissa (London: The Foho Society, 1991), 1:559. Future
references are made parenthetically in the text.
' Pendope B%gs, "Hunt, Conquest, Trial: Lovdace and the Metaphors of the
Rake," Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 20 (1982): 52.
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the rake is prepared to advance in order to make a shabby
course of action sotmd glorious/

Although Biggs admirably tmveils the impHcations of Lovelace's
cliches regarding the rake's hcense with respect to womankind,
she does not examine their implications regarding humankind's
license with animals. Harriet Ritvo, however, does investigate
the human tendency to order hierarchically the animal
"kingdom," a tendency established by the end of the eighteenth
century and further refined throughout the nineteenth, taken
for granted by Lovelace and tmderlying his remark about
"noblest quarries." Ritvo explains that how people rank
animals reveals what people value:
Throughout the nineteenth century naturahsts debated
the rival claims of cats and dogs to be top animals in
terms that made it clear that the issue was not simply
taxonomical. In question was the more fundamental prin
ciple of whether animals should be ranked according to
their utiUty to humankind, as literal servants or as
instructive analogues, or according to some other
standard.^
Lovelace makes clear that gastronomical pleasure is not his
standard for measuring "utility to humankind": "Does not the
keen fox htmter endanger his neck and bones in pursuit of a
vermin which, when killed is neither fit food for man nor
' Biggs, 53.
^ Harriet Ritvo, The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the
Victorian Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 35. Ritvo writes that
eighteenth-century children's literature encouraged humane treatment of animals
for the purpose of inculcating kindness in its readers: "The complex relationship
between sympathetic concern for animals and manipulation of people was clearly
expressed in the only genre of eighteenth-century literature that focused repeatedly
on humane issues...Animals were quickly recognized as promising didactic
instruments, and works of both juvenile natural history and moral fiaion were
loaded with uplifting messages about the need to treat them kindly" (131).
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dogs?" (1:558). Lovelace's standard accords utility to whomever
he can exploit, and his attitude toward hiunans of lesser rank
parallels his attitude toward non-human animals. Consider his
treatment of Clarissa's merchant landlords at the end when she
has finally escaped him: Lovelace lords his aristocratic privilege
over them and violates their shop because he carmot violate
Clarissa. He has no such frustration to serve as his provocation
at the beginning for his gratuitous intimidation of Rosebud's
family; he simply sees the necessity of subordination in every
relationship among individuals: "in every friendship, whether
male or female, there must be a man and a woman spirit (that
is to say, one of them a forbearing one) to make it permanent"
(2:864). He delights in extolling the transcendence of the
human male over the female, as much as he does the aristocracy
over the middle class: "Women, Jack, tacitly acknowledge the
inferiority of their own sex in the pride they take to behold a
kneeling lover at their feet" (1:796). He is so intoxicated by his
exercise of power that he experiences delusions of grandeur:
I shall be as unhappy after a while, from my reflections
upon this conquest, as Don John of Austria was in his,
on the renowned victory of Lapanto, when he fotmd that
none of his future achievements could keep pace with his
early glory. (1:559)
Thus, Richardson's himting and trapping metaphors relate the
oppression of women, nations, and animals to the notion of
hierarchy and the gratification of the exercise of power
conferred by rank, an exercise of power itself necessary to the
maintenance of rank.
Although in his Preface to the 1759 edition of Clarissa
Richardson wrote that one of his purposes was "to caution
parents against the tmdue exertion of their natural authority
over their children" (1:36) both the plot and the animal
metaphors of the novel demonstrate that the question is not the
difference between due and undue exertion of authority, but
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whether good exercise of authority represents a contradiction
of terms. All major characters but Clarissa seek power in
human relationships, while she seeks only autonomy; Lovelace
represents the rule, rather than the exception.^
"Whether aristocratic or middle class, authority is cruel.
Lovelace, Mr. Harlowe, James, and all who possess power enjoy
striking terror into the hearts of their subjects. Morden, for
example, the best of the Harlowe men, and bearing a name
suggestive of death, kills Lovelace in a duel, despite Clarissa's
request that he forbear revenge in order to allow Lovelace time
to repent and escape damnation: Morden employs his authority
to exercise jtxstice without mercy and sends a sotd to hell.
Furthermore, the exercise of power in all heterosexual relations
in the novel (until Clarissa's conversion of Belford^, from that
between Mr. and Mrs. Harlowe to that of Lovelace and
Rosebud, is characterized by obligation, submission, and
' Lovdace desires to control Clarissa's body, miad, and sotd (he thinks them all
one) and to put James in his place, primarily to demonstrate and achieve
acknowledgment of his power by his victims and by society at large. Mr. Harlowe
wants Solmes's monqr, James's advancement, and acknowledgment of his supreme
power in the household. Mrs. Harlowe wants peace at any price, to please her
husband, and Clarissa's happiness (in this order). James wants to best Lovdace, to
get a title, to oppress the women in his family, and to be the father of it. Bdla
wants to best Clarissa and to get back at Lovdace. Anna wants Clarissa's
happiness and personal freedom, dignity, and equality in her rdationships.
Hickman wants Anna and conventional marriage. Bdford wants first to befriend
Lovdace and then to befriend Clarissa, as both are his mentors. AH these desire
power through human rdationships. Clarissa, alone of the characters, wants
something that transcends human social rdationships—to do right in the eyes of
God; but she has been taught that this goal is achieved by submission to patriarchal
authority. While the figures of authority try to prevent her from doing what she
bdieves is right, Clarissa struggles for the autonomy necessary to aa according to
her conscience.
^ Bdford marries into Lovdace's family and may make a good husband, but
heretofore he has been a weak charaaer, influenced first by the stronger, licentious
spirit of Lovdace, and later by the virtuous strength of Clarissa's soul. Can he
remain good without Clarissa's guidance? One might recall Everard Grandison,
cousin of Sir Charles Grandison, a reformed rake who returns to his former
immoral habits as soon as he is out of Sir Charles's s:^ht.
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coercion. Anna Howe echoes Lovelace's words when she
explains how her friends have coerced her into submitting to
her marriage, to a kind man very unlike Lovelace, despite her
fears of "wedded warfare," which she assumes will necessarily
accompany all husbandly attempts to control her: "But there
must be bear and forbear, methinks some wise body will tell
me" (2:1457). The affinity between "some wise body's" words
and those of Lovelace suggests that the patriarchal hierarchy has
an agenda as dehixmanizing and malevolent as that of Lovelace.
To exercise fatherly, husbandly, or aristocratic privilege in
Clarissa is to be cmel, even despite one's intentions.
Angus Wilson has identified power as the villain of the
novel:
In the battle between Clarissa and Lovelace, we go ever
deeper through a beautifully realized fight between two
particular individuals: through the social conflict between
the Harlowes' bourgeois acquisitive Puritanism and
Lovelace's aristocratic, extravagant, arbitrary will; even
through the age-long battle between the sexes...For
Clarissa is finally a novel about the refusal of one human
being (the heroine) to be treated as a thing by another
(her pursuer, Lovelace). It is, I think, the most complete
and powerful accotmt of that terrible battle against power
to be fotmd in literature.®
He sees the power struggle between Lovelace and Clarissa as
emblematic of larger power struggles among classes. Richard
son's use of htmting imagery, however, points beyond the
questions raised about humanity's exertion of power over
oppressed peoples to human oppression of other species.
Philosophers have long been making this same comparison in
' Angus W2son, introduction, Clarissa, by Samuel Richardson (London: The Folio
Society, 1991), 1:21.
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an effort to identify the cause of our evil-doing; Montaigne, for
instance, wrote in 1578:
If we wish to derive some advantage from this very fact,
that it is in our power to seize [animals], to use them and
do what we like with them, this is only the same
advantage that we have over one another. We have our
slaves upon this condition.'
Montaigne specifies unwarranted Pride as the basis of our need
for subordinating an other: "Presumption is our namral and
original malady. The most vulnerable and frail of all creatures,
and at the same time the most arrogant."'® Belfard recognizes
this same unfounded pride at the bottom of Lovelace's cruelty:
"What miserable yet conceited beings men in general, but we
libertines in particular, are" (2:1126) As Clarissa is told also
from Belford's and Clarissa's, as well as Lovelace's, points of
view, the reader has no trouble recognizing the delusion which
informs Lovelace's assertion of his superiority.
Like Montaigne, Jeremy Bentham in 1780 linked this human
tendency to subordination of other species to subordination of
his own in slavery:
The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not
yet past, in which the greater part of the species rmder
the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law
exactly upon the same footing as, in England for example,
the inferior races of animals are still...The French have
already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no
reason why a human being should be abandoned without
redress to the caprice of a tormentor...What else is it that
should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of
' Michel de Monta^ne, "Apology for Raymond Sebond," The Complete Essays of
Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965),
306-18, 337.
Montaigne, "Apology," 330.
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reason, or, perhaps, the factilty of discourse? But a fullgrown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more
rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an
infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But
suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the
question is not Can they reason} nor. Can they talk} but.
Can they sufferT"^
Bentham locates the cause of httman cruelty in the "pleasures of
malevolence."'^
Through the bird-catching analogies Lovelace uses to exploit
his pursuit of Clarissa, Richardson demonstrates that his villain
possesses not only the inflated pride written of by Montaigne,
but also an epicurean appreciation of what Bentham calls the
"pleasures of malevolence":
We begin with birds as boys, and as men go on to ladies;
and both perhaps, in turns, experience our sportive
cruelty:
Hast thou not observed the charming gradations by
which the ensnared volatile has been brought to bear with
its new condition? How at first, refusing all sustenance,
it beats and bruises itself against its wires, till it makes its
gay plumage fly about, and overspread its well-secured
cage. Now it gets out its head: sticking for breath, and
erectedly perched. (1:557)
He continues to detail lovingly the miseries of the caged bird
through most of his letter. As Biggs points out:
Such images, with their stress on the baiting of a helpless
captive, give a whole new tone to the himting meta" Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1879), 311.
Bentham, Principles, 114.
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phors...we come to see vejty different concepts of
achievement and entertainment."

She rightly acknowledges that it is not "sport" or "challenge"
that Lovelace enjoys, but inflicting pain:
The "difficulty" Lovelace refers to as enjoyable is really
the spectacle of ineffectual struggle, as with the captive
bird...Any measure that shows Clarissa as a genuine con
tender, i.e. one with a chance of winning...throws liim
into a rage."
Marjorie Spiegel explains that modern psychologists
recognize that pleasure is the driving force behind the cruelties
of sexual offenders hke Lovelace and other persecutors: "No
matter how noble the oppressors claim to be, we must
remember that the infliction of pain and suffering becomes a
pleasurable act, an end in itself."" It is a vicious cycle we
imcover; hierarchy is achieved and maintained through exertion
of power over another; the exercise of power reinforces pride
in rank; the exercise of power is so pleasurable that it becomes
its own justification; and hierarchy is made necessary in order
to maintain the existence of an other who can be made to feel
this power: "To those who would be master, what matters is
not so much who their slaves will be, but that there are slaves
to be had.""
Belford is aware of the complex web of pride and pleasure in
subordination of the other that motivates Lovelace's persecution
of Clarissa:

" Biggs, 54.
" Biggs, 57.
" Marjorie Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery (New
York: Mirror Books, 1989), 90.
" Spiegel, 91.
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Proud and vain as the conceited wretch [Man] is of
fancied and self-dependent excellence, he is obHged not
only for the ornaments, but for the necessaries of life
(that is to say, for food as well as raiment) to all other
creatures; strutting with their blood and spirit in his
veins, and with their plumage on his back, for what has
he of his own, but a very mischievous, monkey-like, bad
nature? Yet thinks himself at liberty to kick, and cuff,
and elbow out every worthier creature: and when he has
none of the animal creation to himt down and abuse, will
make use of his power, his strength, or his wealth, to
oppress the less powerful and weaker of his own species.
(2:1125-26)
Belford, enabled by his empathy to see from the perspective of
the himted, calls Lovelace to account for his sadistic pleasures
by comparing Clarissa to a wounded deer:^^
Canst thou thyself say, on reflection, that it has not the
look of a wicked and hardened sportiveness in thee, for
the sake of a wanton humour only (since it can answer
no end that thou proposest to thyself, but the direct
contrary), to htmt from place to place a poor lady who,
like a harmless deer that has already a barbed shaft in her
breast, seeks only a refuge from thee in the shades of
death? (2:1224)
What is glorified as sport and challenge by Lovelace is shown
to be simply "the pleasures of malevolence" by Belford. Thus
does Richardson employ an estabUshed tradition of comparing
human cruelty toward people to human cruelty toward animals
" In "Of Cruelty," Montaigne suggests tliat with the aid of reason, "It is possible
to master the onset of this pleasure' in the hunt, whether the prey is animal or
woman. Michel de Montaigne, "Of Cruelty," The Complete Essays of Montaigne,
306-18, 313.
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in order to demonstrate that hierarchy, power, pride, and
pleasure are at the basis of numerous abuses.
Like Richardson, Samuel Johnson also angrily attacks the
Lovelace-like attitude of Soame Jenyns in his review of Jenyns's
"A Free Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Evil" by
employing animal imagery to criticize a particular theory of
hierarchy, with the effect of undermining the very concept of
rank. Johnson expresses disbelief in the concept of cosmological hierarchy, which Jenyns (borrowing from Pope) uses to
justify sufiFering in the world: Johnson argues that the concept
of inferiority is subjective, constructed in the mind of the
beholder. He attempts to consider the point of view of the
other:
Pope might ask the weed why it was less than the oak,
but the weed would never ask the question for it
self...There is no evil but must inhere in a conscious
being, or be referred to it; that is, evil must be felt before
it is evil. (524)
As to Jenyns's saying that the Great Chain of Being is based
on the utility of lower-ranking creation for higher, that the
poor exist for the benefit of the wealthy, or animals for
humans, Johnson wants to know for whose benefit people were
made, for our existence seems to serve neither angels nor
animals:

It does not appear even to the imagination that of three
orders of being, the first and third receive any advantage
from the imperfection of the second, or that indeed they
may not equally exist, though the second had never been,
or should cease to be, and why should that be concluded
necessary which cannot be proved even to be useful.
(525)
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Johnson parodies this anthropocentric view of creation by
shifting perspectives in "The Vultures' View of Man," from
Idler No. 22, in which the vulture assumes that it is the center
of creation and that man was created for his uses because man
is "the only beast who kills that which he does not devour,"
providing the vulture with bounteous feasts after his wars.'^ Is
there a better explanation for the destruction of foxes and
women by a predator such as Lovelace?
Johnson particularly takes issue with Jenyns's complacency
and hardness of heart, for Jenyns writes that evil is inherent in
the subordination that he believes characterizes creation:
these real evils proceed from the same source as those
imaginary ones of imperfection before treated of, namely,
from that subordination without which no created system
can subsist; all subordination implying imperfection, all
imperfection evil, and all evil some kind of inconveniency
or suffering: so that there must be particular inconveniencies and sufferings annexed to every particular rank of
created beings by circumstances of things, and their
modes of existence. (530)
Even Pope, from whom, Johnson tells us, Jenyns plagiarized his
ideas, advocated compassion toward those he considered lesser
beings, not contempt:
I caimot think it extravagant to imagine, that Mankind
are no less in Proportion, accountable for the ill use of
their Dominion over Creatures of the lower Rank of
Beings, than for the Exercise of Tyranny over their own
Species, especially because there is no "Recompence" in
the next world for their suffering."
" Johnson, "The Vultures' View of Man," Samuel Johnson, ed. Donald Greene
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984): 282-4.
" Alexander Pope, "Against Barbarity to Animals" in Selected Prose of Alexander
Pope, ed. Paul Hammond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 46.
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Pope goes so far as to say that we have obligations toward
"inferior" creatures:
It is certainly the part of a well-natured Man to take care
of his Horses and Dogs, not only in expectation of their
Labour while they are Foals and Whelps, but even when
their old Age has made them incapable of Serviced®
Jenyns, however, beheves that suffering carries its own
compensation:
Poverty, or the want of riches, is generally compensated
by having more hopes and fewer fears...Ignorance, or the
want of knowledge and hterature, the appointed lot of all
born to poverty and the drudgeries of life, is the only
opiate capable of infusing that sensibility which can
enable them to endure...It is a cordial administered by the
gracious hand of providence, of which they ought never
to be deprived by an ill-judged and improper education.
(527)
Johnson counters that poverty is "want of competence" and "of
necessaries," and that the poor are more likely to be "despon
dent" than hopeful, their insensibility to lesser worries
accounted for by their greater pain (527). He asks how we are
to recognize those "born to poverty," those whose lot would be
made harder by education (529). How can one determine any
individual creature's place in the scale of creation.^
Johnson advocates intellectual htunility and humane charity
instead of Jenyns's pride of place in the Great Chain of Being:
This doctrine of the regular subordination of beings, the
scale of existence, and the chain of nature I have often
' Pope, 48.
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considered, but I always left the inquiry in doubt and
uncertainty. (525)
The most important question of why God created imperfect
beings is one "we shall never be able to discern" (525):
I would advise Qenyns] a little to distrust his own
faculties...Subordination in human affairs is well under
stood, but when it is attributed to the universal system,
its meaning grows less certain, like the petty distinctions
of locality, which are of good use upon our own globe,
but have no meaning with regard to infinite space, in
which nothing is high or low. (531)
Johnson identifies in Jenyns the same unwarranted pride and
sadistic pleasure in the exercise of power which Richardson
associates with Lovelace:
I am always afraid of determining on the side of envy or
cruelty. The privileges of education may sometimes be
improperly bestowed, but I shall always fear to withold
them, lest I shotild be yielding to the suggestions of pride,
while I persuade myself that I am following the maxims
of policy; and imder the appearance of salutary restraints,
should be indulging the lust of dominion, and that
malevolence which delights in seeing othen depressed.
(529)
Although (according to the OED) "sadism" was not incorpo
rated into our vocabulary tmtil 1888, Johnson and Richardson
exhibit an tmderstanding of the concept and its relation to the
oppression of another. Johnson, Hke Richardson, exposes the
complex relationship of hierarchy, pride, and pleasure in the
exercise of power as the source of human evd.
Johnson attacks all these by employing vivisection imagery
in the way Richardson employs hvmting and trapping imag-
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ery—to give the point of view of the oppressed other and to
destroy all "ennobling" theoretical justifications of hierarchy.
Jenyns
imagines that as we have not only animals for food, but
choose some for our diversion, the same privilege may be
allowed to some beings above us, who may deceive,
torment, or destroy us for doe ends only of their own pleasure
or utility. (534-5)
Wayne Schmalz writes that the danger Johnson sees in Jenyns's
logic is that "it could be used to condone evil acts in the name
of good and provide an excuse for maintaining present
inequalities,"^' which is certainly true, but Schmalz overlooks
some of the implications. He explains that
By linking "elegance" with "swelling" Johnson creates a
complex series of interactions between Jenyns and the
poor, which gives the impression that Jenyns is in some
way responsible for reducing them to the level of
animals.^^
Johnson, however, criticizes Jenyns not for "reducing [the poor]
to the level of animals," but rather for defending the very
notion of hierarchy in creation which Schmalz takes for
granted. Johnson imagines all the abuse we inflict upon animals
turned upon ourselves in the passage Schmalz discusses:
He might have shown that these hunters, whose game is
man have many sports analogous to our own. As we
drown whelps and kittens, they amuse themselves now
and then with sinking a ship, and stand round the fields
Wayne Schmalz, "Samuel Johnson's 'Soame Jenyns Review';
Experienced," Wascana Review (1983); 40-55, 42.
Schmalz, 53.
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of Blenheim, or the walls of Prague, as we encircle a
cockpit...Some of them, perhaps, are virtuosi, and delight
in the operation of an asthma, as a human philosopher in
the effects of the air pump. To swell a man with
tympany is as good sport as to blow a frog. Many a
merry bout have these frolic beings at the vicissitudes of
an ague. (535)
The effect of this passage is to create contempt for the creature
(the himter/vivisector) who considers that he has a right to the
use of other creatures for his pleasure, as well as to engender
compassionate identification with his victim. Johnson regards
these "superior" beings who use us for their pleasure as sadistic,
and the suggestion is that we in whose image Johnson's fanciful
creatures are made are also sadistic.^^
Thus, Johnson's animal imagery expresses doubt about how
well "subordination in htiman affairs" is understood. Once
those accustomed to considering themselves higher on the chain
of being are subjected to oppression by others who consider
themselves even higher, their natural response is to question the
standards that determine rank, and even the concept of rank
" In "The State of Affairs in Lflliput," from the Gentleman's Magazine, Johnson
wrote in the Swiftian mode of virtuous outsider astounded by European barbarity:
the people of the Lilliputian Empiie in Degulia
have made conquests and settled colonies in very distant regions, the
inhabitants of which they look upon as barbarous, though in simplicity of
manners, probity, and temperance superior to themselves; and seem to
think that they have a right to treat them as passion, interest, or caprice
shall direa, without much regard to the rules of justice or humanity...If
you endeavor to examine the foundation of this authority, they neither
produce any grant from a superior of jurisdiaion, nor plead the consent
of the people whom they govern in this tyrannical manner; but either
threaten you with punishment for abridging the Emperor's sovereignty, or
tell you in positive terms that Power is right. (47)
See Samuel Johnson, "The State of Affairs in Lilliput," Samuel Johnson, ed. Donald
Greene: (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 44-50, 47.
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itself. Under what conditions would "superior" beings rank
higher than the highest of the human race? And, having met
those conditions and been acknowledged higher, what rights
would they have over us as a perquisite of their rank? It is
painful to imagine ourselves in the situation of being obliged to
rely on the noblesse oblige of Johnson's visionary creatures; it is,
however, somewhat less taxing to rationalize our own exertion
of power, both benevolent and cruel, over members of our own
and other species labelled "inferior" by those who have
constructed and who perpetuate hierarchical notions of
creation. Johnson's superior beings are "wiser and more
powerful than we" (535) but it is evident in his discussion of the
uses to which they put their superior endowments that greater
intelligence and power do not imply an inherent right of
dominion. In this work, as in Clarissa, "superiority" is often an
excuse for the infliction of pain, softened by euphemisms such
as "duty" and "natural authority," euphemisms constantly
recurring in discussions of hierarchical relationships, whether in
the family or the state, or between genders or species. Johnson
asserts that "humble acquiescence and fervent adoration" (534)
are the right uses of reason, but preoccupation with how high
we rank in an anthropocentric world is not conducive to
humility.
Richardson, Johnson, and other eighteenth-century writers
(notably Swift^'' and Voltaire^^) began the work of tearing down
In Gulliver's Travels, Swift's protagonist sees projectors blowing up dogs with
bellows (as did the "virtuosi" of Johnson, mentioned above) (155); remarks on the
English mistreatment of horses in Houyhnhnmland (208); and voices fear of the
Brobdingnagians treating him as animals are treated in England—"I apprehended
every moment that he would dash me against the Ground, as we usually do any
little hatefid Animal which we have a mind to destroy (67). Gulliver's experience
of seeing from different perspeaives leads him to wonder, "And who knows but
that even this prodigious Race of Mortals might be equally overmatched in some
distant Part of the World, whereof we have yet no discovery?" (67). The
Brobdingnagian king, having heard catalog of human evils great and small,
recognizes the disparity between our worth and our pride; "I cannot but conclude
the Bulk of your Natives, to be the most pernicious Race of little odious Vermin
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the Great Chain of Being, opening the way for compassion as
the basis for relationships, rather than hierarchy, inviting us to
admit that we find pleasure in oppressing others in order that
we might rehabilitate our warped sensibilities. Boswell,
accentuating Johnson's gentle kindliness, describes his love of
children, servants, and animals (all traditionally considered
beings inferior to the adult, white, middle-class European male)
in three paragraphs, among which can be found the anecdote
about Johnson's care personally to procure oysters for his cat,
that Nature ever sufiE^eied to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth" (108). See
Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels in The Writings of Jonathan Swift, ed. Robert A.
Gieenberg and William B. Piper (New York; Norton, 1973): 1-260.
In his Philosophical Dictionary Voltaire writes under "Animals" that philosophers
are presumptuous who assert the inferiority of the souls of animals, for xhey have
no evidence for such conclusions. See Voltaire, "Animals," in Philosophical
Dictionary, trans. A. I. Woolf (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, n.d.), 22-3. He takes
issue with the assertion that because animals have not speech th^ also have not
feeling:
Is it because I speak to you that }rou judge that I have feeling, memory,
ideas? Well, I do not speak to you; you see me going home looking
disconsolate, seeking a paper anxiously, opening the desk where I
remember having shut it, finding it, reading it joyfully. You judge that I
have experienced the feeling of distress and that of pleasure, that I have
memory and understanding.
Bring the same ju<^ment to bear on this dog which has lost its master,
which has sought him on every road with sorrowful cries, which enters the
house agitated, uneasy, which goes down the stairs, up the stairs, from
room to room, which at last finds in his study the master it loves, and
which shows him its joy by its cries of delight, by its leaps, by its caresses.
In the philosophical tale "Micromegas," Voltaire's two morally, intelleaually,
and physically gigantic interplanetary travellers light upon Earth, discover that
people are overly proud, and are informed by the Earthlings "that their persons
[the travellers'], their worlds, their suns, their stars, everything was made solely for
man" (168). After laughing a while, "The Sirian picked up the little mites again;
he still spoke to them with much kindness, although at the bottom of his heart he
was a little bit angry to see that infinitely small creatures should have a pride
almost infinitely great" (168). See Voltaire, "Micromegas," in Candide and Selected
Stories, trans. Donald M. Frame (New York: International Collectors Library,
1969), 152-68.
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Hodge, lest the servants feel put upon and treat Hodge badly7^
Johnson's concern for Hodge demonstrates his understanding
of the human pleasure in the exercise of power over subordi
nates. But it also exemplifies the wondrous possibilities of a
value system based upon humility rather than pride. Of course,
neither Johnson nor Richardson was a radical leveller,
democrat, nor animal rights activist; yet the animal metaphors
abounding in theirs and in much eighteenth-century writing
about hmnan relationships reveals a pervasive and discomfiting
tmcertainty about what it means to be human, about relation
ships between people, and about relationships between species.
The logic of their metaphors leads to the conclusion that there
are much more humane perspectives than philosophies based
upon hierarchy.
James Boswell, Life of Johnson, ed. R. W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1970), 1216-17.

MATCHING THE
"MATCHLESS ORINDA"
TO HER TIMES
Kathleen M. Swaim

iinong the most prominent names that literary archaeology into England's earliest women writers has brought
forward is that of Katherine Philips (1631/2-64), whose
engaging sobriquet, "The Matchless Orinda," offers a quick
glance into the drawing-rooms of a lost cultural moment. Her
contemporaries took Philips very seriously indeed as a poet, a
moral model, a pioneer, an inspiration and a nonpareil, the
English Sappho, the Muse's darling and equal. Besides adding
the claim "matchless" to the "Orinda" she chose for herself,
John Oldham (1653-83), for example, includes Philips as one of
five poetic worthies along with Chaucer, Milton, Cowley, and
Denham.^ Despite the range of honorifics from contemporary
male and female commentary alike, traditional literary history
has victimized Philips within what modern feminism identifies
as "the politics of benign neglect."^
' Earl Miner, The Restoration Mode from Milton to Dryden (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1974), 424.
^ Nancy K. Miller, Subject to Change: Reading Feminist Writing (New York:
Coltxmbia University Press, 1988), 28. In Earl Miner's exhaustive three-volume

77

78

1650-m0

This study seeks to repair some of the neglect of Philips's
poetry through a pluralistic or multivalenced inquiry, one of
the recognized kinds of feminist criticism. By comparing
several of her lyrics with precise analogues from John Milton
and John Donne—cherished favorites of the seventeenth-century
literary canon—this study supplies some fresh means for
historically and aesthetically contextualizing her work. It puts
forward some epistemic and cultural grids of the transitional
historical moment she self-consciously inhabited. The poetic
territory to which Philips chiefly laid claim, woman's friend
ship, would seem to endorse a non- or even anti-political stance,
but, as we shall see, her subject matter and the poetic discourses
in which it is couched are themselves cultural and political
signifiers.
My contrastive methodology highlights more chronological
than gendered difference to discover surprisingly political
dimensions to Philips's performance. Section I below contrasts
two Philips's lyrics with two nearly contemporaneous sonnets
on the same subjects by John Milton to argue that, poetically,
Philips's work focuses the contestation of the sixteenthcentury's characteristic resemblance and representationalism
against the eighteenth-century's empowering of discourses along
the lines that Michel Foucault traces in The Order of Things.
Whatever its ultimate limitations, Foucaultian typology can
productively ground the rediscovery of an author like Philips.
Section U takes up the intertextualities of Philips's appropria
tion of John Donne's famous compass conceit from "A
analyses of seventeentt-century poetry—to cite just one example—only some
fourteen out of a total of 1200 pages so much as mention the names of women
poets of the century, and only one poem on one page {Ihe Cavalier Mode from
Jonson to Cotton [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971], 301) by one poet,
Katherine Philips, is presented for anything like its own case, and that with
carefully couched condescension {Cavalier 112, 300, 302, 304). Anne KiUigrew's
name, it is true, appears on five pages, but only because Dryden (clearly Miner's
favorite author) happened to write a famous ode to her. Miner dismisses
KiUigrew's own poetry dartmingly with the label "at best a second Katherine
Philips" {Restoration 520).
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Valediction Forbidding Mourning" in order to "explore the
multiple paths that lead to the unmasking of cultural artifacts
as socially symbolic acts," the task that Fredric Jameson assigns
to the political unconscious within his 1981 study of that title.
Together these sections attend to the widening frameworks of
a text's social grounding that Jameson distinguishes as the text,
the social order, and the ideology of form. They annotate
Philips's literary texts within a narrowly defined political
history of punctual events and chronically sequenced happen
ings, but also place them within less diachronic and time-bound
social history more largely, taking into account the constitutive
tension between social classes as well as the larger patterns of
history as a succession of modes of production and social
formations.^

Two of Philips's non-friendship poems precisely parallel two
poems by John Milton to differentiate the historical positioning
of these authors, their literary generations and cultural contexts.
The analogues enact the social and biographical within the
formal and aesthetic. The first poem celebrates a particular
moment of Philips's biography, her twenty-sixth birthday in
1657/8, and as such it invites comparison with Milton's sonnet
acknowledging the passing of his twenty-third year (1632).'*
Philips manifests what Earl Miner describes as the Cowley
' Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 20, 76, 98, 75.
Philips was born the year Milton's sonnet was written, 1632, and she had been
dead three years when he pubhshed Paradise Lost (1667). Although Phihps was
born and died in London, where their paths might have crossed, she spent more
than twenty of her thirty-three years in Wales and another in Ireland, where they
could not. In the great chasm that divided the English population, Phihps's
sympathies were Royalist while Milton's were Republican in the extreme. If
Philips accompanied her husband to Westminster when he sat with Parliament, she
might have met Milton, but in any imaginable circumstances the two would have
constituted a most unlikely conversational pairing.
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effect, that is the distancing of the poet from his/her subject
matter and situation, attended by a heightened consciousness of
the reader/ Her second-generation practice assumes a public
and political mantle, as Milton's assumes an aesthetic or laureate
mode. Keenly aware of inhabiting a world spinning and
turning upside down, Philips, like so many other poets of the
later seventeenth century, locates herself in the present moment
and in immediate historical realities at the expense of transcen
dence and prophecy.
Milton's birthday sonnet, the seventh out of a lifetime total
of twenty-three, confirms his commitment to poetry and piety
and anticipates a life of lofty achievement. In form as in
content, it aspires to the laureate mode, specifically to that
fashioning of an official, ethically exemplary poetic self that
Richard Helgerson attaches to seventeenth-century "selfcrowned laureates"/
How soon hath Time, the subtle thief of youth,
Stol'n on his wing my three and twentieth year!
My hasting days fly on with full career.
But my late spring no bud or blossom show'th.
Perhaps my semblance might deceive the truth.
That I to manhood am arriv'd so near.
And inward ripeness doth much less appear.
That some more timely-happy spirits endu'th.
Yet be it less or more, or soon or slow.
It shall be still in strictest measure ev'n
To that same lot, however mean or high.
Toward which Time leads me,and the will of Heav'n;
All is, if I have grace to use it so.
As ever in my great task-Master's eye.^
' Miner, The Metaphysical Mode from Donne to Cowley (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969), 195; Restoration 4, 7.
' Helgerson, Self-Crowned Laureates: Spenser, Jonson, Milton, and the Literary System
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), passim.
^ John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes (New York:
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This sonnet assumes Virgilian, Ciceronian, and Christian
endorsements of its rhetoric, ethical argument, and poetic
aspiration, of its affirmation of divine will and heroic human
patience. When it was first published in the collection of
Milton's youthful English and Latin verse in 1645, it looked
forward specifically to the imminent "brave new world" of
Puritan, Republican political hopes in which Milton actively
invested, but it enfolds any political assumptions within the
laureate tradition's public/private univocality and within
Milton's sense of the poet as vates (prophet) or spokesman for
his culture and his God and of making the whole design of his
life "a true poem" (Poems 694).
In the absence of any overt statements in her poetry or
prose, we cannot know if Katherine Philips ever read this or
indeed any of Milton's poems, but a similar poem, "On the I.
of January, 1657," likewise commemorates her twenty-sixth
birthday in twelve lines of pentameter couplets. This brief,
virtually unknown poem looks back upon the history that
Milton's poem anticipated:
Th' Eternal Centre of my life and me.
Who when I was not, gave me room to be.
Hath since (my time preserving in his hands)
By moments numbred out the precious sandfs].
Till it is swell'd to six and twenty years,
Checquer'd by Providence with smiles and tears.
I have observ'd how vain all glories are.
The change of Empire, and the chance of War:
Seen Faction with its native venom burst.
And Treason struck, by what it self had nurs'd:
Seen useless Crimes, whose Owners but made way
For future Candidates to wear the Bay.^
Odyssey Press, 1957), 76-7. Hereafter cited as Poems within the text.
' The Collected Works of Katherine Philips, The Matchless Orinda, ed. Patrick Thomas
(Stump Cross, Essex; Stump Cross Books, 1990-93), 1.213, #94. Hereafter cited
as Works within the text. Phihps's original title reads Poems By the most deservedly
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Like Milton's, Philips's poem views her life sub specie aetemitatis, though it otherwise speaks motives and aspirations that
differ markedly from Milton's presentation of a self heroicized
within classical and biblical discourses. Its first half acknowl
edges the point in life she is just achieving with a grateful eye
to divine cause and preservation. Its second half retrospects not
theology but chronology. It reviews the historical categories
that have defined life in England during Philips's adult years;
Empire, War, Faction, Treason, and "useless crimes" more
generally. "The change of Empire, and the chance of War" (my
italics) gives a deft, linguistically balanced formulation to the
Civil War, the beheading of a monarch, the Interregnum, the
Stuart return—the extraordinary sequence of events that serves
as background to her time and awareness. Her more political
vision anticipates an era of poetry not for herself alone but for
her society generally to displace the chaotic political negotia
tions she sees as slouching toward oblivion.
We cannot know if Philips was deliberately giving Milton's
earlier construct a twist that could contain her differently based
sense of life and literary performance, but the poetics and the
self of her lyric reflect a distinctly later age. In form as in
content, both make theological gestures, but where Milton is
personal. Philips is political. Where Milton enfolds his sense of
his own destiny in inherited imageries (theft, springtime) and in
biblical parable (Matthew 25: 14-30), Philips looks to the later
expressional norms of heroic couplet and abstract diction that
were to dominate the literary reigns of Dryden and Pope. Like
Milton's, Philips's poem concludes on a quietist note.
Philips is political not just by belonging to and being marked
by a particular time, place, and self-consciousness, but also by
engaging that world and rewriting the experience that power
Admired, Mrs. Katherine Philips, The matchless Orinda. To which is added Monsieur
Comeille's Pompey and Horace, Tragedies. With several other Translations out of
French (London, 1667). Hereafter cited as Poems. The heretofore most convenient
venion of her work is in volume I of Minor Poets of the Caroline Period, ed.
George Saintsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905).
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and history have written upon her, by interwriting personal,
social, and natural experience/ In a quite deliberate choice,
political positioning is a matter of status, ambition, and
authority for her. It is worth remembering that Philips begins
her published volume of Poems with titles and subjects that
insist upon her political self-presentation and right to comment,
such titles as "Upon the double murther of K.Charles, in
answer to a libellous rime made by V.favasor] P.fowell]",* "On
the numerous accesse of the English to waite upon the King in
Holland"; "Arion on a Dolphin to his Majestie in his passadge
into England"; "On the faire weather at the Coronacon"; "To
the Queene on her arrivall at Portsmouth. May. 1662"; et
cetera}'^ Where Milton builds his poem and constructs his poetic
self by enfolding his education, literary inheritance, and biblical
grounding securely within a poetics of the heroicized personal.
Philips gives politics full priority, even over the writing self.
She aligns her life with history, not, as Milton does, with
transcendence.
Besides these similar threshold affirmations of poetic
commitments and destinies. Philips and Milton also shared a
common friend and collaborator in Henry Lawes (1596-1662),
perhaps the most notable of English lyric musicians in this most
musical of ages." Both Milton and Philips enjoyed personal as
well as professional relationships with Lawes, Milton in spite of
Lawes's pronounced Royalist allegiance. Throughout his long
' Lauio Martines, Society and History in English Renaissance Verse (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1985), 1-4.
Philips, Works 1.69-75. See also Dorothy Merwin,'''Women Becomiog Poets:
Katherine Phihps, Aphra Behn, Anne Finch," English Literary History 57 (1990):
341.
" Lawes well earned the subtide of Willa M. Evans's biography, Henry Lawes:
Musician and Friend of Poets (New York: Modern Language Association of
America, 1941), by providing settings for some 80 of the century's poets, some
prominent, some obscure (239-40), and it is easy to see why poets praise his shift
away from the polyphonic madrigal that foregrounded musical complexity and
toward the new fashion of declamatory or recitative song that highhghted their
own art.

84

1650-1850

career, Lawes set to music poems by both Milton and Philips,
and both sang his praises in poems, Milton in Sonnet 13, "To
my freind Mr. Hen. Laws Feb. 9. 1645" [= 1646 n.s.]'^, and
Philips in 40 lines of heroic couplets entitled "To the truly
noble Mr Henry Lawes" (#15). These comparable poems
extend the historical, epistemological, and literary differences
glimpsed above.
Milton's tribute was first printed in Henry and William
Lawes's Choice Psalmes put into Musick (1648) dedicated to the
then imprisoned Charles 1.
Harry, whose tuneful and well measur'd Song
First taught our English Music how to span
Words with just note and accent, not to scan
With Midas' Ears, committing short and long.
Thy worth and skill exempts thee from the throng.
With praise enough for Envy to look wan;
To after age thou shalt be writ the man
That with smooth air couldst humor best our tongue.
Thou honor'st Verse, and Verse must lend her wing
To honor thee, the Priest of Phoebus' Choir
That tun'st their happiest lines in Hymn, or Story.
Dante shall give Fame leave to set thee higher
Than his Casella, whom he woo'd to sing.
Met in the milder shades of Purgatory. {Poems 144)
This sonnet, like the birthday one, is finely executed in the Miltonic appropriation of the Spenserian model, with a strong
break between octave and sestet, insistent enjambment, tough
content, and a surprisingly muted ending. Its diction and logic
defy the simplistic sweetness of the genre as passed down from
the Elizabethans, and its strong literary reference, here detailing
^ John Milton; Poems: Reproduced in Facsimile from the Manuscript in Trinity
College, Cambridge: With a Transcript (Menston: Scolar Press, 1970), and similarly.
Poems 1645: Lycidas 1638 (Menston: Scolar Press, 1970).
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both classical myth and Italian epic, exploits the reader's literary
study, memory, and ingenuity. Milton's Lawes sonnet again
claims laureate and vatic "authority." Its personal/public
univocality follows the practice of so many of Milton's sonnets
in elevating an historic personnage as heroic exemplar of the
loftiest principles of character, piety, or in this case art.
Katherine Philips's collaboration and association with Lawes
date from at least the 1650s. He was the music teacher to
several of her lifelong friends and set to music at least three of
her other poems:" "Set by Mr. H. Lawes / A Dialogue
between Lucasia and Orinda"
1.94-5); "On the death of
my first and dearest childe. Hector Philipps, borne the 23'' of
Aprill, and dy'd the 2^ of May 1655. set by Mr Lawes" (220),
and "Friendship's Mysterys, to my dearest Lucasia. (set by Mr.
H. Lawes.)" (90-1). The last of these was published in Lawes's
Second Book of Ayres and Dialogues (1655), a volume Philips's
biographer describes as a virtual commentary on Philips's
pseudonymous "society.""
Despite their differing sizes and formats, Philips's poem joins
Milton's not just in claiming Lawes as "friend," but in making
him representational of the largest ideas. Neither author
exploits the pun in their subject's name, but both celebrate
measure, order, and govern in what are perhaps allied gestures.
Calling Lawes "Great soule of nature," Philips like Milton
embeds her subject within the cosmos and the layered
harmonies that impel it:
Nature, which is the vast creation's soule.
That steady curious agent in the whole.
The art of heav'n, the order of this frame.
Is onely number in another name:
" Evans, Henry Lawes, 202, 205-6.
" Philip W. Souers, The Matchless Orinda (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1931), 60; similarly Evans 202. "A Dialogue betwixt Lucasia & Rosania, Imitating
that of Gentle Thirsis" {Works 197-8) seems also to glance at Lawes under the
name of the role he played in Milton's A Mask of 1634 (Souers 57).
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For as some King, conqu'ring what was his own,
Hath choice of severall titles to his crown;
So harmony, on this score now, that then.
Yet still is all that takes and governs men. {Works \.%7)

Like Milton, Philips views Lawes in relation to preceding and
subsequent ages, though for her those ages are not marked as
literary.
As with Philips's birthday poem, this one too relies heavily
upon the abstract conceptual diction that was so much to
dominate the Age of Reason, but her procedure realizes a
metaphor even within such constraints. Thus after establishing
the cosmic governance of harmony and number, she hinges a
series of principles of character and person upon a musical
diction:
Beauty is but Composure, and we find
Content is but the Concord of the mind.
Friendship the Unison of well-tun'd hearts.
Honour's the Chorus of the noblest parts.
And all the world on which we can reflect,
Musique to th'Eare, or to the Intellect.
My italics show how, in fact, each poetic line turns upon the
same verbal hinge, the final two lines here balancing more
largely upon the summational word that comes just at their
juncture.
Such dictional exploitation functions much as imagery
functions in the earlier poetics. What is now imaged is not
some item of experiential reality but a category of discourse.
That radical alteration in the base of the poetic—here for Philips
as elsewhere for her contemporaries and heirs gener
ally—embodies in a telling miniature the epistemological
transformation that Foucault illuminates in The Order of Things
between the resemblance that dominated the sixteenth century
and the classification that came to prevail in the eighteenth.
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Gone is the profound kinship between language and the world
and the shared epistemology of conjuncture, and in its place
appear new systems of artificial, arbitrary, man-made signs
translating apprehended realities into manipulated discourses."
Several of Philips's tributes to Lawes reconstitute the earlier
representationalism, most notably in taking up themes that
other works of Milton attach either to Lawes himself or to the
Platonic Idea or best earthly practice of music.
If then each man a little world must be.
How many worlds are coppy'd out in Thee?
Who art so richly formed, so compleat,
T'epitomize all that is good and great;
Whose stars this brave advantage did impart.
Thy nature's more harmonious then thy art.
These lines (15-20) cast as a rhetorical question the multilayered
roles within which Milton coded Lawes's presentation of
himself in A Mask, as simultaneously composer, music teacher,
Orphean pastoral poet-singer, Thyrsis, Attendant Spirit, and
generally—musician layering into Music itself—as mediator
between the careful deity and needy, worthy humans. Since
Philips's tribute is couched in the resolutely assertive sonorities
of heroic couplets rather than the allegorical prophetic poetics
of Milton's masque, such layerings are much curtailed in her
verse. Indeed where Milton seeks to raise his materials and his
audience's vision to the resonating heavens, Philips's concern is
to bring down and contain vision and subject within the
confidences of a familiar world shorn of numinousness.
In allied Milton works, ad Patrem offers a grateful tribute to
his musical father and At a Solemn Music compounds voice and
verse, that is singer and song, within a supralunary vision of the
Music of the Spheres and the inability of fallen humans to hear
" Michel Foucault, Tlje Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences
(New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 42-3.
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it. Both these early Milton works may be invoked to footnote
Philips's next lines:
Thou dost above the Poets praises live,
Who fetch from thee th'Eternity they give;
And as true reason triumphs over sence,
Yet is subjected to intelligence:
So Poets on the lower world look down,
But Lawes on them; his height is all his own.
For, like divinity it self, his Lyre
Rewards the wit it did at first inspire:
And thus by double right Poets allow
His and their Laurells should adorn his brow.
The conclusion here is very like Milton's neat turn in Sonnet
13: "Thou honorest Verse, and Verse must...honor thee." Both
authors box themselves into and out of self-referentiality. Both
project tributary works, not themselves, as the agency of praise,
but where Milton displaces the gesture from himself to Dante
and Dante to Casella (Purgatorio 2.76-117), Philips projects
hierarchies of mental faculties and the arts—Foucaultian
discourses—situating herself on high though below the subject
of her praise. Where Milton's gaze is prophetically upward.
Philips shares with Lawes a downward glance at lesser mortals.
Although we might expect Milton to offer the public poem
and Philips the personal one, the opposite proves to be the case
in this pairing as in the former one. Her concluding ten lines
give Philips's poem not just a public but a political turn,
compounding the sort of expectations that the birthday poem
conditioned us to expect with the cosmic compass of the
present design:
Live then (Great soule of nature!) to asswage
The savage dullness of this sullen age;
Charm us to sence, for though experience faile.
And reason too, thy numbers will prevaile.
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Then (like those Ancients) strike, and so command
All nature to obey thy generous hand:
None can resist, but such who needs will be
More stupid then a Stone, a Fish, a Tree.
Be it thy care our Age to new-create:
What built a world may sure repayre a state.
As before, where Milton insists upon his own inheritance of
divine and human literary lines and inspiration—Phoebus and
Dante—Philips is deeply conscious of inhabiting and retreating
to a particular historical and political place. It is usual to
assume female poets' remoteness from politics and power,but
this, like the earlier Milton example, demonstrates not just an
interest in such matters, but a vision that includes their relation
to the writing self and private interests as well.
Philips's concluding lines contain two surprising literary
gestures, and both encapsulate the adjustments in governing
poetic between, on the one hand, Milton—the first half of the
seventeenth century, and Renaissance poetry generally—and, on
the other, the Restoration, Enlightenment epistemology, and its
modern linguistic and desacramentalized legacy.'^ The first of
these represents an Orphean career and destiny. That ultimate
poet, when fully empowered by the ancients and the Renais
sance, overwhelms all resistance to his combination of poetry
and music, wresting responsive order from animals, plants, and
stones, even indeed from the god of the underworld himself.
As Milton presents such power in It Penseroso, in order to free
his bride Eurydice, Orpheus so enchanted that deity that he
"made Hell grant what Love did seek" {Poems, 108). In
Philips's contrast of modernity's savage, sullen dullness with
Orpheus' sensual and harmonious charms, we recall too
Milton's epithet for Orpheus as the Muse's "enchanting son, /
" For example, Merwin, "Women Becoming Poets," 336, 342.
Malcolm Mackenzie Ross, Poetry and Dogma: The Transfiguration cf Eucharistic
Symbols in Seventeenth Century English Poetry (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1954), 18-19, 87, 181-2.
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Whom Universal nature did lament" {Lycidas, 59-60). Even in
its generalized phrasing, Philips's gesture toward such inherited
narrative under the category of "those ancients" manifests her
age's deliberate displacement of the myths its predecessors
reveled in to a fault. She enacts Abraham Cowley's 1656
dismissal of some of his contemporaries' classical borrowings as
"the Cold-meats of the Antients, new-heated, and sew set
forth.""
Philips's final ten lines begin by distinguishing between
historical eras, its own recognized as "sullen," but available for
"new creation" under the harmonious leadership represented by
Lawes. The second literary surprise and reward of this
conclusion reinvokes the Harmony that at the poem's outset
had built the world and nature and served as its soul and agent.
Here Harmony's creativity is reaffirmed, but also reassigned
within the foregrounded present to the lesser task of "repayrfing] a state," a phrase deftly balanced against "builfding] a
World."
That culminating, if anticlimactic, distinction between
divinely ordained cosmos and humanly constructed political
oi^anization embodies in miniature the radical shift in ap
prehended power from the Reformation orthodoxy with which
the seventeenth century began to the crudely natural, fragile
stasis a Hobbesian, indeed a modern, world has to settle for.
The earlier model—epitomized, for example, in Philip Sidney's
rehearsal of Menenius Agrippa's speech on the "body politic"
in Defense ofPoesie or in Shakespeare's Coriolanus 1.1—projects
a macro/microcosmic, organic, natural, mutually dependent,
analogical society, universe, and epistemology underwritten by
the further analogue of the Church as the visible body of
Christ. The later model—epitomized in the refigured "body
politic" of the famous frontispiece of Hobbes's Leviathan
(1651)—occurs not as an organic "true" analogy but a static
" Abraham Cowley, "Preface to Poems," in Critical Essays of the Seventeenth
Century, ed. J. E. Spingarn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968), 2.89.
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"occasional" metaphor. It presents a human construct, a
controlled and controlling device through which political power
manipulates its disciplined population into an instrument to
achieve ideological purposes quite distinct from the instrument
itself.^'
Milton is often viewed as the late flowering of Renaissance
literary performance because his practice so essentially assumes
resemblance as the foundational principle and form of experi
ence and knowing. But Philips inhabits the Cartesian alternative
in which orders of thought, not orders of analogy, dominate.
The later mode privileges analysis, scientific, orders, and proof.
It values discriminations of difference not identity; as a
corollary, it values too the occasional finite likenesses it can
discover, measure, and enumerate. Philips's development of
Donne's compass conceit—discussed in Section 11 below—even
more fully extends the Foucaultian typology to a point where
signs displace resemblance and self-conscious awareness replaces
the earlier divinely inspired language of things. Rather than the
discovery of the anterior resonating truths of the older system,
the new signs perform an arbitrary, fabricated, and now only
certain or probable signifying function. They leave behind a
cause/effect relation in favor of a sign/thing-signified one, and
a random and circular divination in favor of progressive
analyses and fabricated signs within systematized knowledge.
What has been lost is both a guaranteed relationship between
signs and their contents and the mediating bond of resemblance.
In the new mode, a sign not only becomes "the representativity
of the representation in so far as it is representable," but it also
inhabits "the interstices of ideas...in a perpetual state of
decomposition and recomposition" (Foucault, Order 52, 59,
60-61, 63, 65, 67).
At the deepest level, the emerging epistemology thus reenacts
the extraordinarily fluid contemporary politics. When the
" Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical
Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 171-83.
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truthful figuration of the world moves out of language and into
perception, language necessarily enters a period of transparency
and neutrality.^® Epistemologically and poetically—as politically
and culturally—these signatures of seventeenth-century change
mark Katherine Philips's literary practice, and this linguistic
development—as we shall see in the next section—shows her
world writing itself through Philips's poetry in a series of
conventions of genre and mode that transcode social needs and
social realities ranging well beyond the confining private
interests that normatively bound occasional verses.

Fredric Jameson launches The Political Unconscious (1981) with
the imperative "Always historicize!" an operation that
distinguishes between the object and the subject, between the
"objective" structures of a cultural text and the historical
emergence of the audience's interpretive categories or codes (9).
When Katherine Philips's "Friendship in Emblem, or the Seale,
to my dearest Lucasia" (#29) borrows the famous metaphysical
conceit of "stiff twin compasses" from John Donne's "A
Valediction Forbidding Mourning," the cross-generational
intertextualities again produce new insight into Philips's less
familiar texts and contexts, but to discover them we must allow
the interpretive act to resurrect some sedimentary master codes.
The categories of analysis for these contrasting texts largely
leave behind the earlier politics of individual biography in favor
of the politics of social class and ideological program. They
discover Katherine Philips in the peculiar political position of
writing to legitimize a ruling class under temporary contesta
tion.
Philips's subject matters include political affirmations,
topographical descriptions, elegies, social and familial tributes,
and translations of both lyrics and plays from the French—all
Foucault, Order, 55.
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established genres of the time—but something more than half of
her 116 poems—and the work for which she is best known by
far—treat female friendship—that is the "sentimental friendship"
that Janet Todd defines as "close, effusive tie[s], revelling in
rapture and rhetoric."^' Since we are relatively unfamiliar with
the literary systems—and, of course, the gender systems—that
underwrite her subject matter, these poems tend to sound very
much alike to our ears. We forget that on first glance virtually
all Petrarchan sonnets, invoking the same metaphors and
themes, will sound very much alike too, for the authors'
deepest intentions honor the conventions they embrace.
Practitioners of specialized literary modes measure their
originality by increments that the uninitiated may find minute.
A recent commentator generalizes that Philips's celebrations
of love lack "the dramatic tension between flesh and spirit that
imparts nervous urgency to Donne's amatory verse,but a
close look at the intertextualities of these two poen:is,jJiscovers
a female poet not tamely reinscribing a male text, but
embracing a female poetic that reaches beyond male discourse
to an alternative French female literary tradition. Although her
contemporaries understood this as shaping her practice—and
despite the manifest political linkage—canonical literary inquiry
has nearly always ignored the continental context that could
make sense of the priorities of Philips's verse, just as vested
academic specialties have drawn rigid barriers between
Renaissance and eighteenth-century literatures, in effect
assigning a great many English works between 1660 and 1700
to limbo.
Todd, Women's Friendship in Literature (New York; Columbia University Press,
1980), 3 . See Harriette Andreadis, "The Sapphic-Platonics of Katherine Phihps,
1632-1664," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society: 15 (1989): 34-60.
" Merwin, "Women Becoming Poets," 343. Philips borrows from Donne on other
"friendship" occasions as well. See, for example, "Friendship's Mysterys, to my
dearest Lucasia" (#17); "To the excellent M"' A[nne]. 0[wen]" (#25); "To My
excellent Lucasia, on our friendship" (#36); "To my dearest Antenor on his
parting" (#54); and "Friendship" (#57).
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The final stanzas of Donne's "Valediction Forbidding
Mourning" draw out a justly famous metaphysical conceit
likening a pair of lovers to the two feet of a compass, one
centered and fixed soul, sometimes leaning after its oblique
extension, sometimes drawing it erect. Their love with its
compelling "inclination" and firmness achieves the perfection of
circularity, ending with its own beginning. The compass image
occurs as the final three of a total of nine quatrains.
If they [our souls] be two, they are two so
As stiffe twin compasses are two.
Thy soule the fixt foot, makes no show
To move, but doth, if the'other doe.
And though it in the center sit.
Yet when the other far doth rome.
It leanes, and hearkens after it.
And growes erect, as that comes home.
Such wilt thou be to mee, who must
Like th'other foot, obliquely runne.
Thy firmnes makes my circle just.
And makes me end, where I begunne.^^
Ever since Izaak Walton's Life of Donne, this image has been
singled out for particular notice, and it is often said to
encapsulate the unique compounding of imagery and themes
that characterize not only Donne's poetry but seventeenthcentury metaphysical poetry generally.^'* Although ostensibly
addressed to the poet's beloved, in fact this work, like
Petrarchan "love" poetry generally, targets a male audience
^ The Complete Poetry of John Donne, ed. John T. Shawcross (Garden City:
Anchor Books, 1967), 88.
Walton, The Lives of John Donne, Sir Henry Wotton, Richard Hooker, George
Herbert, and Robert Sanderson, intro. George Saintsbury (London: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1966), 42.
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similar to the author in education, wit, and gender condition
ing. Such poetry makes "love" the vehicle for meditations upon
self, art, and the largest of human and divine truths.
There seems little doubt that Philips was deliberately
borrowing the image from an acclaimed master. Her reinscription implies an analogous female poetic and a woman's
community to create and receive such works. Tellingly, her
poem does directly address its declared interlocutor. In its
largest reaches. Philips's borrowing from Donne enfolds a
gendered poetic politics within the historical and epistemological changes already noted. Philips takes up the image in stanzas
6-14 of a sixteen-quatrain, tetrameter lyric:

The compasses that stand above
Express this great immortall love;
For friends, like them, can prove this true.
They are, and yet they are not, two.

And in their posture is express'd
Friendship's exalted interest:
Each follows where the other Leanes,
And what each does, this other meanes.
8
And as when one foot does stand fast.
And t'other circles seeks to cast.
The steddy part does regulate
And make the wandrer's motion streight:
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So friends are onely Two in this,
T'reclaime each other when they misse:
For whoso're will grossely fall,
Can never be a friend at all.
10
And as that usefull Instrument
For even lines was ever meant;
So friendship from good-angells springs.
To teach the world heroique things.
11
As these are found out in design
To rule and measure every line;
So friendship governs actions best.
Prescribing Law to all the rest.
12
And as in nature nothing's set
So Just as lines and number mett;
So compasses for these being made.
Does friendship's harmony pei^wade.
13
And like to them, so friends may own
Extension, not division:
Their points, like bodys, separate;
But head, like soules, knows no such fate.
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14
And as each part so well is knitt,
That their embraces ever fitt:
So friends are such by destiny,
And no Third can the place supply.
15
There needs no motto to the Seale:
But that we may the mine [mind.'] reveale
To the dull ey, it was thought fit
That Friendship onely should be writt.
16
But as there is degrees of bliss,
So there's no friendship meant by this.
But such as will transmit to fame
Lucasia and Orinda's name. (1.107-8)
In borrowing the figure of the compass, Philips recognizes a
male society, its central figure Donne, the Platonizing of sexual
love he/they so often articulated, and their characteristic
superimposition of a metaphysical dimension upon a fully
envisioned physical object and the processes appropriate to that
object. But where Donne is engaged in an act of discovery, or
what every schoolboy of his age would call an act of Invention,
Philips performs an act of appropriation and interpretive
reading. Where Donne fuses disparates together with striking
originality, Philips breaks down, or de-fuses, the constituent
parts of a borrowed conceit. Working within quite different
literary conventions and epistemological assumptions. Philips
at once reconstitutes a metaphysical conceit and de-intensifies its
metaphysics into safe, stable assertion. Her form like her
content glances as well at the emblem genre.
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Philips invokes Donne's precedent as the initiating or ritual
embodiment of her poetic "society." Her sixth stanza likens
friends to a compass in being both one and two. Her seventh
highlights the compass's "posture," where "leaning" coincides
with grasping each other's "meaning" with which it rimes, a
compound of "inclination" and perfect understanding. The
eighth stanza recasts Donne's chief conceit of one male circling
foot and the other fixed female one. Politically, where Donne
posits female sympathetic immobility and male freedom. Philips
makes the participants intenJependent mirroring peers with
equal freedom and equal control.^^ Stanza 9 combines the
numerical from stanza 6 with the stabilizing from stanza 8 to
separate friends only in the ability of one to "reclaim" the other
from an error. Donne's metaphysics, thus, transmutes to
Philips's ethics.
It transmutes too to physics, and the technological de
velopments of stanza 10 reflect late century prospects. Philips
considers the scientific and mathematical processes of her
"usefull Instrument" within a contemporaneous Royal Society
discourse emphasizing even lines, design, rule, and measure. She
translates number or quantity into equivalence or qualitative
extension when the points of the compass, though separate, in
fact signify not division but harmony, order, and completeness.
Besides articulating the radical epistemological change detailed
above, such technological specificity enacts a secular and femaleempowering by-product of Puritan meditative traditions that
disciplined the mind to careful interpretive scrutiny of the
"creatures" and the "occasions" of daily life.^^
Philips's final stanzas develop the abstract dimensions of her
subject. They politicize friendship into the central governor of
" Elaine Hobby, Virtue of Necessity: English Women's Writing 1649-88 (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), 138.
U. Milo Kaufmann, The Pilgrim's Progress and Traditions in Puritan Meditation
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), passim; Hilda L. Smith, Reason's
Disciples: Seventeenth-Century English Feminists (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1982), 62-3.
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all actions and proffer it as a just and stable standard against the
recognition—new and transforming to the century's
thought—that "in Nature nothing's set," a point that Donne
elsewhere phrases as "the new Philosophy calls all in doubt"
("The First Anniversary," 205). Moreover, her friendship
"springs" from good Angels "To teach the world heroique
things." The friendship Philips celebrates in this and similar
lyrics compounds mutual feeling and knowledge with full
understanding, growth, freedom, aspiration, enlightenment,
even heroism, nobility, and divinity.
Philips's "Friendship in Emblem" collects and illuminates a
congeries of contemporary fact and discourse as a prism does
light. At a basic level, it aligns with the emphatically "social"
poetry of those contemporary Cavalier writers Alexander Pope
described as "the Wits of either Charles's days, / The Mob of
Gentlemen who wrote with Ease."^^ Such poets enfold active
courtly and military engagement within celebrations of each
other and their networks of personal relations. They produce
a poetry that mirrors the mannerism of contemporary art, since
mannerism too emphasizes the author's sense of himself as an
inheritor and a latecomer reconstituting his predecessors'
achievements in a poetic characterized by polish, virtuosity, and
a seemingly effortless savoir faire. Such poets "often decoratfe]
the smaller concerns of life in a style forged to express the
greater.'""
Encoding contemporary attitudes toward originality and
literary history, John Dryden rewrote Chaucer's Canterbury
Tales, Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra, and even Milton's
very recent Paradise Lost, and Alexander Pope recast Donne's
Satyres into what he considered ordered, comprehensible clarity
and refined expression. In a similar tidying or reclamation
operation, Philips's "Friendship in Emblem" unties the knots of
Donne's excessive discordia concors even as she reenvisions his
Pope, Horace Imitation, Epistle 2.i.107-8; Miner, Cavalier, passim.
Helgerson, Self-Crowned, 201, 194-5.

100

1650-1850

"usefull Instrument" in up-to-date scientific grids. The era of
such recastings was also an era of translations, not just Dryden's
Aeneid and Pope's Iliad, but dozens of lesser exercises, including
Philips's own. Both kinds of transliteration reflect a sense of
cultural displacement, loss, and alienation, and urgently reach
for transitioning, for larger meanings, and for reconnections to
disrupted cultural continuities.
More largely, Philips's poem does for her age what she said
friendship did for the heart. It "(like Moses bush presum'd), /
Warm'd and enlighten'd, not consum'd." Where the classically
learned Milton might have referred his views on friendship to
the calm virtue of Cicero's De amicitia, Philips draws hers from
a quite different and, of course, modern tradition. For both,
friendship rests upon concords of goodness, wisdom, loyalty,
and happiness. In the example of Milton's friendship for
Lawes, social concord quickly gives a local habitation and a
name to universal ordering principles of cosmic harmony. To
understand Philips, we must draw upon other kinds of
understanding. Milton was the most individualistic of men—the
OED credits him with several of the earliest uses of the very
word individual—hux Philips was very much a social being, and
came of age within a milieu formulating new structures of
personal and social interaction. Her poetry draws strength
from and popularizes a female version of the emerging
conventions.
To understand Philips's insistence upon friendship, we must
draw back briefly to a longer view of evidence. Virtually by
definition, Calvinism generates what Max Weber describes as
the "feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness of the single
individual."^' An imbalance toward individual autonomy will
in time necessarily rebound in the direction of social reciproc
ity, and the seventeenth century acts out such a carom from the
Reformation in multiplying new social quasi-institutions with
^ Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), 104.
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at least skeletal organization—men's interest groups such as the
Royal Society, for example, or semi-private gatherings at
taverns, coffeehouses, and chocolate houses. Such social in
tensifications at convenient public sites signal the rise of a
diverse gentry, with sufficient leisure for intellectual and social
pursuits and ambitions and with new tastes, specializations,
discourses. In the second half of the century, the Court itself
was a coterie, defiantly defensive against Puritanism and antiCatholicism, the more so from pre-Restoration confederacy on
French soil. The very etymology of CABAL—precisely datable
to a pamphlet of 1672—emblematizes the tendency.^" Conventi
cle co-religionists translate exclusive associations based on com
mon goals and strict loyalty even to the lower strata of society.
The seventeenth century empowered new ideals of personal
friendship. For the young, the new boarding or "public"
schools provided isolated environments and generational and
academic disciplines that nurtured fellowships based on shared
class, tastes, activities, and aspirations. They marked adoles
cence as an age chronologically prior to marriage during which
the young could both define their identities and discover the
"other." They fostered friendships grounded in an anthropolog
ical "spiritual kinship" modeled on the family that assumed
reciprocal obligations, defended its members against external
threats, and severely sanctioned failures to follow its rules.
Gradually, this sort of extra-familial, voluntary, optional, and
flexible society, free of self-interested motives, spread to later
age groups. Sometimes friendship in the period shares the same
vocabulary with love, love being "carnal" friendship or "tender"
friendship. It can refer not only to everyday social relations,
but also to unusually exalted associations.^' The latter was of
Germaine Greer et al., eds., Kissing the Rod: An Anthology of Seventeenth-Century
Women's Verse (New York: Noonday Press, 1988), 257.
Maurice Aymard, "Friends and Neighbors," in A History of Private Life, ed.
Philippe Aries and Georges Duby, vol. 3 of Passions of the Renaissance, ed. Roger
Chartier, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard Univenity Press,
1989), 489, 466-7, 450.
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course rare, "once in three ages" according to Montaigne who
coopts it for males on the grounds that women's souls are not
"strong enough to endure the pulling of a knot so hard, so fast,
and durable." In deference to its specific recipient, Jeremy
Taylor's 1657 A Discourse of the Nature and Offices of Friendship,
in a Letter to the Most Ingenious and excellent M[rs]. Kfatherine].
PJhilips]. partly qualifies this gender exclusion.^^
Among women, salons in private homes served overlapping
purposes, being likewise exclusionary, predominantly single-sex,
and with at least rudimentary form. Women's groups,
however, organize not around subject matters but around per
sonal styles. At the highest social levels, English female society
imported French models of social deportment for defining and
representing the self. Specifically, it borrowed the precieux dis
course that more and more minimized objective content and
disregarded data of work, family, practicality, and utility. As
filtered socially downward, such cultural transformations were
supported by a proliferation of prescriptive texts on proper
social behaviors and collections of model conversations and
letters.^'
Many events of Philips's life conspired to ground the "style"
of her friendship discourse. During her years at Mrs. Salmon's
school for girls at Hackney, Philips formed a particular
friendship with a classmate Mary Aubrey, dubbed "Rosania" in
Philips's poetic friendship circle, a cousin of the chronicler John
Aubrey. After moving with her newly remarried mother to
Wales, Philips cited Anne Owen as "Lucasia" in no fewer than
28 poems that interweave celebrations of their friendship with
Michel de Montaigne, The Essays of Montaigne Done into English by John Florio
(1603), vol. 1, intro. Geoige Saintsbury, The Tudor Translations, ed. W. E. Henley
(London: David Nutt, 1892), 197, 200; Jeremy Taylor, The Whole Works of the
Right Reverend Jeremy Taylor, D. D., ed. Charles P. Eden, volume I (London:
Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1854), especially 94-5.
Elizabeth C. Goldsmith, "Exclusive Conversations": The Art of Interaction in
Seventeenth-Century France (Philadelphia: University of Peimsylvania Press, 1988),
1, 4, 47.
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daily occasions.^'* Besides friendship poems to "Ardelia,"
"Philoclea," "Valeria," and "Celemina," Philips developed a
number of (at least) epistolary friendships with such prominent
male figures as Jeremy Taylor ("Palaemon"), Sir Edward
De[e]ring ("Silvander"), and Sir Charles Cotterell ("Poliarchus").
Her husband as "Antenor" and herself as "the matchless
Orinda" also inhabit this apparently imaginary rather than
formal society of friendship.^^ Historically, such discourse
reflects the French romances of Philips's reading, but to a
modern feminist consciousness, it may also signal women
claiming the power to name themselves in gestures at once
mimetic and anti-patriarchal.^^
It is no accident that this social remodelling inypkes French
romance and precieux traditions. The proudest curricular claim
of the new schools for gentlemen's daughters that the young
Philips attended was instruction in modern languages with
readings in up-to-date French romances.^^ The post-Restoration
"Lucasia," like other of her code names, seems to derive from the plays of
WiUiam Cartwright, a favorite of Queen Henrietta Maria and Royalist
sympathizers, an associate of Henry Lawes, and the subject of Katherine Philips's
first published poem (Thomas 1.7, #51). Sir Charles Cotterell ["Poliarchus"] was
Charles U's master of ceremonies and politically Philips's most famous associate.
" Souers, Matchless, 39.
Miller, Subject to Change, 29, building on Iragaray.
Keimeth Charlton, "The Educational Backgrotmd," in The Age of Milton:
Backgrounds to Seventeenth-Century Literature, ed. C. A. Patrides and Raymond B.
Waddington (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 109-12. Students
of English literature will imderstand the basic features of the romance genre from
Sir Philip Sidney's Arcadia. Later French works extending the genre enjoyed wide
popularity in England, and perhaps closest to Philips herself is her friend
Cotterell's translation of de la CalprenMe's Cassandre in 1652 (partial) and 1661
(complete) (Annabel Pattenon, Censorship and Interpretation: The Conditions of
Writing and Reading in Early Modem England [Madison: Univenity of Wisconsin
Press, 1984], 189-90, 264). Phihps's non-dramatic translations include a 368-line
version of one of Geoi^es de Scudery's pastorals, and the small volume of letters
Phihps left behind was also—it has been suggested—modelled on his sister
Madeleine's epistolary romances (Alfred A. Upham, The Erench Influence in English
Literature from the Accession of Elizabeth to the Restoration [New York: Octagon
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publication of Philips's Poems insists upon her linguistic skills
by presenting French texts on verso pages and her translation
on matching recto pages.
In the middle decades of seventeenth-century England,
allegiance to French literature—to French anything—was a
political stance favoring the Stuart family and cause. Before her
exile, Queen Henrietta Maria had energetically imported French
social practices and ideals onto English soil, including a vogue
for her gallant, courtly version of Platonic love modelled on the
society of the Hotel de Rambouillet and its dominant text
D'Urfe's LMstree (1607-27). English versions of the practice are
necessarily complexly layered when a French queen, conscious
of cultural privilege and opportunity, imports a foreign text
itself giving a Renaissance updating to Platonic love and seeks
to impose such discourse upon the everyday life and society of
its self-consciously different time and place.^® Further layerings
necessarily qualify Philips's late and provincial appropriations
of original French sources, Henrietta Maria's influences, and
continuously imported new French texts.
French preciosity provides Philips with both a rationale for
her society of Platonic friendship and with some features of her
poetic. The social and literary precieux movement flourishing
in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France presupposed
exclusive and superior language, imagery, and society. Erica
Veevers summarizes the style as
a search for recondite and ingenious comparisons, which
at the same time avoided archaic, pedantic, or vulgar
expressions; and a dependence on antithesis, allegory, and
abstraction, the aim of which was to communicate wittily
with the group in ways which avoided obviousness and
which often veiled the meaning from outsiders. At its
Books, 1965], 446-7).
Upham, French Influence, 327-31, 344-5, 363; Erica Veevers, Images of Love and
Religion: Queen Henrietta Maria and Court Entertainments (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 16.
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best the style had distinction, at its worst it fell into
affectations."
In Odette de Mour^ues's provocative summation, precieux
literature constitutes "an art not of production but of consumption.'"*® Formally, writers sought not originality, accuracy, or
vigor of expression, but always to eschew low words, to reduce
objects to one or more of their qualities, to take up only what
could be contained within acknowledged and well-classified
categories, to seek refuge in vagueness and the mechanical
workings of formal logic, and in general to reduce the
threatening complexity of reality and the contradictions of
language to safe absolute assertions. They make considerable
use of antitheses and hyperbole, but where antitheses normally
provoke witty insight into the familiar, precieux antitheses
proffer automatic associations of ideas and the reassuring
operations of well-known mechanisms. Alexander Pope's praise
of "Nature to advantage dressed, / What oft was thought, but
ne'er so well expressed" might well describe the style but for its
characteristic prolixity.'^^
Early precieux literary productions featured elaborate
imagery and clever conceits—not unlike what students of
English literature will know as Elizabethan Petrarchanism,
Euphuism, handbook collections of rhetorical tropes and
figures, and even metaphysical conceits. But because such
poetry does not create new metaphors and in fact tends to kill
the metaphors it borrows, its normal evolution is toward the
abstract expression that predominates in late seventeenthcentury English practice. At a late stage, metaphors are no
Veeveis, Images of Love, 15.
Odette de Mourgues, Metaphysical, Baroque and Precieux Poetry (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1953), 131-2.
•" de Mouig;ues, Metaphysical, 123, 125-7; Pope, Essay on Criticism, 297-8;
Geoi^es Mongredien, Les Precieux et les Precieusts (n.p.: Mercure de France, 1963),
19.
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longer required for expression at all/^ and as we have seen,
Philips often inhabits this stage, the Foucaultian era of linguistic
transparency and neutrality noted at the end of Section I above.
To work our way through the formal features of this poetic
is to array some characteristics of Philips's Friendship poetry.
If the results strike a modern reader as hermetic, exclusionary,
and overly circumstantial, it is precisely because they were
designed to create these effects. When Philips appropriates
Donne's compass image, she aims not to create a fresh
metaphor, but to develop a stock comparison within a secure
conventional pattern. From her removed vantage, she analyzes
the likeness into parts and draws out all its logical conse
quences. Precieux hyperbole—and this category includes most
of Philips's claims for her friendship with "Lucasia"—seeks to
escape not just the complexity of reality, but even reality itself,
and the interchangeability of their and her hyperbolic
metaphors proves the gratuitousness of the device. What in
Philips's "Friendship in Emblem" at first looks like a
metaphysical gesture is merely an exercise in preciosity. We
have here not a poetic of disquieting inquiry, not a teasing of
reality, but an exercise that minimizes the importance of the
feeling or idea it brings forward while deliberately removing it
from the realm of actual experience.
Philips's poetry—and precieux poetry in general—should not
be dismissed as decadent by-products of excessively decorated
and complacent elites. In the examples we have considered, the
preciosity of her Donne analogue balances against or even over
balances a heightened awareness of what we saw in the Milton
examples, political negotiations and her own and poetry's
participation in history. Although precieux poetry may appear
escapist, in fact it seeks to "shelter the delicate flowers of
civilization from the rough winds of tempestuous times."""
de Mourgues, Metaphysical, 139, 125; Mongredien, Les Precieux, 10, 13-15.
de Mourgues, Metaphysical, 123, 127, 129.
" de Mourgues, Metaphysical, 116-17.
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Precieux poets not only uphold the blessings of culture, they
also mobilize in defense of peace, order, and high civilization
and thrive by opposing political intrusions and historical chaos.
Such production records the complex nature of Katherine
Philips's age, its undertow of relief and hope, its retreat to
security and trust—fragile and doomed wishes in what had
become a Hobbesian world. "Poliarchus's" introduction to
Philips's collected works (1667) shows that from the outset
"Orinda" was made representational of larger historical designs
along these lines. Against the background of the plague and fire
of 1666-67 and the preceding Civil War arise her "gentle and
tender strains of Friendship"; they will, he hopes, "outlive all
these dismal things to see the blessing of Peace, a conjuncture
more suitable to their Nature, all compos'd of kindness; so that
I hope Time it self shall have as little power against them, as
these other storms have had" (Poems [1667] al'""). In 1675
Milton's nephew, Edward Phillips (no relation), similarly judges
her style as "suitable to the humour and Genius of these
times.'"^^
Against the chaos of the seventeenth-century's radical
transformations of faith, knowing, social categories, and
material culture, a world literally turned upside down,
Katherine Philips bravely proffers what she has found to be true
and worthy and transcendent, filtered through French
conventions she saw as securing the English future. Her
friendship expresses not so much an achieved state as the rather
desperate hope that such an achievement might come to pass.
For her, friendship can restore coherent virtue, order, and
stability to the frenzied flux of the social and political worlds
she inhabited.
For a young woman in the early 1660s such hopes might
have held promise, but as additional decades marked the
advance of the century, such hopes and such strengths seemed
less and less realizable in the private and larger worlds. Thus
Edward Philips, qtd. in K. Philips, Works, 1:24.
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Anne Killigrew (1660-85) speaks for the following generation
in idealizing "True Friendship" as "a Rich Cordial" and "the
sweet Refection of our toylsome State," and Lady Winchilsea
similarly echoes "Orinda" in 1713 in identifying friendship as
the Support of Human-kind;
The safe Delight, the useful Bliss,
The next World's Happiness, and this."*^
As Killigrew sees it, however, modern friendship mixes ill with
good, passes dross for gold, and "for one Grain of Friendship
that is found, / Falshood and Interest do the Mass compound.'"^^ Elsewhere Killigrew—again by contrast with her
deteriorated epoch—eulogizes Philips as a "Radiant Soul" and
"Albions and her Sexes Grace," as one to whose laurel all other
laurels once bowed and whose name is now fixed high among
the Stars ("Upon the saying that my Verses were made by
another")/' Although we may set aside some of the extrava
gance of contemporary praise of "the matchless Orinda,"
adjusted understandings of Philips's literary universe, her
gendered and generational differentiation, make it possible, I
believe, to credit the reverence and wisdom that contemporaries
found essentialized in her and that inspired a later generation of
female poets with grateful awe.
Winchilsea quoted in K. Philips, Works 1.33.
KiUigrew, "The Discontent," quoted in Ann Messenger, His and Hers: Essays in
Restoration and Eighteenth-Century Literature (Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press, 1986), 229.
See Greer, Kissing, 306.

KICKING THE EMPEROR
Some Problems of
Restoration Parallel History
David Gunto

political orientation of historical studies in sevenl^teenth-century England is axiomatic among scholars.
Particularly tendentious and polemic were studies of
English history and antiquities, 'since, as has been proven at
length, these studies often undertake to demonstrate the
limitation (or, less often, the freedom) of royal Stuart authority
as part of a political program.^ Less familiar to students of
Restoration literary culture is the similar goal of late Roman
historiography during the early 1680's. My aim in this essay
is to examine Roman historical polemics in light of the
' My discussion of seventeenth-century historiogiaphical theory and antiquities is
based upon Arthur B. Ferguson, C/io Unbound: Perception of the Social and
Cultural Past in Renaissance England (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979); F.
Smith Fussner, The Historical Revolution: English Historical Writing and Thought,
1580-1640 (New York: Coluhnbia University Press, 1962); F. J. Levy, Tudor
Historical Thought (San Marino: Himtington Library Press, 1967); J. G. A.
Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical
Thought in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1957); and R. J. Smith, The Gothic Bequest: Medieval Institutions in British Thought
1688-1863 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
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Exclusion Crisis and to discuss the peculiar combination of
insight and historical lacunae these propagandistic parallel
histories display. In challenging or defending James's right to
succeed his brother, these texts employ a remarkable medley of
arguments drawn from historical, political, moral and theologi
cal premises. The aspects of these works that address the
perceived significance of late Roman history to the immediate
problem of the Exclusion Bill bespeak an intense focus on
cultural and institutional difference as well as on purely moral
parallels, a focus that not only differentiates them from such
traditional poetic polemics as Dryden's Absalom and Achitophel,
but also denies and undercuts the very axioms of such historical
polemics. Thus, the Exclusion Crisis serves as a focal point for
a study of the confluence and conflict of two modes of
historical interpretation and poetic history, one of which is
determined by atemporal parallels of political character and
narrative, and one of which at least partially denies the
pertinence of easy parallel history in favor of a more comparativist approach to history.
Parallel histories of the Restoration have not been often
viewed in the light of Renaissance and earlier seven
teenth-century historiography, but clearly they reflect crucial
developments in these related forms. Increasingly over the
course of the seventeenth century, historical writing moved
from an essentially political genre, which focused on political
narrative and character, typified by what one scholar has called
"the tyranny of the res gestae,"^ to a mode of discourse more
accepting of and impelled by the gradually accumulating data of
social, cultural and institutional history compiled by that
industrious if eccentric group of scholars collectively referred to
as "antiquarians." Though there are exceptions to the rule, such
as Roger Ascham and Sir Thomas Elyot, Elizabethan historians
did not consider non-political material to be part of history
proper, nor did they view antiquarians as proper historians; the
^ Ferguson, ch. 1.
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duty of history as exemplified in Holinshed, Hall, and Polydore
Vergil was to detail the political fortunes of states, increasingly
with an eye to the political wisdom to be obtained thereby by
(especially) statesmen. Given the universal, static view of
human motivation and human nature common to much
Renaissance history, the "rules" recoverable through a learned
study of history were more or less universally applicable,
whether the historian's material was earlier English history or
indeed the history of another civilization.
On the other hand, the antiquarians developed through the
often erratic employment of humanist scholarship a body of
material that while not usually avowedly historical did much to
engender in English thought a sense of historical and cultural
relativity and anachronism. These studies were often compelled
by immediate political interests—church history after 1535 is a
key instance—but they were successful at creating an awareness
of "man aggregate," of how national and even local monuments,
laws, social conventions, and traditions delineate peculiarly local
and English culture. Thus, even though English legal scholars
lacked the awareness of the difference between English and
Roman law, which characterized French work in this area
(arguably due to the "lack of a basis of comparison" spoken of
by Pocock^), legal research during this period effectively
established a canon of British common law.
Had the antiquarians been more frequent or better poets, we
might expect that the emerging idea of the cultural grounding
and referentiality of historical and political narrative, if not its
complete determination by culture, could have found its way
into poetic treatments of historical parallels and problems such
as the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis. Instead, it is clear that
propaganda in prose and verse, but especially the latter,
continued the practice of historical parallels that stressed
political narrative and moral motivation or character over
impersonal social data. It has been argued persuasively that
' Pocock, ch. 3.
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verse parallels such as Absalom and Achitophel have much in
common with seventeenth-century historical writing in terms
of intention and interpretation, since they pretend to present
unbiased historical narrative for learned scrutiny."^ I would
prefer to discuss briefly another of Dryden's historical works in
this light, since the problems arising from its production shed
light on the interpretive assumptions of Restoration historical
readers with political motivations. This is Dryden's The Duke
of Guise.
An exhaustive treatment of this play and the problems its
publication created for Dryden is beyond the scope of this
essay,' but the play's introduction reveals something of how
Dryden conceived the historiographer's task and how his
enemies detected or invented treasonable intention:
Our play's a parallel: the Holy League
Begot our Cov'nant; Guisards got the Whig.
Whate'er our hot-brain'd Sheriffs did advance
Was, like our Fashions, first produc'd in France;
And, when worn out, well scourg'd, and banish'd there.
Sent over, like their godly beggars, here.
Could the same trick, twice play'd, our nation gull.^
It looks as if the Devil were grown dull;
Or serv'd us up, in scorn, his broken meat,
And thought we were not worth a better cheat. (1-10)
As soon as he announces his parallel, Dryden explains how
the French Holy League "begot" the English Solemn League
•* John M. Wallace, "Dryden and History: A Problem in Allegorical Reading,"
ELH 36 (1969): 265-91.
' A useful and pentrating discussion of the interpretive complexities surrounding
the play, the production of which was actually delayed for a time because of
historcal inferences, is Alan Roper, "Drawing Parallels and Making Applications
in Restoration Literature," in Politics as Reflected in Literature: Papers Presented at
a Clark Library Seminar, 17 January 1987 (Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1989).
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and Covenant, and it becomes clear immediately that the
parallel depends not on how these respective bodies operate
within a nexus of political, social and legal entities unique to
their respective states but upon their both having been, like all
rebellion, instigated by the Devil, who lacks the invention to
create an entirely new plan of treason for the English. Indeed,
this is the type of parallel historiography central to Dryden
and to much verse polemic. Its predominance cannot be due
simply to its relative ease (the sin with which Johnson and
Coleridge charged classical parallels), but must be explained as
being largely the result of the period's exclusion of non-moral
and non-political elements from much of its official history.
Again, the Whig attacks on Dryden's play assume only parallels
of character and plot. The key question became whether
Dryden intended only a parallel of "times" or one of "men" as
well. The Whigs argued the latter, of course, so that Dryden
could be shown to have made comparisons between Charles n
and the morally problematic Henry HI, but both times and men
are seen to be parallel because the respective political narratives
and (more controversially in this case) the moral characters of
the key players are implicated in Dryden's choice of stories.
Had Dryden been more thoroughly antiquarian in his thinking
(as was, for instance, his Royal Society friend and colleague
Walter Charleton), he might well have replied that the French
Holy League and Henry were the product of Gallic culture and
history and therefore simply could not be exported to England,
but in this case the moral dimension of the play and conse
quently its purpose would be lost. This is why, as Alan Roper
has argued. Restoration parallel histories tend to exclude
differences in detail and narrative and to emphasize and distort
resemblances.^
Viewed in the light of "antiquarian" historiography, the
traditional historical parallels of the Restoration are clearly, as
in the case of Dryden, heavily indebted to the ahistorical
' Roper, Politics.
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modalities of Biblical typological interpretation, even when the
subject is classical rather than scriptural. Of course, Dryden's
main excursion into polemic, typological history, Absalom and
Achitophel, takes Old Testament narrative as its theological
justification; the privileged history of the Bible underwrites, as
it were, the validity of Dryden's politicized narrative. But
while this mode provides supernatural sanction for its view of
history, its essential ahistoricity is obvious when viewed in the
light of the propagandistic prose histories composed by some of
Dryden's contemporaries.
A convenient example is Dryden's rather casual use of
parallel institutions in the poem. Consider the following
passage from Achitophel's temptation address to Absalom:
Let him give on till he can give no more.
The thrifty Sanhedrin shall keep him poor;
And every shekel which he can receive.
Shall cost a limb of his prerogative. (390-93)
Within the context of the poem this passage is an obvious
allusion to the Whig strategy of coercing Charles by witholding
money in Parliament, a time-honored maneuver. But from a
wider perspective this brief mention of the Sanhedrin, a central
institution in biblical Hebrew culture, is highly problematic.
Does Dryden mean to suggest that the historical Sanhedrin had
the power of the purse over Saul or David? Or, to put it a bit
more bluntly, are we as sympathetic readers of the poem
expected to believe that the Sanhedrin is somehow really "like"
the British Parliament? Clearly the question is irrelevant. The
purpose of the Sanhedrin in the poem is merely to serve as a
morally questionable political body that can be manipulated by
wicked men. Its actual, historical resemblance to what is in fact
a radically different English institution is not a matter Dryden
expects his readers to consider; the moral resemblance is
enough. In a different more antiquarian political text this
question might, we may easily imagine, be paramount to some
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key political point. Is it relevant to make this comparison, for
instance, when the roles and prerogatives of these respective
bodies are so radically different? Perhaps even the use of
"shekels" for "pounds" reveals a crucial difference in economic
arrangements which the historian would be well advised to
consider in his polemic.
The conception of history as depending on timeless patterns
of ethical motivation and divinely distributed justice is still
potent in the texts I wish to examine. Indeed, the typological
idea of history outlined above is alive and well in Exclusion
debate, prose and verse; and in even those texts concerned with
antiquarian interpretations, the influence of the Biblical model,
of type and antitype, shadow and fulfillment (or event and
replay), motivates the choice of historical analogues. Even a
character from secular rather than sacred history can be
expected to prefigure the fate, good or bad, of his English
counterpart, since classical figures are subject to the same
passions, excite the same responses in their countrymen, and
provoke God in more or less the same ways.
The prose polemics inspired by the Exclusion Crisis
incorporate both strands of seventeenth-century historical
thought.
At times they extend the naive assumptions
concerning the continunity and uniformity of English social
life, especially English law, to their treatment of Roman
history, while alternately they reject the exclusively political
and narrative focus of the versifying historians in order to
demonstrate the essential incompatibility of the parallels
themselves.
The first Roman history in this controversy is the Reverend
Samuel Johnson's Life of Julian the Apostate.^ Published
around 18 June 1682, the work is a response to a sermon
preached by George Hickes (who will figure prominently
shortly) which extolled the sovereign power of kings and
^ Works of the Late Samuel Johnson, sometime Chaplain to the Right Honourable
William Lord Russell (London, 1710).
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passive obedience to them. Chaplain to Lord Russell, who
brought the Bill of Exclusion before Parliament, Johnson was
notorious to his contemporaries as a zealous defender of
Protestantism and "liberty" against the encroachments of Stuart
prerogative and Catholic interest. Predictably, Johnson found
himself in legal trouble upon more than one occasion, but he
was never closer to the center of controversy than he was upon
the appearance of Julian. This small book, intended to
champion the cause of the Whig exclusionists, draws a sustained
parallel between the careers and characters of James 11 and
Julian the Apostate.
The importance of the controversy between Johnson and
Hickes (as well as other minor figures on the Royalist side) lies
in the fact that this debate, in its deployment of "antiquarian"
data and in its ultimately skeptical interrogation of the classical
parallel's central historiographical assumptions, prefigures the
final defeat of this mode of historical polemic by argument
from linguistic, institutional and sociological inquiry. For
instance, the concerted scholarly efforts of Robert Brady and his
followers, sympathetic all of them to the Tory/Stuart cause,
produced during and after the period of the Exclusion Crisis a
body of scholarship on English history that, drawing on
primarily non-narrative material, destroyed more or less
completely the Whig notion of an ancient, Gothic constitution
that gave supremacy to the Parliament over the Crown. The
Johnson/Hickes exchange represents a first, tentative step of the
"new" history into the realm of the historical parallel, an early
intrusion of empirical and comparative historical analysis into
the essentially poetic, analogical and moral realm of the parallel
character. The ui^ency of the Exclusion to the readers of these
works and the prestige of the disputants (the chaplain to a
notorious Whig peer and a renowned Jacobite linguistic scholar
respectively) only underscore the importance of the battle's
central issue: whether the poetic analysis of politics and
character undertaken by Dryden and the others is ultimately a
valid historical hermeneutic. In the long run, over the ensuing
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decades, the answer to the question posed early by Johnson and
Hickes is no.
The long-term development is incidental to Johnson's
immediate aims, of course. The immediate point of his
comparison is obvious. James, like Julian, brings an "alien"
religion to the throne and is likely to repeat Julian's pagan
persecution of "true" Christians (indeed, the book goes so far as
to include "A Comparison of Popery and Paganism"). But
Johnson's appropriation of fourth-century Roman history is
designed to do more than merely villify James. Johnson
employs a sophisticated legal and political parallel to attack the
central doctrine of Stuart royalists: the theological imperative
of passive obedience. Thus, Johnson employs both an
ahistorical moral parallel as well as a comparative study of
sovereignty and succession to attack James and to undercut the
theoretical premises of his supporters.
Johnson's preface dwells at some length upon the question
of the legal status of Christianity at different historical periods,
a concept central to his attack on the theory of passive
obedience and to his claim that the early church would have
favored England's exclusion of an anti-Christian monarch:
This Behaviour of theirs Qulian's Christian subjects]
being so contrary to what is commonly reported of them,
and to the Carriage of former Christians, I found it
necessary to make some few Remarks upon it; and to
show that there was as wide a difference betwixt their
Case, and that of the first Christians, as Laws for Men,
and against Men, could possibly make. (4)
This feature of Johnson's attack on passive obedience turns
the table on the theoretical defenders of that doctrine;
Johnson admits the Pauline injunction to submit to the
ordinances of men, but he insists on the illegal status of early
Christianity. By Julian's time, Johnson explains, Christianity
was the established, legal religion, so that threats to it could be
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resisted actively in good conscience. Johnson adduces St. Paul's
defense of himself under Roman law to prove that the Apostle
was not in favor of passive obedience:
And St. Paul himself was not for Passive obedience by
any means, even when the lawful Magistrate persecuted
him, if it were in an unlawful way; but he stood upon
his Birthright. For did he not in one place awe the
Centurion and chief Captain, and make all the Soldiers
vanish who were commanded to beat him, by telling
them he was a Roman? (6)
Johnson's problem as a theoretical exclusionist, a problem
reflected in his Roman parallel history, is that he must do more
through his comparison than merely make James odious as a
man. His historiography is obliged to draw sufficient institu
tional and legal parallels to compel his English audience to
admit resistance to a legal monarch on religious grounds.
Johnson's use of St. Paul's appeal to Roman law is useful, but
his establishment of Julian as a legal or constitutional monarch
in the English tradition is perhaps the weakest part of his
polemic. He is obliged, in the second chapter of Julian, "The
Sense of the Primitive Christians about his [Julian's] Succes
sion," to insist on the legal and (more important) entailed
nature of Julian's accession. That is, Johnson must maintain
that a legal monarch may be resisted for opposing an established
religion, and that the regret he perceives in the church fathers'
discussion of Julian ai^es that the Church would have opposed
Julian's coming to the throne had they known of his religion.
Johnson quotes Eusebius and Eumenius to support his
contention that the Roman Empire was hereditary. In the
absence of documentary evidence of resistance to Julian during
his lifetime (a thorny problem for Johnson), he cites the
invective of St. Gregory. The problem posed by the relative
passivity of the fathers and of the army with regard to Julian
are explicitly addressed by Johnson in a rare instance of
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apparent lack of confidence in the historical solidity of an
assertion:
They [the church fathers] were not so happy indeed as to
be beforehand with Julian, and to get him excluded;
because, as I said before, there was not the least suspicion
that he had chang'd his Religion: but they shew'd him
their good will sufficiently by what they said and did
afterward. If they had no occasion to make their Applica
tion to Constantius about this Business while he was here,
will it not do full as well, if they call after him to Hea
ven, and expostulate the Matter with him there.^ (12)
Johnson's invocation of Gregory is problematic, as responses
to Julian realized, especially in light of the paucity of real
opposition to Julian. The text skirts the problem by dismissing
the historical lack of active rebellion as a result of weakness and
by insisting, throughout the remainder of the book, that the
challenging and rude behavior directed by isolated Christians at
Julian bespeaks a legal Roman resistance to an unlawful,
unchristian despot and his religion. Johnson divides these
resistances into three main categories: the "words" "actions"
and "devotions" of Julian's Christian subjects. The first of these
examples is largely anecdotal and consists of collected verbal
attacks on Julian. Most of these are the actions of individuals,
such as the nobleman of Berea, who denounced paganism in the
presence of Julian, although the Antiochans are recorded as a
group as having "abominated" Julian, for which they were
named "beard haters" by the Emperor.
Johnson provides two examples of actions taken against
Julian, one of which is Gregory Nazianzen's claim that his
father threatened to kick the Emperor for bringing archers
against the temple. The narrative section of Johnson's book
then closes with accounts of the harsh invectives the Christians
composed after the death of Julian, their prayers against his
paganism, and (most provocatively) an account of Julian's death.
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Johnson quotes Libanius in perhaps the most provocative
passage in his book;
For it is not improbable, that some one of the Soldiers
might take into consideration, how the Heathens, and all
Men to this day, do still praise those who long since
have kill'd Tyrants, as Men that were willing to die for
the common Liberty, and defended in that manner their
Countrymen, Kinsmen, and Friends. (25)
Here Johnson develops his parallel to a dangerous extreme;
perhaps it is not surprising that he was flogged in 1686 for
inciting the army to rebellion. Likewise in his chapter
"Reflections on the Behaviour of these Christians," Johnson
returns to his main theme, the essential difference between the
first-century legal status of Christianity and its position as the
official creed of Julian's empire and Charles U's England.
Johnson also cites Bracton to support the priority of the law
over the will of a "popish successor," whose will can have no
binding legal authority if manifested in an illegal act. Johnson's
use of English legal history is, it seems to me, the most
persuasive element of his polemic, but the cultural and
institutional differences between Rome and England form the
basis of some of the most potent responses to Julian, two of
which I would like to examine here.'
' I have chosen these for their representative arguments and because they
occasioned rephes from Johnson. Other pubhshed responses include Edward
Meredith's Some remarks upon a late popular piece of nonsense called Julian the
Apostate, (1682), Thomas Lang's Vindication of the Primitive Christians (1683), and
John Northleigh's The Triumph of our Monarchy (1685). There is also Dryden and
Tate's Absalom and Achitophel part 2, which, ironically, ridiculed Johnson in a
pseudo-bibhcal parallel as "Ben-Jochanan." Dryden would have been famihar with
Johnson, of course; he contributed commendatory verses to Northleigh's The
Iriuimph of our Monarchy, which contains "observations" on Julian. In 1695
Charles Hatton noted that "Juhan Johnson" continued in his insistence on the
power of the people over the monarch. See Poems of John Dryden, vol. IV, ed.
James Kinsley (Oxford: Clarendon University Press, 1958), 1925.
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The first of these, John Bennett's Constantius the Apostate,
does not effectively exploit this weakness.' Bennett's method
is rather to follow the biographical method of Julian in order
to prove that Constantius, who became an Arian before leaving
the throne to Julian, provides a truer parallel to the English
situation (though as a royalist piece Constantius does not draw
comparisons between the heretical emperor and the Prince of
York). Bennett's chapter-by-chapter parallel is lai^ely a
refutation of Johnson's treatment of his historical sources, a
theme of much anti-Julian polemic. In refuting Johnson's
discussion of the Christians' "actions" and "Devotions, Psalms,
and Prayers," for instance, Bennett attempts to overwhelm
Julian with the volume of counter-examples he can cite. He
ai^ues that, taken in context and as a whole, both the outward
submission of Christians, including the army, and their prayers
bespeak clearly their acceptance of the Arian Constantius as a
legal ruler. The few contrary examples are for Bennett
exceptional instances of un-Christian behavior on the part of
isolated individuals. Constantius was recognized as legitimate
despite his religion.
Apart from the standard biblical defenses of passive
obedience, only two features of Bennett's apology are notable
here. The first of these is his acceptance of Johnson's view of
Roman succession as hereditary; this historical lapse he uses to
his advantage by claiming that, if Johnson's citation is correct
and the crown was passed on by a "law of nature," exclusion
would be contrary to that natural law. The second, and more
historically perceptive of Bennett's arguments concerning law
is that Johnson's distinction between first-century Christians
and those under Constantius is false, since the notion of a law
standing apart from and having priority over the emperor's will
is a misapprehension of history. He observes, in the most terse
statement of this problem;

' John Bennet, Constantius the Apostate (London, 1683).
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The Laws were no more against the first Christians, than
they were against those under Julian: for they suffered
both by the same Law, viz the uncontrollable will of
their Emperour. (59)
It is interesting that although Bennett addresses Johnson's
legal arguments, especially those from Bracton, he fails to
exploit the difference between Roman and English institutions,
even though this difference is implicit in both authors'
discussion of English law. The tendency to emphasize a
universal morality of character and action over governmental
and social differences is at times even more powerful in Bennett
than in Johnson, and it remained for a more learned and
lengthier royalist response to Julian to take advantage of this
fundamental weakness of Johnson's argument.
This was Geoi^e Hickes's Jovian, or an Answer to Julian the
Apostate, published in 1683.'° Hickes was a learned and prolific
(and Jacobite) divine, who has been called the "most important
single figure among the historical scholars of England in the
latter half of the seventeenth century."" Hickes's later work
involved Anglo-Saxon linguistic scholarship, and provided an
immense foundation of data on Anglo-Saxon social life and
customs on which subsequent historical scholarship could build,
though significantly Hickes did not call his work "history."
Hickes's scholarly interest dovetailed naturally in his refutation
of Johnson. Hickes's book, like Bennett's, presents a reexami
nation of Johnson's sources and reiterates Bennett's assertion
that the subjects of Julian were generally notable for the
obedience and acceptance they granted their emperor. But
[George Hickes], Jovian, or an Answer to Julian the Apostate, 2nd ed. (London,
1683).
" David C. Douglas, English Scholars (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), 93. A more
recent and penetrating view of Hickes's role in antiquarianism, especially the
Ancient and Modems controveny, is Joseph M. Levine, Battle of the Books:
Literature and History in the Augustan Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991),
chs. 11, 12.
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Hickes goes much further; there is, for instance, an attack on
Johnson's use of the Julian narrative as a parallel. Having
pointed out the impossibility of the Romans considering
provisional or exclusionary laws against an unpopular successor,
Hickes demonstrates the many historical gaps in Johnson's
parallel:
And truly, to make the case of Julian, and his R. H.
exactly parallel, we must not only suppose, that the
Succession to the Empire was Hereditary, but that
Constantin the Great had been murdered after a long
Rebellion by the Aerians, his Son Constantius miracu
lously preserved and restored and the Ruined Church
restored with him; that from the time of his Restauration, the Aerians resumed their old practices against the
Church and the Monarchy, and underhand helped Juliany
after he had left the Communion of the Church, to get an
Indulgence for themselves and the Pagans;...and that
however the Aerians and Pagans were opposite in other
things, yet they agreed in conspiring against the Estab
lished Christian Religion, even in the Senate, where they
always voted alike. (80)
Here Hickes both exposes the many points at which the two
narratives differ fundamentally and employs the parallel to
castigate Johnson and the Whig opposition by associating them
with the Arians and pagans, an association that calls into
question both their religious orthodoxy and their civic loyalty.
Hickes's sense of the basic differences between Roman and
English institutions, of the historical developments (including
linguistic change) by which cultural mechanisms assume
legitimacy and meaning, is perhaps the most potent apologetic
element in Hickes's work. Throughout, Hickes insists not only
on the inaccuracy of Johnson's Creek or on his partial use of
sources, but on the gaping holes in historical understanding
Johnson exhibits. The first chapter of Jovian is called "The
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Roman Empire not Hereditary," and its ailment attacks,
through a brief but compelling account of the emperors up to
Julian, one of Johnson's crucial premises: that the Romans of
the fourth century resisted a legal, hereditary monarch. The
Preface of the book makes the same point in comparative terms
and demonstrates a sophisticated awareness of the linguistic
element of historical argument:
First, then, whereas I have asserted. That there was no
such thing as Entail, nor any Notion of it among the
Romans, I think it necessary here to add. That this limited
way of Hereditary Succession unto one Line is grounded
wholly upon the Feudal Laws, which had nothing
common at all with the old Roman or Civil Laws, but
were received from the Customs of the Barbarous
Nations, which invaded the Empire, and after settled in
it. (6-7)
They [the Romans] were probably as Ignorant of these
sorts of Settlements, and Heirships, as their Subjects:
which is worth observing to all those, who read the Latin
or Greek authors, that they be not imposed upon by the
words Heir, Hereditary, Inheritance, or Patrimony ,which
never signifie in that special manner, as they do among us
in relation to that unalienable sort of Lineal Succession,
which is common to Entailed Estates, and Hereditary
Kingdoms from the beginning. (11)
Hickes thus identifies a central weakness in Johnson's
position: the conflation of two widely different socio-political
contexts in order to justify English resistance by analogy of
Roman rebellion. That is, if Roman emperors were established
not by patrimony as a legal institution but rather by the
pleasure of emperors (which is Hickes's interpretation of
Eusebius's "law of nature" in his discussion of Julian's
succession), then there is no appeal to common law existing
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prior to and above the will of an emperor to justify either
exclusion or active resistance. The second half of this equation
is perhaps implicit in Bennett, but Hickes examines the problem
of the theory of succession more fully than any other historian
involved in this controversy.
Hickes also manages to catch Johnson in a source problem
involving the question of inheritance. This is Johnson's use of
Eusebius. Hickes begins with Johnson's citation of that author:
Constantin the Great (saith he) Famous for being the
first Christian Emperour, divided the whole Empire at his
death amongst his three Sons, as a Father doth his Estate
among his Children...This indeed sounds somewhat like
an Entailed Inheritance, whereas, had he truly and entirely
rendred the place, it would not have Favoured that
Design; for Eusebius saith That Constantin...dlwided the
whole Empire, like a Patrimony amongst his three Sons,
as being the most Beloved of his Heirs. (94-5)
That is, Hickes contends that Eusebius claims that
Constantine chose his sons to inherit the Empire from among
a group of heirs, and "might have passed by his Sons, and given
the Empire to them." Hickes also reiterates Bennett's attack on
the distinction in Johnson between the legal status of first and
fourth-century Christianity. Hickes repeats the familiar
argument that neither the Neronian nor the Constantian/Julian
persecution was illegal since, statutes legalizing Christianity
notwithstanding, the will of the emperors was a law unto itself.
Hickes appeals to Fortesque to begin his discussion (whose
authority Johnson effectively addresses in his response to
Jovian), but soon proceeds to classical sources, citing Dio to
make the nature of Roman law clear on this point:
This is the Sum of what Dio saith of the Imperial
Leviathan, to which the Civil Law agrees; which tells us.
That "the Emperor was above Law, that whatsoever
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pleased him had the nature of a Law, because by the Lex
Regia, the People had surrendered unto him all their
Authority, and Power: whatsoever therefore the Emperor
appointed by Letters, or knowingly decreed, or declared
in his Interlocutors, or commanded by an Edict, was a
Law." (87)
Hickes proceeds to show how this "Legal Absolute Power"
was manifested over a wide range of imperial actions, including
not only the selection of heirs, to which he devotes his first
chapter, but also the execution of members of the imperial
household. Thus everything suffered by both early and
fourth-century Christians was according to law, to which true
Christians must submit. Here Hickes implies the legal position
he later announces: that while no subject may be impelled to
believe or act contrary to his faith, he may not resist even the
persecutions of a lawful monarch, since a lawful sovereign's
statutes are law and since Scripture demands obedience to the
ordinances of men.
Johnson's published responses to these attacks (published
together in his Collected Works of 1710) are a curious mixture
of insight and historical blind spots. His task in the "Answer
to Constantius the Apostate" is generally simple; most of the
tract points to partial rendering of Bennett's sources, which if
fully translated show that Constantius, though flawed, was
neither wicked nor apostate. Johnson also insists upon his
distinction between submission to legal ordinances and to those
enacted contrary to law.
The "Answer to Jovian" is more problematic and displays
some of the tensions between versions of historical interpreta
tion we have seen already. To refute Hickes's rather solid
assault on his ahistorical notion of an hereditary empire,
Johnson can do comparatively little. He is forced to search his
sources more carefully to discover a pattern of blood relation
ships between emperors and their successors, but his response
is not really up to the challenge.
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On the other hand, Johnson's critique of Hickes's deploy
ment of English legal scholarship, especially Fortesque, is much
more effective. Johnson succeeds in exposing Hickes's fine
distinction between royal prerogative and common law, a
common law that, Johnson believes, is in no way violated by
an act of exclusion. Johnson's careful legal reasoning goes far
toward establishing a legal foundation, derived from English
common law, for passing an act of exclusion that respects the
royal prerogative and the hereditary nature of the monarchy.
And this perhaps is the greatest irony of this pamphlet battle,
since for Johnson the most potent aspect of his argument is
not his historical parallel but his discussion of radically different
English institutions; the analogy between Roman and English
history is effectively discredited by Hickes, who nevertheless
uses the parallel to at^ue against exclusion. This passionate
searching for parallels amid a largely institutionally irrelevant
antiquity is, aside from moral and theological applications, an
irony perhaps most akin to that implicit irony in the career of
that greatest of Jacobite historians of English antiquity. Dr.
Robert Brady, who destroyed the notion of a whiggish "Saxon"
past only to be posthumously mined and pillaged by exponents
of "progressive" Whig historiography.*^ In both cases the
alienness of the past is both an opportunity for historical
understanding and a potential epistemological explosive in the
midst of polemic, historical projects.
Isaac Knunnick, Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Potties of Nostalgui in the Age
of Walpole (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), ch. 5.

EDITING MINOR WRITERS
The Case of
Laetitia Pilkington and
Mary Barber
A. C. Elias, Jr.

uring the past twenty years the focus of many scholars'
I attention has begun shifting away from the so-called
SS?major authors—Shakespeare, Milton, Swift, Pope, and a
handful of others who seem to tower above their contemporar
ies—toward a variety of lesser but arguably more representative
figures of the times, people who can tell us something about
readership and publishing, popular culture and tastes, relations
between the sexes, class attitudes, and other phenomena
necessary for a fuller and more accurate assessment of the
printed word and its workings in English. Amid the resulting
ferments and excitements, it is easy to overlook the problem of
editing these lesser but sometimes equally instructive authors.
Formerly, it went without saying, a major writer like Pope
or Swift received full scholarly attention. We all know the
drill. The editor traces, dates and compares all the surviving
early manuscripts and editions, constructs a stemma or line of
textual descent, and then machine-collates a sufficient number
of copies from each key edition to identify stop-press correc129
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tions and other signs of authorial revision. He or she then
chooses his copy text, the edition or manuscript that seemingly
comes closest to the author's intentions, and from it constructs
an optimum critical text that, he hopes, best represents what
the author had in mind for the work. After all, a Pope or
Swift merits real care. For annotating this critical text—making
all its references and allusions fully intelligible to the modern
reader—the responsible editor performs comparable feats of
research with archival materials, contemporary publications, and
the sizeable secondary literature that has built up over the
years.
For minor writers, the job of editing was much simpler.
Since we know that a Pope and a Swift are complex figures
writing complex literature drawing from complex personal,
political, cultural and literary backgrounds, editing them
requires genuine care. By contrast, we have assumed that a
Mary Barber, a Stephen Duck, a Laurence Whyte, or a Laetitia
Pilkington are simple and unambiguous types, writing simple
and unambiguous work that just as clearly would not require
special care. With a few exceptions—Wilmarth Lewis's Horace
Walpole first comes to mind, along with Robert Halsband and
Isobel Grundy's Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, both based on
textually straightforward autographs—the traditional approach
has been to reprint what seems to be the best early text
(without the folderol of stemmata, collations, and the like), add
a few explanatory notes, and preface the whole with an
introduction in which one points out some of the writer's
foi^otten virtues while congratulating both reader and writer
for one's condescension in making the work available once
again. Anything further is an option, not a necessity; an
additional condescension, not a duty: a work of intellectual
supererogation. But now that we have begun to recognize
more value and interest in lesser authors, both extrinsic and
intrinsic, it is time to reconsider the way we want them edited.
Even on the face of it, the old attitudes seem chiefly designed
to perpetuate themselves. When Swift cracks a joke, we can
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count on Harold Williams or Herbert Davis or one of their
annotating successors to explain what it refers to, its back
ground and nuance and literary source, and otherwise show us
exactly what is amusing about it. When the joke comes from
Swift's young countrymen William Dunkin or Robert
Jephson—assuming they are edited at all—we are lucky to find
even a brief stab at explanation. The result is to confirm our
expectations, our sense of the great gulf fixed between the
so-called major authors and the crowd of nonentities begging
before their gates.
In the period from 1985 to 1993 I had occasion to ponder
these questions—more accurately, have my nose rubbed in
them—while editing the three-volume autobiography of Swift's
friend Laetitia Pilkington. Once we can establish a proper text,
the Pilkington Memoirs reveal themselves in places to be a work
of surprising, and surprisingly modern, literary merit. Once
properly evaluated, their vignettes of Swift, Colley Gibber,
Samuel Richardson, and other contemporaries offer the scholar
a mine of useful information. Once the facts are sifted from
the fictionalizing, and the interesting detritus under the rug
swept back out again, we also find we have a three-dimensional
case study of what it was like to be an intelligent woman in the
eighteenth century, from the courted young girl to the model
wife and mother, and from thence to the struggling divorcee.
In all cases the operative word is once. What I first planned as
a three-quarters full-dress edition—while thinking myself pretty
big in proposing so much—soon grew, of necessity, into the real
thing. Along the way I had to learn something about Mrs.
Pilkington's early friend and patron Mary Barber, the Dublin
poet and woollen-draper's wife. Meanwhile, late in 1992, when
I was nearly finished, the British academic Bernard Tucker
brought out an edition of Mrs. Barber's poems, cleaving to the
traditional straight-and-narrow for editing minor writers.^ It is
' The Poetry of Mary Barber? 1690-1757, ed. Bernard Tucker (Lewiston; Edwin
Mellen Press, 1992).
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not my purpose here to attack Tucker. As an independent in
the academic world, like a private in the army, I have learned
to salute everything that moves. But I think that the different
roads taken in editing the two Irishwomen may illustrate a few
of the issues at stake.
Let us consider the problem of texts. Technically, one of
Mrs. Pilkington's great stylistic achievements is her skill at
making past conversations come alive, her ability to slide from
paraphrase to indirect quotation to direct quotation and back
again, with just the right timing and phrasing for the conversa
tional punch line. Had I made the usual assumption about
editions and made my copy text the last London printings in
her lifetime, I would have sacrificed much of her conversational
ease exactly as her last editor, Jacob Isaacs, had done in 1928.^
Originally, her first two volumes of memoirs had been printed
for her in Dublin, then reprinted in London—once for volume
n, two times for volume 1. Each time, it turns out, her London
publisher Ralph Griffiths seems to have engaged a press
corrector, or in-house editor, to go through her work to tone
down some of her colloquialisms, regularize her phrasing, and
remove contractions from the dialogue she gives ("'tis"
corrected to "it is," "don't" corrected to "do not," and so on).
The results are often wooden. Further research confirmed that
Mrs. Pilkington remained all this time in Dublin, far from the
scene of the revisions. She even wrote to her friend Richardson
not long afterward asking how the book succeeded in London,
as if she had no other means of knowing.^ Generally, the
^ Memoirs of Mrs Letitia Pilkington 1712-1750, ed. J. Isaacs with introduction by Iris
Barry (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1928), 24, claiming to print from "the earhest
editions." For the text of Mrs. Pilkington's first volume, the most celebrated of
the three, Isaacs in fact used the 1749 second London edition (the fourth overall),
and for her second he used an even later source, the 1776 Dubhn reprint. Only
for her Volume IH did he follow the earhest and best edition, pubhshed by her son
Jack in London during 1754.
' The Correspondence of Samuel Richardson, Author of Pamela, Clarissa, and Sir
Charles Grandison, Selected from the Original Manuscripts, Bequeathed by Him to His
Family, ed. Anna Laetitia Barbauld (London: 1804), II, 157 (28 May 1749).
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London revisions incorporate little or no inside information.
But could I be certain that Mrs. Pilkington had had no hand in
them, directly or by proxy? In the end I found it necessary to
sit down at the mechanical collator at Penn and compare
multiple copies of each lifetime edition—thanks to the help of
Daniel Traister, who arranged to borrow extra copies from
other libraries. To make a long story short, there were no
signs of authorial input. But a moral emerged even so. I found
the correct copy text for my edition only because I had taken
the trouble to do edition-to-edition and copy-to-copy collations,
alongside some bio-bibliographical research about the books'
background. Laetitia Pilkington may not be a literary giant,
but it does not pay to edit her less carefully. The differences
are those of scale, not kind. Counting each separately printed
volume separately, we have only nine different typesettings of
her memoirs before 1800, while for Swift's prose alone the total
must run a good fifteen or twenty times higher. As for the
secondary literature that has built up over the years—an Augean
stable to challenge each new aspiring hero of literary scholar
ship—Swift's must outweigh hers by at least a hundred to one.
With Mary Barber's poems the textual situation is almost
certainly more complicated than for Mrs. Pilkington. In his
recent edition. Tucker informs us that he follows the "Bodleian
copy" (unclear which one of three copies located there by
ESTC) of Mary Barber's quarto Poems on Several Occasions,
London, dated 1734. This was her well-known subscription
edition, the first of two printings of her sole collection of
verse—certainly the most logical edition by the traditions of
minor-author editing."^ Tucker's choice may prove right in the
* As part of its own projected edition of Mary Barber—scheduled for autumn 1997,
to be edited by J. Paul Hunter for the Oxford University Press series "Women
Writers in English, 1350-1850"—the Brown University Women Writers Project has
been distributing to purchasers a printout draft-in-process transcribed from a copy
of the familiar quarto subscribers' edition of the Poems (information courtesy Juha
Flanders, WWP Textbase Editor, February 1995). Where Tucker used a copy at
the Bodleian, the WWP transcribed the copy at the Huntington Library (shelfmark
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end, but meanwhile questions remain. Why not use the octavo
reprint, the commercial edition dated a year later, containing (as
it turns out) a scattering of corrections and minor revisions?
Despite the difference in imprint dates it was set up so soon
after the quarto that some of the same printer's ornaments
recur in the same places in the text. And the author can be
placed in London at the time.^ Tucker pays even less attention
to earlier editions of individual poems, which are easily traced
in Foxon; to the poems that had previously appeared in
miscellanies (including a group of six printed in the Tunbridge
Wells collection for 1730% which are traceable through the
unknown to the WWP, 83365 according to the Eighteenth-Century Short Title
Catalogue). Unlike Tucker, who prints only a sampling of the subscribers' names
and omits many of the poems contributed by friends and acquaintances of the
author's, the WWP transcript reproduces everything in the quarto volume, albeit
with the subscribers' Est in the earher state with only nine late subscribers' names
as opposed to the 33 on the cancel leaf described by ESTC.
^ Except for its date, the octavo edition bean the same title and imprint: Poems
on Several Occasions (London: Printed for C. Rivington, at the Bible and Crown
in St. Paul's Churchyard. M.DCC.XXV). For repeating ornaments at the same
places in the text, see the headpiece at quarto 40 and octavo 80, and the tailpieces
at quarto 27 and octavo 27, quarto 37 and octavo 37, quarto 98 and octavo 100,
quarto 230 and octavo 237, and quarto 232 and octavo 239. Samuel Richardson
was the printer, but in Samuel Richardson; Master Printer (Ithaca, 1950; rpt.
Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977), 114-15 and 148-9, Wilham M. Sale, Jr., fails
to note the near-simultaneous appearance of the two editions. The earliest
advertisement for the original subscribers' quarto, in the Daily Journal for 4 Jtme
1735, mentions that "A Neat Edition" of the same in octavo "is just Printed off"
and will soon be available. The poor author, meanwhile, was reported laid up
with gout in London all that spring and early summer; see The Correspondence of
Jonathan Swift, ed. Sir Harold Williams [and David WooUey] (Oxford, 1963-65;
rpt. corr. Oxford: Clarendon, 1965-72), IV, 332-3, 372.
' Tunbrigialia: Or, Tunbridge Miscellanies, for the Year 1730 (London, 1730), 4 ["To
Dr. Lynch, on his Excellent Sermon preach'd at Ttmbridge-Wells Aug. 23 1730"];
5 ["An Epigram on the same Occasion"]; 10 ["Occasion'd by seeing two
Subscribers wanting to fill up a Raffle for Addison's Works"]; 11 ["Written upon
the Rocks at Tunbridge"], 14 ["Upon seeing Lady Betty Germain do a generous
humane Action at Tunbridge-Wells"]; and 16-17 ["An Apology for the Clergy,
who were at Ttmbridge-Wells when the Minister read Prayers"]. The first text
allows us to identify the "Reverend Dr. L—" addressed in the collected Poems,
141. He is the Rev. John Lynche, D.D. (1698-1760), a well-cormected gentleman
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Boys-Mizener first-line index at the University of Kansas; and
to early manuscript and newspaper versions, which are traceable
through other first-line indexes and catalogues. As I reported
at the Third Munster Swift Symposium in 1994, the textual
differences are often striking. Taken as a group, the early texts
sound like the work of a middle-class merchant's wife—which,
after all, is what Mary Barber was. The collected versions speak
in accents noticeably less colloquial and more genteel—much
more conventional as poetry, though to my own ear, at least,
less interesting and individual.^ Which versions should the
editor choose as copy text.' In her Memoirs Laetitia Pilkington
reports group editing sessions in Dublin—at the house of Swift's
friend Patrick Delany—for the purpose of "correcting these
undigested Materials" for presentation in Mrs. Barber's collected
Poems volume. Besides Delany and Mrs. Pilkington, the group
included Mrs. Pilkington's husband Matthew (the parson and
poet), their friend Constantia Grierson (the press corrector,
poet, and classical scholar), and sometimes, she says. Dean Swift
himself. There can be no doubt that Mrs. Barber approved the
final product, but to what extent do the revisions reflect her
work? The one person whom Mrs. Pilkington does not place
at the editorial meetings is Mary Barber herself.' Indeed, during
the four and one half years between the first signs of planning
and the book's final appearance, Mrs. Barber had been away in
England for all but eleven or twelve months, revisiting Dublin
only from September 1732 until August or September 1733.
Her closest friend in the editorial group, Constantia Grierson,
died in early December 1732—giving the pair a bare two
from Kent who became Dean of Canterbury a year after the sermon Mrs. Barber
celebrates. See under Lyncbe in John and J. A. Venn, Alumni Cantabrigienses, Part
I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922-27).
' See Ebas, "Senatus Consultum: Revising Verse in Swift's Dublin Cbcle,
1729-1735," hithcomingin Proceedings of the Third Munster Symposium on Jonathan
Swift, ed. Hermann J. Real (Munich: Wilbebn Fink).
' The Third and Last Volume of the Memoirs of Mrs. Laetitia Pilkington (London,
1754), 65-7.
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months of overlap.' Like Delany and like Swift, who said he
found in her work "a true poetical Genius," we know that Mrs.
Grierson already admired Mary Barber's verse. No matter how
they may have brushed the verse up, chronology and common
sense suggest it was the early versions that first attracted them.
Even if we ignore the early texts with Tucker, the Barber
quarto of 1734 presents problems in itself—problems that are
only soluble by copy-to-copy collations and a far wider search
than I have attempted. For one thing, the imprint date is
wrong. The volume was advertised as "In the Press" as early as
October 1733. The following May, in 1734, Mary Pendarves
reported Mrs. Barber ready to publish "about a month hence."
But so far as I can determine, the book did not actually appear
until a full year later, in May or June 1735.^° Probably we can
' The first clear sign that Mary Barber was preparing to collect and publish her
poems by subscription comes in Swift's letter to her of 23 February 1731,
suggesting arrangements and noting some progress so far. She had been in England
since the previous summer. See Swift, Correspondence, EI, 439-40, 394. For her
return to Ireland in 1732, see The Autobiography and Correspondence of Mary
Granville, Mrs. Delany, ed. Lady Llanover (London, 1861-62), I, 372 (6 September);
for her departure again for England about a year later, in company with Mrs.
Pilkington on board the Dublin Yacht, see Swift, Correspondence, IV, 186 (30 July
1733), The Memoirs of Mrs. Laetitia Pilkington (Dublin, 1748),1, 125, and the Dublin
Evening Post for 7/11 August and 25/29 Sept. (Yacht sailings on 8 August and 22
September). For the death of Constantia Grierson on 2 December 1732, probably
from tuberculosis, see Elias, "A Manuscript Book of Constantia Grierson's," Swift
Studies 1 (1987): 36, 44-5.
Daily Journal, 20 Oct. 1733—"In the PRESS, And will be speedily Pubfish'd,
(Having been delay'd by the Author's Want of Health)"—first noted by Sir Harold
Williams in Swift, Correspondence, IV, 333n; Mrs. Delany, I, 473 (28 May 1734).
From 19 December 1734 through 27 February 1735 advertisements in the Daily
Journal claimed that the volume would be ready for subscribers "the Fhst of next
March," but the earhest pubUcation armouncement I have found (again in the Daily
Journal) dates from 4 June 1735. An oft-quoted letter of 10 May from Arm
Donellan to Swift, reporting that "her [Mrs. Barber's] poems are generally greatly
liked" except by "a few severe critics" (Swift, Correspondence, IV, 332-33), may
reflect reactions to whatever poems she had been showing people prior to
pubhcation, to drum up subscriptions. In her verses "To a Lady, who commanded
me to send her an Accoimt in Verse, how I succeeded in my Subscription," 275-83,
the Poems volume indeed concludes with a long burlesque description of various
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attribute part of this delay to Mrs. Barber's arrest in February
1734, on the information of her former friend Matthew
Pilkington, for her part in publishing Swift's Epistle to a Lady
a few weeks before." Something certainly interrupted the
Barber printing process, and by the time her volume finally
appeared it contained several poems about events in the summer
and fall of 1734, well after the targeted publication date. Did
they replace something taken out of the volume.' In the three
or four copies I have seen, I find no obvious cancels beyond a
late addition to the subscribers' list. Nor do I notice any
sudden changes in type style, headlines, or ornaments—no
physical signs of the interruption, which we know took place.
We are left with a mystery. Until someone undertakes a more
thorough search and comparison of surviving copies, we stand
little chance of solving it." Choice of text may determine
people's reactions (some harsh) to poems that the author had been circulating this
way.
" For a full account, see John Irwin Fischer, "The Govermnent's Response to
Swift's An Epistle to a Lady," Philological Quarterly 65 (1986): 39-59. Charges
against her were not dropped tmtil Trinity term 1735, about the time her Poems
finally appeared.
The same situation holds true with Mrs. Barber's tmcollected works, early verse
that she did not print with her volume as well as poems that she composed too
late to include. Ignoring the first category altogether. Tucker notes some poetry
on her gout printed in Gentleman's Magazine for March 1737, but otherwise
supposes that she "wrote very little verse after 1734" (8). In truth, no thorough
search has yet been made—nor will it prove easy once undertaken. Except in her
Poems volume, Mrs. Barber typically published her work anonymously. Without
her working papers to guide us, this means that verse not printed in the Poems
must be identified by occasion, subject, style, and other circumstantial evidence.
For instance, in the Dublin Journal of 21/25 October 1746—when she and her
husband (by 1744 apparently too incapacitated to sign a legal document) were back
in Ireland Uving at Glasnevin outside Dublin—style and circumstance suggest her
as the author of the poem beginning "What fragrant Works by Sympathy are
done," described as being by "a Person in Distress, who, if she could raise a small
Sum to carry her and her sick helpless Husband to Bath" (where the Barbers had
Hved during much of the 1730s) "would not stay any longer in this Kingdom."
Similarly in the 1730 Tunbrigialia volume, besides the six poems that she later
reprinted, there are at least two others attributable to her with a fair degree of
certainty: "On a Lady who was at Tunbridge-Wells Chapel, August 23, 1730"
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whether or not a Mary Barber or Laetitia Pilkington sounds
alive in her writings, but it is annotation that lets these works
live and breathe in good earnest. As with so many others in
the eighteenth century, their writings are occasional—thax. is,
they derive from or otherwise comment upon real-life people
and events that the authors have brushed up. against. How can
we gauge literary worth unless we know what is going on? In
her second volume of Memoirs, for instance, Mrs. Pilkington
harks back to a painful period in Dublin during late 1737 and
early 1738, between her separation and divorce on charges of
adultery. Suddenly she found herself in the limelight, snubbed
by her close female friends, and, all too often, propositioned by
their mates. At this time, when "it was quite the Mode to
attack me," she made ends meet by ghostwriting for the
stage-struck portrait painter James Worsdale, who had also been
commissioning work from her estranged husband Matthew.
When Worsdale presents one such piece at the Smock Alley
theater—a ballad opera adapted from The Taming of the Shrew
by Matthew—he has her write a "flaming Prologue to it, in
Honour of my fair Countrywomen," to be recited on
Worsdale's benefit night as author. Worsdale insists on her
attending that night, she goes on,
assuring me he would have a Lettice secured entirely for
me, or any Friends I should please to bring, and would
himself take care of placing me, and also guard me safe
out, for really I was very much afraid of receiving some
Insult. On these Promises I ventured to go; but, lo you!
the Lettice was full—but that was no matter, the Ladies
though my intimate Friends, quickly decamped, and Mrs.
DuB
g, the Fiddler's Wife, declared she had like to
faint at the sight of the odious Creature\ The Reverend
(28-9), the same church service that inspired a known poem of hers elsewhere in
Tunbrigialia, and "To WiUiam Conolly Esq." (12), invoking a familiar theme of
Irish patriotism for a rich Irish landholder who later subscribed to her Poems
volume.
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Mr. Gr
n also took to his Heels, so I had indeed the
whole Lettice for me and my Company, which were two
young Misses, daughters to my Landlady. My Goi^on
Face, instead of turning my Enemies into Stone, clapped
Wings to their Feet, and made them fly downstairs like so
many feathered Mercuries, Parson and all, though he was
bulky, and tipsy, and dull, and so forth."
This is lively and amusing material even when we cannot
identify Mrs. DuB
g the fiddler's wife or the Reverend Mr.
Gr
n, do not know what a Lettice or Lattice is, or why Mrs.
Pilkington should want to sit there. "Lattice" or "Lettice," as
it turns out, was the Dublin term for what Londoners called a
greenbox, a balcony-level box into which the gentlemen who
occupied the pit (usually drunk and disorderly) could not peer
during intermissions, as they did into the regular boxes
downstairs." Any Dubliner would have recognized Mrs.
DuB
g as the wife of the famous conductor and composer
Matthew Dubouig, Master of the King's Music in Ireland, a
Pilkington family friend who had indeed risen into prominence
through his violin virtuosity. If there is some irony in calling
Mrs. Dubouig "the Fiddler's Wife," there is more in capturing
her exclamation that she was like to faint at the sight of the
odious Creature. What little I can discover about Mrs.
Dubouig—from a poem addressed to her by the theatrical
camp-follower Benjamin Victor—suggests that she had once
been a professional singer, a career that like professional acting
and dancing, was not usually associated with female gentility or
n.
chastity." It is the bulky and tipsy Reverend Gr
" Pilkington, Memoirs (1748), II, 226-7.
Mrs. Delany, I, 294; John O'Keeffe, Recollections of the Life of John O'Keeffe,
Written by Himself (London, 1826), I, 287; and Esther K. Sheldon, Thomas
Sheridan of Smock Alley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 51n84,
113n21, 114, 231.
" For Matthew Dubourg, his career, and his connections with Matthew
Pilkington—who celebrated him in a 1725 poem and had him set his royal
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however, who allows Mrs. Pilkington's art to begin opening up
for us. The initials could stand for almost anything—Green,
Grogan, Griffin, perhaps even Grattan, the name of some
parson brothers who figure elsewhere in the Memoirs. The
correct answer is Graffan, the Reverend Dr. Hugh Graffan, at
the time of writing a senior fellow of Trinity College Dublin
and Professor of Oratory and History. Eighteen years before,
Graffan had figured in one of those vehement straight-faced
Irish altercations that so alarm the English and amuse everyone
else. As a junior fellow then at T.C.D., he had been saddled
with the unpaid dogsbody job of Censor, requiring him to
supervise undergraduates penalized for pranks or nonattendance
at lectures.'^ One night on his rounds, having had a drop
taken, he burst into a delinquent student's room, provoked him
to fisticuffs, and lunging forth to retaliate, promptly fell on his
face and was drubbed. The incident inspired a series of poetical
effusions, including The Censoriad and a collection entitled
Birthday Ode to music in 1728—see Philip H. HighfiU, Jr., Kalman A. Burnim, and
Edward A. Langhans, A Biographical Dictionary of Actors, Actresses, Musicians,
Dancers, Managers and Other Stage Personnel in London, 1660-1800 (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1973-93), IV, 485-6; Brian Boydell in T. W.
Moody and W. E. Vaughan, eds., A New History of Ireland: Volume IV.
Eighteenth-Century Ireland 1691-1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 547, 576,
591; James WooUey, review of Foxon, Modem Philology 75 (1977): 69 (Matthew's
Ode, 1728); and [Pilkington], The Progress of Musick in Ireland, A Poem, 2nd ed.
(Dublin, 1725), 7. In 1727, in England, Duboutg had married Frances Gates,
supposedly the daughter of the noted singer Bernard Gates, master chorister of the
Chapel Royal and Westminster Abbey. Apparently it is she whom Victor
addresses as "Dona" ("Whose voice is music, and whose looks are love") in his
poem "On the Birth-Day of Mrs. D." See his Original Letters, Dramatic Pieces,
and Poems (London, 1776), HI, 53-4.
" For Hugh Graffan, a schoolfellow of Matthew's at Trinity who remained there
to become Fellow (1724), D.D. (1736), and Professor of Oratory and History
(1738), see Alumni Dublinenses, ed. George Dames Burtchaell and Thomas Ulick
Sadleir, rev. ed. (Dublin: Alex Thom, 1935), 338, and his obituary in the Dublin
Journal, 1/5 November 1743. For the job of Censor, which he held since its
creation about 1728, see The Dublin University Calendar, 1834 (Dublin: Curry,
1834), 16, and for its lack of pay, the T. C. D. Bursar's Quarterly Accounts
1718-1745, MUN/V/1/57.2, under Graffan for 1728-1731.
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Graffanio-Mastix, which variously celebrated and deplored the
combat and eulogized the fallen hero while he yet lived. In her
description of Smock Alley Mrs. Pilkington echoes one of
them, A Modest Defence of Mr. Graffan, which was full of
sympathy for the Censor:
If a Person of Business, of Credit, and "Worth,
Be bulky, and tipsy, and dull, and so forth.
He cannot pass by, but he suddenly meets
His Talents bespatter'd in dirty half-Sheets.^^
All this took place in 1730, while Mrs. Pilkington's account of
her Smock Alley visit did not appear until the end of 1748. To
the very few Dubliners who might still remember the Graffan
poems in detail, her description of the bulky and tipsy parson
fleeing her lattice would identify the man and in the process
tinge the incident with added absurdity. For most readers,
though, the quotation would not have conveyed much either
way—a minus for Mrs. Pilkington rather than a plus. (Here the
fault probably lay with her printer, Samuel Powell, a cautious
soul who inserted blanks wherever he feared libel, even in
references to her ex-husband "Mr. P
n." If the name
Graffan had been spelled out, her older and more sophisticated
readers should have caught the allusion with no more difficulty
than Pope's did the literary allusions in his verse satires.) In
print Mrs. Pilkington is more successful with her mise-en-scene,
her straight-faced description of modestly trying to avoid public
notice while contributing a "flaming" feminist prologue for
Worsdale's author's night at Smock Alley. Many Dubliners
would have remembered the winter of her separation and
divorce ten years before. Reconstructing the scene from outside
sources—contemporary newspapers, letters, and journals—we
find that Worsdale's benefit took place on 18 January 1738, just
A Modest Defence of Mr. Gr
1730), 3.

n. Being an Answer to the Censoriad (Dublin,
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three weeks before her scheduled divorce triald' At the time,
she would have been noticeably pregnant with her last child,
which, under Irish law, would be automatically declared a
bastard at her divorced' Meanwhile, Worsdale's ballad opera
that night, which survives in print, is a cheerfully libertine
affaird° Even without it, Worsdale was gaining considerable
" A hit afterpiece in Dublin that season (played at least fourteen times by May 19),
the "new Operatical Farce" A Cure for a 5c£)i!£/—advertised as "Written by Mr.
Worsdale, founded on Shakespear's Taming of the SHREW"—made its Irish debut
at Smock Alley on 16 January 1738 {Dublin News-Letter, 10/14 January).
Worsdale's benefit took place two nights later, on 18 January {Dublin Journal,
14/17 January). For the Pilkington divorce trial on 7 February, before the Dublin
diocesan consistory court, see the Dublin News-Letter and the Dublin Evening Post
of 7/11 February.
" Mrs. Pilkington reports herself pregnant at the time of her separation from
Matthew the previous fall and mentions the birth as taking place not too long after
the divorce, which was pronoimced on the day of the trial, 7 February 1738
{Memoirs, I, 178, 217, 221). The separation dates back to late September or
October 1737, judging from Dr. Edward Barry's reference to the bedroom scene
that precipitated it, in a long gossipy letter dated 28 Oct. and printed in T. Percy
C. Kirkpatrick's Report of Sir Patrick Dun's Library, Presented to the Royal College
of Physicians in Ireland On St. Luke's Day, 1919 (n.p. but Dublin, privately printed,
1919), 10, 11. For the legal provisions that bastardized children born after an
ecclesiastical divorce unless their legitimacy was demonstrated in court, see Edward
Bullingbrooke, Ecclesiastical Law; Or, The Statutes, Constitutions, Canons, Rubricks,
and Articles of the Church of Ireland (Dublin, 1770), I, 555-6, and Arthur Browne,
A Compendious View of the Ecclesiastical Law of Ireland, 2nd ed. (Dublin, 1803),
278.
See Worsdale, A Cure for a Scold. As it is now acting at the Theatres in London
and Dublin (Dublin, 1738). Unfortunately, this omits Mrs. Pilkington's special
prologue. Worsdale had first staged the opera in London three years before. The
1738 Dublin text shows a fair amount of revision, presumably Matthew
Pilkington's work. The dialogue has been brushed up in places, a new duet has
been added in Att 11 (Air XI, "Eye, nay prithee Wife"), a suggestive song made
more so ("So the Cur who possest, / A Bone of the best, / Cou'd lick it, or leave
it, at Pleasure," 19), and a long new ballad substituted for the short chorus finale
("While the duU, the morose, in a jocular Strain"). Nor was the original 1735 text
all Worsdale's work. As John Genest first pointed out in Some Account of the
English Stage (Bath, 1832), HI, 448, it derives not directly from Shakespeare but an
unmentioned intermediate source, John Lacy's comedy Sawny the Scott; Or, The
Taming of the Shrew (London, 1698). Indeed, some of Lacy's minor dialogue has
been carried over verbatim.
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notoriety that season as a ringleader of the Dublin Hell-fire
Club, or Blasters, who were rumored to meet at the Eagle
Tavern for bouts of blasphemy, debauchery, or worse.^' As a
close friend of Edward Walpole, the British prime minister's
son, Worsdale himself could not be touched. While Bishop
Berkeley thundered against the Blasters in the Irish Lords on
College Green that winter, the newspapers reported Worsdale
busy painting the portrait of His Grace the Lord Lieutenant, up
the street in Dublin Castle.^ How could Mrs. Pilkington have
For the Blasters and Worsdale's connection to them—he painted a group portrait,
and the name "James Worsdale Master of the Revels" has been found engraved on
one of their drinking glasses—see Swift's letter to John Barber of 9 March 1738, in
Correspondence, V, 97; Anne Crookshank and Desmond J. V. FitzGerald, 29th
Knight of Glin, The Painters of Ireland c. 1660-1920 (London: Barrie & Jenkins,
1978), 47-9; National Gallery of Ireland, Acquisitions 1986-1988 (Dublin, 1988),
68-70; and illustration (portrait of the Hell-fire Club), CPA Irish Arts Review, VI
(1989-90): 224.
^ The Blasters inspired Berkeley's Discourse Addressed to Magistrates and Men in
Authority, Occasioned by the Enormous Licence, and Irreligion of the Times that
winter, as well as his much-applauded speech in the House of Lords. The Lords'
inquiry culminated in a warrant for the arrest of a far less influential Blaster, the
painter Peter Paul Lens, who promply fled. See A. A. Luce, The Life of George
Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (London: Thomas Nelson, 1949), 176-7; Journals of the
House of Lords, HI (Dublin: 1784), 414; and Sir John T. Gilbert and Lady Gilbert,
Calendar of Ancient Records of Dublin (Dublin: Joseph Dollard, 1898-1903), VIII,
304 (constables' accotmt). Meanwhile, during the week of 19-25 March 1738, we
find the Lord Lieutenant, the Duke of Devonshire, reported sitting "three Times"
for a portrait by Worsdale, hardly a mark of official suspicion or displeasure
{Dublin Journal, 25/28 March, see also Gilbert in Irish Quarterly Review 3 [1853]:
261-2n, recording payment for the portrait, frame, and a copy in April and July
1738). Young Walpole was in Dublin that season serving as secretary to the Lord
Lieutenant—a post of considerable power and influence. He shared Worsdale's
interests in painting, music, stage writing, and mimicry, in which Wondale was an
acknowledged master. Three yean earUer, back in London, Wondale had
dedicated the original venion of A Cure for a Scold to him, and in later yean
helped to foil an attempt to blackmail him for allegedly sodomizing an
unemployed Irish footman. See Wondale, A Cure for a Scold. A Ballad Farce of
Two Acts (London: n.d. but 1735), dedication; A Genuine Narrative of the
Conspiracy by Kather, Kane, Alexander, Nickson, &c. Against The Hon. Edward
Walpole (London: n.d. but 1751), 22 & passim; Victor, Original Letters, I, 193-5;
and The History of Parliament, The House of Commons 1713-1754, ed. Romney
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dared to appear publicly in Worsdale's box, on Worsdale's
benefit night, pregnant and awaiting divorce as she was? How
Matthew Pilkington must have writhed! No wonder the dull
and tipsy Hugh Graffan flew downstairs as fast as his bulk
permitted him. Knowing some of the background, which her
readers knew, we find ourselves in a position to recognize and
savor the cheerful yet oddly innocent effrontery that is so
characteristic of Mrs. Pilkington. ¥ier Memoirs breathe a gaiety,
a sense of mischief, and a fundamental unconcern about
appearances—even as she marshals them against her foes—which
strike me as extraordinary. I would not have missed editing
them for the world.
Given the necessary editorial time and effort, I have a feeling
that Mary Barber might likewise live again through her verse,
though probably not for the same reasons. To get as far as I
did with Mrs. Pilkington required going well beyond the
standard secondary sources. Indeed, for minor authors,
secondary sources do not usually amount to much. Misinfor
mation tends to be repeated over and over through the years
with few serious attempts at verification. From Prof. Tucker's
to the magisterial Roger Lonsdale's, in his Oxford anthology of
female poets, recent accounts of Mrs. Barber illustrate the
problem.^^ She was born about 1690, we are told, had either
two or four children—two or three feature in her Poems
Sedgwick (New York: Oxford University Press for the History of Parliament
Trust, 1970), II, 508.
" Eighteenth Century Women Poets: An Oxford Anthology, ed. Roger Lonsdale
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 118-19; see also Jeimett Humphreys in
DNB I (1885), 1068-9; Irvin Ehrenpreis, Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age,
in (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 635-6; Anne M. Brady and
Brian Cleeve, A Biographical Dictionary of Irish Writers (Mullingar: Ldliput Press,
1985), 6; Joyce Fullard in A Dictionary of British and American Women Writers
1660-1800, ed. Janet Todd (Totowa: Rowman & Allenheld, 1985), 38; Patrick
Pagan in A Georgian Celebration: Irish Poets of the Eighteenth Century (Dublin:
Branar, 1989), 43-4; Virginia Blain, Patricia Clements, and Isobel Grundy, The
Feminist Companion to Literature in English (New Haven: Yale Univenity Press,
1990), 59; and Joanne Sbattock, The Oxford Guide to British Women Writers
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 25-6.
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volume—and finally died in 1757. However, the Dublin Journal
reports her death two years earlier, on 14 July 1755, and if she
had been born in 1690 she certainly began her reproductive
career early. The St. Werburgh's parish registers record a son's
baptism in October 1705—the first of nine or ten children
recorded there.^"* Nor was this earliest child in the registers
necessarily the Barbers' first. The surviving documents begin
only the year before. Supposedly the family lived in Capel
Street, on the semi-suburbanized north side of the Liffey. Her
husband the woollen-draper was supposedly named Jonathan.
But the parish registers consistently give their address as St.
Werburgh's Steet in the heart of the old downtown business
district, precisely where we would expect to find a successful
retailer. From them, the Registry of Deeds in Dublin, and
book subscription lists of the 1740s there can be no doubt that
his name was Rupert, not Jonathan. Instead of dying about
1733, as Lonsdale assumes, Mary's death notice indicates he was
still alive 22 years later, as does an entry that year in Mrs.
Delany's printed letters (sometimes overlooked because missed
At the Representative Church Body Library in Dublin, MSS R326.1.1 and
R326.4.1 (St. Werburgh's, Dublin, registers of baptisms, marriages, and burials,
1704-1836) list a son Richard baptised 12 October 1705, a son Robert (a slip of the
clerk's pen for Richard.') buried twelve days later in the same year, a daughter
Elizabeth buried 29 November 1708, a daughter Euphemia baptised 25 Jrme 1710
and buried 9 November the same year, a son Constantine (the future physician)
baptised 20 September 1714, a son James (otherwise "Jacob") baptised 5 September
1716 and buried 8 February 1717, a daughter Mira (otherwise "Mirah") baptised 25
December 1717, a son Rupert (otherwise "Rubert," the future painter) baptised 20
September 1719, a son Lucius (otherwise "Lucia") baptised 18 September 1720, and
a son John baptised 30 June 1724 and buried 6 November the same year. Only
Constantine, Rupert, Lucius, and Mira lived to maturity. For some reason—error
by successive parish clerks, a change in her own preferred usage—all but the last
baby ("John Son of Rupert and Mary Barbor Warburghs Street") are listed as the
offspring of Rupert and Ann Barber. No record of a first-wife burial or
second-wife marriage supports the supposition that Rupert had married twice and
that Mary was the surviving children's stepmother, not mother; for a signature of
hers as early as 1710, when she witnessed a will as "Mary, wife of Rupert Barbor,
Dublin, merchant," see P. Beryl Eustace, ed.. Registry of Deeds, Dublin, Abstracts
of Wills, volume I (Dublin: Stationery Office, 1956), #25.
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by the index) Of Mrs. Barber's character we know even less.
Both Swift and Patrick Delany risked their reputations to help
her find influential English subscribers for her poems vol
ume—including Alexander Pope, whom she boldly importuned
to correct them—and then to defend her when she was chained
with forging letters in Swift's name to Queen Caroline, praising
herself as "the best female poet of this or perhaps of any age"
and denigrating a courtier who had blocked her access to the
Queen. To a correspondent of the slandered courtier, Mrs.
Barber gave the impression of a "strange, bold, disagreeable
woman," while Swift insisted that she had "only one defect,
which is too much bashfullness."^^ Now Mary Barber was
See the subscribers' list in John Winstanley's Poems (Dublin, 1742), giving the
whole family (Rupert, Mary, all four surviving children) in correCT order of
precedence; a deed of 1744 also lists the entire family in order, with the eldest son
Constantine signing for bis father via power of attorney (Registry of Deeds,
Dublin, vol. 117, 149-51, #80074). Reporting Mary Barber's death in 1755, the
Dublin Journal of 14/17 June calls her "Wife of Mr. Rupert Barber," not "widow"
or "relict"; compare Mrs. Delany a few months earber. III, 327: "Old Mr. Barber
is alive, drinks bis claret, smokes bis pipe, and cares not a pin for any of his family."
To bis credit, Patrick Pagan catches the Delany reference in A Georgian Celebration
(1989), 44, followed by Tucker both in bis edition, 8, and in a follow-iip article in
Eighteenth-Century Ireland 7 (1992): 47, generally recapitulating information from
the edition. The error about Rupert Barber's death seems to have originated in
Ebrenpreis's biography of Swift (1983) as does the supposition that bis name was
Jonathan—the name mistakerJy recorded in bis son Constantine's matriculation
entry at Trinity College Dublin, as published in Alumni Dublinenses, 38. The
mistake about the Barbers' home in Dublin derives from Mary Barber's quarto
Poems volume, 172, a verse dirmer invitation dated "Capel-street, Dublin, January
24, 1732," during her brief visit back to Dublin in 1732-1733 when she was
presumably staying in lodgings. The Barbers bad not bved in Ireland since May
or June 1730 and did not return for good until sometime between the summer of
1737, when Lord Orrery saw her in England, and August 1741, when she wrote
Samuel Richardson from Dublin. See Swift, Correspondence, EI, 394 (2 May 1730)
and V, 65 (23 July 1737); The Orrery Papers, ed. Emily Charlotte de Burgh Caiming
Boyle, Countess of Cork and Orrery ^ndon: Duckworth, 1903), I, 223 (10 May
1737); and T. C. Dimcan Eaves and Ben D. Kimpel, Samuel Richardson, A
Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 122, 628 (26 August 1741).
Swift, Correspondence, IH, 479-80, 449, and V, 259-60; Charlotte Clayton, Lady
Sundon, Memoirs of Viscountess Sundon, Mistress of the Robes to Queen Caroline, ed.
Katberine Byerley Thomson (London: 1847), U, 71, 68; and Mrs. Delany, I, 552.
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nothing if not an occasional writer, a poet of middle-class
motherhood responding to and writing about the children she
raised, the education she gave them, the household she ran, the
people she met, the places she went, and the events she
witnessed. If we do not know the first thing about her basic
life and character—and the same holds true for any number of
other lesser authors—I question how much we gain from
editing, anthologizing, or generalizing about her in the easy
traditional ways. How indeed can we take a full measure of her
or any other "minor" writer against the "major" ones unless we
edit them with the same attention to text, context, and literary
and biographical allusion? Meanwhile it has never been easier
to order film, fiche, or copyflo of original eighteenth-century
texts. Compared to modern scholarly publications, the cost has
never been lower. Why bother to edit a Mary Barber unless we
can substantially improve upon such vehicles? If she and others
like her deserve editorial attention at all, they deserve attention
that's serious?'
^ For the impetus and encouragement to undertake this essay I am grateful to
James E. May, Smollett editor and biobibliographical scholar extraordinaire.
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EDITOR'S NOTE; This is the last article written by Professor
Carl R. Kropf. His colleague, Murray L. Brown, who
prepared the manuscript of this article for publication, offers
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The following essay was written by Professor Carl R.
Kropf (1940-1993) some months before his death in
March of 1993. Professor Kropf received his BA from
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esteemed by his students and by his colleagues in the
academic community. All of us at Georgia State
University miss him very much indeed. He is survived
by his wife Martha.

riting in 1955, Aubrey "Williams noted that "in the
pantheon of poetry no deity has remained, perhaps,
so mysterious as the goddess Dulness."* Since then
matters have not noticeably improved. Valerie Rumbold
discusses the women in The Dunciad and concludes that Dulness
"stands for what his [Pope's] mind abhors and imagination
craves."^ In what sense Dulness can be said to stand for what
Pope's imagination craves is unclear, but certainly she does
stand for much that he fears. As Patricia Spacks has noted,
many of the female figures in eighteenth-century literature—in
Smollett's novels, for example—are vaguely threatening,
ominous characters.^
Beyond doubt, figures like Pope's Dulness, his Spleen in The
Rape of the Lock, Swift's Criticism in The Battle of the Books, and
assorted other threatening female figures are part of the long
antifeminist tradition that Felicity Nussbaum finds in
eighteenth-century satire,'' but in fact the major feminist studies
of eighteenth-century texts have little or nothing to say about
these three related female figures. In her later study of
antifeminist satiric topoi, Nussbaum does not deal with these
' Aubrey Williams, Pope's Dunciad: A Study of Its Meaning (New York: Archon
Books, 1968), 144.
^ Valerie Rxunbold, Women's Place in Pope's World (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 167.
' Patricia Meyer Spacks, "Early Fiaion and the Frightened Male" Novel 8
(1974-75): 14-15.
•* Felicity A. Nussbaum, "Pope's 'To a Lady' and the Eighteenth-Century Woman,"
Philological Quarlerly 54 (1975): 444.
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women.® Ellen Pollak refers to Spleen in passing,® as does Ruth
Salvaggio, who also mentions Swift's Criticism briefly.^ The
feminist critics' silence about these female figures is, I believe,
quite appropriate. The term "antifeminist" is usually used to
refer to works in which the authors' language consciously or
unconsciously privileges masculinity or masculine behavior in
a way that embodies western culture's pervasive assumptions
about women's inferior position. The evidence that most
eighteenth-century literature is antifeminist and that much
modern criticism of that literature is also antifeminist along
with much criticism of that literature is overwhelming.
William Walker has recently shown that even Locke, who was
unusually careful about allowing unarticulated assumptions to
infiltrate his language, often slips into antifeminist language and
imagery in his Essay.^ To say that the female figures under
consideration here are antifeminist, however, is to trivialize
their impact and to dilute their power as symbols. What I want
to argue is that rather than being merely unusually strong
exhibitions of virulent antifeminism, they are expressions of a
well-defined Jungian archetype. It can be ai^ued, I believe, that
the long antifeminist tradition that Nussbaum documents in
eighteenth-century satire is not only, or perhaps even predomi
nantly, the result of enculturated antifeminism.® Rather than
growing out of the age's obviously condescending attitude
toward women as naturally inferior beings, many of the
threatening female figures in eighteenth-century satire are
archetypal expressions of what Carl Jung called the "Terrible
Mother." In other words, they spring from the collective
' Felicity A. Nussbaum, The Brink of All We Hate (Lexington; University of
Kentucky Press, 1984).
' Ellen Pollack, The Politics of Sexual Myth: Gender and Ideology in the Verse of
Swift and Pope (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1985), 77, 97.
^ Ruth Salvaggio, Enlightened Absence: Neoclassical Configurations of the Feminine
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 69, 90.
' Wilham Walker, "Locke Minding Women," Eighteenth-Century Studies 23 (1990);
245-68.
' Nussbaum, "Pope's 'To a Lady,'" 444.
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unconscious and are therefore far more compelling as images of
dangerous and threatening forces than literary analysts have
recognized.
Because literary critics have often been rather cavalier in
their use of the phrase "archetypal image," it will be useful to
begin by recalling Jung's repeated reminders that the archetype
"in itself is an irrepresentable, unconscious, pre-existent form
that seems to be part of the inherited structure of the psyche
and can therefore manifest itself spontaneously anywhere, at
any time" and that "archetypes are not determined as regards
their content, but only as regards their form and then only to
a very limited degree."^" Consequently, identifying any symbol
as archetypal, or more accurately as an expression of an
archetype, is necessarily a stochastic enterprise. As a result,
careful authors such as Marie-Louise von Franz note that "one
can never say, or interpret, what an archetype means, but one
can to a certain extent circumambulate them [^rc] by showing
their different aspects and functions within their psychic set
up."" Erich Neumann therefore appropriately opens his study
of The Great Mother with the reminder that the term "arche
type" refers "not to any concrete image existing in space and
time, but to an inward image at work in the human psyche.
The symbolic expression of this psychic phenomenon is to be
found in the figures of the Great Goddess represented in the
myths and artistic creations of mankind."" In her positive
manifestation the Magna Mater is nature's benevolent, creative,
and nurturing force. For the Emperor Julian she is the "source
of the intellectual and creative gods, who in their turn guide the
All quotations from Jung are from The Collected Works, eds. Sir Herbert Read
et al., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), vol. 10, 1847; vol. 9, intro.,
179.
" Marie-Louise von Franz, A Psychological Interpretation of the Golden Ass of
Apuleius (Irving: Spring Publications, 1980), 151.
Erich Neumann, The Great Mother; An Analysis of the Archetype, trans. Ralph
Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 3. See also Jimg's
discussion of the anima or mother figure: Symbols of Transformation {Complete
Works, vol. 5).
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visible gods: she is both the mother and spouse of mighty
Zeus; she came into being next to and together with the great
creator; she is in control of every form of life, and the cause of
all generation."" For Plutarch she is Isis, the "female form of
Nature" and "receptive of every form of generation."" In the
Isis-Book of Apuleius's Golden Ass she appears to Lucius and
identifies herself as "mother of the universe, the mistress of all
the elements, the first offspring of time."" In Christian
literature she appears most notably in Proverbs 8 as the
personification of the wisdom of God and in Patriarchal
writings as sapientia creata}^ It is in this form, as Sapience, that
Spenser addresses her in religious terms in his "An Hymne of
Heavenly Beavty."
Literary critics have recognized specific manifestations of
this benevolent aspect of the archetype in literature. Frank
Manley argues that Elizabeth Drury in Donne's Anniversaries
is a symbol "too complex for all its parts to be held in the mind
at once discursively," but "in present-day terms perhaps a vague
idea of what Donne was getting at is available in C. G. Jung's
concept of anima, which is in itself vague but which in general
represents the 'Idea of a Woman' in man, the image of his own
soul, of his own deepest reality." Similarly, in his analysis of
medieval European literature, Curtius recognizes a recurring
feminine power that "invades the concept of the Godhead. It

" Julian, "Hymm to the Mother of the Gods," in The Works of the Emperor Julian,
trans. Wihner Cave Wright (New York: Macmillan, 1913-23), I, 463.
" Plutarch, "Isis and Osiris," in Plutarch's Moralia, vol. 5, trans. Frank Cole Babbit
(Cambridge: Harvard Univenity Press, 1957), 129.
" Apuleius of Madauros, The Ms-Book, ed. J. Gwyn Griffiths (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1975), 75.
" Frank Manley, ed., John Donne: The Anniversaries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1963), 18. Manley concludes his lengthy discussion of this feature
of the hterature by noting that "she is identified in Christian terms as the Holy
Ghost or the Spirit of the Messiah...the Grace of God, that was lost in the fall and
restored by the coming of Christ' (32). For discussion of other relevant traditions
see John Sitter, The Poetry of Pope's Dunciad (Minneapohs: University of
Minnesota Press, 1971).
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is the archetype of the unconscious, which C. G. Jung calls the
anima. >»17
Critics have been somewhat less ready to perceive the
appearance of the equally important negative features of the
Great Mother, even though Jung himself and Neumann
recognize the profoundly ambivalent nature of the archetype.'®
Neumann observes that the anima has "a positive and a negative
aspect; it preserves the ambivalent structure of the archetype
and, like the Great Mother, forms a unity in which positive,
negative, and ambivalently balanced constellations stand side by
side." In fact, he devotes a lengthy chapter to what he calls
"The Negative Elementary Character" of the Great Mother.''
In pagan myth, Isis is not only the mother of all living things,
she is also the destroyer and has, like Ishtar, in M. Ester
Harding's words "a twofold character. Not only is she the giver
of life but she is also the destroyer."^" In his extensive
comparative history of motherhood, Robert BriflFault notes the
presence of this same ambiguity in Christian attitudes toward
women, for in addition to being associated with divine wisdom
she is "universally regarded as having brought death into the
world and all our woe."^'
One can find this same ambiguity toward the female as
symbol in the immediate literary background to the eighteenthcentury. If the Mighty Mother appears as Sapience in Spenser's
"Hymne," she also appears in her negative aspect as the
loathsome resident of Error's Den in The Faerie Qveene. Like
Sin in Milton's Paradise Lost, Error's upper parts are female
while her lower parts are those of a huge serpent. Both figures
live in an underground setting and are surrounded by their

" Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans.
Willard R. Trask (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953), 122.
" See Jung, Complete Works, vol. 5.
" Neumann, The Great Mother, 34, 147-210.
M. Ester Harding, Woman's Mysteries Ancient and Modem {^evfYorV:. Putnam's
Sons, 1972), 109, 184.
Robert Briffault, The Mothers (London: AUen & Unwin, 1927), IT, 571.
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many children7^ While most critics agree that Milton's Sin
most immediately derives from Scylla who was identified with
sin in Christian literature at least as far back as St. John
Chrysostom, most of her features are also associated with the
Terrible Mother as we shall soon see. Even in his "Anniversa
ries" where Donne vaguely identifies Elizabeth Drury with the
spirit of the Second Person of the Christian God, he remarks
on the ambivalence of the female symbol:
For the first mariage was our funerall;
One woman at one blow, she kill'd vs all.
And singly, one by one, they kill vs now.
(105-07)"
Pope expresses a similar ambivalence in his "To a Lady""
when he writes "And yet, believe me, good as well as ill, /
Woman is at best a Contradiction still" (11. 269-70), thereby
once again expressing what Valerie Rumbold identifies as his
"troubled fascination with striking and assertive women" that
is a "recurring theme both in his poetry and in his personal
life.""
The constellation of images and figures that surround
expressions of the Terrible Mother figure derive from ancient
pagan ceremony and from the myths that grew up around the
gods." Jung writes, for example, that the genealogy of the
Sphinx has a number of connections with the Terrible Mother:

" The Fairie Qveene, I, 1, 14-15; Paradise Lost, II, 650-6.
Here, as is frequently Donne's habit, he puns on the term "to die," a meaning
made clear in subsequent lines; the term's sinister aspect is immediately evident.
I use Geoffrey Tillotson's The Rape of the Lock and Other Poems, 3rd ed. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), and rely on James Sutherland's edition of The
Dunciad, 3rd. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). All subsequent
references will be to these two editions.
" Valerie Rumbold, Women's Place in Pope's World (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), xv.
The following discussion of these images is necessarily brief. See also Jung,
Complete Works, 5 and passim, and Neumann, 147-79.
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"she was a daughter of Echidna, a monster with the top half of
a beautiful maiden, and a hideous serpent below," a figure that
antedates by several millennia Spenser's Error and Milton's
Sin.^^ Like those two figures the Terrible Mother is also
commonly associated with the underground, or at least with a
cave or den, suggestive of the womb, and therefore of darkness.
In his explanation of the common features of the archetype,
Neumann emphasizes the importance of this facet of the image
cluster: "Thus the womb of the earth becomes the deadly
devouring maw of the underworld, and beside the fecundated
womb and the protecting cave of earth and mountain gapes the
abyss of hell, the dark hole of the depths, the devouring womb
of the grave and of death, of darkness without light, of
nothingness."^^
Like her benevolent counterpart, the Terrible Mother is also
endowed with transformative powers, to change life to death,
or like Circe to change men into beasts, especially into dogs.
Dogs (and the dogstar) and serpents are commonly associated
with the Terrible Mother as they are with Hecate and Artemus
and with Milton's Sin. And finally, incest is a consistent theme
associated with the Terrible Mother as it is with the mother of
the gods who is both mother and spouse to Zeus. In Paradise
Lost Milton's Sin, like Satan himself, is a fallen angel and their
offspring in Hell is Death. Immediately after his birth Death
rapes his mother, and as a result she gives birth to the dogs that
help them guard hell's gates.
This by no means completes the catalogue of unpleasant
images associated with the Terrible Mother, but it is at least
enough to provide a working basis for an analysis of some of
the female figures who appear in eighteenth-century satire and
to give an idea of the cluster of attributes one can expect to find
in expressions of the archetype. The danger with such an
analysis, of course, is that the critic will leap to the conclusion

See lung, Complete Works, 5:265.
Neumann, Tke Great Mother, 149.
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that he has located an expression of the Terrible Mother
archetype in a text when minimal evidence of its presence is
located. Unfortunately, no hard and fast rules can be formu
lated about the use of evidence in such cases, and one must
resort to simple common sense. Consider the example of
Tabitha, Matthew Bramble's termagant sister in Smollett's
Humphry Clinker, who might be regarded as an expression of
the Terrible Mother. She is clearly to be numbered among
those threatening women to whom Spacks refers in her
discussion of frightening women in the novels,^' and she is
devoted to Chowder, her egregious pet dog that causes all sorts
of tragicomic problems for her companions. Eighteenth-cen
tury novels, however, are filled with embittered, aging spinsters
on one last, desperate search for a husband. The fact that this
one is accompanied by a dog hardly justifies our mobilizing the
entire apparatus of analytical psychology to explain her
existence or to understand the significance of her presence in
the text. To do so would do more to complicate than clarify
our understanding of Smollett's accomplishment or our
appreciation of his characterization of the figure.
Restoration heroic tragedy, on the other hand, offers some
more interesting and complex female figures as candidates for
archetypal images. M. Ester Harding discusses what she calls
"the demonic, nonhuman aspect of woman" as it appears in her
relationships with men. "If a woman acts, in any situation, as
nothing but female," that is, if she acts purely according to
sexual instinct, her male companion
is very apt to get ensnared in a way which undermines
him. Such a situation has often been described in novels
and plays where a woman uses her power over a man to
induce him by means of her sex appeal to stay with her
when his duty or honor califs] him away. The typical
story is that he must join his regiment. When he goes to
' Spacks, 14.
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say goodby to her she coaxes him to remain or is so
alluring that he forgets his obligation, and the army
entrains without him.^°
To anyone acquainted with heroic tragedy where the major
conflict is commonly between the hero's honor or duty and his
love of the heroine, this sounds very familiar. In fact, it exactly
describes the conflict Dryden develops in the first three acts of
All for Love, his version of the Anthony-Cleopatra story and his
best tragedy. For the purposes of the present analysis an even
more interesting example is Dryden's Conquest of Grenada, his
longest and most complex heroic tragedy. Dryden's hero,
Almanzor, is torn between his honor and his love for Amanda
who is promised and eventually married to someone else. In
spite of his pleas and her love for him, Amanda remains true to
her vows, contrary to her own instincts. Meanwhile, a
contrasting female character, Lyndaraxa, uses her sexual appeal
to foment plots and rebellions to satisfy her desire to become
queen. The plot, like that of many heroic tragedies, repeatedly
defies probability and the characterization is extravagant far
beyond credibility. But the play's contemporary popularity and
its continued fascination for modern readers becomes more
comprehensible if the entire work is approached in terms of
myth and the two women as expressions of the two contrasting
aspects of the mother archetype. Amanda is clearly the
nurturing, generative mother of order, acting at every turn as
the positive female principle. Lyndaraxa is consistently
associated with disorder, devouring greed, and darkness.
The major satires of the eighteenth century, and especially
the mock-epics, provide the clearest, most explicit expressions
of the Terrible Mother. The genre itself furnishes a context in
which readers expect to find classical allusions, characters
reminiscent of or analogous to those found in classical epics,
and events important to cultural and social history. And the
' Harding, 81.
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best mock-epics of the age assuredly possess these qualities. The
fact that most satire, at least of the Horatian kind, is humorous,
sometimes even rollicking, by no means forecloses its treatment
of serious matters. Satire is composed precisely because the
author thinks something is wrong; the use of mock-epic
implies that the issues are grave and deserve serious attention.
Ronald Paulson has shown that "the satire of Dryden, Swift,
and Pope follows a tradition beginning in Christian humanism,"
and when their satire "is ostensibly about literary vices, it is
actually about moral and religious issues."^'
This is certainly the case with the three works in which the
three female figures of major interest here appear. Swift's Battle
of the Books, in which Criticism is personified as a Terrible
Mother, is one of hundreds of documents in the AncientsModerns Controversy, a debate that involved much more than
the relative merits of ancient and modern literary works. As
Richard Jones has convincingly shown, it embraced the entire
range of cultural values and provoked a broad debate over the
accomplishments of modern science, art, and politics.^^ Pope's
Rape of the Lock, where Spleen appears as a goddess of the
underworld, includes a serious commentary on the pride and
depravity of the privileged social classes, and of course The
Dunciad, especially The Dunciad, in Four Books (1742), is an
elegy for an entire system of values and in its fourth book
chronicles the final triumph of Dulness and the moderns who
worship her. All three of these works, in other words, record
what the ancient commentators on the epic called the translatio
studii, the rise and fall of cultures and the clash of values such
events involve. These are phenomena worthy of epic treatment
and such as the gods might concern themselves with.
And finally, it is certainly germane to the present argument
to recall that satire, more than most other forms of literary art.
Ronald Paulson, The Fictions of Satire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1967), 113-14.
Richard Foster Jones, Ancients and Modems, 2nd ed. (St. Louis: Washington
University Press, 1961).
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enjoys a privileged position with respect to ritual and ancient
myth. In his study of the affinities between satire and magic,
Robert C. Elliott concludes that the satirist "may contribute to
the richness and coherence of his culture by virtue of its being
a constitutive element of ritual, as in the Greek Phallic Songs.
Or it may be employed in straightforward and warlike defense
of his tribe against threat from without."^^ As literary
historians have repeatedly argued, the Tory satirists of the
eighteenth century were an embattled tribe fighting a hopeless
war against the encroachments of modern art and morality.
That they chose satire and mock-epic in particular as their
weapon and that the immediate issues were both pressing and
morally consequential are significantly enabling conditions for
the appearance of expressions of the Terrible Mother archetype,
and they justify the expectation that these satirists would deploy
the most powerful imagery available in the genre's arsenal.
Among the three works at hand the Terrible Mother puts in
her briefest appearance as the "malignant Deity" Criticism in
Swift's Battle of the Books where Momus, symbol of the modern
carping critic and patron god of the Moderns, seeks her aid in
behalf of his worshipers. He finds her atop a mountain "in her
Den, upon the Spoils of numberless Volumes half devoured."^'*
Like the Magna Mater figure, she is associated 'with the incest
theme, for next to her is "Ignorance, her Father and Husband."
She is additionally associated with animals, having "Claws like
a Cat: Her Head, and Ears, and Voice, resembled those of an
Ass." Her spleen, the organ associated with bad temper, "was
so large, as to stand prominent like a Dug of the first Rate, nor
wanted Excrescencies in form of Teats, at which a Crew of ugly
Monsters were greedily sucking." Momus arouses her from a

Robert C. Elliot, The Power of Satire: Magic Ritual, Art (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960).
Jonathan Swift, A Tale of a Tub, ed. A. C. Guthkelch and D. Nichol Smith, 2nd
ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 247. Compare the passage quoted earlier
(xxx) where Netunaim discusses "the protecting cave of earth and moimtain" and
its associations with the Terrible Mother.
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characteristic lethai^, and she visits the scene of the impending
battle in St. James's Library to sanctify the exploits of her
mortal son, William Wotton. Here "the Cares of a Mother
began to fill her Thoughts" and she assumes the guise of
Wotton's friend Richard Bentley to deliver a message of
inspiration to her offspring (241-3).
We do not need a point by point correlation of this
description with the earlier catalogue of characteristics
associated with the Terrible Mother to get the message. The
operative symbolism here is of the archetype. One interesting
feature of this sketch is the arrangement of the minor gods and
goddesses surrounding Criticism. Ignorance and Pride sit
respectively on her right and left hands, and arranged about her
are a number of subservient deities—"Noise and Impudence,
Dullness and Vanity, Positiveness, Pedantry, -siaA Ill-MannersA The
arrangement recalls the emblematic representations of any
number of semi-divine female figures in medieval and
Renaissance manuscripts. Sapience, Sophia, or Ecclesia and
sometimes the Madonna, are commonly depicted as standing or
enthroned in a superior position with various minor allegorical
figures arranged around them or sometimes suckling them.^^
Swift's entire scene is an inversion of these emblems in both
substance and import. This theme of perverse transformation
extends to Criticism's own transformational powers: "'Tis
I...who give Wisdom to infants and Idiots; By Me, Children grow
wiser than their Parents; and School-boys, Judges of Philosophy"
(241). The image is complete, compelling, and unmistakable.
The picture is not entirely grim despite Criticism's claim that
"'Tis I, who have deposed Wit and Knowledge from their Empire
over Poetry, and advanced my self in their steadP (241), for in the
end the ancients and humane enlightenment survive. The
Terrible Mother's final victory had to wait until the fourth

See, for example, Neumann, plates on 174, 175, 178; Jung, Complete Works, vol.
12, plates 26, 201. Pope was to use this same kind of setting in his description of
Fame in his Temple of Fame (1715), 11. 258-75.
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book of Tlje Dunciad, but her presence here is a measure of the
gravity of the threat in Swift's view.
Pope's Rape of the Lock is a more fully realized mock epic
than The Battle of the Books in the sense that it exploits the full
range of epic conventions for its satire, rather than concentrat
ing on the heroic battle as its major feature. In the fourth
canto after Belinda's lock has been ravished, Umbriel, "a dusky
melancholy Spright," descends "to the Central Earth, his proper
scene," to the "gloomy Cave of Spleen" where he implores the
goddess to upset Belinda's serenity and give her a fit of hysterics
(IV 18-89). He finds the goddess in her grotto "screen'd in
Shades from Day's detested Glare," reclining like Swift's
Criticism "on her pensive Bed." She is attended by two
handmaidens, Ill-Nature and Affectation, and surrounded by
"unnumber'd Throngs" of both men women "chang'd to
various Forms by Spleen." The entire environment vaguely
recalls pagan ritual and ominous circumstance:
A constant Vapour o'er the Palace flies;
Strange Phantoms rising as the Mists arise;
Dreadful, as Hermit's Dreams in haunted Shades,
Or bright as Visions of expiring Maids.
Now glaring Fiends, and Snakes on rolling Spires,
Pale Spectres, gaping Tombs, and Purple Fires:
Now Lakes of liquid Gold, Elysian Scenes,
And Crystal Domes, and Angels in Machines.
(TV, 38-46)
As the editors of the Twickenham Edition note. Pope is
describing here the typical stage setting in such contemporary
opera and pantomime as Mountford's Life and Death of Doctor
Faustus and D'Urfey's Wonders of the Sun. Umbriel makes his
way safely through this setting with "a Branch of healing
Spleenwort in his hand," reminiscent of the golden bough
Aeneas carries as a passport on his visit to Hades.
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The emphasis in this sketch is on the Terrible Mother's
transformational powers expressed in terms of overheated
imaginings:
A Pipkin there like Homer's Tripod walks;
Here sighs a Jar, and there a Goose-pye talks
Men prove with Child, as pow'rful Fancy works.
And Maids turn'd Bottles, call aloud for Corks.
(IV, 51-4)
This same power later will turn the mild mannered Belinda into
a hysterical shrew in Canto V. The Magna Mater's transforming
power, for good or for ill, is one of her most dominant
characteristics.
Neumann devotes four chapters to the
transformative character of the archetype,^^ and Jung's fullest
discussion of the Terrible Mother occurs in his book on
Symbols of Transformation?^ The point is that later when
Belinda becomes hysterical she is "possessed" by the Terrible
Mother and is a representative of the powers of evil. As
Thalestris remarks in her advice to Belinda, to submit to the
Baron's insult without violent protest is to sacrifice her public
honor, and rather than that "Sooner let Earth, Air, Sea, to
Chaos fall, / Men, Monkies, Lap-dogs, Parrots, Perish all!" (IV,
119-20). The brief sketch of chaos here anticipates the fourth
book of The Dunciad just as the sketch of Spleen anticipates
many of Dulness's characteristics in the same work.
It would be a mistake to make too much of the appearance
of the Terrible Mother in The Rape of the Lock. The entire tone
of the work is a good deal less somber than that of The
Dunciad, for Belinda's social circle is relatively harmless and
presents no real threat to the moral fabric of the community as
a whole except in so far as Belinda allows herself to become
possessed by the devastating spirit of the Terrible Mother and

" Neumann, The Great Mother, 211-338.
Jung, Complete Works, vol. 5.
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wages destructive war on society. Insofar as she does so, she
functions as the direct opposite of Elizabeth Drury in Donne's
"First Anniversary." Donne sees Drury as a kind of Christ
figure in her fleshly manifestation:
Shee tooke the weaker Sex, she that could drive
The Poysonous tinture, and the stayne of Eue,
Out of her thoughts, and deeds; and purifie
All, by a true religious Alchimy. (179-82)^^
Under Spleen's influence Belinda becomes the antithesis of this
benevolent Great Mother.
Dulness in The Dunciad is a fuller and more sustained
treatment of the Terrible Mother. As early as 1955, Aubrey
Williams identified Dulness with the "'Magna Mater, the
maternal deity whose cult was popular in Rome."^' More
recently, Douglas Brooks-Davies, in an otherwise severely
flawed study of the poem, identifies Dulness with Isis."*® Pope
refers to her explicitly as the Mighty Mother at both the
beginning (I, 1) and at the end (IV, 642) of the poem, and dates
her existence from "eldest time, e'er mortals writ or read, / E'er
Pallas issu'd from the Thund'rer's Head" when she reigned
supreme as "Daughter of Chaos and eternal Night" (I, 9-12).'*^
As we have corrie to expect of the Terrible Mother figures, she
resides in a cave, in this case "The Cave of Poverty and Poetry"
which constitutes her "sacred Dome" (I, 34, 265), and is seated
on a throne with her favorite son, Cibber, reclining in her lap
(TV, 20). The image recalls any number of renditions not only

" The reference to alchemy as a transforming process is appropriate to the contejct.
Jung's studies of alchemy {Complete Works, vol. 12, 513) demonstrate the extensive
association between the female figure's and alchemy's transforming powers.
" Pope's Dunciad, 26.
Douglas Brooks-Davies, Pope's Dunciad and the Queen of Night (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1985), 122.
All quotations are from the "B" text in the Twickenham edition unless otherwise
specified in the text.
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of "Madonna with child" but also of surviving Egyptian images
of the seated Isis holding Horus in her lap/^ As we have also
come to expect, she is surrounded by her attendants, Envy and
Flattery (IV, 36) in this case, and by her captured enemies
bound and gagged, the arts, sciences and muses.
In Williams's view, Dulness is a distinctly Christian, satanic
figure, and certainly he marshals an impressive amount of
evidence in the form of Pope's many allusions to satanic
contexts in Paradise Lost and especially to Milton's personifi
cation of Sin (131-9). But an equally impressive body of
evidence points toward a more pagan conception of evil in the
poem. In addition to the evidence already cited that is
associated with the Magna Mater figure, Dulness is also
associated with the Dogstar (TV, 9) as was Isis (Plutarch, 53, 91;
Harding, 172) and with Hesiod's portrait of the Great Mother
in his Theogony. There Hesiod tells us that first came Chaos
and from Chaos came "Erebus and black Night,'"*^ a passage
that Pope clearly echoes and footnotes (I, 12n).
She is also associated with ominous transformational powers,
especially in Book IV, far beyond anything that could be
accounted for in terms of a Christian context. Williams seems
to be aware that Dulness transformational powers are associated
with her being an expression of an evil archetype: "For as Pope
employs this principle of inversion in the Dunciad," he writes,
"it is more than a matter of technique: it is also a realization
of the nature of evil, of its negative and destructive qualities.'""
This is especially true of Book IV, which begins with a new
invocation where the poet promises to celebrate (that is, to
symbolically recreate in the sense that the Mass is a celebration)
ancient mysteries (IV, 5). The promise is fulfilled in lines 517ff.
when "a Wizard old his Cup extends" and the final transform-

See Neumann, The Great Mother, plate on 38.
Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 87.
Williams, 155.
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ation to chaos begins. That Pope had ancient, pagan rites in
mind is made evident in his note on the line:
Lastly the great Mother shutteth up the Solemnity with
her gracious benediction, which concludeth in drawing
the Curtain, and laying all her Children to rest. It is to
be observed that Dulness, before this her Restoration, had
her Pontiffs in Partibus-, who from time to time held her
Mysteries in secret, and with great privacy. But now, on
her Re-establishment, she celebrateth them, like those of
the Cretans (the most ancient of all Mysteries) in open
day, and offereth them to the inspection of all men.
One other interesting detail is worth noting. Dulness's final act
is to yawn mightily (IV, 605) which might be taken as a parody
of the last trumpet or as an inverted logos, the "uncreating
word" to which Pope refers (TV, 654). Curiously, however,
Neumann points out that the yawn is anciently associated with
the devouring maw of death, itself associated with the Terrible
Mother (171-3) and with the motif of the vagina dentata
(168-9). In her final act Dulness thus confirms her identity as
the Terrible Mother.
If we return to the propositions and the critical problems
with which this discussion opened, several conclusions seem
plausible. In the first place there is almost invariably a certain
minimal circularity built into arguments about the literary
expression of archetypes. By their very nature such expressions
are unconscious on their authors' part at least before Jung
identified the archetypes. That is, the critic is in danger of
locating archetypes at every turn or, more insidiously, of
declaring that a given image is an expression of an archetype
because its appearance has decisive consequences in the text and
then, having demonstrated that the image is an archetypal
expression, ai^uing that the image has decisive interpretative
consequences. Fortunately for the present argument, one can
break out of this circle by turning to certain external evidence:
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the conventions of the mock-epic, the gravity of the cultural
situation in the Tory satirists' view, and the variety of the
constellation of images and motifs that commonly appear
associated with the archetype in Jung's and Neumann's studies
and in the texts surveyed. The consistency with which Swift's
Criticism and Pope's Spleen and Dulness fit the patterns defined
in the major psychological texts is striking and confers a large
measure of certitude on claims that they are expressions of the
Terrible Mother archetype. The evil female figures in heroic
tragedy are somewhat less certainly archetypal, though heroic
tragedies, like mock-epics, are based on heroic poetry in
Dryden's case. The nagging spinsters common to narratives of
the period are even less clearly archetypal, and regarding them
as such offers no critical insights or interpretative advantages.
And finally, it is clear that the three female figures studied
most closely here are not antifeminist in the usual sense of that
term. They are the unconscious expressions of "an inward
image at work in the human psyche," to recall Neumann's
phrase, expressions of psychological truths deeply seated in the
collective unconscious, not literary extensions of a social idiom.

ROBERT BROWNING'S
"IN A GONDOLA"
Sources and Circumstances
Murray L. Brown

obert Browning wrote "In a Gondola" during the same
period he produced several of the shorter dramatic
®?iJl^poems for which he is better, perhaps best knownd
The poem was composed some four years after Browning's first
visit to Italy (and to Venice) in 1838, and two years before his
second visit in 1844. The complete poem first appeared in
Dramatic Lyrics (1842), but at the request of John Forster,
Browning composed the first seven lines to accompany a
painting, Daniel Maclise's The Serenade [Fig. 1], in the catalogue
for the exhibition of the British Institution for February 1842.
Browning composed these lines without having seen the
painting and with only Forster's verbal account of it. During
the next few months, and after seeing the painting, he
developed and expanded the poem to its published form.
In addition to drawing upon The Serenade for the physical
details of the completed poem, my thesis is that Browning
discovered or recalled Cielo [Ciullo] D'Alcamo's "Dialogue:
' I am using the 1981 Yale University Press edition of Browning's poems, edited
by John Pettigrew and supplemented and completed by Thomas J. Collins.
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Lover and Lady" (Italian, or Sicilian, c. 1250), and drew upon
this poem to complete his own7 Despite the lack of external
evidence linking the two works, textual evidence is strong.
D'Alcamo's "Dialogue" affords a dramatic situation in keeping
with the subject of Maclise's painting; it also offers structures,
characters, themes, and plot elements, which Browning
apparently conjoins with the original lines he produced for The
Serenade. Browning's poem, however, is more than a mere
rehashing of the "Dialogue." While Browning employs many
elements of D'Alcamo's dramatic poem, his habit is to invert
them so that new themes emerge. These alterations quite
literally turn D'Alcamo's poem on its head.
At some point in the mid 1830s, probably in 1836,^ John
Forster introduced Browning to Daniel Maclise. By the mid1840s, Maclise had become a painter of considerable promise
and growing reputation."^ In addition to his work as a painter,
Maclise was a gifted caricature artist, and beginning in the
1830s, he treated over eighty literary figures for Fraser's
Magazine that proved to be one of the magazine's chief
attractions.^ Although I do not find that Maclise ever rendered

^ "Dialogue: Lover and Lady" appears in Dante Gabriel Rossetti's The Early Italian
Poets (1861; rpt. London: Anvil Press, 1981), 15-21. This is the only extant poem
by this early figure, but (as in the case of Sordello) it can be assumed that he
composed many others. The earhest known manuscript of the poem is found in
the Vatican (codex 3793), and although it is an anonymous copy, a sixteenth
century commentator, A. Calocci (d. 1547), attributed the poem to "Cielo dal
Camo" in the margin of the manuscript. See Aristide Marigo, ed., De Vulgari
Eloquentia (Firenze: Felice le Monnier, 1957), 103n33. For a modern edition of
the poem see Poeti del Duecento, vol. I, ed. Riccardo Ricciardi (Milano, Napoh,
1960), 177-85.
' See W. Hall Griffin, The Life of Robert Browning, 3rd ed. Harry Christopher
Minchin (London: Methuen, 1938), 76.
^ For an overview of Maclise's career, see Richard Ormond, "Daniel Machse,
Burlington Magazine 110 (December 1968), 684ff; and "Daniel Maclise (1806-1870)
—A Major Figurative Painter," Connoisseur 179 (1972): 165-70.
' Ormond, "A Major Figurative Painter," 166. Machse's caricamres from Eraser's
Magazine were collected and published in 1874 as Gallery of Illustrious Literary
Characters.
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Figure 1: Daniel Maclise, The Serenade, 1842.
With permission of the Hankamer Treasure Room,
Armstrong Browning Library, Baylor University.
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Browning's likeness in this way, one imagines that Maclise, who
often used literary subject matter in his paintings, would have
had a great deal in common with a poet possessing a fine
understanding of both painting and literature. It is likely these
shared qualities are what first led Forster to suggest that
Browning compose lines to accompany Maclise's painting.
In late 1841 Browning learned of Maclise's The Serenade and
of the artist's plan to enter it in the exhibition:
...Oh let me tell you—I chanced to call on Forster the
other day—and he pressed me into committing verse on
the instant, not the minute, in Maclise's behalf—who has
wrought a divine Venetian work, it seems, for the British
Institution—Forster described it well—but I could do
nothing better than this wooden ware (All the "proper
ties," as we say, were given—and the problem was how to
cataloguize them in rhyme and unreason)
I send my heart to thee—all my heart
In this my singing!
For the stars help me, and the sea bears part,—
—The very night is clinging
Closer to Venice'-streets to leave one space
Above me whence thy face
May light my joyous heart to thee—its dwelling place.
Singing and stars and night and Venice streets in depths of
shade and space are "properties," do you please to see. And
now tell me, is this below the average of Catalogue original
poetry? Tell me—for that end, of being told, I write it. (It is,
I suppose in print now and past help)...^

' Robert Browning to Miss Euphrasia Fanny Haworth, 30 December 1841, in
Letters of Robert Browning, ed. Thomas Hood, comp. Thomas J. Wise (New
Haven: Yale Univenity Press, 1933), 6, 7.
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Forty years later, in response to an inquiry concerning the
whereabouts of The Serenade, Browning explained to Dr. F. J.
Furnivall that:
I wrote the Venice stanza to illustrate Maclise's pic
ture,—for which he was anxious to get some such line or
two: I had not seen it, but, from Forster's description,
gave it to him, in his room, impromptu...'when I did see
it, I thought the Serenader too jolly somewhat for the
notion I got from Forster—and I took up the subject in
my own way.^
"While the fate of the painting immediately following the
exhibition is unknown, all that can be determined with any
certainty is that the painting was not sold at the exhibition.®
The reasons for its disappearance are probably explained by the
reviewers:
It may in some account for the poverty of the
Exhibition, that Eastlake, Leslie, Turner, Stanfield,
Roberts, are all absent—one would wish, for his credit,
that Maclise had been absent too. His picture (255) is
disgraceful to himself and to his art. Seldom has such
depravity of taste been united with such excelling gifts of
mind, eye, and hand, as those possessed and abused by
this clever painter.'
This review may well have convinced the painter never to show
this picture again. Another critic reviewing Maclise's entry for
the Art Journal saw fit to include Browning's stanza within the
review itself.The tepid critique concludes:

^ Robert Browning to F. J. Furnivall, 15 September 1881, in Hood, 196.
' See Art Journal for March, 38 (1842): 60.
' The Athenaeum 747 (1842): 171.
Art Journal for April, 39 (1842): 76, item 255.
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We have quoted the passage pictured, less to justify the
somewhat fantastic air and character of the cavalier, than
as an example of exceedingly rich and graceful versifica
tion from the pen of a poet, kindred to Maclise in
imagination and mind.
The Spectator's reviewer also found little to praise in Maclise's
painting and maintained that while "There is a power and
animal spirit in the design...it is a practical burlesque of the
refined sentiment of the verses of Mr. Browning."" These rank
among the most positive reviews Browning had yet received
and among the worst of Maclise's entire career. While
Browning was obviously encouraged enough to expand the few
impromptu lines he had composed and include them for
publication in Dramatic Lyrics, The Serenade, which was
certainly the object of considerable effort and ability, failed
dismally. Ironically, after Browning published "In a Gondola,"
he must have read a review of Dramatic Lyrics in The Spectator
for December 10, 1842, and discovered that what had
previously been praised as "refined sentiment," was now
"rendered constrained and unnatural.""

" The Spectator 711 (Feb. 12, 1842): 165.
Geoige Santayana disapproved of the immoral position the poem supposedly
upholds, daiming it favors passion over intellect. See "The Poetry of Barbarism,"
(1900) rpt. in Robert Browning; A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Phihp Drew
(Boston: Houghton Mfflin, 1966), 17-35. Percy Lubbock admits much of what
Santayana says about the morahty of Browning's hero, but is intrigued with the
dramatic situation (see "Robert Browning," The Quarterly Review 217 [1912]:
437-57). Seventy years later, PhUip Drew qualifies Santayana's objections, but
continues: "The minute kernel of useful criticism to be extracted from Santayana's
essay is the observation that from one point of view these ["In a Balcony" is
included] are the least satisfactory of Browning's love poems...One must admit that
if all Browning were like ["In a Gondola"], instead of only one poem, then much
of what Santayana says about his love poetry would be justified" {The Poetry of
Robert Browning: A Critical Introduction [London: Metheun, 1970], 404).
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Despite the reviewers, Browning held to his "ecphrastic""
method and to his family of subjects because they had long fed
his imagination. As a child Browning sat on his father's knee
and was repeatedly enthralled by the Tale of Troy and its
marvelous illustrations." As a young adult he continued to
delight in meditating on certain engravings; one such engraving
was after Caravaggio's Perseus and Andromeda-. "We have it on
the authority of a friend [?] that Browning had this engraving
always before his eyes as he wrote his earlier poems.""
Turning to the poem itself, we find Browning's ecphrasis
permits us to enter literally into Maclise's creation to find a
chamber filled with paintings. These pictures possess lives and
personalities of their own, and they interact with one another
in a human fashion. Here the graphic artist clearly engenders
the poetic faculty. In this same balcony room we find the
lady's harp, and in her absence the instrument
Breathes slumberously, as if some elf
Went in and out the chords, his wings
Make murmur wheresoe'er they graze.
As an angel may, between the maze
Of midnight palace-pillars (171-75)

" I use the term "ecphrastic" ia a way similar to Jean Hagstrum's usage in his
influential study The Sister Arts; The Tradition of Literary Pictorialism and English
Poetry from Dryden to Gray (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
Hagstrmn explains; "I use the noun 'ecphrasis' and the adjeaive 'ecphrastic'...to
refer to that special quahty of giving voice and language to the otherwise mute art
object...My usage is etymologically sound since the Greek noim and adjective come
from ekphrazein...'ta speak out,' 'to tell in full'" (18n).
" Wilham Sharp, The Life of Robert Browning (London: Walter Scott, 1890), 26.
" Sharp, 25. An example of an eighteenth-century engraving after this painting
was done by Joharmes Volpato (1772) and is the British Museum (see Judith Fay
Alberti "Robert Browning and Italian Renaissance Painting," tmpubhshed
Dissertation [University of California at Berkeley, 1979], 3). The engraving is also
reproduced in John Maynard, Browning's Youth (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1977), 160-61. Sharp's accuracy has sometimes been questioned, but W. Hall
Griffin confirms the poet's attachment (123).
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Browning takes this angel from among the pillars, the subject
of one of his heroine's paintings, and lets it strum an eolian
image. Browning clearly indicates how he perceives his poetic
process; the natural harmonies so essential to the romantic
paradigm as presented, for example, in Samuel Taylor
Coleridge's "Eolian Harp" (13-25), have not been supplanted,
but they have been greatly qualified. Browning suggests that his
music does indeed come about by the "one intellectual breeze,"
the difference now being that this breeze is not stirred directly
by God, or by nature, but through the interaction of an objet
d'art and poetic imagination.
It is perhaps unlikely that The Serenade was the subject of
extended meditation by the poet, yet several of the poem's
finished "properties" indicate that Browning did indeed
incorporate into his expanded poem several of the painting's
details. These inclusions extend well beyond the first seven
lines, indicating the painting continued to influence the poem
even though the poet later admitted his dissatisfaction with the
serenader's jollity. Browning's use of the "Smyrna peach" is an
example:
Then a sweet cry, and last came you—
To catch your lory that must needs
Escape just then, of all times then.
To peck a small plant's fleecy seeds.
And make me happiest of men.
I scarce could breathe to see you reach
So far back o'er the balcony
To catch him ere he climbed too high
Above you in the Smyrna peach.
(140-48)
In the painting we clearly see the peach tree below, and the
poem alters the tree's position; it is found either on, or above
the balcony. In either case. Browning makes an indisputable
allusion to the painting. Browning's use of the painting
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decreases as the poem progresses, but even as this primary
influence fades, another commences.
Browning was a dedicated student of Italian literature and an
ardent admirer of Dante. In the course of his study he may
well have encountered a reference to Cielo D'Alcamo in
Dante's prose tract, De Vulgari Eloquentia (I, xii, 6). Browning
had already demonstrated his fascination with the early Italian
poets, and his Sordello (1840), which engaged him for seven
years, is much in keeping with rather obscure source suggested
here. Given Sordello's critical reception, its reputed obscurity
and incomprehensibility, it is little wonder that Browning failed
to admit the use of yet another obscure medieval Italian poet in
his "In a Gondola."
There are numerous parallels between D'Alcamo's poem and
Browning's "In a Gondola"—far more than exist between poem
and painting—and one is tempted to conclude that Browning
knew D'Alcamo's poem intimately.^^ While Tlje Serenade
provided the original impetus. The "Dialogue" provided the
poem's subject, structure, plot, characters, and many metaphors
as well. D'Alcamo's poem is also a dramatic dialogue, but it
cynically recounts a seduction, the story of a wealthy young
woman resisting, however faintly, the persistent demands of her
admirer:

" See Maynatd, Browning's Youth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977),
305-8.
Many years after Dramatic Lyrics appeared. Browning's young friend, Dante
Gabriel Rossetti, presented Browning with an inscribed copy of his The Early
Italian Poets (1861), an anthology that includes D'Alcamo's "Dialogue." Although
there is no external evidence suggesting Rossetti included D'Alcamo s poem
because he recognized Browning's use of it, it is attractive to think he did. The
volume, which is at Princeton, contains no annotation indicating Browning's
apparent debt to D'Alcamo. I would like to thank Charles E. Greene, Keeper of
the Rare Book Room at the Princeton University Library, for his kind assistance.
I work mostly from Rossetti's translation of D'Alcamo (Sally Purcell, ed. [rpt.,
London: Anvil Press Society, 1981]), but also from Joseph Tusiani's, The Age of
Dante: An Anthology of Early Italian Poetry Translated into English Verse (New
York: Baroque Press, 1974).
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He: Thou sweetly-smelling fresh red rose
That near thy summer art,
Of whom each damsel and each dame
Would fain be counterpart;
O! from this fire to draw me forth
Be it in thy good heart:
For night or day there is no rest with me,
Thinking of none, my lady, but of thee
She: If thou hast set thy thoughts on me.
Thou hast done a foolish thing.
Yea, all the pine-wood of this world
Together might'st thou bring.
And make thee ships, and plough the sea
Therewith for corn-sowing.
Ere any way to win me could be found:
For I am going to shear my locks all around.
(Rossetti, 1-16)
Several indications that Browning used the "Dialogue" as a
primary source appear in its first sixteen lines. The rose is set
up as an object of adoration and symbol of carnal delight, and
reference is made to the seductive nature of the woman's hair.
These are common comparisons and subjects; alone they do
not prove Browning knew the "Dialogue" in 1842. Yet, how
they are used establishes a pattern of inversion, that does make
such a suggestion. D'Alcamo's Lady first mentions her hair
while the "troubadour" makes this comparison in "In a
Gondola." Here the lover first likens her to a rose, while in
Browning's poem the Lady likens herself to the flower. The
divine creature who in the first stanza illuminates Browning's
hero, in D'Alcamo's first stanza sets him aflame with passion.
Browning constructs this series of inversions which he
extends even to his poem's conclusion. In addition to the
examples given above, we can return to Maclise's painting
where we see his heroine toying with her black hair as she
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listens to her serenader; Browning's heroine has the golden
tresses of D'Alcamo's heroine (Rossetti, 78); he chose to have
his hero praise their beauty, whereas D'Alcamo's heroine
knows their beauty and uses it as a kind of coquettish threat:
He: So much as I love thee, thou crimson rose.
Thou wilt be mine at last: this my soul knows.
She: If I could think it would be so.
Small pride it were of mine
That all my beauty should be meant
But to make thee to shine.
Sooner than stoop to that, I'd shear
These golden tresses fine.
And make one of some holy sisterhood;
Escaping so thy love, which is not good.
(71-80)
Browning takes what D'Alcamo's Lady withholds and gives it
to his Cavalier—what was black is become golden. Each of the
Lady's threats are in D'Alcamo's poem countered by her
Troubadour, who, in dialectical progression, anticipates
Browning's treatment. The inversions continue: D'Alcamo's
Lady constantly seeks to rid herself of her admirer and gains
him; Browning's ardently seeks to preserve hers, but loses him.
This shift requires Browning's heroine to be pensive and
accepting, only to lose what she has gained; while D'Alcamo's
is stubborn and unconvinced, she retains her admirer. Both
poems have the same number of principal characters in the
same roles, with the same relative importance to the plot. The
poems are of similar length, and both sets of heroes and
heroines remain nameless. Browning's heroine refers to two
servants—his and hers—and these figures have no models in
D'Alcamo's poem, but may be instead provided by Maclise's
painting. When Browning's hero refers rather cryptically to
"the Three" (104), he muses that
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They trail me, these godless knaves,
Past every church that saints and saves.
Nor stop till, where the cold sea raves
By Lido's wet accursM graves.
They scoop mine, roll me to its brink.
And...on thy breast I sink!
(110-115)

While these may be the Lady's relatives, they are also the
Doge's infamous and anonymous team of assassins. While "the
Three" do not specifically figure in the painting or in the
"Dialogue," a similar threat exists in the latter. When the
heroine, unconvinced as she pretends to be, considers that her
admirer might be harmed, she brusquely replies:
She-. Nay, though my heart were prone to love,
I would not grant it leave.
Hark! should my father or his kin
But find thee here this eve.
Thy loving body and lost breath
Our moat may well receive
Whatever path to come here thou dost know.
By the same path I counsel thee to go.
He-. And if thy kinsfolk find me here.
Shall I be drowned then.^
Marry, I'll set, for price against my head.
Two thousand agostari.
I think thy father would not do't
For all the lands in Bari.
Long life to the Emperor! Be God's thy praise!
Thou hear'st, my beauty, what thy servant says.
(Rossetti, 25-40)
She: ...A boy before he is a man
Could give me as much fear.
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If suddenly thou get not hence again,
It is my prayer thou mayst be found and slain.
(125-28)
"The Three" of Browning's poem appear as the Lady's father
and relatives as they are presented in D'Alcamo.^^ Further,
when Browning's hero quite suddenly refers to his pursuers, it
is as though he expects us to understand their identity without
making clear their connection with the Lady. On this point.
Browning has apparently over-extended his reliance on the
"Dialogue," importing its supporting characters whose roles are
only clarified if we know the "Dialogue."
Both heroines, in both poems, make reference to their
marriages throughout—the subject dominates both poems.
However, Browning's heroine constantly seeks an affirmation
of a personal marriage rite, one which requires no parent or
institution to lend it legitimacy, while D'Alcamo's Lady refuses
a private understanding between herself and her lover: she
presses for his promise of marriage. Browning's heroine
disengages the links of a golden chain and has her lover repeat
vows to her. There are also chains in the D'Alcamo poem, but
these are the "cunning chains...wound about my heart" causing
the serenader to "groan" in pain (Rossetti, 65, 68). Browning
places this private marriage rite near the beginning of his poem,
but D'Alcamo does not mention it until the final lines. From
the beginning. Browning displays requited love and the
impediments to it, "the Three," while those who serve in this
role in the "Dialogue" are presented not as threats to be
overcome, but as the Lady's protectors. Browning treats the
role of "the Three" in the same fashion he handles the

Browning's interest in the "Dialogue" is almost certainly not based on any
identification of the Lady's relatives with Elizabeth Barrett's father. "In a
Gondola" was composed before any relationship or correspondence was established
between Browning and Elizabeth Barrett. See Daniel Karltn, The Courtship of
Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 61 ff.
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metaphoric chains that cause D'Alcamo's hero's sufferings:
harmony becomes discord, and discord, harmony.
Both poems contain references to death by drowning and
death by stabbing. The former, scoffed in D'Alcamo, is subject
for high seriousness in Browning. Browning's heroine, while
reclining with her lover on their gondola, ponders his death:
Dip your arm o'er the boat-side, elbow-deep.
As I do: thus: were death so unlike sleep.
Caught this way? Death's to fear from flame or steel.
Or poison doubtless; but from water—feel!
Go find the bottom! Would you stay me? There!
Now pluck a great blade of that ribbon-grass
To plait in where the foolish jewel was,
I flung away: since you have praised my hair,
'Tis proper to be choice in what I wear.
(116-24)
Browning has constructed another inversion here. D'Alcamo's
Lady shows no fear of her lover's death, and threatens to
drown herself rather than submit to his advances: "There's
nothing now could win me to be thine: / I had rather make my
bed in the sea-brine" (Rossetti, 191-2). It is D'Alcamo's hero
who raises the question of his being stabbed to death, either by
her love, or as a result of it (Rossetti, 161-68), but it is
Browning's heroine who sees the threat as genuine and fears it
(116-18).
In expressing his feelings of estrangement from the Lady's
family. Browning's hero likens himself to a Jew who could
spirit her away across the Giudecca, perhaps to the Lido, where
members of his tribe might offer up the Lady herself "to bribe
/ The devil that blasts them unless he imbibe" (64-70).
D'Alcamo's Lady assures us that her troubadour
She-. For Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,
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Three times I cross myself.
Thou art no godless heretic,
Nor Tew, whose God's his pelf:
(201-04).
Browning borrows his hero's supposed Jewishness from the
"Dialogue," and he elaborates upon the "horrendous fables" that
are left relatively undeveloped in the "Dialogue."'' As has
become characteristic by this point, it is Browning's hero who
muses upon his Jewishness, while it is D'Alcamo's heroine who
raises the issue in his poem.
D'Alcamo's hero mentions a rope ladder with which he
apparently plans to fetch the Lady. This is the first hint in
D'Alcamo's poem of defined spatial relationships. The Lady is
placed above her Lover just as she is in both Maclise's painting
and Browning's poem. D'Alcamo places the Lady above her
lover, in her father's house (Rossetti, 123, 124), in her garden
(135), and in a boat (Ricciardi, 74n2). Browning uses these same
locations and presents them in the same sequence.
Like
Browning's Cavalier, D'Alcamo's hero fashions wings on the
shoulders of his beloved, but it is no deification; here she is
likened to a bird he longs to capture and perhaps destroy:
"You thought to put out feathers, / and yet your wings are
dead."^° Browning uses the wings after the same fashion he
handles the fire and light, death by drowning, the golden chain
and many other aspects of the poem: these wings become those
of an angel.
At the close of D'Alcamo's poem, the Lady suddenly, but
perhaps not unexpectedly, relents and gives way to her passion.
She admits that she is herself "aflame." This sense of apprehen
sion followed by abrupt revelation is the precise effect
Browning achieves at the close of "In a Gondola" when the
hero is suddenly, but not unexpectedly, murdered. Just as the

" Tusiani, 205.
Tusiani, 117, 188.
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death of Browning's Cavalier was foreshadowed, so is the
Lady's surrender anticipated in D'Alcamo's poem. In fact, the
suddenness of D'Alcamo's Lady's surrender, and the legalism
she uses to justify it, can be seen as another inversion: Brown
ing's Lady loves openly and sincerely, but marries by personal
ritual, or by mutual understanding; as a consequence she loses
her lover. D'Alcamo's Lady secretly desires and finally uses a
legalism to hold and preserve her future husband from physical
harm. D'Alcamo's heroine is convinced by public forms, while
Browning's heroine is guided by an individual understanding.
The forthrightness of Browning's heroine, her sincerity, her
sole reliance upon her heart as a guide, and her willfulness in
following it, all work to deny her possession of her lover; this,
while D'Alcamo's heroine shuns her lover's advances until he
promises the marriage at which point she acquiesces and they
rush to immediate carnal gratification.
A wonderful symmetry exists between these two poems, one
that raises many questions about romantic love and marriage as
an institution. Does the Lady love or lust.? Is she protected by
her relatives, or is she imprisoned by them.? Do hero and
heroine love according to their own inclinations and rules, or
are they the slaves of familial pressures and institutional ritual?
Is the rose divine, or passionately carnal? Is the heroine's hair
to be cropped for the convent, or to be displayed after the
fashion of Roman maidens? Does this love emit a light or
merely radiate heat? Does the heroine's love offer life or death?
Browning's theme falls from the lips of his dying hero:
...The Three, I do not scorn
To death, because they never lived: but I
Have lived indeed, and so—(yet one more kiss)—can die!
(229-31)
The sudden twists that end both poems, and all the many
other similarities they possess, lead one to consider Browning's
poem as pendant, or even as a concluding act to a drama begun
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by D'Alcamo. Once Browning's poem departs from Maclise's
painting and takes up the "Dialogue," the two works mesh
completely as companion poems. Indeed, Browning takes the
"Dialogue," a comedy, and through a complete alteration of
circumstances and attitudes, transforms it into a tragedy. If we
return to Maclise for a moment and understand that he
attempted to transport not only the spirit of the Renaissance
but its compositional and material practices as well, we may
understand the revitalizing process to which Maclise and
Browning were committed. These qualities are what attracted
Rossetti to both of these men. Browning essentially decon
structs the "Dialogue," and whereas Santayana (see nl2) asserts
that this poem holds passion above reason, I am certain that
Browning would not have considered the charge as an indict
ment. In creating this antithetical companion to a medieval
work, he equates the materialism and the emotional oppression
of his medieval model with the reactionary and hypocritical
conservatism of Victorian mores and institutions.

"NEW-NOTHINGS,"
NEOLOGISMS, AND THE
RECOINAGE OF 1696
Sandra Sherman

aniel Defoe's An Essay Upon Projects (1697) is an early,
1remarkable text addressing financial conditions followig the Seven Years War. It proposes initiatives
("Projects...of publick Advantage") to build roads, care for
widows and sailors, discover bankrupts' estates, organize banks,
run a lottery and, inter alia, house fools by taxing mental
labor.^ Each project aigues for improvement over things as
^ Defoe's "Projects," intended for "publick" advantage, were to be privately
financed. If a projector arted on "the honest Basis of Ingenuity and Improvement,"
he could "aim primarily at his own Advantage, yet with the circumstances of
Public Benefit added." See An Essay Upon Projects (London, 1697), 10-11. P.
Bastian discusses the Essay in Defoe's Early Life (Totowa: Barnes & Noble, 1981),
195-200, as does Paula Backscheider in Daniel Defoe; His Life (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 68-70. Bastian su^ests that Defoe's projects
were ahead of their time since they depended on a strong central executive, but
that they soon became impracticable as a wave of laissez-faire enterprise made
centrally-managed initiatives less appealing. Backscheider examines the text in
context with the prevailing economic crisis. For a detailed examination of the
effects of the war on merchants (whom Defoe claims "did not apprehend the
Danger to be really what it was" [4j), see D. W. Jones, "London Merchants and
the Crisis of the 1690's," in Crisis and Order in English Towns, lSOO-1700, ed. Peter
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they are: the text is about innovation. The "publick
Advantage" it promotes assumes the infrastructural needs of
emergent capitalism, and it acknowledges capitalist motivation
in underwriting public works ("What Profit to the Undertakers?
For we must allow them to Gain, and that Considerably, or no
Man wou'd undertake Such a Work").^ Yet Defoe's disposition
towards "Gain" is tempered, averse to profitors that profiteer.
He distinguishes innovation from scams, citing
a great difference between New Inventions and Projects,
between Improvement of Manufactures or Lands, which
tend to the immediate Benefit of the Public and Imploying of the Poor; and Projects fram'd by subtle Heads,
with a sort of a Deceptio Visus and Legerdemain, to bring
People to run needless and unusual hazards. (15)
In this essay, I argue that Defoe's commitment to genuine,
public-spirited innovation, freed from deceptive projectors who
snatch one's funds, is allied with his project to free English
usage from eccentric, innovating neologism.^ Underlying both
Clark and Paul Slack (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 311-55. On
Defoe's life-long career as a projector, see John Robert Moore, Daniel Defoe:
Citizen of the Modem World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 283-305.
The text is rarely treated as a literary artifact, but see Cynthia Wall, "'Her
Conversation heavenly': Defoe's Architectural Dialogues and the Academy for
Women," in Compendious Conversations: The Method of Dialogue in the Early
Enlightenment, ed. Kevin L. Cope (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1992), 237-48.
^ An Essay, 106. The chapter on "The History of Projects" cites the "hardship for
a man to be Master of so fine a Thought, that had both the Essential Ends of a
Project in it.—Publick Good and Private Advantage-, and that the Publick shou'd
reap the benefit, and the Author be left out; the Injustice of which, no doubt,
discourag'd many a Good Design" (28).
' In proposing an economic/literary ahgnment both to analyze texts and theorize
conditions of cultural production, my method approaches James Thompson's in
"'Sure I Have Seen That Face Before': Representation and Value in EighteenthCentury Drama," in Cultural Readings of Restoration and Eighteenth-Century
Theater, ed. J. Douglas Canfield and Deborah Payne (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1995), 281-308. Thompson connects economic and social theory
"specifically in relation to the concept of value," exploring the ways in which "two
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is an animus toward representations—words—that represent
nothing, simulacra that dissipate meaning (or good sense) in the
ephemera of nonce-words.'' Defoe cites affinities that link stock
jobbing (projects "blown up by the air of great Words"[13]),
expletives, and upstart speech into a unified field of dissolute,
literally dissolving language. The market, conversation, and
literature evince a common vice. Defoe's project for a Society
to renovate English, to purge it of vapid innovation, is a parallel
expression (to his blast at jobbery) of a single concern: words
evade meaning, aggrandize their users.' His rhetorical politics
different discourses, political economy and comedy, work through a method of
reading, a model for determining 'face value.'" In making this connection,
Thompson does not argue that the economy "causes" a type of comedic discourse,
but rather that both are "relatively autonomous discursive formations determined
by specific historical conditions" (281, 282). I argue that puffery and innovation
in the market, innovation and linguistic irregularity in literature and conversation,
condense into a field of opacity condemned by the Essay, instantiating a recoil from
unchecked privatization.
•* As opposed to "representation," simulation "substitut[es] signs of the real for the
real itself," cancelling referentiality, hence originality. It produces a field of
apprehension "sheltered from...any distinaion between the real and the imaginary."
See "The Precession of Simulacra" in Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. Paul
Foss, Paul Patton, Phihp Beitchman (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), 1-79, 4. As
Baudrillard observes, simulation is "the generation by models of a real without
origin or reahty" (2).
' Defoe's support/suspicion of innovation is embedded in a discourse marked by
ambivalence. J. S. Peters observes that "a nvunber of seemingly tmrelated
historical conditions and metaphoric habits are part of the story of the general
cultural interest in novelty (and the accompanying suspicion of it) in the late
seventeenth century." See "The Novelty; Or, Money, Fashion, Getting, Spending,
and Glut," in Cultural Readings, ed. J. Douglas Canfield and Deborah Payne,
169-94, 170. In the Essay, the relative weighing of innovative, desirable projeas,
false innovation, and neologism tropes the perplexed view of novelty that Peters
cites. Defoe's association of newness with the ephemeral and unrehable parallels
the attimde of a print culture catering to popular demand. In "'News, and new
Things': Contemporaneity and the Early Enghsh Novel," Critical Inquiry 14
(1988), 493-515, J. Paul Himter observes that in the late seventeenth century, "the
preoccupation with novelty...developed in one of its aspects into pure emphemeral
silliness. Publishing ventures, including most of Dunton's, often tried to read
fickle public taste in the simplest and most obvious ways. A proliferation of
anonymous ballads, broadsides, narratives of public and private intrigue,
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privileges "publick Advantage"; it opposes privatized speech
that destabilizes meaning for private profit (of jobbers or
authors). At a metaphoric level, his assault on linguistic
innovation is troped by false "coining," debasement of a
standard (of value, sense, good taste) to suit a private whim.
I shall suggest that Defoe's concatenation of coins and words
applies to language the contest over valuation that arose during
the "recoinage crisis" of the 1690's, when Parliament finally
recalled clipped, devalued coins that along with counterfeits had
debased the money supply.^ In the Essay's logic, the Society is
a type of mint. It stamps out words whose value derives from
intrinsic content, rather than public acceptance (clipped coins
continued to circulate), whose value (as to each piece and in
gross) would endure (milling prevented clipping and made
counterfeiting harder). My point is that the metaphoric
exchange between words and money that informs the Essay has
a specific material basis, which Defoe evokes so as to ground his
project in exemplary "publick Advantage." Finally, I argue that
the Essay perceives wholesale public acceptance, "custom," as
inimical to linguistic integrity. The Society's rationale rests on
a paradox; "custom" sanctions non-signifying words, the
prophecies, criminal confessions, and other ephemera took events and rumors of
the street and returned them to the street in printed form" (494-95). Newness,
embodied in two-peimy throw-aways (aimed at "an ever-intensifying attention to
the latest news or pseudonews" [499]), might be less truthful than appealing, but
profitable anyway.
' The recoinage crisis lent itself to conservationist cultural critique. Richard KroU
observes that "in 1696 [John] Evelyn links [medals'] pecuhar weight as culmral
currency (with its attendant metaphors of ciroilation and potential inflation) to the
current debate on the coinage." Kroll suggests that Evelyn's gathering up all the
medals he could find "seeks at a culmral level to resist the decline of value in 'this
mercantile nation' by 'chpping, debasing, and all other imrighteous ways of
perverting the species.'" See The Material Word: Literate Culture in the Restoration
and Early Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991),
178, citing Evelyn's Correspondence. Evelyn's critique extended specifically to the
mistreatment of words. KroU notes that Evelyn was "painfully conscious" that his
book on medals Ijdumismata, 1697), which was riddled was printer's errors, was
"subject to a process of chpping and debasing" (178).
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community promotes non-communication. Defoe urges that
"custom" be suppressed, words implanted with a value
unmediated by a devaluing consensus. The last part of this
essay compares Defoe's animus toward the "custom" of nonsignifying speech both in the Essay and in A New Test of the
Sence of the Nation (1710). The later text transposes to the
political context (swearing meaningless oaths of allegiance) ideas
raised in the Essay with respect to politeness (swearing
meaningless expletive oaths). I will suggest, however, that in A
New Test the money/language nexus is still emergent, in that
lurking behind "custom" (which Defoe feminizes) is her exact
contemporary, the imperious Lady Credit.

In An Essay Upon Projects, Defoe distinguishes between "the
Honest and the Dishonest" project, implicating deceptive speech
in the promotion of chimerical invention:
There are, and that too many, fair pretences of fine
Discoveries, new Inventions, Engines, and I know not
what, which, being advanc'd in Notion, and talk'd up to
great things to be perform'd when such and such Sums of
Money shall be advanc'd and such and such Engines are
made, have rais'd the Fancies of Credulous People. (11)
The object of jobbery is "talk'd up," "new Inventions" projected
into a fancied future of "things" that words seem to (but do
not) represent. As a result,
on the shadow of Expectation [the jobbers] have form'd
Companies, chose Committees, appointed Officers,
Shares, and Books, rais'd great Stocks, and cri'd up an
empty Notion to that degree, that People have been
betray'd to part with their Money for Shares in a NewNothing. (12)
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What had been "talk'd up" is hyperbolized, "cri'd up." The
"empty Notion" advanced by profiteers is blown up by elevated,
empty speech. Such speech is mere vapor, a non-representation
shrouding a non-entity, a "New-Nothing." That something can
be "new" and "nothing," an invention that does not exist,
submits market language to paradox.
To unravel the
metaphysics of such paradox requires that language call
"Fancies" into being, while referring to no referent in the world
of phenomena.'' The involvement of pretended innovation,
fancied existence, and the dissipative tendency of marketplace
speech, emerges in the image of commercialized clouds:
When the Inventors have carri'd on the Jest till they have
Sold all their own Interest, they leave the Cloud to vanish
of it self, and the poor Purchasers to Quarrel with one
another, and go to Law about Settlements, Transferrings,
and some Bone or other thrown among 'em by the
Subtlety of the Author, to lay the blame of the Miscar
riage upon themselves. (12)
As the invented Cloud decondenses back into air, the only
reality left is the investors' "Quarrel," the words of disap
pointed dupes who mistook simulacra for the real. NewNothings, and the words of projectors who talked them up,
share a logic of evanescence. Such speech, like a cloud, is
transient as projects it pretends to represent.
' The notion of outsize, empty words was of course not new. In 1650, Thomas
Hobbes observed that "there be so many wordes in use at this day in the Enghsh
tongue, that though of magnifique sound, yet (like the windy bhsters of a troubled
water) have no sense at all." See "The Answer of Mr Hobbes to Sr Will.
Davenant's Preface Before Gondibert," in Sir Willaim Davenant's Gondibert ed.,
David Glandish (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 52. Defoe, however, cites
"windy bhsters" on troubled financial waters, a trope that became commonplace
after the South Sea Bubble. A type of New-Nothing is invoked in A Modest
Apology, Occasioned by the Late Unhappy Turn of Affairs, With Relation to Publick
Credit (London, 1720), where John Hammond speaks of stocks "dissolving and
sinking into their Original Nothing" (5).
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In effect, dishonest projectors sell only words:
So have I seen Shares in Joint-Stocks, Patents, Engines,
and Undertakings blown up by the air of great Words,
and the Name of some Man of Credit concerned, to £100
for a 500th. Part, or Share, some more, and at last
dwindle away, till it has been Stock-Jobbed down to 10,
12, 9, 8 1. a Share, and at last no Buyer; that is, in short,
the fine new word for Nothing-worth. (12-13)
In the market, words made of air collapse, but not before
jobbers counterfeit a project's worth.^ Hhe: Essay warns "those
who wou'd not be Tricked out of their Estates by such
Pretenders to New inventions" (14). Thus this tract supporting
invention wields a counter-discourse on linguistic misinvention,
the projection onto words of "meaning" that (like clouds)
disappears. The Essay is concerned with a type of reverse
performative, words that speak into existence that which is not,
"Conceptions which dye in the bringing forth, and (like
Abortions of the Brain) only come into the Air, and dissolve"
(4)Dead-on-arrival projects are dead ab initio, but mimic life.
The desperate projector
finds no remedy but to paint up some Bauble or other, as
Players make puppets talk big, to show like a strange thing,
and then cry it up for a New Invention; gets a Patent for
it, divides it into Shares, and they must be Sold. (34)
Projectors' neologisms, like ventriloquists' words, dislocate
provenance, imputing intrinsic worth to painted Baubles.
' Balloon-words mm up again. In the Review, VI, #30, 11 June 1709, 120, Defoe
observes that stock-jobbers "added 625,000 1. of Air-Money to the Bank, they give
a new imaginary value to the Stock—and what is the Consequence, but whenever
they please, they can with the same Breath of their destructive Mouths blow away
this, and carry away 625,000 1. more of real Value along with It?"
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Dummy projects hide manipulation, arousing the "Ambition of
some honest Coxcomb...wheedl'd to part with his Money" (34).
Projectors with patents privatize misrepresentation with a
communal stamp, suggesting that an "Innovation" (and hence
the words that puff it) meets a standard of communal "Advan
tage." The ability to evade proper supervision, so that language
is unconstrained, surfaces as a vice that the Essay's logic
compounds when applied to linguistic reformation. At this
point, exclusion of projectors' speech from stern appraisal
precipitates a cascade of ironies: lax supervision, trumped by
lack of punishment, topped off by arrogance. The coxcomb
who "part[s] with his Money" is "left to carry on the Project,
and the Projector laughs at him." "Then good night Patent and
Invention-, the Projector has done his business, and is gone"
(34-35).
The evanescence of project, projector, and puffery instanti
ates the text's governing metaphor. Just as the Essay cites the
market for production of New-Nothings, it cites the English
language as such a market, vulnerable to linguistic projectors
who debase the stock of words. Words whose meaning
dissipate—in the market, in the community of anglophones—
are the focus of the Essay's animus, connecting depredations of
jobbery with the country's linguistic decay. Defoe's proposal
for a Society to establish—to impose—standard English jibes
with his economics: in each case, Defoe resists upstart,
destabilizing words. He resists an unconstrained privatization
wherein the speaker's meaning is not shared within a commu
nity of discourse. Projecting enei^ that circulates through the
Essay is reined in at the level of language, which must itself be
the object of a project to restrain (linguistic) projecting.' That
' Defoe's proposal for a Society to determine appropriate standards for English was
not a new idea, even for him. The Essay recycles a suggestion, and indeed some
of the very prose, which appeared in his "Prefatory Discourse" to the 1688 English
Grammar published by Guy Miege. In Defoe's Life (104-05), Bastian also examines
Defoe's 1684 association with an aristocratic society intended to refine the
language. On the early history of proposals for an institution to purify and
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Defoe's proposal for linguistic reform was part of a summa on
projecting, rather than standing alone (as did other such
projects), reflects its rhetorical, logical engagement with the
discourse of emergent capitalism. In the Essay, decayed English
diction and projectorial (mis)representation ("blown up by the
air of great Words") resonate within a single problematic:
words that have ceased to be stable, transparent.
In establishing the basis for his proposed Society, Defoe
invokes the manipulation and debasement common to
marketplace speech. He cites the same bogeyman, innovation:
The Work of this Society shou'd be to encourage
Polite Learning, to polish and refine the English Tongue
...to puige it from all the Irregular Additions that Ignor
ance and Affectation have introduc'd; and all those
Innovations in Speech, if I may call them such, which
some Dogmatic Writers have the Confidence to foster
upon their Native Language. (233)
Such new words are homologous with economic NewNothings; both consist in mere fancy, "as if their [the
Dogmatic Writers'] authority were sufficient to make their own
Fancy legitimate" (233). In a stark desublimation of metaphor,
he imputes to authors "the Impudence to Coin" (236) words.
conserve English, see B. S. Monroe, "An Enghsh Academy," Modem Philology 8
(1910), 107-22; and Edmimd Freeman, "A Proposal for an Enghsh Academy in
1660," Modem Language Review 19 (1924): 291-300. All such seventeenth-century
proposals were essentially ineffective, and more or less lacking in detail. The
exception was one made by John Evelyn to a committee of the Royal Society in
1665, which made substantial provision for establishing, but not regulating the
language (see Monroe, 110-11). After the Restoration, such proposals always (as
does Defoe's) invoke the French Academy as an inspiration if not a model. For
a discussion of the psychology of language reform, including an examination of
how particular groups are cited as sources of linguistic corruption, see Richard W.
Bailey, Images of English; A Cultural History of the Language (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1991), 237-66.
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The Society's "Voice" would function as a type of voice-over,
dispelling innovative trcpes in English:
The Voice of this Society should be sufficient
Authority for the Usage of Words, and sufficient also to
expose the Innovations of other mens Fancies; they
shou'd preside with a Sort of Judicature over the Learning
of the Age, and have liberty to Correct and Censure the
Exorbitance of Writers, especially of Translators. The
Reputation of this Society wou'd be enough to make
them the allow'd Judges of Stile and Language; and no
Author wou'd have the Impudence to Coin without their
Authority.'® (127)
Defoe's attack on dishonest projectors cites "Innovation" as
ephemeral, and for that reason deceptive. Language deployed
by such projectors, like their falsely innovating projects, is
dissipative, devolving into discourse for which the projectors
could not be held to account ("they leave the Cloud to vanish
of it self, and the poor Purchasers to Quarrel with one
another"). Constructing an homology between English usage
and dishonest projecting, Defoe sets put to reverse unaccountability for English usage." He observes that innovative, fanciful.
In the late seventeenth century, the verb "to coin" was bi-valent. The Oxford
English Dictionary (1989) states that it meant "to make (money) by stamping," "to
make (metal) into money by stamping pieces of definite weight and value with
authorized marks or charaaers." But it also meant "to make, devise, produce,
especially in a bad or deprecatory sense: to fabricate, invent, make up (something
specious, pretentious, counterfeit)." Defoe deploys these antithetical meanings,
absolving upstart authors from coimterfeiting only upon receipt of the Society's
permission to "coin." The Oxford English Dictionary points out that to "coin" also
applied to linguistic enterprise, "to frame or invent (a new word or phrase)."
" Defoe's homology, reified in his counterfeiting metaphor, reflects the metaphoric
fertility of the money/language equation studied by Roland Barthes in S/2 (New
York: Hill & Wang, 1974), Michel Foucault in The Order of Things: An
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), and Sandra
K. Fischer in Econolingua~A Glossary of Coins and Economic Language in
Renaissance Drama (Newark: Delaware University Press, 1985). Such equation
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clipped, and counterfeit words are projected onto English,
debasing linguistic exchange. The exchange between English
and other languages is "especially" corrupt.
The Society, however, will speak with the "Voice" of an
"Honest Projector...who having by fair and plain principles of
Sense, Honesty, and Ingenuity, [brings] any Contrivance to a
suitable Persecution, makes out what he pretends to, [and] picks
no body's pocket" (35). In the metaphorical exchange pursued
by Defoe (jobbery/English usage), the Society functions as a
mint, stamping words (and style in general) with an authority
that attests to their worth, their ability to pay off in clarity and
good sense. Words approved by the Society would not be
simulacra, floating in a regime of authorial self-indulgence.
The paradox of Defoe's zeal to expel "impudent" innovation
is that it elevates the Society into an innovator. Defoe states
that
Custom, which is now our best Authority for Words,
wou'd always have its Original here, and not be allow'd
without it. There shou'd be no more occasion to search
for Derivations and Constructions, and 'twou'd be as
Criminal then to Coin Words, as Money. (236-7)

continues to resonate in Defoe's oeuvre. In The Anatomy of Exchange Alley
(London, 1719), Defoe attacks stock-jobbers for "Coining false News" that appeals
to the "Weakness of those, whose imaginations they have wrought upon" (4).
False news, circulating through the economy like false coin, hterally impoverishes
all who receive it, since they take a simulacrum for the real. In An Appeal to
Honour and Justice (London, 1715), Defoe casts his own name as a fictionalized
representation that has been commodified and sold by fraudulent salesmen: "no
Man ever suffer'd under so much as myself...my name had been hackney'd about
the Street by Hawkers, and about the Coffee Houses by the Politicians, at such a
rate, as no patience could bear." See The Shakespeare Head Edition of the Novels and
Selected Writings of Daniel Defoe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1927, rpt. 1974), DC,
189-238, 229. It appears that no other seventeenth-century proposal for conserving
English engages this language/money exchange.
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If words may be coined (that is, counterfeited) like money, then
Defoe's own rhetoric partakes of this equation. Defoe "coins"
Custom, collapsing its meaning (as signifier of communal
acceptation) into the Society's originary jurisdiction (which
retrieves custom from the community). Custom is rendered
contingent, ceasing to be definitively communal, a matter of
accretion and consent.'^ It becomes instead a function of obiter
dicta. In the sense that Custom loses its meaning, it becomes
a neologism (a counterfeit!) itself." The metaphoric exchange
informing Defoe's rhetoric, which exposes the baseness of newnothing words, infects Defoe's own projects. To justify his case
for the Society, he slips into the vice his case opposes. The
Essay becomes ironic, a parody of itself. Apparently Defoe
cannot resist the projecting mentality he has defined, innovating
upon "Custom" to advance his polemic for renovating English.
"Custom" becomes a type of good face, mounted on a
project to monopolize the vernacular and curtail authors'
liberty to interpret style, foreign language, and even linguistic
trends. As the "original" of custom, the Society is a restraint
on trade, displacing rival linguistic proprietors." Its rationale
In New Test of the Sense of the Nation (London, 1710), Defoe himself defines
Custom: "What is it that we call CUSTOM, but the Sence of the Nation. Or, the
common Acceptation, in which, such, and such Things are generally received" (7).
" The Society's custom-creating claims contrast with the more modest, albeit
prescriptive view of custom espoused by Thomas Dyche in A Guide to the English
Tongue (London, 1707). Dyche argues that grammar should reflect the "Custom
of the best Speakers" (49). Likewise, John Jones suggests in Practical Phonography
(London, 1701), that "English Speech is the Art of Signifying the Mind by a
humane Voice, as it is commonly used in England, (particularly in London, the
Universities, or at Court)" (1). The Society's generative authority, stripping
popular practice of legitimacy by virtue of being popular, evinces "how persistently
language theory [in the late seventeenth century] returns to the question of who
controls cultural and textual spaces" (The Material Word, 186) Moreover, if a
word's "Derivation" establishes its external history, defines it as a cultural
phenomenon, then the Society can efface such external traces, legitimating
whatever "Construction" it would maintain.
'•* As sole "Original" of usage/coin, the Society renders usages of other linguistic
proprietors coimterfeit.
In Money, Language, and Thought; Literary and
Philosophical Economies from the Medieval to the Modem Era (Berkeley; University

"New-Nothings"

201

is that as mere coiners (counterfeiters), such proprietors do not
generate capital, but debase existing capital by circulating false
tokens. In the unregulated market of words, they authorize
their own Fancy, stamp their false coin with meaningless
valuations. To preserve linguistic capital, the Society would
deface such coin, melt it down, "silence the Impudence and
Impertinence of Young Authors, whose Ambition is to be
known" (237). In the sense that "Young Authors" are their
own projects, the society would write them into new-nothing
ness "like Abortions of the Brain." It would enforce an intergenerational version of Ancients vs. Moderns, in which the
Society, thirty-six "Persons Eminent for Learning" (234),
literally "silences" the young.
However, in authorizing the Society to become the
"Original" of Custom, the phenomenon that the Essay
complains of (innovative self-referring representations) circulates
back in a type of logical double-take. Mobius-like, the Essay
installs innovation, denominating it a type of renovated
Custom. As minted by the Society, Custom becomes a
simulacrum, detached from real custom and referring only to
of California Press, 1982), Marc Shell observes that what "matterfs] in considering
whether a coin is genuine or counterfeit is the issuing authority. A coin as money
is counterfeit when the stated place of origin does not correspond to the actual
place of origin. A counterfeit coin may claim to have and may actually have the
same weight and purity as the legitimate coin of which it is the counterfeit. It is,
however, treason for a private citizen to mint coins" (160). If a usage does not
"have its Original" in the Society, but claims equahty with a society "original," it
cannot be used as a medium of exchange.
" Defoe qualifies the term "learning" by excluding from the Society pedants
"whose English has been far from pohte" (126). If possible, the Society would be
"wholly composed of gentlemen," including "twelve of the nobihty" (127). Intergenerational rivalry is complicated by class prejudice and taste. Such attitude
subsides in the later Defoe, who appreciated the class affiliation and Grub Street
circumstances of authors attempting to break into the market. In Vindication of
the Press (London: 1718), he acknowledged that authors write for pay ("for bread")
and should not be criticized when writing for both pohtical parties (21).
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the Society's diktats}^ In pursuit of linguistic hegemony, the
Society would encompass every linguistic practice, producing
Essays on the Nature, Original, Authorities, and
Differences of Words, on the Propriety, Purity, and
Cadence of Stile, and of the Politeness and Manner in
Writing; Reflections upon Irregular Usages, and Correc
tions of Erroneous Customs in Words; and in short,
everything that wou'd appear necessary to the bringing
our English Tongue to a due Perfection, and our
Gentlemen to a Capacity of Writing like themselves.
(237)
Gentlemen would become "like" members of the Society,
ceasing to be original sites of linguistic generation. Origination
as the prerogative of individuals, entrepreneurs of language,
would cease.Moreover, not only would they be restrained as
inventors, but as practitioners. Should they practice "Erroneous
Customs," enforcing the legitimacy of such usage, their
enforcement authority would be confiscated. The notion that
" The megalomania directed towards origination is thrown into relief by Defoe's
pubhcation, almost thirty years later, of an extensive treatise demonstrating the
slow accretion of writing skills and customs, An Essay Upon Literature: Or, An
Enquiry into the Antiquity and Original of Letters (London: 1726).
Not only does the Society prescribe "Propriety," evicting the common nm of
gentlemen from that determination. Throughout the Essay, the contest over
propriety, which in the late sevententh century was synonymous with "property,"
enacts the contest between the Society and individuals over who shall own the
right to originate linguistic practice. As a bi-valent term, "propriety" concentrates
the money/language exchange central to the Essay's polemic. On the late
sevententh-century meaning of "propriety," see the Orford English Dictionary
(1989), which cites contemporary usages of "propriety" as equivalent of "property,"
for example, "rights of possession or use," "something owned, a possession." See
Defoe's own usage in An Essay on the Regulation of the Press (London, 1703/4), ed.
John Robert Moore (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948), 27: "[F]or every Author
being obhg'd to set his Name to the Book he writes, has, by this Law, an
undoubted exclusive Right to the Property of it. The Clause in the Law is a
Patent to the author, and settles the Propriety of the work wholly in himself."
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custom is legitimating would be acknowledged only insofar as
custom was "customized" by the Society, fitted to the Society's
oxymoronic role as the "Original" of Custom."
The difficulty with collapsing custom into the ab initio is
that it authorizes origination as a source of propriety,
proprietorship, the right to impart authority to words outside
communal supervision. Stock-jobbers claim a like authority.
This potential contradiction is muted, however, in that unlike
the "Clouds" perpetrated by jobbers, "talk'd up" in evanescent
promises, the Society's determinations endure. They are
designed to last, in obiter dicta that bring the language "to a due
Perfection." Indeed, the Society's condemnation of a practice
would discourage jobber-like impositions even from erupting;
"I believe nothing wou'd so soon explode the Practice, as the
Publick Discouragement of it by such a Society" (250). The
pursuit of custom turns society into a sort of panopticon. But
the Society's single, central, corporate perch is "where all our
Customs and Habits both in Speech and Behaviour shou'd
receive an Authority" (250).
This universal inquest into English assumes that custom is a
threat because it leaches value from speech but cannot be given
a local habitation and a name (as "Young Authors" can).
Custom is Everybody, an unaccountable mass. The idea behind
Defoe's assertion that custom is not the desideratum of proper English, and that
language can and should be restrained within boimds that discount contemporary
usage, was a view that prevailed through the first part of the next century.
Johnson's Dictionary (1755) represents a decided shift, in which linguists do not
seek to suppress so much as register and understand changes in English usage. For
a discussion of this shift, see Murray Cohen, Sensible Words: Linguistic Practice in
England 1640-1785 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977),
Chapter 3. While Defoe denigrates crude, chaos-causing "custom," he praises
custom where it imposes order. He cites custom's "authority" in the Review, vol.
I, #38, July 15, 1704, 168. See also vol. I, #74, 18 November 1704, 311. In vol. 11,
#15, 7 April 1705, he observes that "The English Tongue is Entirely govern'd by
Custom" (59), making odd constructions accessible. See also An Essay Upon
Literature, where Defoe argues that languages such as English, "which have no
Authorities for the Usages of Speech," are "legitimated only by Custom." Indeed,
custom prevents confusion among "Words bearing the same Sound" (94-5).
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the Society is that authorized language needs to be made visible
at the point of its generation, so that unauthorized language
does not work its way into custom. The Essay proposes to
draw up the curtain on plays before they are shown to the
world:
All the Disputes about Precedency of Wit, with the
Manners, Customs, and Usages of the Theatre, would be
decided here; Plays shou'd pass here before they were
Acted, and the Criticks might give their Censures and
damn at their pleasure; nothing wou'd ever dye which
once receiv'd Life at this Original: The Two Theatres
might end their Jangle, and dispute for Priority no more;
Wit and Real Worth shou'd decide the Controversy, and
here shou'd be the Infallible Judge. (250)
The object of this extraordinary passage, suggesting a reinstitution of licensing on questions of rhetoric and taste, is to localize
the source of "Manners, Customs, and Usages." Their
uncontrolled generation at an infinitely expandable number of
points would cease. Linguistic conduct would be manageable,
stabilized, the threat of new-nothings overcome: "nothing
wou'd ever dye which once received Life" from the Society.
Rival linguistic proprietors, the two theaters, would make no
counterclaims either against the Society or each other, subdued
by prior review. The model of language proposed is devolutionary toward some single, contemporary source, since "there
shou'd be no more occasion to search for Derivations" (236-7).
The idea of linguistic time—an Alpha of origin, an Omega in
the incalculable (radically changed) future—is abolished.
Such abolition is constructed through an extended conceit:
language and money are not only metaphorically equivalent,
but under threat from new, debasing impositions (rhetoric
dissipates money, "coining" dissipates style) perversely accepted
in everyday exchange. I suggest that the Essay tropes language
and money—demonizing acquiescence in debased exchange—not
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to profit from the "interest" of a complex metaphor, but to
invoke the recoinage crisis of the 1690's, attributing to the
Society the touted "publick Advantage" of its settlement. In
Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England,
Joyce Appleby examines the crisis, demonstrating that two
ideologies conflicted over the valuation of money:
For two years [1694-96], contending pamphleteers
addressed themselves to the question of whether money
derived its principal value extrinsically from its being legal
tender or strictly from its intrinsic, specie content.
In this regard, John Locke's Further Considerations Concerning
Raising the Value of Money (1695), urged (along with his other
•writings) that money and silver were equivalent (i.e., money
had an "intrinsic," unwavering value derived from popular
consensus as to the value of silver).^" The weight of silver in a
shilling constituted its value, albeit such value was imaginary.
The masses of clipped shillings passing for "shillings" therefore
debased the money supply, lowering its total value. Yet, as
Appleby points out, "the fact that coin was legal tender added
value to the silver content as the acceptance of clipped shillings
had demonstrated....Locke's opponents were willing to start
•with the evidence that coin had a source of value in addition to
its silver or gold content" (222-23). In the view of these
commentators, "an extrinsic value [was] added by sovereign
authority" (228). In this view, the value of a shilling (even a
clipped one) was based on accidentals, not essences; on
" Joyce Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 220. See generally ch. 8, "A Crisis
Over Money." See also Peter Laslett, "John Locke, the Great Recoinage, and the
Origins of the Board of Trade: 1695-1698," William and Mary Quarterly 14 (1957),
378-85, and J. Keith Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, 1650-1710
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
In "'Sure I have seen that face before,'" James Thompson discerns Locke's theory
of money in the discourse of "face value" in eighteenth-century comedy.
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speculation and behavioral imperatives of the market; on acts
of the sovereign, not natural law. The value of a shilling might
be set irrespective of specie content, it could vary, but it was
constructed empirically {pace Locke) rather than by imagination.
Parliament's response, calling in the old clipped coins and
minting new ones, followed Locke's rationale. In effect, the
value of a shilling would be independent of popular, quotidian
acceptance; it would be set a priori by reference to an assumed
popular imaginary reflected in the coin's real weight. Appleby
explains the political implications: "If money had only an
intrinsic value arising from the universal desire for gold and
silver, then the sovereign's control over the money supply was
minimal, amounting to setting the terms for minting to a
standard determined by universal consensus" (217).
Incorporated at the level of metaphor, the logic of the
recoinage debate—and of the winning side—circulates through
the Essay, justifying recoinage of English usage. The rationale
for a Society to establish Purity and Propriety is bootstrapped
into a quid est demonstrandum, transposing from coinage to
words the Lockean position endorsed by Parliament. In effect,
the Essay suggests that coined words floating through the
language courtesy of "custom," lacking intrinsic value, are
equivalent to clipped coins that must be recalled. It assumes the
value of stable linguistic stock (definite Derivations and
Constructions, an unchanging "due Perfection"), new milled
with unclippable edges that are harder to counterfeit.
Most particularly, the Essay dismisses the authority of
popular acceptation to impart value to words legitimately part
of the language (if not exactly the King's English). Locke had
argued that notwithstanding a coin's face value, its intrinsic
value could be clipped away, and no popular acceptation could
confer a higher value. The Society, like Parliament, would
restore "intrinsic" value; it would not allow "extrinsic" factors
("custom") to elevate sovereign whim or aggrandizing traders (in
linguistic terms, translation). Hence, while claiming to be the
"Original" of custom, the Society's authority is less than it
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might be. The Lockean rationale rationalizes the Society's
originary authority; it appears consistent with popular will, not
as to corrupt, customary (i.e. extrinsic) usage but as to intrinsic
good sense. Published only a year after Parliament's resolution
of the "crisis," the Essay exploits the terms of that resolution,
authorizing its own project for fixing the usage of words.

The linguistic stasis procured by the Society operates to defend
rational communication. The Essay's most far-reaching assault
on linguistic loose cannonry, states that custom can undermine
sense, that even popular constructions may defy natural word
order. The Society polices violations of sense, arresting
disorderly constructions that impair communication. Defoe
cites swearing as specially opposed to a regime of rational
words. Swearing violates an immutable rational order because
it mixes fustian into speech: "there is nothing so Impertinent,
so Insignificant, so Senseless and Foolish, as our vulgar way of
Discourse when mix'd with Oaths and Curses" (239).
Nevertheless, "Custom has so far prevail'd in this foolish Vice,
that a man's Discourse is hardly agreeable without it" (238).
Swearing, then, becomes the test case for the relative merits of
custom and reason, the linguistic formation that (along with
jobbery) supports a theory of linguistic discipline prompted by
anger at Senseless speech:
[W]hen our Discourse is interlin'd with needless Oaths,
Curses, and long Parentheses of Imprecations, and with
some of very indirect signification, they become very
Impertinent-, and these being run to [an] extravagant
degree...become perfectly ridiculous and Nonsense?^
Mid-to-late seventeenth-century conduct books for "gentlemen" routinely
attacked swearing, but as an immoral, unbecoming custom. For example, in The
Gentlemans Monitor (London, 1665), Edward Waterhouse cited "Prophaneness" as
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The Essay expounds the custom/reason dichotomy broached by
swearing on grounds that it attenuates natural word order and
dissipates meaning:
'Tis true, Custom is allow'd to be our best Authority
for "Words, and 'tis fit it should be so; but Reason must
be the Judge of Sense in Language, and Custom can never
prevail over it. Words, indeed, like Ceremonies in
Religion, may be submitted to the Magistrate; but Sense,
like the Essentials, is positive, unalterable, and cannot be
submitted to any Jurisdiction; 'tis a Law to it self....
[T]here is a direct Signification of Words, or a Cadence
in Expression, which we call Sense-, this, like Truth, is
sullen and the same....Thus a man may speak in Words,
but [be] perfectly unintelligible as to Meaning....'2>ul 'tis
the proper Position of Words, adapted to their Significa
tions, which makes them intelligible...the contrary of
which we call Nonsense. (243-45)
r

Like counterfeit coin, swearing dilutes the value of that with
which it mixes—discourse—finally reducing it to the "perfectly
unintelligible." Speech larded with swear-words becomes a
"Cloud," obscuring meaning, dissolving into meaninglessness.
The "Impertinent" nature of swearing (im-pertinent words
pertain to nothing) reifies the Essay's logic, which organizes
metaphor against dissipative speech. When custom is submitted
to reason, reason overcomes the potential of "nothing" to exist,
defeating the liminal materiality of "nothing" which is the
paradox that troubles the Essay. Indeed, Defoe explicitly
denounces swearing as "nothing," evoking new-nothing projects
and the empty representations by which they are "talk'd up":

either a "close and covert hostility against God" or "lend and Meretricious
boulstring out of Immorahty" (245). "Both of these," he asserted, were "abounding
in this time" (246). Defoe's attack on swearing renders it opposite the honest
projector's "fair and plain principles of Sense" (35).
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This Vicious Custom has prevail'd upon Good
Manners too far....'Tis is a Mean to no manner of End;
'tis Words spoken which signify nothing. (236-7)
Swearing is a simulacrum, a self-referential outburst with "no
manner of End" beyond itself. It is the opposite of reasoned
speech intended to communicate.^ It is inconsistent with a
mentalist, conceptualist epistemology, concerned with the
mind's capacity to organize received signs.
Defoe concedes that reason cannot be legislated ("'Tis is a
Law to it self"); but it can be enforced, urged, exemplified,
which is the role of the Society. By discouraging swearing,
thereby supporting reason, the Society supports stability, the
order of words that "is sullen and the same." It opposes the
encroachment of "nothing"—which is not so immaterial that it
cannot confuse—and does so by opposing newfangled departures
from "positive, unalterable" "sense" (130). Hence, the logic of
Defoe's rebuke to swearing comes round to his dismissal of
phony projects. In each case, he invokes (and would curtail)
the tendency of words to evanesce, to fail as "publick,"
accountable phenomena.
Defoe suggests that recognizing a locution as customary
necessarily discredits it. "Customary" language is alien to its
user, not fully a measure of his intent or honor:
'Tis [swearing]yr«rt/es5, for no man is believ'd a jot the
more for all the Asseverations, Damnings, and Swearings
he makes: Those who are us'd to it themselves, do not
believe a man the more, because they know they are so
^ On Locke's idea that words are not merely intended to embody thought, but to
communicate to a listener, see Nicholas Hudson, "Dialogue and the Origins of
Language: Linguistic and Social Evolution in Mandeville, Condillac, and
Rousseau," in Compendious Conversations, ed. Kevin L. Cope, 3-14. In "'Her
Conversation heavenly," Cynthia Wall argues that the structure of Defoe's Essay
is conversational, and that his project for a female Academy is intended to educate
women into conversational fluency.
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customary, that they signify little to bind a man's
Intention; and they who practice them not, have so mean
an opinion of those who do, as makes them think they
deserve no belief. (240-41)
Swearing is dissipative, attenuating intelligibility and credibility.
Because it is "so mean[ly]" regarded, it is not taken at face value
as a mere expletive, a sign of emphasis. Rather, it works
ironically, interpolating a man's speech into "so customary" a
practice that all practitioners inflect the speech-act, degrading it.
The principle is that of false coining, where plug shillings
debase a whole stock. (Defoe does not acknowledge the
resultant conundrum: if a gentleman's address is "hardly agree
able" without swearing, why is the practice held in such
contempt.'). In the Essay's logic, the swearer is not the direct
agent of his intent, but one of a cohort of swearers who
mediate his intent with the ill-repute of swearing. His speech
transmits interference. Custom is not therefore a useful
convention signifying meaning, but a windy diversion
destabilizing one's representations.
In a notable sleight of hand, Defoe combines the notion of
swearing as signifying "nothing," with the notion that swearing
signifies a sort of negative quantity, a false oath. The swearer's
"oath" is bi-valent: it segues from mere nonsense to implying
a possible non-commitment (even perhaps a lie). In any case,
the utterance remains a simulacrum. Practiced swearers view it
as "so customary," so dissociated from personal intent, that it
does "little to bind." Non-practitioners will disbelieve swearers
because their "opinion" of the practice is "so mean." Either
way, the very habituality of swearing, its attainment to the
status of custom, alerts swearers and non-swearers that a
promise/oath accompanied by an expletive/oath is less than a
spontaneous expression of personal intent. Rather, it is more
like a ritualized utterance, a formula dictated by external
protocols. In this regard, swearing (the promise of any
performance, accompanied by "Asseverations, Damnings,"
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expletives) is affiliated to oaths imposed on politico-religious
dissenters, which in the late seventeenth century were fre
quently dismissed as noncredible.^^ In Samuel Butler's Hudibras
(1663-78), for example, which satirizes Puritan pretensions, the
squire Ralpho asserts:
Oaths are but words, and words but wind.
Too feeble implements to bind.
And hold with deeds proportion so
As shadows to a substance do. (2.2.107-10)24
In this passage, the "nothing"-ness of oaths implies their moral
ephemerality, an idea Defoe takes to new metaphysical heights,
suggesting that expletives are an anti-grammar of "nothing"-ness.
Logically viewed, it is impossible to valence windy
^ On the status of religious/political oaths during the late century, see Susan
Staves, Players' Scepters: Fictions of Authority in the Restoration (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 191-251. In Ways of Lying: Dissimulation,
Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modem Europe (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1990), Perez Zagorin examines casuistical practices in England
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that encouraged disbelief in oaths.
See chapters 9 and 10. See also J. Douglas Canfield, Word as Bond in English
Literature from the Middle Ages to the Restoration (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1989), which in a series of discussions demonstrates literary
disenchantment with oath-taking in the late seventeenth century.
Compare John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester's address to a reified Nothing in his
poem, "Upon Nothing" (1680):
The great Mans gratitude to his best Friend,
Kings Promises, Whores Vows, towards thee they bend.
Flow swiftly into thee, and in thee ever end.
In Word As Bond, Canfield cites the wittiiiess of "religious expletives" in
Restoration comedy, noting that their "moribtmd status indicates the emptiness of
such language" (74). With regard to Drydsn's Marriage A La Mode (1672), Canfield
observes, "The entire world of the play appears to be one marked by absence: of
God, of order, of love, of meaning to all the words that bind society together"
(75-6). He notes that in Etherege's The Man of Mode (1676), the libertines "use
religious language casually and insouciantly, as in their constant, meaningless
expletives" (112).
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asseveration with a potential lie, since making no sense
precludes dissimulation (making sense dishonestly). Presum
ably, Defoe's scheme allows for degrees of "nothing" that
accommodate false seeming. Moreover, insofar as Defoe is
suggesting that a sworn oath represents no intent, but is only
a customary, formulaic response, his argument holds together.
In any event, by associating swearing with broadly based,
habitual behavior—custom—the Essay finesses the issue of
whether (in fact) sworn oaths inflect a person's actual intent
(assuming there is one). Rather Defoe focuses on how oaths are
perceived, suggesting it is the low "opinion" of swearing that
damns "Damning." He seeks to prove that habitual locutions
do not constitute a code, conveying discrete parcels of readily
apprehensible, conventional data. Rather, they provoke the
hearer's routine perception of disembodied words with no (or
at best an uncertain) relation to the speaker's convictions and
sense of responsibility. As such, swearing is an instrument of
rhetorical irony. It generates shared, even ubiquitous locutions
("a man's discourse is hardly agreeable without it" [128]), but it
is the object of resistance, the enemy of "sense," the signifier of
unreliability. The social consensus that confers a certain cache
on swearing is, like swearing itself, bi-valent, since there is a
consensus among swearers and non-swearers to discredit the
practice.
Since swearing subverts meaning and credibility, the custom
of swearing must be abandoned. Polite usages prescribed by the
Society can return discourse to sense and apparent honesty.
Custom can resurface as a new "Original," fixed by a rhetorical
elite. Defoe imagines an exchange between the new and the
customary not much different from that between a melt-down
of old coins and the minting of new ones, preserving old values
in more stable, trustworthy artifacts. Despite the bi-valent
double-takes inherent in his argument, there is a sense in which
custom—though embodying the devalued—will ultimately stand
for value against the crassly new. So long as custom is depopularized, reissued by the Society as a new/old phenomenon
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with "publick Advantage," it can provide a gauge of discursive
"Propriety."

While Defoe never succeeded with this logically tortuous
project, he recurred to it, though without explicitly linking
scapegrace prose and money. In 1710 he observed (with selfproclaimed irony) that a "new" "custom" had deprived political
oaths of signification.^' Under such a regime—where words
mean nothing and lying is impossible—"the Honesty and
Integrity" of oath-takers "may be clearly defended" (3). A New
Test of the Sence of the Nation cites byzantine zig-zags in dynastic
allegiances, but aligns them under a "New System in all our
Politicks" which permits men to "solve all the strange
Phenomena...^h\c\\ have so long puzzl'd our People, and laid
stumbling Blocks in the way of Honest Men" (11). Honesty
bypasses such blocks because under this new system it is
"preposterous to expect, that Men shou'd be suppos'd to mean
the same thing to Day, that they meant yesterday by the same
Words" (2). Popular acceptance of discursive discontinuity
makes it a norm. It makes it the Sence of the Nation,
sanctioned by "Custom...the great Arbiter of the Meaning of
Speech" (3).
Under "a new Tyranny of Custom," words have capricious
meanings
such as were never heard of before: By which, for
Example, a Sacheverellite and a Jacobite, a Mad-Juror and a
Non-Juror, a High-Flyer and a French-Papist are become
" While the tract's irony could hardly be missed, Defoe added a postscript avowing
that "what has been said is Ironical" (79), that he is not in favor of this "new
advanc'd System" (13). On Defoean irony, see Maximillian Novak, "Defoe's Use
of Irony," in The Uses of Irony, ed. Maximillian Novak and Herbert Davis (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 7-38.
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synonimous, and signify the same Thing; nor are the
Etimologies or Vulgar Acceptations of the Words to be
alter'd, or their Agreement to be interrupted by the
Casual Intervention of Taking or Refusing Oaths,
Abjurations, Associations, or any such Trifles upon any
Account whatsoever. The Reason is plain, for such is the
Sence of the Nation. (4)
Custom becomes the virtual mirror-image of the Essay's Society.
It defies "Etimologies"; under the Society there is "no more
occasion to search for derivations" (127). It authorizes
Agreement of incompatible terms; under the Society there is
"no more occasion to search for...constructions" (127). In the
most telling departure, illogic is installed by Custom-as-female,
opposite the thirty-six "gentlemen" who compose the Society:
All this is brought to pass, by the Wonderful
Assistance, and Irresistable Force of CUSTOM, which, by
her absolute Authority in the Kingdom of Speech, has
full Power to cause what Constructions she pleases to be
put upon Words, and to cause them to be understood as
best may serve to her Royal Ends and Purposes;—making
those Constructions become The Sence of the Nations. (4)
If the all-male Society stabilizes meaning ("nothing would ever
dye which once received Life at this Original"), Custom, as the
female Sence of the Nation, imposes a whimsicality consistent
with gender norms. It hardly needs stating that "in the history
and sociology of inter-sexual perception...masculine minds
constantly symbolize the changable, the unpredictable and the
imaginative as feminine. In this context, I would argue that
Defoe's female Custom is sister to his Lady Credit, her exact
J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), 99. On imputations of female whimsicality, see also
Felicity Nussbaum, The Brink of All We Hate: English Satires on Women 1660-17S0
(Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 1984).
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contemporary, who careers "despotickly" through Defoe's
Review as the embodiment of marketplace caprice:
'Tis a strange thing to think, how absolute this Lady is;
how despotickly governs all her Actions: If you court
her, you lose her, or must buy her at unreasonable Rates;
and if you do, she is always jealous of you, as Suspicious;
and if you don't discharge her to a Tittle of your
Agreement, she is gone, and perhaps may never come
again as long as you live; and if she does, 'tis with long
Entreaty and abundance of Difficulty.^^
Insofar as Custom and Lady Credit are valences of the same
gendered paradigm, each importing caprice into the processes of
exchange, it is possible to see a submerged, indirect link
between language and money in A New Test. Lady Credit, a
major figure in Defoe's journalism, appeared regularly in the
Review in the period in which A New Test appeared. An
oblique reference to her ability to upset marketplace exchanges
powerfully supports the case against Custom.
In A New Test of the Sence of the Nation, Custom permits
words to vaporize, to become the type of nonce-words attacked
by Defoe in the Essay.
Two Men may turn Back to Back in the great Road of
Allegiance, and One Travel, that is, Swear, one Way, One
another; and marching on strait forward meet at the
same Point of Truth and Sincerity....[Tjhis is only by
Custom stepping in, and legitimating the Word SWEARING,
and JESTING, to mean the same Thing in The Sense of the
Nation. (5)

^ Review, vol. HI, #5 (10 January 1706), 18. Lady Credit was a prominent figure
in the iJet/ietf from 1709-11. See Sandra Sherman, "Lady Credit no Lady: Or, the
Case of Defoe's 'Coy Mistress,' truly stat'd," Texas Studies in Literature and
Language 37 (1995): 185-214.
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The politics of swearing allegiance is reduced to comedy,
"Jesting," with approval from all sides. As in the Essay, Defoe
analogizes personal and political speech. In each case, custom
dissipates meaning: "Custom governs Kingdoms as well as Men,
and directs you to take all the Imprecations and Execrations of
the Common Conversation of Men to signify nothing at
all....The Sence of the Nation has long since taken away all
Signification from the most violent Oaths in the World in
common Speech, as Things that neither are intended, or shou'd
be understood to have any Kind of Meaning at all in them" (8).
Bringing his argument down to cases, Defoe observes how
oaths to God are "a Support to Parties, and a Property to
Hypocrites" (11). Yet, mirabile dictu, "the Language...really
signifies Nothing,—is receiv'd without Thinking, administer'd
without Meaning, and stands for a Cypher" (11). The reason is
that:
CUSTOM has declar'd, that all those Politick Oaths are
taken as having no Signification; That we are to
understand them, and the Takers of them to have no
Meaning at all....It is evident, these Gentlemen take all
these Sacred Pledges of Honour given by Her Majesty, to
be like their own Swearing,—•yiz. to be taken for
NOTHING, to have no Manner of Signification...and that
this is the Sence of the Nation. (12)
Custom operates to replace sense, "Meaning" with anti-sense, a
Sence of the Nation that sanctions the absence of meaning.
This "Sence" is not mere indifference, but a coherent outlook,
a "Glorious System" (5), wherein language is continually
processed to stand "for a Cypher." The radical instability or
words in this System allows their realignment into a running
tally of zero-sums: "a Man may sail North and South at the
same Time in the great Ocean of Politicks" (5). Custom, like
Lady Credit, is the agent of impermanence. Unlike her,
however, she is indulgent, casting men's meanest acts as
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Honest?^ The nightmare projected by A New Test is a kind of
new-speak, in which for calculated, rational purposes society
agrees to suspend linguistic integrity. Words cease to be
instrumental, to have a meaning beyond mere utterance. In the
grand scheme of things, however—in the System—dishonesty
towards words makes nominal Honesty among speakers. Defoe
perceives the usefulness of useless words, and charges everyone
with perceiving it.
If there is a shift between an Essay and A New Test as regards
the posture of Custom, it is that the later tract acknowledges
the use of an abhorrent custom even though disdaining it. This
slippage in Defoe's rationale, this accommodation of social
fictions, blunts Defoe's claim that his praise for the Sence of the
Nation is ironic. In a certain "sense" Custom is portrayed as a
more "Glorious" Lady Credit: she is more dependable and
procures a tempered peace. She allows the business of state to
run on, if not exactly to elicit meaningful discursive exchange.
In this posture. Custom—sanctioning the disruption of utterance
and intent—becomes a fixture of Defoe's mature oeuvre,
working its way back to explicit connection with monetized
exchange. In The Compleat English Tradesman (1725), Defoe
opined:
CUSTOM indeed has driven us beyond the limits of our
morals in many things, which trade makes necessary, and
which we cannot now avoid; so that if we must pretend
to go back to the literal sense of the command, if our
yea must be yea, and our nay nay; if no man must go
beyond, or defraud his neighbor; if our conversation
must be without covetousness, and the like, why then it
is impossible for tradesmen to be Christians, and we must
unhinge all business...in short, we must shut up shop and
As to Lady Credit, Defoe admonishes: "if you will entertain this Virgin, you
must act upon nice Principles of Honour, and Justice." Review, vol. VIE, #116, (21
December 1710): 463.
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leave off trade, and so in many things we must leave off
living.2'
In this passage, no ironic demurrer undercuts the utility of a
CUSTOM sanctioning words of uncertain intent. The irony is
rather in Defoe's own "progress," from attacking custom in An
Essay Upon Projects to condoning it on similar grounds almost
thirty years later. In between, Defoe wrote Robinson Crusoe,
Moll Flanders, A Journal of the Plague Year, Roxana, and similar
fictions claiming to be true. He learned the value of endorsing
a suspension of disbelief.
In arguing that "we cannot now avoid" suspicious locutions
(much less should we try to dispel them), Defoe suggests that
"conversation" requires mis-communication verging on non
communication; it is a chancy exercise, every man for himself;
maybe "Yes" means "No." Though the scene has changed
(stock-jobbers wear aprons, stand behind counters), the milieu
is again that of the linguistic entrepreneur. Conversation is
vindicated, but it is perverse, unaccountable. Damn!
^ The Compleat English Tradesman (London, 1725), I, 234-5.

TRUTH, BEAUTY, HARMONY,
ORDER, AND MUSCULARITY
IN LE FRANC
DE POMPIGNAN'S
POESIES SACREES
Theodore E. D. Braun

)or a Catholic poet in eighteenth-century France,
[accurately translating or paraphrasing the Bible was in
itself an expression of the Truth. For a writer like JeanJacques Le Franc de Pompignan (1709-84), brother of the future
Bishop of Le Puy and Archbishop of Vienne, accuracy in these
matters was a major concern. After all, he knew not only Latin
and Greek but also Flebrew (which he had studied precisely to
prepare himself for composing his book of poems based on
various biblical texts), and often relied on the Hebrew text
rather than following the Vulgate, which he discovered did not
always follow the Hebrew literally. "Qu'on ne s'imagine pas
connaitre toutes les richesses poetiques de I'Ecriture," Le Franc
tells us in the Discours preliminaire to his Poesies sacrees, "si on
n'en juge que par la traduction latine. II en est beaucoup reste
dans I'original" ["Don't imagine that you know all of the
richness of the poetry of the Scriptures if you judge only by the
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Latin translation. Much remains in the original"].' He gives an
example drawn from Psalm 138: "Si sumpsero pennas meas
diluculo, et habitavero in extremis maris," which he translates
literally as "Si je prends mes ailes au point du jour, et si je vais
habiter aux extremites de la mer" ["If I take my wings at the
break of day and go to live at the end of the sea]" adding:
"L'hebreu dit: 'J^ prendrai les ailes de I'aurore, etc.'" ["The
Hebrew says: T will take the wings of Dawn, etc.'"]. His verse
translation of this brief passage reads:
Quand des ailes de I'aurore
J'emprunterais le secours.
Et qu'aux mers du peuple
More
J'irais terminer mon cours.

[Even if I were to rely on
The wings of Dawn,
And in the sea of the
Moors
/ were to end my flightJl

He goes on to say that if a poet does not know Hebrew, he
should at least make use of the Greek version that the Vulgate
is based on (xij).
We will examine some consequences of this insistence on
accuracy in translation (and, to the extent possible, in
paraphrases) later on.^ I hope to show, among other things,
that in his pursuit of Truth in the sense of coming as close to
the Divine Word as possible, Le Franc also discovered
Muscularity, which for purposes of this essay I define as
powerful—and even sometimes baroque—images that run
counter to the prevailing classical taste of the times (a taste that
was already apparent in Saint Jerome's Latin translation), and
' Jean-Jacques Le Franc de Pompignan, Oeuvres (Paris: Nyon I'ame, 1784), I, xj.
The Poesies Sacrees occupies volume 1.
^ While both Albert Cherel {De Telemaque a Candide [Paris: J. de Gigoid, 1933],
50, and Emile Faguet {Histoire de la Litterature Franfaise de la Renaissance au
Romantisme voltune DC [Paris: Boivin, 1935], 131-2) cite this same passage, neither
of them does more than approve of his boldness in making use of the original
Hebrew text to give more force to his expression than the Vulgate, which,
according to Faguet, "affaiblit ou affadit roriginal" ["weakens or duUs the original']
(131).
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a strong sense of the universe in motion, in contrast to the
stasis that represented the point of perfection in Newtonian
physics and indeed in traditional Catholic theology.^
Not that these classical elements are not present in Le
Franc's book: Harmony, Beauty, and Order are part and parcel
of the aesthetics that he practiced. One could even say that
without them we could scarcely notice the Muscularity that
occasionally appears in his verse. He addresses this question
directly:
Dieu a lui-meme inspire la poesie aux hommes. Il a voulu
que pour celebrer ses grandeurs, sa puissance, ses
misericordes, sa bonte, que pour exprimer sa colere et son
indignation, on se servit d'un langage figure, hardi,
melodieux, assujetti a des mesures sonores et cadencees
qui le distinguassent de la marche unie du discours
' Very little has been written on this topic. Faguet addresses it to some extent in
discussing a few poems; in their books Fr. Albert Duffo {fean-Jacques Lefranc,
marquis de Pompignan. Poete et magistral (1709-1784) [Paris: Picatd, 1913]),
Theodore E. D. Braun {Un Ennemi de Voltaire: Le Franc de Pompignan-Sa vie, ses
oeuvres, ses rapports avec Voltaire [Paris: Lettres Modernes Minard, 1972]), and
Guillaume Robichez (/.-/. Lefranc de Pompignan: Un Humaniste chretien au Steele
des lumih-es [Paris: SEDES, 1987]) devote a good number of pages to Le Franc's
aesthetics of poetry but tend to ghde over this aspect of his composition (Braim
discusses it to some extent in a comparison between Le Franc and Jean-Baptiste
Rousseau, 127-38; Robichez, among his observations, notes the vehemence of Le
Franc's language when he attacks his enemies, listing some 80 words of invective
in Le Franc's poetic vocabulary); Braim, in articles dealing with the Poesies sacrees
("Antiphilosophie dans les Poesies sacrees de Le Franc de Pompignan," Revue de
I'Universite d'Ottawa/University of Ottawa Quarterly 54 [1984]: 9-15; "La Bible
dans les Poesies sacrees de Le Franc de Pompignan," in Le Steele des Lumihes et la
Bible, ed. Yvon Belaval et Dominique Bourel [Paris: Beauchesne, 1986], 355-64),
treats other aspeas of Le Franc's poetic output, though in "La Bible" he does
discuss some of these issues (357-62); Jacques Vier says (but without reference to
any particular poem) that Le Franc's book is one of the "joyaux poetiques"
["poetic jewels"] of the century and that he gives the poetry of his age "quelquestms de ses plus vigoureux caracteres" ["some of its most vigorous expressions"]
{Histoire de la Litterature fran^aise du XVIIP siecle [Paris: Armand Colin, 1970], I,
612).
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ordinaire at commun. [God himself inspired men to write
poetry. To celebrate his grandeur, his power, his mercy, his
goodness, to express his anger and his indignation, he wanted
men to use a language that is at once full of images, bold,
melodious, subject to sonorous and cadenced measures, so as
to distinguish it from the ordinary and common way of
speaking.] (xv-xvj)
Finding this language, what Faguet calls a "fougue verbale"
["verbal ardor"] (137), is one of the tasks of the author of
religious verse, a task that Le Franc sets before himself.
Truth is, then, for Le Franc in the Poesies sacrees coexistent
with an accurate translation or paraphrase of the Bible, not
only in meaning but (more importantly for our topic) in
expression. What about the other elements of our study.^
Harmony is the subject of Le Franc's very first known
poem, the text of a kind of salon opera entitled Le Triomphe de
I'Harmonie written when he was just 20 years old.'* He was
later to use a slightly revised version of this text as the prelude
to his very successful full-scale opera, produced seven years later
in 1737 and bearing the same title.^ The goddess Harmony, in
part with her song and her verse, in part with her reason and
her grace, conquers the forces of War, Discord, and Disputes of
all sorts.
Harmony triumphs in his sacred verse in other ways, too,
ways more appropriate to the subject of this essay. Harmonic
serves as an antonym and as a resolution not only of disaccord
[discord in the sense of disagreement], but also of discordance
[discord in the sense of dissonance]; that is, it has in French as
in English a musical value, too. One way of writing musical
^ Le Triomphe de I'Harmonie /Divertissement /Par M. Lefranc /Mis en musique par
Mile Butier / 1730. This short piece, still unpubhshed, can be found in the
Bibhotheque Nationale, Manuscrits fonds fianfais 9293, Collection de Solleine,
47-51. Dated and signed, it consists of two scenes in one act.
' Le Triomphe de I'Harmonie, ballet heroique, music by Grenet, in CEuvres, III, 1-56.
This opera-ballet was performed in Paris in 1737 and 1738.
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verse in French, according to the poet Verlaine (perhaps the
most musical of the nineteenth-century symbolists), is stated in
the opening lines of his celebrated Art poetique:
De la musique avant toute chose,
Et pour cela prefere I'Impair.
[Music first of all.
And for that, pr^er lines of odd-numbered syllables.]
The musical effect, if we are to believe Verlaine, is created
especially by lines of odd-numbered syllables, rather than the
more static even-syllabic lines of traditional French prosody (in
French, syllables rather than metrical feet are counted).
Verlaine's poem, written 130 years after Le Franc's, has ninesyllable lines; the lines by Le Franc quoted above have seven
syllables. This is not the only example of the use of "musical"
lines in the Poesies sacreesi Le Franc has lines of five and seven
syllables scattered throughout the first four books of this
volume.
Musicality can also be expressed by such elements as douceur
[sweetness or softness] and sentiment, which Le Franc mentions
frequently in his prefatory remarks and which he often succeeds
in expressing. But the sweetness and the sentiment he refers to
have nothing to do with human love. With few exceptions, the
Bible—and particularly those passages Le Franc chose to
translate or to paraphrase—is not lyrically effusive. Love of
God, indignation, despair, terror, adoration, serenity—emotions
like this are the stuff of his verse.
Variety of tone and form are also important to rendering in
French the musicality of the Hebrew original, according to our
poet:
Mais si I'on avoue que [les psaumes] ont ete faits pour
etre mis en musique et chantes, on ne saurait disconvenir
qu'il n'ait fallu pour les plier avec plus de grace aux
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difFerentes modulations du chant, un melange de breves et
de longues arrangees avec plus d'art et de symmetrie que
dans la prose....[Les rimes] y sont amenees pour flatter
I'oreille et pour favoriser le chant. [But if you agree that
[the Psalms] were made to he put into music and sung, you
would also have to agree that they must be provided with
more grace in the different modulations of song, with a
mixture of long and short syllables arranged with more art
and symmetry than in prose....[Rhyme] is introduced to
appeal to the ear and to favor singing.'] (xlj-xlij)
He adds that a "melange symmkrique de strophes inhales
formerait un contraste harmonieux" ("a symmetrical mixture of
stanzas of unequal length forms a harmonious contrast") and
that poetry must "imiter la musique, dont le charme consiste
dans une melodieuse variete de tons et d'accords" ("imitate
music, whose charm consists in a melodious variety of tones
and accords") (liv-lv).^
Harmony is not just musicality, however; it is also the unity
between a thought or an image and its expression. It follows
that if an idea or a person is sweet and languorous, the language
used to express this idea or person must reflect or incorporate
these qualities; and if an idea or event is violent, the language
used to express it must be violent also. It would appear that
this latter sort of expression violates the kind of calm or at least
abstract quality classical authors favored, preferring to soften
harsh lines or too-powerful images. As we will see, Le Franc
moves in the opposite direction, choosing where possible to
' Robert Finch is particularly sensitive to the musical quahty of the Poesies sacrees,
comparing the various poems to musical compositions consisting of movements,
vivace, adagio, moderato-. "like music, especially music of the time, these lyrical
movements can hardly be appreciated in short snippets but must be followed
throughout their changing web of orchestration from beginning to end" [The Sixth
Sense: Individualism in French Poetry, 1686-1760 [Toronto: Univenity of Toronto
Press, 1966], 200). Indeed, Finch beheves that the first four books of the Poesies
sacrees, being "admirably suited for the purpose, there is httle doubt [Le Franc]
hoped they might be set to music" (195).
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express powerful thoughts by powerful images, and in fact often
seeking out powerful images to attract the reader's attention.
In this sense, Harmony, in certain contexts, curiously resembles
Muscularity.
If Beauty comes from a combination of Truth, Harmony,
and Order, among other elements, Le Franc has succeeded in
his chosen task. The Order of the Poesies sacrees can be seen in
the coherent harmony of the individual poems, usually
containing the symmetry he vaunts, in the astonishing variety
overall but carefully controlled parcelling out of meters within
each poem, and in the grouping of the poems in books: the
first edition of the Poesies sacrees had only four books, in perfect
symmetry, each containing tdn poems (the final edition, more
Palladian, had five books with a total of 85 poems and varying
numbers of poems in each book).
Among the other elements Le Franc insisted upon, and
which enter into his conception of Beauty, he finds in the
Scriptures: "le sens mysterieux, le langage figure, les expressions
hardies et singulieres" ["the mysterious meanings, the figurative
language, the bold and unusual expressions"] (xxij). The poems
must fire the imagination and heat up the coldest minds (xij).
To do this, poets must not "think things" as the Moderns are
wont to do; they must imitate the Ancients, especially the
authors of the Bible, and "dream words" (xvij). What a concept
for the eighteenth century! Not the work of the physicist, the
naturalist, the astronomer, the metaphysician, the geometrician,
the moralist, who "think things," who examine, evaluate,
calculate, weigh unseen causes and half-seen effects. No, not the
world of reason, but the unchartered waters of the imagination,
the safe refuges of faith, the warm air of sensibility, where one
"dreams words," the words to express what is felt and what is
known through instinct and feeling.
All this is of a piece; and another thread woven into the
fabric is Muscularity, the divine inspiration that permits words
to express ideas and things as they are, without a visible
disorder (xxiij), despite the violence that this inspiration works
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upon the soul it has taken control of (xij). In the context of
biblical verse, Harmony, Order, Beauty, Truth, and Muscularity
meet and become one. This is especially so in books I and lU
of this collection (Odes, Propheties) because their sources are
rich in images, in metaphors, in actions, in scenes of aweinspiring greatness, of colossal destruction, of eternal perdition.
It is time to illustrate some of what I have proposed up to
now. Let me begin by giving some examples of Beauty and
Harmony expressed through Muscularity, and especially of
Muscularity discovered in the pursuit of Truth, which
(linguistically speaking) is to be found rather in the original
Hebrew text of the Sacred Scriptures than in the Latin of the
official Vulgate version of St. Jerome.
I mentioned above that Le Franc used bold and unexpectedly
strong expressions to capture the attention of the reader. This
desire he renders explicit when he says that the author must
write "impetuous and audacious beginnings which surprise the
reader" (xxxv). Some of his Odes begin with images that are
even more energetic than those found in the Hebrew. For
instance. Ode IV (10-12), taken from Psalms 13 and 15, begins
in the Latin:
Dixit insipiens in corde suo:
"Non est Deus."
Corrupti sunt, abominanda egerunt
non est, qui faciat bonum.
\The fool says in his heart,
"God does not exist!"
They are corrupt, they go about spreading
abominations;
there is none who does good.']
In the Hebrew the beginning is nearly identical:^
' I am giving the Hebrew text in French translation; the text of the Vulgate and
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L'insense dit en soi-meme: "II n'y a pas da Dieu!"
leur conduite n'est que corruption et perversite,
aucun ne fait le bien!
[The fool says to himself, "There is no God!"
their conduct is all corruption and perversity, not
one does good!]
Le Franc's opening scene is much more dramatic:
L'impie a dit: brisons ces temples,
Non, je ne connais pas de Dieu.
Il le dit, et porta en tout lieu
Ses pas impurs et ses examples.
[The unbeliever said: "Tear down these temples.
No, I know no God."
He says this, and he brings everywhere he goes
His impure steps and his (bad) examples.]
Insense ("fool") is a term that recurs often in the Bible with a
non-psychological, religious meaning: it is the opposite of the
term used later in the psalm, sage or wise man, that is, a person
who seeks God. Note that Le Franc's translation is far more
accurate than the Vulgate or the King James Bible ("The fool
says in his heart"), although truth to tell, he turns the nonbeliever into a fanatic, as his next phrase shows: this is no
the literal translation- from Hebrew to French come from the exegetical Bible
prepared under the general editorship of Lauis Pirot and Albert Clamer {La Sainte
Bible, texte latin et traduction fran^aise d'apres les textes originaux avec un
commentaire exegetique et theologique. vol. V, Les Psaumes, trans. E. Pannier and rvd.
H. Renard [Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1950]). The Psalms, constituting volume V
of this edition, were translated and annotated by E. Pannier and revised by H.
Renard. As a check for accuracy in the translation, I have consulted The Holy
Scriptures According to the Masoretic Text, published by the Jewish Publication
Society of America {Holy Scriptures According to the Masoretic Text [Philadelphia:
The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1955]).
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simple abstraction, but is rather an example of the behavior of
non-believers. Indeed, whereas the Hebrew and the Latin
continue to deal in abstractions, apparently intended to show
the result of the unbelievers' disbelief ("They are corrupt, they
have done abominable things" in the Vulgate, "their conduct is
all corruption and perversity" in the Hebrew), Le Franc makes
us see his unbeliever act: he destroys temples, he carries his
foul examples with him as he walks. Attention to the
particular image is underscored by the poet's continuing focus
on the individual as an exemplum of the entire class; the earlier
texts rapidly establish their abstract tone by moving to the
plural. A small example, but a telling one and an arresting
opening image.
In the next ode examined here. Ode V (13-19), taken from
the Vulgate Psalm LXVII, we have another strong opening
statement, which is seen neither in the Latin nor in the
Hebrew, both of which begin with hortatory subjunctives, the
second of which is also passive: "Let God [Elohim] arise, may
his enemies be scattered, and may those who hate him flee from
his face." Le Franc puts this abstraction in a concrete image, in
actions: "God arises: fall down, king, temple, altar, idol. / In
the fire of his glance, at the sound of his word, / The
Philistines have fled." Not only does the narrator wish that
God's enemies (here identified as the Philistines) be dispersed,
but indeed they have already fled humanity, and its creations
bow down before the Creator's fiery eyes and his thunderous
voice: Pompignan develops as a metaphor, and therefore makes
much more powerful, the Biblical texts' simile of the cauldron.
His narrator does not merely wish for the dissipation and
destruction of the wicked, he sees it and he describes it.
The Vulgate and the Hebrew are essentially identical here:
Exsurgat Deus, et dissipentur inimici eius,
et fugiant qui oderunt eum a facie eius.
Sicut deficit fumus, deficiant
sicut fiuit cera a facie ignis.
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sic percant peccatores a facie Dei.
[May God arise, and may his enemies disappear,
and may those who hate him flee from his face.
As the smoke dissipates, may they dissipate,
as the wax melts before the face of the fire
may the sinners perish before the face of God.'\
Le Franc's version has a more powerful effect, a bold opening
statement that Finch states has an individual tone that is quite
unlike that in other poems (199), and in which Faguet
underlines the "mouvement," the "vigueur," the "verdeur"
["vitality"] of the text (137):
Dieu se leve: tombez, roi, temple, autel, idole.
Au feu de ses regards, au son de sa parole
Les Philistins ont fui.
Tel le vent dans les airs chasse au loin la fumee
Tel un brasier ardent voit la cire enflammee
Bouillonner devant lui.
[God arises: fall, king, temple, altar, idol.
In the fire of his glance, at the sound of his word.
The Philistines have fled.
So the wind in the airs drives the smoke afar
So a heated cauldron sees the flaming wax
Boil before it.'\
We note in passing the movement from passive to active voice,
a grammatical change that allows the poet to remain faithful to
his source while developing its poetic possibilities.
Similarly, Ode XI (37-43), drawn from Psalm Cm, w. 2b-4,
changes abstract images into concrete ones, but in this case, Le
Franc expands the biblical text considerably to achieve his goal.
The first two stanzas of the psalm (containing nine verses)
correspond to the first three days of creation. Le Franc turns
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this into a 42-line segment of his poem, including two complete
stanzas consisting of strophe and antistrophe, and the strophe
of the third stanza. A brief examination of verses 2b-4,
expanded to sixteen lines (the antistrophe of one stanza and the
strophe of the next), can serve as a point of comparison.
The Latin reads:
extendens caelum sicut pellem.
Qui tegis aquis superiora eius,
qui pones nubem ascensum tuum,
qui ambulas super pennas ventorum,
qui facis angelos tuos spiritus
et ministros ignem urentem
This text is an attenuation of the Hebrew, which reads:
[et tu] deploies les cieux comme une tente!
[Puis] il fa9onne avec les eaux sa haute demeure,
des nuees, il se fait un char,
il s'avance sur les ailes du vent
Des souffles [de la tempete] il fait ses messagers,
et ses serviteurs, du feu et de la flamme [de I'orage]!
\(Thm) he makes his heavenly home out of water,
out of clouds he makes a coach,
he goes forward on the wings of the wind
He makes his messengers out of the (stormy) gusts of wind!
and his servants, out of the fire and the flame (of the
storm)!\
The Vulgate softens the Hebrew by substituting statements for
exclamations, by replacing the metaphor of gusts of wind as
God's messengers with a less dramatic statement (they are
directly called angels), and by consistently using the second
person singular rather than shifting between second and third
person.
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Le Franc's version, true to the original in its spirit but much
more developed in its power and imagery, goes like this:
Ainsi qu'un pavilion tissu d'or et de soie,
Le vaste azur des cieux sous sa main se deploie:
II peuple leurs deserts d'astres etincelants.
Les eaux autour de lui demeurent suspendues.
Il foule aux pieds les nues,
Et marche sur les vents.
Fait-il entendre sa parole,
Les cieux croulent, la mer gemit.
La foudre part, I'aquilon vole.
La terre en silence fremit.
Du seuil des portes eternelles,
Des legions d'esprits fidMes
A sa voix s'elancent dans I'air.
Un zMe devorant les guide,
Et leur essor est plus rapide
Que le feu brulant de I'eclair.
[Like a tent woven of gold and silk
The vast blue of the heavens unfolds under his hand:
He peoples their deserts with glistening stars.
The waters remain suspended around him.
He tramples the clouds with his feet.
And walks on the winds.
Should he make his voice heard.
The heavens collapse, the sea groans.
The thunder roars, the north wind flies.
The earth trembles in silence.
From the threshhold of the eternal gates.
Legions of faithful spirits
At the sound of his voice hurl themselves in the air.
A devouring zeal guides them.
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And their flight is more rapid
Than the burning fire of the lightning.]
Although stronger than the Vulgate, the Hebrew text is
virtually devoid of detail. Le Franc's translation develops each
image more fully. For instance, the biblical concision ("you
unfurl the heavens like a tent!") gives way to details of immense
size ("vaste"), of colors ("or," "sole" [i.e., white], "azur"), of
texture ("soie"). Le Franc even finds a biblical image (the hand
of God) to add grandeur and majesty to the scene. The
creation of the stars and other heavenly bodies, not mentioned
in the Hebrew text, is elegantly elaborated in the French
version ("II peuple leurs deserts d'astres etincelants"), an image
in which darkness and light, day and night, nothingness and
plenitude are all delicately touched upon. And while Le Franc
makes no mention of the coach in which God travels on the
wings of the winds, he does present the deity as a titan striding
on the clouds and walking on the winds. The final verse in this
example is expanded to the ten-line strophe of the second
stanza. The Muscularity of these lines is worth considering
here. Note that the Hebrew, in its sublime concision, merely
states (albeit with an exclamation point indicating admiration,
wonder and awe) that God created the angels from winds and
fire and lightning. Le Franc has God speak and immediately
the heavens collapse, the sea groans, lightning and thunder
strike, the north wind flies, the storm thus suggested seems to
stretch into infinite space and infinite time, causing vast
numbers of angels ("legions d'esprits fidMes") to fly in response
to his call. These servants are guided by a devouring zeal, and
the image of fire and lightning is converted to the speed at
which they fly. The power, the Muscularity of these lines,
unanticipated in yet suggested by the Hebrew text, is in perfect
harmony with the idea the author is trying to convey, the aweinspiring power of God at the moment of creation. There is,
furthermore, an order and a sense of beauty in this, uniting in
a seamless whole the strands of our themes.
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But the pursuit of Truth was not the only path to
Muscularity in Pompignan's biblical verse. At times the choice
of subject matter belies a kind of baroque or gothic interest in
the macabre or the strange. Certainly, the image of the
resurrection of the dead, of heaps of bones coming to life at the
prophet's command, is an example of this kind of interest
(Prophetie d'Ezechiel, chap, xxxvii, 213-16, stanzas 4-5).®
II dit: et je repke a peine
Les oracles de son pouvoir.
Que j'entends partout dans la plaine
Ces OS avec bruit se mouvoir.
Dans leurs liens ils se replacent,
Les nerfs croissent et s'entrelacent,
Le sang inonde les canaux.
La chair renait et se colore:
L'ame seule manquait encore
A ces habitants des tombeaux.
Mais le Seigneur se fit entendre,
Et je m'ecriai plein d'ardeur:
Esprit, hatez-vous de descendre,
Venez, esprit reparateur,
Soufflez des quatre vents du monde,
Soufflez votre chaleur feconde
Sur ces corps prks d'ouvrir les yeux.
Soudain le prodige s'acheve
Et ce peuple de morts se leve,
Etonnes de revoir les cieux.
[He spoke: and scarcely have I repeated
' Finch points out (199) the brilliant opening movement of this poem, which we
are unable to present here because of space limitations. I am not citing the Latin
and Hebrew versions of this and the following prophecies, since it is not truth in
itself we are examining but rather the kind of subject matter Pompignan chose for
some of his poems.
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The oracles of his power,
Than I hear from all over the plain
The noise of these hones moving.
They refit themselves in their places,
Their muscles cross and interlace.
Their blood floods their vessels.
Their flesh is reborn, and takes on color:
The only thing these tomb-dwellers lack
Are their souls.
But the Lord spoke to me.
And I cried out full of fire:
Spirit, make haste to come down.
Come, O restoring spirit.
Make the four winds of the world blow.
Breathe on these bodies ready to open their eyes
Your revivifying warmth.
Suddenly the miracle is produced
And this population of the dead arises
Astounded to see the heavens again.']
While conceding that Ezekiel intended to depict the end of the
Babylonian Captivity, Le Franc avers that the second meaning,
the resurrection of the dead, was more important than this,
referring to the "astonishing impression" that this tableau made,
filling the faithful simultaneously with "terror and consolation"
(213).
The hand of God leads the prophet to a "triste et vaste
plaine" ["sad and immense field"] strewn with a large number
of bones, which the prophet contemplates. God orders Ezekiel
to call these bones back to life in his name. This excerpt
contains the text of the two stanzas devoted to the resurrection
proper. The bones do not move silently, and do not return to
life without some struggle: they move with noise, tendons
appear, muscles and nerves grow and intertwine, blood flows
anew, flesh is reborn and takes on color. These zombie-like

Truth, Beauty, Muscularity

235

forms need only a soul to become human again, conscious of
their existence. At the prophet's command, God reunites their
souls with their bodies in the form of winds blowing from the
four corners of the world. The dead arise, astounded to see the
heavens again.
Pompignan could have said that without color, without
movement, without power, without Muscularity. He could
have had Ezekiel simply report that God had commanded him
to call the dead to life and that he had done so. Classical critics
might well have praised the sublimity of this simple statement,
but it would have left no imprint on the minds and hearts of
generations of Christians.
Our final example, drawn from the first chapter of the
prophecy of Nahum against Nineveh (237-43), consists of the
first four stanzas of this poem. We see a startling opening
image of a vengeful God who is jealous, who loves vengeance,
who hates his enemies with a passion, whose hatred is merciless,
whose wrath is cruel and when aroused, he never misses his
target. God is pictured in the second and third stanzas as being
accompanied by winds and storms, walking with thunder and
lightning, breaking up clouds. When he addresses his enemy,
rivers run dry, fields become sterile, nations are devastated. We
understand the reaction of Nature (the sea withdraws from the
shore, rivers dry up, fields become sterile, orchards cease
producing fruit) when we learn that he upends mountains,
dissolves hills; his power is such that the ground shakes under
these colossal ruins, the universe trembles just hearing his
terrifying blows. His wrath is metaphorized in the fourth
stanza into a fire capable of devouring stone, a destructive wind
ravaging the land, killing off entire populations, dethroning
kings. By contrast, the good that he does, in the final lines of
the stanza, is colorless, generalized, in a word, intellectual,
devoid of imagery and of emotion ("He weeps for his children
in the day of their sadness / And the evil that presses them /
He cures in all the hearts that recognize his rights").
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Le Seigneur est jaloux, il aime la vengeance,
II hait avec fureur I'ennemi qui I'offense,
Sa haine est sans pitie, son courroux est cruel:
II est lent a punir, mais c'est en Dieu qu'il frappe
Et nul crime n'echappe
Aux coups inattendus de son glaive eternel.
Accompagne des vents, entoure des orages,
Il marche sur la foudre et brise les nuages.
Mer, tu le vois paraitre, il te parle, et tu fuis.
Tout fleuve est desseche, tout champ devient sterile,
Bazan n'est plus fertile,
Le Liban perd ses fleurs et le Carmel ses fruits.
Il renverse les monts, il dissout les collines.
La terre a tressailli sous leurs vastes mines,
Uunivers tremble au bmit de ses coups effrayants.
Quel pouvoir bravera sa puissance invincible,
Et de ce Dieu terrible
Quel mortel soutiendra les regards foudroyants?
Sa colere est un feu qui devore la pierre,
Un souffle destmcteur qui ravage la terre,
Depeuple les etats, et detrone les rois.
Mais il plaint ses enfants au jour de leur tristesse
Et du mal qui les presse,
Il guerit tous les coeurs qui connaissent ses droits.
[The Lord is jealous, he loves vengeance.
He hates violently the enemy who offends him.
His hatred is pitiless, his wrath is cruel:
He is slow to punish, but it's as God that he strikes
And no crime escapes
The unexpected blows of the eternal sword.
Accompanied by the winds and surrounded by storms.
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He walks on the thunder and splits the clouds asunder.
O Sea, you see him appear, he speaks to you and you flee.
Every river is dried up, every fleld becomes sterile,
Bashan is no longer fertile,
Lebanon loses its flowers and Carmel its fruit.
He upends the mountains, he dissolves the hills.
The ground shakes beneath their vast ruins.
The universe trembles at the sound of his terrifying blows.
What power will dare face his invincible strength.
And of this God of terror
What mortal can stand the thundering gaze?
His anger is a fire that devours stone,
A destroying breath ravaging the land,
Depopulating nations, and dethroning kings.
But he weeps for his children in the day of their sadness.
And the evil that presses them
He cures in all the hearts that recognize his rights.']
Le Franc writes: "On remarque dans le texte sacre des
assemblages plus bizarres et plus choquants en apparence, du
singulier avec le pluriel. Et qu'on ne dise pas que ce sont la des
tours propres et particuliers a I'hebreu, qui s'accordent mal avec
le caractere et le genie de la langue franfaise. Cette incompatibilite disparait dans la poesie" ["You can see in the sacred texts
passages (that are) more bizarre and more shocking (than texts
like those seen above), mixtures of singular and plural. And let
it not be said that these are characteristics of Hebrew which do
not accord with the character and genius of the French
language. This incompatibility disappears in poetry"] (xxix).
It is evident that Le Franc believed that French poetry could be
made more powerful by incorporating the language and the
images found in the Hebrew text of the Bible and that he
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intended to offer his book as an example of what future poets
might accomplish.'
"What is interesting to us here is that this poet sought out
these and other passages precisely for their Muscularity, which
he clearly saw as one of the elements of this kind of literature,
an element giving life to poems otherwise merely Harmonious,
Beautiful, Orderly, and True. Muscularity is the soul, as it
were, being breathed into the dry bones of classical verse.
' There is litde support for Cherel's judgment that poetic translations of the Bible
were a popular genre in the eighteenth century; his own meager listings show that
only scattered poems were pubhshed, for the most part, after the death of Louis
XIV (he lists only nine poems for the entire year of 1735 and two for 1759, the
years he chose to prove his point) (53). If Le Franc's poems have not been studied
more extensively, it is largely because Voltaire succeeded in attaching ridicule to
his name and his works, as critics have imanimously demonstrated; but it is also
in large measure because the genre has not attracted a large readership for some 300
years.

DEFOE AND CANTEMIR
Eighteenth-Century Explorers,
West and East
Mihaela Irimia

[EDITOR'S NOTE; 1650-1850 always explores the frontiers
and the boundaries of early-modern scholarship. With this
essay. Professor Mihaela Irimia, a Romanian scholar conduct
ing research at Harvard University, makes use of contempo
rary critical methods to open a discussion of the dialogue
between eighteenth-century "eastern" texts and western
conceptions of "Enlightenment."]

I want to look at Defoe and Cantemir as explorers in
•space and time. In so doing, I will consider two works
,that are given relatively little attention, if any at all,
today. One is A Tour through the Whole Island of Great Britain,
which we could easily dismiss from the terrain of literature
because it looks so much like a Whitaker avant la lettre, or a
Baedeker before its days, or a Domesday redivivus. Defoe
committed it to paper between 1722 and 1726 following the
observations occasioned by a number of apparently well-oi^anized "circuit tours" in Britain. The mid-century saw successive
editions of the text, which had already acquired the qualities of
a palimpsest. Richardson's "improvements" and the typical
eighteenth-century editor(s)' personal note(s) were obvious
239
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deflections from the initial notations of an objective, even
though not disinterested, observer. "We now know that The
Tour is to some extent Defoe's mere fabulations about places
and happenings related to them, as we know that this
exploration in space is also a plundering of Camden's Britannia.
The other work that I wish to consider is The History of the
Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire, which Cantemir
compiled between 1714 and 1716. Hospodar of Moldavia, a
personal friend of Czar Peter the Great and an erudite
conversant with all the prominent living languages of Eastern
Europe, Cantemir spent twenty years in the heart of the
Ottomanness, Constantinople before oflPering up his History to
Europe. The writing of the original in Latin, as Incrementa
atque Decrementa Aulae Othomanicae, is a clear indication of the
Latin, therefore European, therefore Christian, identity of a
culture under the suzerainty of the Turkish, and soon, like the
rest of Eastern Europe, of the Russian, Empire. An act of
cultural prestige and of political courage, this history had been
written for the West. It was soon circulated in French and
English translations, under Western courtly patronage, and
remained for a remarkable lapse of time the source of informa
tion about the menacing otherness of the east. A splendid copy
of the accredited English translation by Nicholas Tindal
(1734-5) can now be consulted at the British Library (1756).
Why put these different works together? What should be
the common denominator among a businessman's mercantile
interest in solid British markets (as seen from within the lofty
walls of prosperous empire), and an aristocrat's refined curiosity
to look surreptitiously through the corridors of imperial power,
still from within, but with a stranger's eye? An infrastructure
of evaluative metatext rounds off the factual agglomeration on
which these two explorations are built. In Defoe's and in
Cantemir's excogitations we find the century's Weltanschauung
with its melioristic penchant. As Todorov would say, both
authors articulate a receivable discourse free of the value-sanc
tioning function, a discourse expected to fit a pattern of "idees
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regues."^ Or, as the phrase goes in Italian, se nan e vera, e ben
trovato.
Rooted in the real, Defoe's Tour is no less an illustration of
the life as journey metaphor. We are warned in the Preface to
volume I that this book aims to "correct" the careless
observations of foreign visitors to Britain. Whatever is is right
for Defoe, as for Pope. The official voice of Enlightenment
speaks through Daniel Foe's down-to-earth evaluations: we live
in the best of worlds, and if, at times, we people have a feeling
that something goes wrong, the fault is ours and only ours, and
comes out of taking the part for the whole; the part can be
erratic, but not the whole, and we are fatally blind to the
perfect project of the ensemble, because we see only bits. If
only we could penetrate the whys and whereofs of the world,
or, for that matter, of the political, economic, financial, social,
institutional ensemble called England! On a small scale, the
England of Defoe's Tour is the world. His is a synecdochic
logic advertising an imperative and imposable pattern. Defoe's
Weltanschauung is optimum (there is no better world, look at
England!), optimal (the model is to be proposed to, and
imposed on, others), optimistic (everything advances according
to the law of progess), and optimizing (at the same time as the
model is promoted, people prosper).
Likewise rooted in the real, Cantemir's History of the Growth
and Decay of the Othman Empire is nothing short of a full-scale
philosophy on the fate of power. Power is human. It acts in
the world. Cantemir's subtle meditations sound so much like
the New Historicist or the Cultural Studies critical jargon
today! Power is inscribed through a set of perfectly conducted
rituals, the rules of a subtle and most efficient public "gram
mar." This keeps the world together. Cantemir's worldly
variant of this cosmic pattern is the Ottoman Empire, a
hugeness of a reality, whether in space or in time, which he is

' Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America—The Question of the Other, trans.
Richard Howard (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 54.
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ready to explore. His metatext of meditative assessment recalls
incipient twelfth-century Ottoman rule in Anatolia, only to
gradually emphasize Ottoman prestige under Murat I, who
established his capital in Adrianople, the former Hadrianopolis.
It evokes the exploits of the fearful Bajazet, "The Lightning," as
well as the glory of Mehmet U's capital in Constantinople,
already a legendary echo of the first Christian Emperor's polis.
It stops at some length to paint the taking of Constantinople in
1453, of the exemplary city founded on ancient pagan glory
now translated into a discourse of Ottoman discipline. It
contains spacious descriptions of imperial pride embodied by
Solyman the Magnificent, but it equally gives due attention to
the reiterated sign of decadence that the Ottomans will not see.
For we see what we want to see, Cantemir indirectly admits, as
does Defoe. The Lepanto defeat of 1571 is a sign, the 1699
Karlowitz Peace is another. The Kutchuk-Kaynardji treaty in
the late eighteenth century would be another. Concomitant
with the dislocation of the Ottoman, the inscription on the
body of history of the Russian, imperial discourse is a process
occurring under Cantemir's eyes. He writes as a onetime
Moldavian prince now hosted by the Czar, never oblivious of
his gratefulness to the worldy Christian "father" Peter I. But,
eiron-like, and unlike Defoe, for whom calling a spade a spade
is the passport to efficiency, Cantemir has the distance not only
of a different religious and political allegiance, but of a different
intellectual stance. Hence his respect for otherness when this
slides into intellectual sameness: a typically Enlightenment
image of Solyman the Magnificent irradiates the melioristic
energy of the book's center to each and every line. Solyman,
the one Sultan among Ottoman Sultans, is depicted with the
book in his hand. The book. The written word sacrosanct, the
"technology of symbolism" that can conquer worlds.^ Islam is
a religion of the logos, of the book, to be propagated through
the force of weapons, whereas Christianity's force lies in its

^ Todorov, The Conquest of America, 153.
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pathos. Yet Cantemir's praise is preeminently the scholar's
praise raising grandeur somewhere above the relevance of
military skill and political cunning.
The word and the book—here are Cantemir's paragons. The
spirit endures, whereas the way merely of the world is one of
ups and downs, "incrementa atque decrementa"—V{co's "corsi e
ricorsi." The calculation and the accountant's book—here, by
contrast, are Defoe's measurements. The one, the aristocratic
spectator to the "squabble" of the world (in Cantemir's own
words), the other, the bourgeois engaged in transactions with
the world. Defoe can only negotiate, as Greenblatt would say,
in his characterization of a world of constant exchanges of
energy. Nec-otium, the denial of otiose philosophizing. The
one, the enacter of an ironic show, the other, the actor of a
comedy (in Frye's acceptation of the term). Both fabricators:
Cantemir, the fabricator of exemplary growth and decay, a
Pope of the Essay and of The Dunciad-, Defoe, the fabricator of
growth as accumulation, a boutgeois gentilhomme, who had
been born only to the name of "Foe."
Exploration is literally an enterprise whereby one goes out
into the world (Lat. ex, "out"), in order to advertise one's dis
covery (Lat. plorare, "to cry out"). Discovering is uncovering
the yet un-seen. But the explorer never simply falls upon
something brand new; rather, he creates something so far
untreated, and once the local habitation is there, he will bestow
upon it a name. Exploration is a poetic enterprise recognizable
in the interpretive framework that articulates it. As it
sediments into discourse, it acquires and propagates a normaliz
ing force eventually crystalizing in unequivocal, therefore
univocal, expression. It reinscribes into its text the newly
discovered and domesticates it by iconic representation, or
stabilizing stereotypes. Such things give comfort in the face of
the new. Silencing the other, the new, is thus a therapeutic
operation, and the iconography of official grand history usually
rises on the ashes of difference defeated. Putative moral
superiority, which is as much as saying denigration of the other.
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The rule of the center, versus the margin, of the metropolis
versus the provinces. The capital city, for instance, the "caput,"
"capitis," both time- and space-wise. As origin of power,
through prestige accumulated in time, and transposed into
legend and eventually into myth, it becomes the exemplary,
paradigmatic city.
Such is Byzantium in Cantemir's History. Edirne, the
fourteenth-century Ottoman capital, assumes a new dignity in
European eyes, as the City of Emperor Adrian, at once Latin
and Greek: Adrianople-Hadrianopolis. By public mise-enabime, the city of hie et nunc rises to the dignity of an
atemporal, Utopian center. Opposite the Bosphorus, the other
half of the same temporal city is Constantinople, or also
Istanbul. Preeminently, this is the City of Constantine the
Great, the first Christian Emperor in an empire echoing the
other imperial power. The pagan and the Christian, the
European and the Islamic meet here. Byzantium, the miracle
of survival after fall, the legendary dwelling place, the strong
hold of identity under the constant menace of otherness,
becomes the City-Empire in a telling overlapping of center and
margin—orfe et urbis, like ancient Rome.
Modelled on the pattern of Rome, the London of Defoe's
Tour is at once Lundinium, the City of Anne, reduplicated in
Annapolis, and the City of the Augustus Monarch of the day.
London is Augusta, the Civitas Augusta, whose singleness is
consecrated by successive circumferences irradiating order from
the center. Central London (city and court) is the country, and
round it lies England, and farther off lie the other countries in
the kingdom, and overseas lie the colonies. Defoe reads the
dense text of Englishness all compact in London. Symbolically,
the pilgrim in Defoe periodically reaches his destination by
exemplarily returning to London. London is the site of more
than mere physical centrality, but in the comic mode of
middleclass values this status is tested under mercantile
circumstances. Huge amounts of goods are being carried and
displayed in a London marketplace to which the witness is no
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other than a Spanish ambassador, exemplarily humiliated by the
spectacle of plenty. Defoe's first measure of excellence is
quantity: the aristocratic Spaniard has to admit that not even
in the whole of Spain is the equivaleht of these colossal
quantities of "flesh, fish, and fowl" sold, that are sold here, in
one market in London. At this point Defoe stops being a mere
traveller-explorer; he is a teleologist who knows in advance
what he will "discover": the cornucopia of imperial Englishness.
The dull accountant-like formulation fringing on
reportage is "poetic" through what it implies (Lat. implicare <
in + plica, "fold"). Between the folds of literal meaning
adjacent meanings complete the "story," not the "history." Is
there such thing as history, when everything is discourse,
confabulation? And intentionality: being Spanish, versus being
English is a matter of questioning imperial prestige in the
world, for in the diffuse text of history is inscribed the defeat
of the Invincibile Armada, a paradox deserving the aura of
myth. Being Spanish also means being Catholic, and dissenter
Defoe's explorations in The Tour are imbued with anti-Popish
attacks. Last, but not least, being an ambassador is represent
ing, rather than simply being present. The Spanish ambassador
is the Spanish nation in a nutshell, so, metonymically, his
amazement is the amazement, not less the envy of, the Spanish
race, of Spanishness in front of Englishness. A second axis
mundi rises in the middle of a London market.
For Cantemir, the scholar, myth rises out of, and is sustained
by, the exemplary book. Phanar, the center of intellectual
power in Istanbul-Constantinople, is the seat of schools and of
the Academy recalling and revigorating the onetime fame of
ancient pagan Akademos, the grove where peripatetic Plato
taught. Cantemir's exploration starts in space and extends
backward into the original time of European philosophy. Leaps
in the boundless time of founding wisdom give the true
dimension of this metaphysical exploration: most importantly,
the Patriarchs of Constantinople are associated with the
Academy of Phanar! They are the exemplary fathers of an

246

1650-m0

exemplary family dwelling in an exemplary city. Constantine
is another way of saying Augustus, or Gloriana, or Victoria, or
Adrianus. Superposed on the image of Solyman the Magnifi
cent (yet another Augustus) holding the Book in his hand, this
certificate of paradigmatic identity of the place is the key to our
reading of another "story" in Cantemir's "history."
In Bakhtinian terms, Defoe and Cantemir are each engaged
in chronotopic exploration. Places are visited which are
"discovered" for the sake of confirming the landscapes devised
collectively in a "tableau" of overall harmony. And encounters
occur during the journey that satisfy such collective expecta
tions. And this is how London or Byzantium condense into
zero degree points of reference in space and in time. Explora
tion can be stirred by a number of motives, from the Odyssean
itch of pushing out the limits of the known world, to the
Quixotic rambling in search of ideality, to religious missionarism, or colonial conquest. All of these forms of exploration are
encounters with the Other. They all presuppose a system of
interpretation to accommodate the other and make it familiar.
It is interesting to see how the more widely collective
unconscious operates through similar protocols of assimilation,
whether by agglutination or by exclusion. Both Defoe and
Cantemir lend an occasional ear to the small gossip of history.
The spicy "petites histoires" of royal courts, like the spicy
episodes of "komos," everyday life, are the salt and pepper on
the main course of large-scale history.
TTje Tour is mainly an exploration of economic possibilities
whose pragmatic aim is to extend the English model over
otherness at home and abroad, over Scotland, Ireland, and the
colonies. "Where Scotland has been domesticated through the
Union Act, stubborn Ireland remains the wilderness to Defoe's
disciplining eye. He is over-observant of Scottish and Irish
sloth, laziness, and recklessness. And when the short visitation
of metaphysics is allowed an infinitesimal space in the narrative,
the otherworldy must be Scottish. In Letter VI, Defoe the
traveller comes to the brink of a most curious hole in the earth.
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where the man of the mountain dwells. The wildness embodied
in the black-faced sweating collier makes him shudder not
romantically, but rather with the rancour of the civilizing
colonist who cannot fail to domesticate the text of his
exploration all through. The narrator does not miss the chance
to remark that this is an apparition not simply from the entrails
of the earth, but ah inferis. Even the so very English folly of
Bath summer hybris seems to fall on deaf ears in The Tour.
Defoe cannot afford to waste time on gratuitousness. He is not
mere presence in his circuit tours through the whole island; he
is a representative, and the model he has embarked upon
installing has to have regulatory power even without the least
exception. As the later eighteenth and early nineteenth century
were to invent a Scotland of romantic raggedness, so Defoe's
equalizing eye invents an exemplary England to be consumed
as universal panacea. And while middle-class Daniel Foe
himself falls at times prey to meditations on the fate of empires
in history, especially when consciously or less so he grows
Camdenian, England is of necessity rendered timeless, even
eternal.
At once an insider and an outsider, Cantemir can elegantly
pendulate between the discourse of official Ottoman rule and
that of peripheral "aberration." There are reports of Turkish
monks that are able to live merely on one olive or one fig a
week, and to fly as far as the Church of Sancta Sophia in
Constantinople. They fly from the margin to the center. They
are spiritual fathers, but their unheard-of capacity cannot help
succumbing to questioning. And yet, the center appears
tolerant to the margin, in Cantemir's account, because mediated
by spiritual, rather than material, value. "If any Christian
questions the Truth of this Story, a Turk thinks it sufficiently
prov'd, if he shows it to be written in his Book. For the
illiterate among them believe nothing false can possibly be
recorded in their Books."^ The Book is the one Original Center

^ Dimitrie Cantemir, The History of the Ottoman Empire (Bucharest: Alexandra
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for Moslem illiterate and Christian scholar. This spiritual
relativization of the worldy center can be seen at work in
anonymous collective art produced on the margin of empire at
about the same time as Cantemir compiled his History. The
paradigmatic city circulates in its variants in the famous
churches in Northern Moldavia boasting spectacular frescoes on
their external walls. One particular theme, the siege of
Constantinople, arrests the explorer's interest. The Moldovitsa
fresco, above all, shows Constantinople as a Moldavian fortress
assaulted by referentially identifiable Turks: costumes, hairdos,
and weapons are a guarantee that they are unequivocally Turks.
They are the infidels besieging the Christian Capital, the last
bastion of identity, at least for Eastern Europe. Symbolically,
the "small gossip" of farmer culture has made the Capital
migrate to the margin: Constantinople as the Capital of
Moldavia. Axis mundi stands up and out there. If the center
absorbs otherness, to hush it into acquiescence, the margin does
not do otherwise! Let us read the whole text, and we shall see
that even the zig-zag line of history is patterned on teleological
expectations. The next fresco, set in narrative sequel after the
one we have just referred to, completes the exemplary "story,"
not "history": Hell, or rather descent into Hell, a sine-qm-non
scene in each of these famous frescos, is here the descent of so
many Turks into the bowels of infernal blazes! The two scenes
are framed at human height, on display for the Everyman of
the margin, at once an illustrated Everyman's History and Bible.
If not everybody can read the cryptic signs of writing,
everybody can, instead, read the visual text. The New
Historicist's appetite for anecdote (literally the "unpublished,"
the still "secret," and because of this latently richer) is here
excellently satisfied.
Why bring these so different texts together.' Defoe's Tour
codifies eighteenth-century reality in typically Defoesque
listings, but also in philosophical take-offs that bring it closer to

Dutu & Paul Cernovodeanu, 1973),
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meditative literature produced at the time. Respect for the
written word is obvious. We need hardly remark how
important the written word is for the erudite Cantemir. His
resorting to the universal European language (Latin) makes of
him a believer in some universal grammar, which was one of
the dreams of the century. Defoe believes in his own grammar
of pragmatic precision, and it is hard to deny how persuasive
the Defoesque text usually is, if only because of its referential
quality. Both Defoe and Cantemir venerate codification. The
English translation of Cantemir's work is an overlooked entry
into the archive hosting Defoe's Tour. This mutual jostling of
text by text, of discourse by discourse, yields one more possible
image of one more possible eighteenth century. The Ecole des
Annates in France and the New Historicism, in the Englishspeaking world have long specialized in discovering (and pro
ducing) such multiple eighteenth centuries by means of literary
and other texts; it is not uninteresting to approach the non- or
paraliterary text with the tools of the literary critic. Defoe's
jottings, entries, records, and tabulations, like Cantemir's, add
vitality to their sometimes overly serious discourse. Both these
authors, moreover, are inescapable. When the first grammar of
a modern European language was composed, the grammar of
the Spanish language by Antonio de Nebrija, its author sent
into the world a statement that has not, to this day, lost its
acute human meaning: "language has always been the
companion of Empire." My use of the term "empire" focuses
on the statement of power, itself inescapable, like fabulation,
because, like the latter, human. West and east, authors in the
eighteenth century tried to decode the code of power. The
history of modern Europe begins in the eighteenth century. As
an Eastern European, I hope this history will have a history.
Which gives us plenty of reasons to resume exploring it.

COMPOSITE (DIS)ORDER
Cultural Identity in Wieland^
Edgar Huntly, and
Arthur Gordon Pym
Jochen Achilles

St is a truism that the French and American revolutions
were intellectual as well as political events. In the
following half century, these revolutions uprooted ways
of thinking as well as traditional forms of social organization.
They led to new forms of government, and in America to a
new type of multicultural nation. They also led to aesthetic
manifestations of a deep-rooted disorientation, a consequence of
the loss of traditional value systems. If modernism is

f'"

the art consequent on the dis-establishing of communal
reality and conventional notions of causality, on the
destruction of traditional notions of the wholeness of
individual character, on the linguistic chaos that ensues
when public notions of language have been discredited
and when all realities have become subjective fictions,^
' Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, "The Name and Nature of
Modernism," Modernism: 1890-1930, ed. Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane
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then such aesthetic manifestations of disorientation in the art of
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries may be called
early modernist. In America, Charles Brockden Brown and
Edgar Allan Poe are among those who sowed the seeds of this
early modernist aesthetic's fleurs du mal, which came into full
bloom only around the turn of the next century.^ It is the
contention of this essay that Brown's and Poe's early modernist
aesthetics grow out of their concern for specifically American
problems of cultural composition. These early modernist
aesthetics of fundamental disorientation in turn shape the
treatment of cultural identity in these fictions.
Both Brown and Poe are inspired by the European gothic
tradition, notably by its perhaps most stereotypical devices, the
doppelgdnger and the revenant, which underlie the characteriza
tion of central figures in some of their major works. In
Wieland (1798), Edgar Huntly (1799), and The Narrative of
Arthur Gordon Pym (1838), the inherent duality of this gothic
stereotyping develops into multiple textual structures that
highlight essential problems of individual as well as cultural
identity formation.
These dual or multiple structures become vehicles for the
highly ambivalent examination of various boundary issues such
as the relationship between the Old World and the New, white
and indigenous civilizations, culture and nature, a single
Americanness and ethnic diversity, enlightened rationalism and
instinctual drives. Through the diverse and disparate qualities
that they are capable of reconciling, or have to repress and
displace, Frank Carwin, Edgar Huntly, Clithero Edny, Arthur
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), 19-55; 27.
^ Hagenbiichle's interpretation of Brown's fiction as the manifestation of a
specifically American epistemological crisis and Zanger's examination of
indeterminacy in Poe's Pym, for instance, confirm this view of Brown's and Poe's
proto-modernism. See Roland Hagenbiichle, "American Literature and the
Nineteenth-Century Crisis in Epistemology: The Example of Charles Brockden
Brown," Early American Literature 23 (1988): 121-51 and Jules Zanger, "Poe's
Endless Voyage: The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym," Papers on Language and
Literature 22 (1986): 276-83.
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Gordon Pym, and Dirk Peters, the main characters of these
fictions, develop into experiments of "cultural composition."
Both Brown and Poe bring the arsenal of traditional
European gothicism to bear on the American condition in the
period of the early Republic. The result is not necessarily the
moral conservatism that Leslie Fiedler once summarily
attributed to the American gothic in the wake of Brown.^ The
impact of the American scene also leads to the transformation
of an obsolescent European style into a discourse that challenges
what may be called "the forgotten Enlightenment" of
eighteenth-century America and paves the way for the
modernist transition "from a metaphysical to a relative
morality, from a univocal to a dialogic story of reality.'"'
This early modern transformation of a seemingly outdated
genre is effected by its interaction with an environment that
made it hard to overlook the inner conflicts of the cultural
ensemble: the issues raised by the interaction of different races
and by an untouched nature beyond the frontier. When
channelled by the dual or multiple textual structures taken over
from the European gothic tradition, the discussion of this
multivalence of the American scene breaks through the
encrusted stasis of the Enlightenment belief in culture as
determined forever by the power of reason. If culture is a
concept that "gestures toward what appear to be opposite
things: constraint and mobility,"^ its mobile aspect is fore
grounded by this early modern discourse.
These insights into cultural composition provided by
Brown's and Poe's fiction may at present be all the more
striking and topical when they are considered from a European
' See Leslie Fiedler, Love and Death in the American Novel, 2nd ed. (New York:
Stein & Day, 1966), 161.
•* David Brooks, "Modernism," inEncyclopedia of Literature and Criticism, ed.
Martin Coyle et al. (London: Routledge, 1990), 119-30; 126.
' Stephen Greenblatt, "Culture," in Critical Terms for Literary Study, ed. Frank
Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990),
225, 225-32.
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perspective, as they are here. At the end of the twentieth
century, Europe is experiencing processes of mass migration, the
breakdown of old value systems and world views, the necessity
to reconcile ethnic diversity and a common European cultural
identity. "What is new for Europe is the attempt to transform
this common cultural identity from a hazy abstraction into a
political principle powerful enough to organize social realities.
In their relative novelty for Europe, these phenomena are
comparable to similar problems faced by the United States since
the early modern period. This unfamiliar state of affairs may
be responsible for a particularly vital European interest in this
aspect of early American fiction. Ironically, what seems to be
happening here is almost a reversal of the use of European
models in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American culture.
The difference is that the American model has become as valid
for contemporary Europe as the European models had become
inadequate for nineteenth-century America.
The definition of cultural identity and otherness in early
American fiction oscillates between two extremes, on the one
hand a willingness to integrate everything, which tends to
disregard the explosiveness of incompatibilities, and on the
other a puristic ideal of unadulterated sameness combined with
the irrational fear of otherness in whatever shape.^ I will try to
describe and analyze some of the ways in which Brown and Poe
try to steer clear of these extremes and yet sometimes incorpo
rate both in Wieland, Edgar Huntly, and Pym.
What may somewhat hamper the discussion of cultural
identity in these fictions is the fact that Brown's novels and, to
a lesser extent, also Poe's work foreground problems inherent
in the composition of individual rather than cultural identity.
' In the period of the early Republic, these conflicting attitudes emerge in a
considerable number of American works of fiction. Hiram DooUttle's description
of Templeton's conglomeration of architectural styles in Cooper's The Pioneers
(1823), for instance, illustrates the first of these alternatives. The alchemist
Aylmer's view of his wife's beauty in Hawthorne's "The Birth-mark" (1843)
illustrates the second alternative.
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In some respects, these texts do not entirely bridge the distance
between the formation of personal identity on the one hand
and of cultural identity on the other. The diverse ethnic,
moral, political, and religious positions that collide and are
compounded in Brown's and Poe's works have to be reconciled
psychically by their protagonists as different aspects of their
complex personalities—processes that are not always presented
entirely convincingly.
The grotesque and fantastic features of the main characters
of both Brown's and Poe's texts are caused by the incongruity
between their status as individuals and the processes of cultural
identity formation for which they are made to stand. Cultural
and individual identity formation are interrelated but not
identical. A society is made up of individuals but does not in
all respects function like an individual or, in Hegelian terms, as
a collective subject. The overdetermination of some of Brown's
and Poe's characters appears exaggerated and grotesque if these
characters are solely considered as realistically depicted human
beings. If they are viewed as displaced experiments in cultural
composition, these grotesque features assume new meaning.
They then seem to probe the psychological basis of cultural
conflicts and syntheses.

Ventriloquism and sleepwalking, the capacities which the
sensational plots of Wieland, the Memoirs of Carwin the
Biloquist (1803-5), and Edgar Huntly hinge upon, are devices
that also bridge the gap between southern and northern Europe,
Europe and America, consciousness and the unconscious, moral
probity and villainy, religious faith and agnosticism, appearance
and reality. Thus, they serve as a link between otherwise
categorically discrepant spheres.^ As much as they are part of
' For the sources and background of the mysterious phenomena in Wieland and
for a historical assessment of ventriloquism and somnambulism, see Harry R.
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Brown's endeavor to create gothic atmosphere, both ventrilo
quism and somnambulism also suggest a buried, only vaguely
recognizable, coherence and provide an often spurious
composite identity.
In creating Carwin, the enigmatic catalyst of the plot of
Wieland, Brown experiments with a wide variety of values and
defects that might go into the definition of a multicultural
identity. In the desire to make him all-encompassing. Brown
turns Carwin into a figure capable of straddling continents and
cultures, an overdetermined vessel that is associated with
murderous aggression and sexual libertinage as well as the
religious ethics of several denominations, rationalism as well as
superstition, saintliness as well as satanism. Carwin functions
as a kind of collective unconscious manipulating the actions of
the other characters in the novel. But he seems to play the
roles of id and superego at the same time.®
Warfel, "Charles Brockden Brown's German Sources," Modem Language Quarterly
1 (1940): 357-65; Donald A. Ringe, Charles Brockden Brown, (Boston: Twayne,
1991), 11-12; Alexander Cowie, "Historical Essay," in Charles Brockden Brown,
Wieland; or The Transformation. An American Tale with Memoirs of Carwin the
Biloquist, 1798/1803-5, ed. Sydney J. Krause et al. (Kent: Kent State Univenity
Press, 1977), 311-48; 325-7; Sydney J. Krause, "Ehstorical Essay," in Charles
Brockden Brown, Edgar Huntly; or Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker, 1799, ed. Sydney J.
Krause et al. (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1984), 295-400; 330-57.
' Frank Carwin is introduced as an ermobled version of the American farmer, an
agrarian ideal which harks back to Crevecoeur and foreshadows Thoreau. As we
learn from his Memoirs (247), he is a farmer's son from western Permsylvania,
guided by Godwinian rationalism. Henry Pleyel rememben Carwin also as a
Protestant Enghshman who has transformed himself entirely and convincingly into
a devout Spanish Catholic (67). In addition, he presents himself as a convinced
sensualist to Clara Wieland (90, 201) and is considered to be a convict escaped from
death row in Newgate prison, Dublin (129). In the final part of the novel, Carwin
turns into a kind of self-explaining supernatural (198-216). He reveals himself as
the source of all the seemingly inexphcable acoustic phenomena that disastrously
affect Clara Wieland's fate, with the possible exception of the voice that Theodore
Wieland mistakes for the divine command to slay his own family (225-6). If
Carwin is considered to be the source of this apparently heavenly voice, he adds
to his versatihty by playing God, too. This assumption would also imply the
theologically disturbing consideration that divine intervention may be nothing but
a confidence trick.
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The integration of all imaginable otherness in Carwin's
highly condensed character produces a deeply disturbing result.
In theory, he might be ideally qualified for "the scheme of
Utopian felicity," which he and his mentor Ludloe advocate in
his Memoirs-.
where the interest of the whole and of the individual
should be seen by all to be the same; where the public
good should be the scope of all activity; where the tasks
of all should be the same, and the means of subsistence
equally distributed.' (277)

Carwin's involvement in or ignorance of Wieland's murders has been a
controversial critical issue for a long time as .different passages in Brown's novel
seem to support either one of these contentions. Bernard Rosenthal, "The Voices
of Wieland," in Critical Essays on Charles Brockden Brown, ed. Bernard Rosenthal
(Boston: G. K. Hall, 1981), 104-25, argues for, Ringe (17-18) against Carwin's
involvement. Hagenbiichle considers the issue as tmclear and unclarifiable (125,
128). Beverly R. Voloshin sees Carwiu as the instrument rather than as the agent
of change in her article, "Wieland: 'Accounting for Appearances,'" New England
Quarterly 59 (1986): 341-57; 355. See also Alan Axelrod, Charles Brockden Brown:
An American Tale (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), 83; Cowie, 325;
Robert Hobson, "Voices of Carwin and Other Mysteries in Charles Brockden
Brown's Wieland," Early American Literature 10 (1975/76): 307-9; David Lyttle,
"The Case against Carwin," Nineteenth-Century Fiction 26 (1971): 257-69. Shirley
Samuels makes an interesting point in her essay, "Wieland: Alien and Infidel,"
Early American Literature 25 (1990): 46-66, when she analyzes Carwin as an alien
intruder who may portray nothing but the irmer contradictoriness of the American
family which in turn reflects political and religious threats to the new American
nation. Samuels's excellent analysis thus tmcovers some of the mechanisms that
govern the interpenetration of the psychological and the cultural sphere. On the
protean quality of Carwin's character, see also William Hedges, "Charles Brockden
Brown and the Culture of Contradictions," Early American Literature 9 (1974):
107-42; 121. On the importance of the family structure in Wieland, see Roberta
F. Weldon, "Charles Brockden Brown's Wieland-. A Family Tragedy," Studies in
Arnerican Fiction 12 (1984): 1-11.
' Page numbers in parentheses following quotations from or comments on Wieland
and Edgar Huntly refer to the respective volumes of the Bicentermial Edition of
Brown's works. For bibliographical details of this edition, see n7.
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The protean comprehensiveness of Carwin's personality seems
to match the universality of this cultural ideal. But Brown
demonstrates in Wieland that the price of such comprehensive
ness may be utter disorientation and moral anarchy. The
ultimate contamination of everything by everything else
represented by Carwin's multiple self proves to be incompatible
with the adherence to any one standard to the exclusion of
another. Such adherence might furnish direction and order but,
by ruling out some factors in favor of others, would also
necessarily produce otherness and thus provide a caveat to the
possibility of total integration. The absolute equilibrium of all
the partial claims whose orchestration results in individual or
social identity also leads to moral entropy and, therefore, to
anarchy. A minimum of hierarchical organization is necessary
to make both individual and cultural identity formation feasible.
This is the lesson to be learned from Carwin's chaotic
character.
In Wieland, Carwin's inability to develop a morally
meaningful psychic order out of the multicultural determinants
that go into the definition of his personality is at least partly
responsible for the erosion of the Wieland family's social order.
In Edgar Huntly Brown scrutinizes further this interdependence
of psychological and social identity formation. He splits up
Carwin's condensed hyper-comprehensiveness into the parallels
between the near-doubles Edgar Huntly and Clithero Edny.'°
The multivalent phenomenon of ventriloquism, which lends
expression to Carwin's complexity, is replaced by the binary
one of sleepwalking which is shared by Edgar and Clithero and
links their consciousness with the unconscious.
In a less sensational fashion than Carwin, Clithero Edny,
too, represents an experiment in a composite identity that
reconciles antagonistic social forces. What causes his downfall
For a discussion of the motif of the doubles in Edgar Huntly, see Krause,
"Historical Essay," 317-30; and Ringe, 86.
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is the domination of his actions by unconscious motives." It is
this uncontrollable dominance of the unconscious in Edgar
Huntly, most powerfully symbolized by the somnambulism of
the novel's central characters, which Brown depicts as the key
factor preventing a feasible composite order of the psyche and,
by extension, of society at large." In several instances. Brown
demonstrates how easily enlightened conduct is transformed
into anarchic violence. Clithero, for instance, reaches the
conclusion that it is justifiable and even advisable to murder his
benefactress, by a string of seemingly rational arguments that
only eventually reveal themselves as a camouflage of his
incurable insanity (82-3). Edgar Huntly undergoes a similarly
imperceptible transition from rationally motivated selfpreservation to senseless butchery when he kills his last Indian
more slowly than he finds justifiable in retrospect. With some
surprise at his own behavior, he begins to see in it a hint as to
the origin of all violence:
Such are the deeds which perverse nature compels
thousands of rational beings to perform and to witness!
" For the psychological implications of the oedipal crisis that is embedded in this
character constellation, see Hedges, 132.
^ Critics have repeatedly commented on the interrelation of the psychological and
the cultural dimension of Edgar Hundy. In his "Historical Essay," Krause draws
attention to both aspects (317, 385-6, 399). In his article, "Charting the Hidden
Landscape: Edgar Hundy," Early American Literature 16 (1981): 133-53, George
Toles interprets the novel's scenery as a landscape of the soul, its empirical reahty
as an exteriorization of psychological phenomena. In his essay "Edgar Huntly and
the American Nightmare," Studies in the Novel 13 (1981): 294-302, Sydney J.
Krause insists on the cultural signihcance of this inner world. He portrays Huntly
as the Faustian American hero who, like Wieland, Pym, Goodman Brown, and
others, has to grapple with the problem that evil can develop out of good
intentions. In his article "Desacralizing the American Gothic: An Iconographic
Approach to Edgar Huntly," Studies in American Fiction 14 (1986): 127-38, Dermis
Berthold makes the strongest argument in favor of the "specifically American
iconography" (130) of Edgar Huntly, whereas Beth L. Lueck, "Charles Brockden
Brown's Edgar Huntly. The Picmresque Traveler as Sleepwalker," Studies in
American Fiction 15 (1987): 25-42, tries not very convincingly to see in Huntly a
picturesque traveler transferred from Britain to American soil.

260

1650-1850

Such is the spectacle, endlessly prolonged and diversified,
which is exhibited in every field of battle; of which, habit
and example, the temptations of gain, and the illusions of
honour, will make us, not reluctant or indifferent, but
zealous and delighted actors and beholders! (202)
In some episodes of Edgar Huntly, Brown seems to suggest that
a viable individual as well as cultural identity depends on
restoring unconscious motives to consciousness." In a truly
rationalist fashion, identity and harmonious interaction seem to
depend on the raising to a conscious level of all the implications
of a situation.
Brown's message seems to be an enlightenment version of
Freud's insight a century later that the ego can only become
master in his or her own house if the repressed returns, if the
picture is completed, if the component parts are open to
inspection in their entirety. And only the interaction of
individuals who have pieced together the jigsaw puzzle of their
own personalities can enter into a social intercourse that may
produce a viable cultural identity beyond the personal one. But
the power of the unconscious to obscure a situation is often
stronger than the power of reason to clarify it. Huntly
understands this in a dark moment when he muses on the
imponderability of his own and Clithero's sleepwalking: "How
little cognizance have men over the actions and motives of each
other! How total is our blindness with regard to our own
performances!" (278).
The episode involving the old Delaware woman, whom
Huntly significantly names Queen Mab after the fairy queen
who allegedly has power over men's unconscious wishes and
dreams, shows that intercultural coexistence can, at least
temporarily, also be based on the distortion and repression of
" This is the lesson to be learned, for instance, when Waldegrave's purloined letters
can be retrieved on the basis of the hypothesis that Huntly displaced them himself
during a bout of sleepwalking (259-60).
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aspects of identity (208-10). The seemingly peaceful coexistence
of the English farmers and the Indian woman depends on the
mutual disregard for and repression of important aspects of
their relationship. The whites have to overlook the justifiabi
lity of Queen Mab's position; she has to ignore her humiliation
at the hands of the people who give her sustenance. The often
noted speechlessness between the races in Edgar Huntly
obliquely indicates the void of unexpressed aggression that
erodes their relationship." So do the caverns undermining the
forest paths, chosen by Edgar Huntly and Clithero Edny when
they venture beyond the pale of white civilization. This void
is opened and the repressed aggression that really governs race
relations returns to the surface of consciousness when Queen
Mab is finally apprehended as the guide and accomplice of the
Indians who killed Edgar's friend Waldegrave. With respect to
the relationship between the races, the complete restoration of
consciousness and the composition of the picture in its entirety
reveal conflict instead of producing wholeness.
With regard to both individual and cultural identity, the
message of Brown's perhaps two most important works of
fiction remains ambivalent. As Wieland on the whole and
Carwin, the novel's most conspicuous character, in particular
demonstrate, comprehensiveness cannot guarantee wholeness.
It fails to provide standards of personal, social, and moral
organization. Edgar Huntly shows that an exclusively rational
approach to this problem falls short of integrating elements that
remain beyond its reach. Both an enlightened perspective and
the integration of as many facets as possible are necessary, but
not sufficient, conditions to make a composite culture work.
Laying bare the deficits that remain. Brown's fiction implies
an impasse. One of these deficits seems to lie in the need to
" The significance of the Queen Mab episode has found only scant critical
attention; see for instance Krause, "Historical Essay," 368-70. Berthold beUeves
that the silence of the Indians does not indicate Brown's lack of interest in them
but makes them "iconographic figures necessary to a convincing portrayal of the
American frontier" (133).
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define principles that ought to govern the process of social
composition. If it is left to regulate itself, it may produce a
monstrosity like Carwin. But a rational approach to the
implementation of such regulatory principles is marred by the
ever-present unconscious aspects of the human psyche whose
potentially chaotic effects are graphically described in Edgar
Huntly. Such chaos tends to subvert any consensus that might
be agreed on rationally.^' A minimum of subordination of some
elements to others, in particular the rational control of the
eruptions of the unconscious, emerge as indispensable require
ments that are shared by individual and cultural self-definition.^'

Poe's Pym explores the irritations and the violent destructiveness potentially created by social composition in a fashion that
recalls both Wieland and Edgar HundyF Dirk Peters, Pym's
sole and soul companion, is presented as a condensed character.
" Brown's criticism of the shortcomings of rationalism has been widely discussed
in recent years. In her article on Wieland and in "Edgar Huntly and the Coherence
of the Self," Early American Literature 23 (1988): 262-80, Beverly R. Voloshin has
analyzed Brown's subversion of the Lockean empiricist paradigm and of the
concomitant concept of a coherent self. Hagenbiichle considers this as an
expression of a wider epistemological crisis. In "'An Imperfect Tale': Interpretive
Accountability in Wieland," Studies in American Fiction 18 (1990): 41-54, Toni
O'Shaughnessy reinterprets this crisis as an interpretive one, affecting the authorreader-relationship.
" It is interesting to note that Brown uses two distinaive techniques in Wieland
and Edgar Huntly, respectively, to explore this deadlocked situation of two or more
antagonistic forces. Whereas he makes use of an interior duality (or multivalence),
a condensation of the main character, in Wieland, he employs exterior duality or
displacement in Edgar Huntly. Turning Edgar and Clithero into doubles does not
only add emphasis to the theme of Edgar Huntly, it also results in a displacement
or transfer of the potentially disastrous consequences of tmconscious action to
Clithero alone. Thus, the title figure can be spared and the novel remain
ambivalent instead of turning into tragedy.
" For a discussion of the relationship between Brown and Poe, see Axelrod, 182-3.
See also Bill Christophersen, "'Father of the American Novel': Brockden Brown
in the 80's," Western Humanities Review 39 (1985): 77-85; Cowie, 344-5; Ringe, 28.
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reminiscent of Carwin. In Poe's view, Peters's multi-ethnic
features and alliances seem to predispose him to become a
savior figure in what develops into a deadly interracial conflict.
Peters is lengthily described as a multicultural mixture. His
mother is a squaw of the Upsarokas Indians, his father a white
fur trader. His body is extremely stocky, strangely deformed
and of Herculean strength. His head is even more amazing. It
is
equally deformed, being of immense size, with an
indentation on the crown (like that on the head of most
negroes), and entirely bald. To conceal this latter
deficiency, which did not proceed from old age, he
usually wore a wig formed of any hair-like material which
presented itself—occasionally the skin of a Spanish dog or
American grizzly bear. At the time spoken of he had on
a portion of one of these bearskins; and it added no little
to the natural ferocity of his countenance, which betook
of the Upsaroka character.^' (1043)
This grotesque exterior, completed by his teeth which are
"exceedingly long and protruding, and never even partially
covered...by the lips" (1043-4), makes Peters occupy a middleground between a predatory and cannibalistic nature, white
civilization, and indigenous cultures—between beasts, whites,
blacks, and Indians. Although apparently a Native American,
Peters's condensed portmanteau-identity also embodies elements
of the two ethnic groups whose struggle with each other is
portrayed in the latter part of the novel, set on the black island
of Tsalal. These ethnic groups are represented by the white
South Sea explorers around Pym on the one hand and the black
people whom they seem to be unable to leave behind in their
" Page numbers in parentheses relating to Poe's texts refer to Edgar Allan Poe,
Poetry and Tales, ed. Patrick F. Quiim (New York: The Library of America,
1984).
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voyage south on the other. Like Melville's South American tale
"Benito Cereno" (1855), this intercultural encounter in the
Antarctic has been read as a displaced treatment of racial
conflict in the United States.^'
With a noticeable racial bias but also with considerable
foresight, Poe brings to light the barely repressed aggression and
explosive deceptiveness of interracial relations in this section of
Pym. In the disguise of an Antarctic travel book, he expresses
a warning of highly political import in the context of the
United States: If black people try to rebel against white
civilization, the empire will strike back, mutilate, and devour
them in its technological juggernaut. Poe also makes clear,
however, that this prospect is as unsettling for the whites as it
is for the blacks.
In Poe's Antarctic trial run of the development of the
American composite order, the relationship between savage
aggression and civilized repression is externalized, as it were, in
the conflict between the natives of Tsalal and the English and
American explorers, between whites and blacks. The aggressive
ness that is inadvertently and largely unconsciously building up
in their relationship is not only physically devastating to both
sides, once it is unleashed, it also implicitly negates their
respective concepts of identity and makes evident that the
formation of a composite cultural identity will also demand a
process of death and rebirth in the sense of the radical
reorganization of all the partial identities to be compounded.
" The first critic to read Pym as a voyage to the American South and to suggest
racist overtones was Harry Levin, The Power of Blackness: Hawthorne, Poe, Melville
(New York: Knopf, 1958), 120-3. The most recent interpretation of the tale as
a proslavery text is John Carlos Rowe's, "Poe, Antebellum Slavery, and Modem
Criticism," in Poe's Pym: Critical Explorations, ed. Richard Kopley (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1992), 117-38. See also Harold Beaver, "Introduction," in
Edgar AUan Poe, The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym (Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books, 1975), 7-30; 14-15. David H. Hirsch, "'Postmodern' or Post-Auschwitz:
The Case of Poe," in Poe's Pym, even finds a premonition of Auschwitz and the
holocaust in the most violent scenes of Pym (141-50).
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The graphic scenes of interracial violence in Pym, which
affect the whites as well as the blacks, symbolically indicate the
radical nature of this process of rearrangement. The fragments
of white civilization from the explosion of the Jane Guy wreak
havoc among the black people of Tsalal (1161) and, on a more
symbolical level, destroy their concepts of humanity and social
order. But the ruse of the natives to bury the whites in a
ravine under an avalanche of mud and stones provides an image
that also implies a fundamental disorientation beyond physical
destruction. Pym experiences it as an unprecedented uprooting
of all his beliefs, only comparable to the Last Judgment (1152).
If anything, it is the multi-ethnicity of Dirk Peters that
counterbalances both this mass burial and the explosion of the
explorers' vessel. Peters retains and preserves the reconcilability
of divergent cultures, which seems to have gone up in flames
with the Jane Guy and to have been buried in the ravine with
the ship's crew. Unlike Carwin's condensation in Brown's
Wieland, the many-sidedness of Peters does not produce
anarchic confusion. As grotesquely as it is portrayed, his
composite identity appears as a redeeming force that may be
able to overcome dissension and strife. At the very end of Pym,
Peters, "the hybrid line-manager" (1051), re-emerges as the only
survivor, purportedly living in Illinois, a free state (1180). The
multi-ethnic condensation of his character remains as the
promise of an integrated composite identity.^"
Peters's role as mediator and savior gives a positive
connotation to his multicultural composite identity, which
contrasts with the destruction resulting from the intercultural
encounter of the black world of Tsalal and the white explorers.
But it has to be admitted that the text remains mute about the
I disagree with Rowe's argument that Peters is nothing but "Foe's fantasy of the
faithful and grateful servant" (130) and concur with Beaver who argues: "in the
triple theme of whiteskin, redskin and blackskin that this Narrative tmfolds, the
Indian half-caste alone can play the central role....In issues of life and death...this
is the middle or composite term between 'the blackness of darkness' (which is
Tsalal) and the beckoning transcendence of the Pole" (28).
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underlying causes of this difference. Peters's composite identity
is repeatedly mentioned but never analyzed. If it is a model of
cultural composition that could prevent a catastrophe like the
disastrous conflict between the natives of Tsalal and their white
guests (and, by extension, a remedy for racial conflicts
elsewhere), then the modes of such prevention remain in the
dark. The transfer between individual and cultural identity is
suggested but not effected in Pym.
This transfer is chiefly suggested by an essentially metaphysi
cal metaphorization. Rescuing Pym from intentionally letting
himself fall down a steep precipice (1170-1), Peters becomes
involved in the creation of an image of rebirth and resurrection
that gains metaphysical dimensions in the grand finale of the
novel, the dissolution of everything in universal whiteness near
the Pole (1179).^^ The trouble with this enigmatic vision of
whiteness and the superhuman shrouded figure visible in its
center is that it falls short of its promise of comprehensiveness.
It seems to whitewash, to supersede rather than to integrate, the
black world of Tsalal. Nu-Nu, the only survivor of this black
world whom Pym and Peters have brought with them in their
boat, falls ill and finally dies as the surrounding whiteness
Ringe compares Pym's and Edgar Huntly's series of symbolic deaths (78). Pee
seems to suggest here that only a universal rearrangement of properties and values,
a transition through complete destruction as it is depicted in "The Conversation
of Eiros and Charmion" and "A Descent into the Maelstroem," could produce a
truly comprehensive harmony.
The enigmatic white figure and the ending on the whole has elicited widely
divergent interpretations. Whereas J. Lasley Dameron, "Pym's Polar Episode:
Conclusion or Beginning?" in Poe's Pym, opts for the possibility of an empirical
explanation and thus for realism (33-43), Carol Peirce and Alexander G. Rose III,
"Poe's Reading of Myth: The White Vision of Arthur Gordon Pym" in Poe's Pym,
suggest a highly mythical Arthurian Grail quest (57-74). John T. Irwin, American
Hieroglyphics; The Symbol of the Egyptian Hieroglyphics in the American Renaissance
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 205, considers the white figure
to be Pym's own tmrecognized shadow. Douglas Robinson, American Apocalypses:
The Image of the End of the World in American Literature (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1985), 118, sees it as the shadow of Christ. Zanger
interprets the ending as being intentionally indeterminate.
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intensifies (1178-9). If this whiteness promises rebirth, it does
not seem to promise it for black Nu-Nu.

Compared to Brown's treatment of the theme of composite
identity in Wieland and Edgar Huntly, several new departures
are noticeable in Poe's fiction. Foe addresses the topic with a
markedly heightened intensity. This is most probably at least
partly due to the increased urgency that the racial question had
assumed between the end of the eighteenth century and the late
1830s. This increase in intensity is to a certain extent
contingent upon the depiction of both violent conflict and the
endeavor to achieve harmony as mass phenomena rather than
as individual ones. In Pym, Poe addresses the issue of cultural
identity as such and not by extension as Brown does in both
Wieland and Huntly. Whereas Brown employs ventriloquism
and sleepwalking in order to be able to depict unconscious
psychological processes, Poe makes repeated use of the
dynamism of death and rebirth for a similar purpose. It is again
Poe's narrative strategy that lends itself more easily to the
description of communal as well as individual developments.
Both writers make use of exterior duality or metonymic
techniques. The ambivalence as to the dominance of reason or
irrationality in Edgar Huntly is produced by the near-identity
of the curable title figure and his irretrievably insane double.
If Brown displaces the suggestion that rational control may be
unachievable to a double of his protagonist, Poe displaces the
problem of cultural identity as a whole. In Pym, the Symzonian Antarctic with its edenic promise (1050-51, 1079, 1116)
and its deep divisiveness turns into the double of America.
Both writers also employ the metaphoric technique of
condensation. Carwin and Dirk Peters condense disparate
qualities to an extent that defies credibility. Long before the
advent of modernism when these techniques become dominant
in aesthetic discourse, condensation and displacement.
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metaphorical and metonymical structures assume psychocultural significance in Brown's and Poe's proto-modern
fiction.^ Both Brown and Foe employ these structural devices
to create fantastic effects whose psychological and cultural
import coalesces, as these strategies channel the internalization
of multiple ethnic and cultural properties. They thus provide
instances of what John Higham has called "a universalizing
dimension in the symbolic order of a particular people.
Both Edgar Huntly's and Clithero Edny's somnambulism
raises the question of how eruptions of the unconscious, which
threaten individual as well as cultural identity, can be defused.
The same question resurfaces in Pym on the level of motiva
tional factors underlying ethnic strife. The question that Frank
Carwin and Dirk Peters can only answer by paying the price of
becoming grotesques is the reconciliation of the particular and
the general without a mere reduction of one pole to the other:
" In his Die Traumdeutung, Gesammelte Werke, 5th ed., (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer,
1973), 283-315, Sigmund Freud describes condensation and displacement as the
basic operations of dream-work. Roman Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language and
Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances," in Fundamentals of Language, ed. Roman
Jakobson and Morris Halle, (The Hague: Mouton, 1956), 55-81, has first drawn
attention to the fact that these psychological terms are analogous to the basic
linguistic operations of selection and equivalence, metaphor and metonymy, a
distinction that is at the root of David Lodge's typology of modernism in his The
Modes of Modem Writing: Metaphor, Metonymy, and the Typology of Modem
Literature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977). Jacques Lacan bases his thesis
of the linguistic nature of the unconscious on this analogy too. See Jacques Lacan,
"The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious," in Modem Criticism and Theory:
A Reader, ed. David Lodge (London: Longman, 1988), 80-106. Lacan has
interpreted Poe's "The Purloined Letter" in the light of this theory. His
contention has in turn led to a poststructurahst controversy involving Jacques
Derrida and others. See John P. MuUer and William J. Richardson, eds.. The
Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida, & Psychoanalytic Reading (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1988). The consequences of this debate for the
interpretation of Pym are discussed by Rowe (133-5). In Edgar Huntly,
Waldegrave's seemingly purloined letters and Mrs. Lorimer's writings, which are
hidden through Huntly's and CUthero's unconscious actions, fit into this pattern
equally well.
John Higham, "America in Person: The Evolution of National Symbols,"
Amerikastudien/American Studies 36 (1991): 473-93; 490.
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How can identity and otherness be harmonized? How can
inclusion be achieved without losing the specificity of what is
included? How can what is included remain what it is without
exploding what it has become part of? How can black Nu-Nu
stay alive and yet become part of the all-white redemption at
the end of Pym without turning white himself? Should Poe
have been asked to add some color to his final tableau? How
much color? So much that Nu-Nu and Pym would become
indistinguishable? So much that Pym would be compelled to lie
down in the boat and die instead of Nu-Nu? Is there a
checkered redemption? Do we all have to look as absurd as
Dirk Peters and to talk in as many confusing tongues as
Carwin? Raising such questions by the creation of precariously
overdetermined characters and their involvement in fantastic
plots, Brown at the very end of the eighteenth century and Poe
in the first half of the nineteenth attempt the fictional
exploration of a social as well as psychological terrain that is
still marked by many white spots on our maps of cultural
composition.^'^
Going back to these texts will not provide us with the
answers that we seek. But their aesthetically most questionable
features, the desperate insufficiency and the dreamlike quality of
their multivalent symbols, may remind us of the need to find
imaginative and emotional, as opposed to merely technical and
Contemporary historians, sociologists, and political scientists are still, or again,
discussing similar questions. Whereas Laurence Veysey suggested in "The 'New'
Social History in the Context of American Historical Writing," Reviews in
American History 7 (1979): 1-12, that the parts should have precedence over the
whole "because the parts are seen as the realities, the whole as an artificial
construction sustained by politicians and financiers" (5), Jack Citrin maintained in
"Language Politics and American Identity," The Public Interest 99 (1990): 96-109,
that our "destiny is a revitalized melting pot in which all elements—indigenous and
immigrant, majority and minority—intermingle to produce a new identity for all"
(109). On the interrelation between globalization and specificity in the
contemporary context, see also Stuart Hall's and Maureen Turim's essays in
Anthony D. King, ed.. Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary
Conditions for the Representation of Identity (London: Macmillan, 1991).
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political, solutions to the problem of social cohesion. Both
Brown and Poe thus make important contributions to the
creation of a symbolic vocabulary that helps express the most
elusive and yet formative factors in the development of
individual as well as cultural identity. They do so by trans
forming the obsolescent language of European gothicism into a
medium for the debate of decisive issues of early American
modernity, which seem to begin to coincide with equally
decisive issues of postmodern Europe.^'
" For the importance of narrative structures in the context of both individual and
cultural identity formation, see George C. Rosenwald and Richard L. Ochberg,
eds., Storied Lives: The Cultural Politics of Self-Understanding (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1992).

THE TRANSMISSION OF
GERMAN LITERATURE AND
DISSENTING VOICES IN
BRITISH CULTURE
Thomas Holcroft and the
Godwin Circle
Gregory Maertz

As wine and oil are imported to us from abroad, so must
ripe understanding, and many civil virtues, be imported into
our minds from foreign writings;—we shall else miscarry
still, and come short in the attempt of any great enterprise.
Milton, History of Britain, Book HI
essential bond between the transmission of German
culture in England and the emergence of leading voices
of Dissent, radical politics, and feminism in late
eighteenth-century England has not yet been fully articulated^

' The scholarship on the transmission of German culture in late eighteenth-century
England is limited. The only previously pubUshed investigation of this specific
relationship at this time, other than in the writings of Holcroft, WoUstonecraft,
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Similarly, we have not hitherto fully acknowledged the
prosthetic relationship between the translation and criticism of
German literature, on the one hand, and the appearance of
original works by radical authors, on the other. In this
connection Thomas Holcroft's eifforts as an intermediary
between British and German culture throw into sharp relief the
reciprocal relationship between the transmission of German
culture in Britain and the rise of Jacobinism—Romanticism in
process—that we find situated on the margins of mainstream
English literary culture. While Holcroft's novels have received
a good deal of attention from scholars,^ his achievement as a
transmitter of German culture has been largely overshadowed

and Fuseli themselves, is found in John Boening's article, "Pioneers and Precedents:
The 'Importation of German' and the Emergence of Periodical Criticism in
England," Internationales Archiv fiir Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur, VU
(1982), 65-87. The emphasis in Boening's article, however, is on the kmovative
character of Wilham Taylor's career as a reviewer for the Monthly Review and on
the emergence of a class of professional literary critics in England that can be
traced to the criticism of German htetature in the reviews. Other studies include
Violet Stockley, German Literature as Known In England 1750-1830 (London, 1929;
rpt. Port Washington: Kennikat, 1969); Rene Wellek, Confrontations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1965); Lilian R. Furst, "Mme de Stael's De I'Allemagne:
A Misleading Intermediary" and "Two Versions of Schiller's Wallenstein" in The
Contours of European Romanticism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979),
56-73, 94-108; Rosemary Ashton, The German Idea: Four English Writers and the
Reception of German Thought 1800-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1980); and James Engell, The Creative Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1981).
^ See especially Allene Gregory, The French Revolution and the English Novel (New
York, 1915); C. B. A. Proper, Social Elements in English Prose Fiction between
1771-1832 (Amsterdam, 1929); Virgil R. Stallbaumer, "Thomas Holcroft as a
Novelist," ELH 15 (1948): 194-218; J. M. S. Thompkins, The Popular Novel in
England, 1770-1800 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961); Rodney M.
Baine, Thomas Holcroft and the Revolutionary Novel (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1965); and Gary Kelly, The English facohin Novel 1780-1805
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). For iuformation on Holcroft's life the main
sources are The Memoirs of the Late Thomas Holcroft (1816) in The Complete Works
of William Hazlitt, ed. P. P. Howe (London: Dent, 1932; rpt. New York: AMS
Press, 1967); Charles Kegan Paul's William Godwin: His Friends and Contemporar
ies (London, 1876); and Letters of Charles Lamb, ed. A. Ainger (London, 1888).
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by the work of more prominent intermediaries among the
radical habitues of Joseph Johnson's bookshop—William Taylor,
Henry Fuseli, and Mary Wollstonecraft—all of whom were
associated with William Godwin in one way or another. For
instance, Godwin shared Taylor's upbringing in a Dissenting
household and Norwich roots; Holcioft was his best friend,
Wollstonecraft his wife, and, in addition to friends, he shared
with Fuseli the experience of having trained for the clergy. But
on account of the scope of his translations—what he called "this
just and necessary sufferance"^— which included the work of
such major figures as Goethe, Lavater, Friedrich der GrofSe, and
Stolber^ in travel writing, poetry, memoirs, and plays—the case
of Holcroft discloses to a greater degree the connections
between the transmission of German culture and radical
politics.'^ What follows is an examination of this affinity.
The turn to German literature among proponents of radical
reform answered a deep-seated need in the culture of Dissent
(political and religious) for a breakthrough from insularity into
cosmopolitanism, for growth and development achieved along
an axis of confrontation between the familiar and the foreign,
the self and the other. The response to German culture as an
opening up to otherness and an alternative to native sources of
Bildung thus emerges as an ideological litmus test for radical or
reform-minded intellectuals vying for cultural authority and
access to English literary and academic institutions.' The texts

^ Preface to Frederic Leopold Count Stolberg, Travels through Germany,
Switzerland, Italy, and Sicily, trans. Thomas Holcroft (London: Robinson, 1796),
I, iv.
•* Evidence of the affinity between German Uterature and radicahsm is seen in
Godwin's interest in Werther (which he was reading at the time of Wollstonecraft's
death), in Mary Shelley's inclusion of Goethe's novel among the books read by
Frankenstein's monstrous autodidact, in P. B. Shelley's fragmentary translation of
Faust, and in Coleridge's intense engagement with German culture as revealed in
Biographia Literaria (1817).
' For an example from the early nineteenth century, in 1828 Carlyle applied for
appointment to a professorship at St. Andrew's University based solely on the
strength of his reviews and translations of German hterature; Goethe was in fact
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generated as a response to German culture—translations and
criticism—must be seen as acts of interpretation that inevitably
encode authorial biases reflecting political, class, generational,
and religious affiliation. For members of the Godwin Circle the
appropriation of German culture replaced the Oxbridge or
public school education based on Latin and Greek that had
been denied them on account of gender, class or religious
affiliation. While the identification of spiritual growth with the
study of German culture is inseparable from the quest for
literary status, the attraction of German culture also consisted
in its scientific-critical orientation and a dynamic configuration
of humanism based on historicity, psychology, and subjective
emotion that contrasted with more static characterizations of
human nature, perception, and experience associated with the
Enlightenment. Embracing review criticism and biography,
translations and compilations (of belles lettres as well as
scientific and philosophical tracts, history and biography),
adaptations and instances of outright plagiarism, the texts
transmitted comprise a diverse body of literary activity that
made German texts accessible through modification by such
contingent qualities as taste, idiosyncrasy, and even inaccurate
or misleading interpretations. As women. Dissenters, radicals,
and other members of culturally dispossessed groups, the
writers involved in the transmission of German culture at this
time occupied the periphery of mainstream literary culture in
England and their ideological preoccupations (sympathy with
the aims of the French Revolution, the expansion of the
franchise, legal and economic reform, and the removal of social
and political barriers to dissenters and women) are reflected in
their mediation activities. For Holcroft and his fellow
intermediaries in the Godwin Circle, Taylor, Fuseli, and
Wollstonecraft, the "domestication" of German culture was a
means of acquiring cultural capital from an indifferent, even
hostile dominant culture and its publishing institu-

one of Carlyle's referees.
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tions—booksellers, rival authors, journal and newspaper editors,
government censors, and the reading public formed by them.
The emergence in late eighteenth-century England of hermeneutic vehicles for the transmission of German culture may be
likened to what Andre Malraux in Les voix du silence (1951)
termed a "conquest," an "annexation," and a "possession" of the
foreign and it is certainly a crucial period in the history of
British culture when the interpretation and transmission of a
foreign literary tradition takes on political and cultural
significance. The mediation of German culture was, for Taylor,
Fuseli, Wollstonecraft, and Holcroft, linked to their sympathy
for the aims of the French Revolution as well as the experience
of exile and cultural maiginalization.
The social, political, fictive, and mediative writings of the
Godwin Circle replicate an intricate web of interrelated and
interdependent voices, a region of the mind that is situated on
the margins of all these disciplines, at their junctures and points
of intersection. Entering this polyphonic borderland we are in
an advantageous position from which to approach Holcroft's
literary career, especially his contributions to the transmission
of German culture in England. Dismissed even by many recent
critics as the creator of a minor sub-genre, "novels of pur
pose"—perhaps in order to distinguish his work from the less
overtly ideological novels of the canon—Holcroft's best novels,
Anna St. Ives (1792) and Hugh Trevor (begun in 1794), had
either appeared or were well under way at the time of his
arrest. However subversively one might wish to read such
Gothic novels as Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794)
and M. G. Lewis's The Monk (1796), Holcroft's novels openly
espoused a radical political agenda. For Holcroft, fictional
discourse was merely another means of giving voice to the
ideological struggle taking place between conservative,
monarchist England and revolutionary, democratic France.
Employing the black and white ideological palette of propa
ganda literature, his protagonists persistently advocate the
adoption of a new moral code and predict the inevitable
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triumph of a revolutionary social and political program that
will reeducate and thus recreate the human race along wholly
new lines. Published a few months before Political Justice, Anna
St. Ives anticipates in detail many of the arguments contained in
Godwin's widely influential treatise, a coincidence explained in
large part by the daily discussions between the two writers that
took place as both works were in progress. As Godwin put it
in a letter to Hazlitt, "the principles afterwards developed in my
Political Justice were the almost constant topic of conversation
between Holcroft and myself."^
Cited by Godwin as one of his four principle "oral
educators,"^ Holcroft's worldview was largely shaped by the
leading writers of Continental Deism—Prevost, Rousseau,
Diderot, Mercier, C. M. Wieland, and, of course, Voltaire—and
he is chiefly remembered today as one of the twelve radicals
who were indicted for high treason in 1794. This group, which
included John Home Tooke and Thomas Hardy (a shoemaker
and autodidact like Holcroft and the secretary of the London
Corresponding Society), was swept up in the government's
campaign to eviscerate the reform movement, a process that
began with Tom Paine's trial in 1792. It is interesting to note
that Godwin's suppressed preface to the original edition of
Caleb Williams, in which he declares emphatically that it is a
novel about injustice, is in fact dated the day of Hardy's arrest.
May 12, 1794. As he remarks in a note appended to the 1795
second edition, "terror was the order of the day; and it was
feared that even the humble novelist might be shown to be
constructively a traitor."® Godwin's response to the arrest of
his colleagues in the reform movement did not end with his

' Charles Kegan Paul, William Godwin, I, 64-5.
' "In my 31st year [1787] I became acquainted with Mr. Thomas Holcroft, and it
was probably in consequence of our mutual conversations that I became two years
after an unbeliever, and in my 36tb year an atheist." Charles Kegan Paul, William
Godwin, I, 357.
' William Godwin, Things as They Are; Or, the Adventures of Caleb Williams, ed.
Maurice Hindle (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1988), 4.
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examination of "Things As They Are" with respect to "the
modes of domestic and unrecorded despotism by which man
becomes the destroyer of man.'" Demonstrating unexpected
nimbleness for a mind unfairly seen by posterity as somewhat
plodding and discursive rather than intuitive, Godwin turned
from allegorical treatment of the government's monopoly of
power in Caleb Williams to direct confrontation with the
judicial system in a heroic feat of political journalism. Without
accepting his claim to the lion's share of the credit for the full
acquittal of Hardy, Tooke, Thewall, and Holcroft, we still
might agree with Marilyn Butler that the public outcry that
greeted Godwin's pamphlet. Cursory Strictures on the Charge
Delivered by Lord Chief Justice Eyre to the Grand Jury, October
2, 1794, is evidence that "the defence of liberty could still, given
the occasion and the rhetorician, outweigh fears for property,
and muster in the opposition some sense of a common cause."^°
With the acquittal of Godwin's friends, 1794 constituted the
annus mirabilis of the British reform movement and the highwater mark of Godwin's fame and influence. In this period he
had published Political Justice, Caleb Williams, and his best
political journalism. But even such feats of superhuman will
constituted mere stop-gap measures, not anything approximat
ing a permanent victory. Against a backdrop of commercial
blockade and then actual war with France, public support for
reform fluctuated with the rise and fall of economic conditions.
Popular sympathy for the aims of the French Revolution waned
as revulsion spread at the bloodbath of the Terror. In contrast
to the fickleness of public support, the government's campaign
against dissent was unrelenting. The forces of reaction might
receive a temporary setback, but they could not be held
indefinitely at bay. A counter-revolution was in the offing that
would rollback all the apparent progress signaled by the

' Godwin, Caleb Williams, 3.
Marilyn Buder, ed., Burke, Paine, Godwin, and the Revolution Controversy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 170.
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uncensored publication of Political Justice and the release of
Hardy, Tooke, and Holcroft. Signs of the changing times
included Gillray's caricature of Godwin, Holcroft, and Paine
and attacks on the "new philosophy" by such former allies as
Coleridge in his public lectures and Dr. Samuel Parr in his
"Spiral Sermon" of 1801. A savage parody of Godwin's 1799
novel, St. Leon, appeared anonymously in 1800, under the title
St Godwin: A Tale of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth
Century. While Godwin vigilantly fought his detractors in the
press and in private conversations, he saw his literary reputation
suffer an irrevocable eclipse. In the next decade the leading
voice of the radical reform movement was stilled, and his
energies were channeled into the production of children's books
under the imprint of Mary Jane Godwin's Juvenile Library.
Holcroft managed to avoid the hangman's noose and trans
portation to Botany Bay only to endure the figurative death of
his literary voice in the ensuing years of political repression and
censorship. Indeed, his fortunes as a playwright paralleled the
trajectory of the public's declining tolerance for ideological
theater with its de rigueur attacks on authority and privilege.
An example of the social criticism to which theater audiences
suddenly reacted with catcalls is found in the following speech
by the protagonist in Holcroft's drama Love's Frailties (1794):
"I was bred to the most useless and often the most worthless of
all professions; that of a gentleman." If Holcroft and his fellow
advocates of reform were to remain faithful to their "religion"
as defined in The Rights of Man as "dofing] good," the price paid
for such altruism was growing cultural maiginalization. Denied
access to the booksellers and theater managers who had
previously published and produced his novels and plays,
Holcroft turned to translation for the second time in his career,
albeit with greater urgency than before. Half a dozen years
earlier, following his first trip to France, where he was
befriended by Bonneville and Mercier, Holcroft had translated
a number of texts, including Beaumarchais's The Marriage of
Figaro (1785), several novels by the Comtesse de Genlis (1787),
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and the Posthumous Works of Frederick the Great (1789), also
translated from the first French edition. The profits earned
from this work allowed Holcroft to retire permanently from
the stage where, according to accounts of fellow actors, he had
displayed at best an indifferent talent. This phase of transla
tion coincided, of course, with an upsurge in public interest and
demand for foreign texts and Holcioft's work at this time was
undertaken with no higher motive than to boil the pot as he
sought to establish himself as a writer of original texts. For
obvious reasons, however, the market for French literature
declined in the later 1790s and Holcroft was forced to find an
alternate source for texts to translate. This new source he
would find in German literature—partly as a result of contact
with and encouragement received from Klopstock, Voss,
Stolbei^, and other prominent liberal German writers whom he
met while in exile. But this time around financial pressure,
while still a factor in his decision, was not the driving force
behind his turn to the translation of German texts. Isolated
from the cultural institutions and the literary market place that
owed their existence to the State's sufferance or support, his
career as a writer, his sense of identity and his economic
security, followed the same trajectory as that of his fellow
Jacobins and reformers. Declining to allow his intellect to
languish in desuetude, translation became Holcroft's chief
creative and ideological outlet during the period of exile and
cultural isolation from 1799 to 1803.
Prior to the treason trial in 1794 and the suppression of
reform activity, Holcroft had been a prolific and a fairly if not
wildly successful author of comedies, light opera, and other
pieces for the stage that regularly ran at Covent Garden. His
greatest successes—pieces that ran into several editions—were,
like his imitation of Beaumarchais's Figaro, often adaptations of
French and German works and include plays with such titles as
The School for Arrogance (two editions in 1791), The Road to
Ruin (nine editions in 1792), The Deserted Daughter (four
editions in 1795), and He's Much to Blame (four editions in
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1798). But he is certainly best known for his navels—Alwyn
(1780), Anna St. Ives (1792), Hugh Trevor (1794-97), Memoirs of
Bryan Perdue (1805)—and this is also the segment of his corpus
the most extensively investigated by scholars." Holcroft's
novels show how he progressed from being an advocate of free
thought to an architect of revolutionary society. The preface
to Bryan Perdue reflects his engage stance: "Whenever I have
undertaken to write a novel, I have proposed to myself a
specific moral purpose" (I, iii). The topical interest aroused by
Holcroft's novels prompted their almost immediate translation
on the Continent. A German translation of Anna St. Ives was
published in Berlin by Karl Philipp Moritz in 1792 and a
French edition appeared in Paris in 1798. The appeal of these
novels to foreign readers indicates the occurence of ideological
cross-pollination or the reciprocal flow of revolutionary
ideology from a beleaguered outpost of reform in England to
France and Germany, where sympathy for radical alterations to
the social fabric, combined with the growing fervor of
nationalism, still ran high. At home, however, the situation
could not have formed a sharper contrast with the Continent.
Following the trial, his work could only appear under
pseudonyms. As an avowed enemy of the State, Holcroft luimeme was cut off from the cultural institutions and the literary
marketplace that owed their existence to the State's sufferance
and support. As a result, his position as a writer, his sense of
identity and his economic security, could not have been more
tenuous. In Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) Burke
describes the crucial interdependence between a nation's culture
and State, on the one hand, and the maintenance of a theologi
cal framework that gives the State its power and raison d'etre,
on the other: "Nothing is more certain, than that our manners,
our civilization, and all good things which are connected with

" While Baine and Kelly (see al above) make giant strides in clarifying the
relationship between art and politics in Holcroft's novels, none of these studies
explores the connection examined in the present essay.

Transmission of German Literature

281

manners and with civilization, have, in this European world of
ours, depended for ages on two principles; and were indeed the
result of both combined; I mean the spirit of a gentlemen, and
the spirit of religion."^^
In this passage Burke seems to
anticipate the position adumbrated by Matthew Arnold in
Culture and Anarchy (1869) on the relationship between the
maintenance of social order and the hegemony of statesponsored culture:
a State in which law is authoritative and sovereign...is
requisite if man is to bring to maturity anything precious
and lasting...The very framework and exterior order of
the State...sacred; and culture is the most resolute enemy
of anarchy, because of the great hopes and designs for the
State which culture teaches us to nourish."
The implications for Holcroft's career are fairly clear: in
writing plays and novels that violate generic norms and
audience expectations and objectify a critical stance vis-a-vis
state authority, he rejects the categorical imperative as stated by
Edward Said: "to be for and in culture is to be in and for a
State in a compellingly loyal way."" The result of such flagrant
subversion of the State's artistic agenda is cultural disenfranchisement, figurative homelessness, marginalization in the
canon, and, ultimately, the silencing of the authorial voice,
which amounts to a kind of death. Ventriloquism, or
displacing one's voice in translation, becomes the renegade
writer's last resort to avoid the extinction of his literary
identity.

" Selected Writings of Edmund Burke, ed. W. J. Bate (New York: Modern Library,
1947), 390.
" Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. J. Dover Wilson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960), 204.
Edward Said, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1983), 11.
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The flowering of Weltliteratur, which Goethe thought was
heralded by the transmission activities of Carlyle, can in fact be
seen as the fulfillment of a process that began with the founding
of the Royal Society in 1663 Throughout the first century of
its existence the Society's composition denoted the permeable
borders between the two cultures and anticipated the cultural
and economic exchanges made possible by the founding of the
modern European Community. Indeed, by 1770 at least 120
Germans had been elected to membership in the Society,
including Theodor Haak, the first German translator of Paradise
Lost, Heinrich Oldenbuig, the editor of The Philosophical
Transactions (which was later renamed Transactions of the Royal
Society), Philip Heinrich Zollmann, the first person to occupy
the office of the Society's Foreign Secretary, and such familiar
Enlightenment figures as Leibniz, Wolff, Albrecht von Haller,
Daniel Gabriel Fahrenheit, and Sir William Herschel. Other
instances of contemporary Anglo-German cultural exchange
were facilitated by the laige number of German musicians,
artists, and scholars who resided in England throughout the
eighteenth century but whose impact on English cultural life
has been largely overshadowed by the gigantic presence of
Handel.^^ Nonetheless, several of their names will be familiar
" Goethe acknowledged that the achievement of Carlyle and his contemporaries
(Scott, Gillies, Lockhart, and Wilson, among others) in transmitting German
literature was prima facie evidence of the presence of a widespread European
movement culminating in the emergence of a global, cosmopolitan aesthetic. See
Eckermarm, Gesprdche mit Goethe, zum 15.7.1827, and The Correspondence between
Goethe and Carlyle, ed. Charles Norton Eliot (Boston, 1887; rpt. New York;
Cooper Square, 1970), especially the letters from Goethe to. Carlyle dated 20 July
1827 and 15 June 1828 (13-27; 91-115).
" My discussion in this section is indebted to Garold N. Davis, German Thought
and Culture in England 1700-1760 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1969), 64-80. For the intriguing story of the presence of English culture in
Germany at a slightly earlier period, see Gilbert Waterhouse, The Literary Relations
of England and Germany in the Seventeenth Century (Leipzig, 1914; rpt. New York:
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to historians of science, theater, music, and the fine arts:
Johann Christopher Pepusch (one of the founders of the
"Accademy of Ancient Music" in 1710); John Galliard, the
composer of music for several of Gibber's masques and
pantomimes and also for Gay's Bexar's Opera-, J. J. Heidegger,
who, along with Handel, founded the Royal Academy of Music
in 1719, and was a friend of Fielding and Pope (though Pope
could not resist immortalizing his reputed ugliness in the
Dunciad, Book V, 11. 243-4: "And lo, her bird (a monster of a
fowl) / Something betwixt a Heideggre and owl"). Other
prominent German musicians active in England included
Johann Friedrich Lampe, Karl Friedrich Abel, and Johann
Christian Bach, the eleventh and youngest son of J. S. Bach,
who organized the young Mozart's concerts in London and
arranged for the prodigy's introduction at court. German
artists active in England included the portraitist Sir Godfrey
Kneller, the botanical painter Georg Dionys Ehret, and Henry
Fuseli, of whom, according to Gilchrist, "Blake...was wont to
declare, 'This country must advance two centuries in civilisation
before it can appreciate him.'"^^
Any survey of cultural contacts between England and the
German-speaking world in the early eighteenth century would
be incomplete without noting the thriving two-way trade in
secular and sacred literary texts during this period." In
Methodist circles German hymns and poems were widely
circulated through skillful translations. Of special interest in
this regard is John Wesley's series of hymn anthologies,
especially one pulished in 1742 under the title A Collection of
German Hymns. The presence of a great number of Graf
Zinzendorf's lyrics and hymns in this and other hymnbooks
indicates the intimacy of the bond between English Methodism
and German Pietism and suggests how the rise of English
Haskell House, 1966).
Alexander Gilchrist, Life of William Blake (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.,
1945), 294.
" Davis, German Thought and Culture in England 1700-1760, 11-44
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Romanticism is inextricably linked to the fusion of dissenting
religion, radical politics, the rise of female authorship, and the
mediation of German culture. The popularity and impact of
English literature in Germany, especially the novel, has been
well-documented; indeed, a recent study by Michael Maurer
affirms the formative connection between Anglophilia and the
Enlightenment in Germany.^' But unlike the situation in
Germany, where Anglophilia historically has been and remains
a vital presence in intellectual life, there has traditionally been
strong resistance on the part of many scholars and critics of
English literature to accept a model of cultural history that
acknowledges the impact on English cultural identity of the
transmission of German literature and thought. Perhaps this
may have had something to do with the fact that women and
other cultural outsiders played leading roles as literary
intermediaries and that their mediating activities also constituted
political acts that not only reflected sympathy with Continental
ideologies and revolutions but also initiated their movement
from the margins of literary culture toward the center. Also
underpinning this resistance, I would ai^ue, is the traditional
paradigm of literary history, according to which the processes
of cultural production that threaten to demote the iconic
position of the author and reveal the root system of canonical
works are stripped away or ignored.
In order to restore this root system, much of the original
writing generated by the Godwin Circle must be viewed in
connection with the transmission activities of Taylor, Fuseli,
Wollstonecraft, and Holcroft. Writing for the comparatively
liberal and cosmopolitan Monthly Review, William Taylor of
Norwich emerged as a key figure in the cultural politics of the
1790s. Not as well known as Robert Pearse Gillies or John
Gibson Lockhart, Taylor was arguably the most important

" Michael Maurer, Aufkldrung und Anglophilie in Deutschland (Gottingen und
Zurich: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1987), see especially 41-106.
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critic of German literature before Thomas Carlyle.^° His career
as a critic and translator encapsulates the problems confronting
would-be English transmitters of foreign culture at the close of
the eighteenth century. From October 1790 to August 1799 he
published dozens of reviews and articles on the work of
Schiller, Goethe, Klopstock, Wieland, and Kotzebue. During
the same period he produced the first English translation of
Goethe's classical drama Iphigenie auf Tauris (1799) and one of
the best contemporary translations of August Burner's
"Leonore" (1796). Others who paid tribute to the popularity
of Blither's signature poem include Walter Scott and Henry J.
Pye, the future poet laureate. The decade of the 1790s was
characterized by a vogue for German drama—in England and on
the Continent—especially the pathos-drenched plays of
Kotzebue. Because at this time no critic in England emerged
with the cultural authority to take the lead in canon formation,
nearly every German writer translated into English found at
least one disciple who was prepared to name him the dominant
figure in German literature. To the dismay of the young
Carlyle, who published a watershed series of articles on German
culture in the Edinburgh Review and Eraser's Magazine in the
1820s and 1830s, Taylor sided with Kotzebue as the leading
German writer of his generation. While not alone in giving
voice to the public taste for Kotzebue's brand of kitsch—Sher
idan's successful plays, The Stranger (1798) and Pizarro (1799),
were adapted, respectively, from Kotzebue's Menschenhaf und
Reue (1789) and Die Spanier in Peru, oder Rollas 7bd (1795)—
Taylor was perhaps more joyously uninhibited and less
ambivalent than others in his praise. Kotzebue seemed without
question "the greatest dramatic genius that Europe has evolved
since Shakespeare," whose genius commanded "plays of every
form: farces, melodramas, mixt or sentimental dramas,
household tragedies, classical tragedies, and...that vaster and

For the most thorough authoritative discussion of the significance of Taylor's
career to date, see John Boening's article listed in nl.
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more difficult form of art...the gothic tragedy."^' Kotzebue's
obvious artistic defects—prolificity and nonchalance, the
occupational hazards of a wildly popular author—did not earn
even a sideways glance; Taylor even applauded his tendency to
exploit cheap theatrical effects and to ignore almost completely
the nuances of character and plot development. Not unlike
present-day directors of action films, it was Kotzebue's special
talent to "concentrate the attention of an audience on the
passing scene" by making "free use of the extraordinary."^ As
proof that there is truly no accounting for taste, during this
period Goethe's and Schiller's plays were not even produced in
England. By contrast, performances of Kotzebue's Pizarro and
Menschenhaji undReue—in Sheridan's adaptations—were repeated
over forty times in both 1798 and 1799.
The popular demand for Kotzebue's works reached such
heights that it began to outstrip the capacity of English
translators to produce accurate versions of his plays, and while
the first complaints directed against Kotzebue in the reviews
focused almost exclusively on the literary quality of the
bowdlerized texts, critics of a conservative bent were not slow
to notice that the German playwright's "superior invention"
and emotional enei^ masked a potentially subversive ideology
or sensibility that some were quick to associate with what
recently caused so much mischief in Paris. A critic writing in
The Ladies Monthly Museum in 1798 complained of Elizabeth
Inchbald's Lover's Vows, her adaptation of Kotzebue's Das Kind
der Liebe: "We cannot but declare that the dramas of Kotzebue
have, in our opinion, a tendency to encourage a laxity of
principle that ought to make the English people rather cautious
of giving too implicit credit to the sentiment he inculcates."^
Such qualms are mild, almost praiseworthy, compared to the
William Taylor, Historic Survey of German Poetry (London: Treutel & Wiirtz,
1829-30), n, 102.
^ Taylor, Historic Survey of German Poetry, n, 102-3.
The Ladies Monthly Museum, or Polite Repository of Amusement and Instruction (I,
477).
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vitrolic attack on Kotzebue that appeared in the Anti-Jacobin
Review in 1799:
Let us, for God's sake, look with a little more circum
spection at the claims of these German philosophers
before we so readily admit the value of them; nor suffer
the public taste to be vitiated thus, without making one
single attempt to expose the absurdity of its seducer. My
blood boils with indignation when I see my beloved
Shakespeare, Otway, Rowe, and all those ornaments of
my native country thrust aside to make room for the
filthy effusions of this German dunce.^'*
A bellwether and watchdog for cultural and political reaction
in the decade following the French Revolution, the Anti-Jacobin
Review and Magazine took up where its predecessor, the AntiJacobin or Weekly Examiner, left off. In addition to the charge
of bad morals, the alarm was raised in succeeding issues that
religious and political orthodoxy were also threatened by
Kot2^bue and the "German School." A general fear of
heterodoxy, foreign culture, and liberalism colored such
comments as the following: Pizarro was seen to exalt "Deism,
or natural religion." "By flattering the passions [Kotzebue]
attempts powerfully to interest the heart, and when that is
gained, insidiously instils his venomous principles."^'
Pronounced guilty as well of inverting the social hierarchy in
his plays, Kotzebue frequently depicts "the great...as vicious"
and "the low...as virtuous." Moreover, Elvira, the female
protagonist in Pizarro, was condemned as a "complete

Anti-Jacobin Review and Magazine; and Protestant Advocate; or, Monthly Political
and Literary Censor (HI: 207). In German Literature in British Magazines 1750-1860
(Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 1949), the editon Morgan and Hohlfeld
comment: "Severest of the all magazines in its criticism, it was largely responsible
for the reaction against German literature in 1800" (116).
Gentlemen's Magazine, or Monthly Intelligencer 69.
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Godwinite heroine.
Extreme even by the standards of
xenophobic rhetoric of the Anti-Jacobin Review is the Preface
to the fourth volume, published in 1799, in which cultural
paranoia is carried to new heights;
It is with an equal portion of surprise and alarm that we
witness in this country a glaring depravity of taste, as
displayed in the extreme eagerness for foreign produc
tions, and a systematic design to extend such depravity by
a regular importation of exotic poison from the enven
omed crucibles of the literary and political alchemists of
the new German school. The state of the foreign
presses...is still such as to justify the most serious appre
hensions in the mind of all who feel any interest in the
preservation of religion and morality, and the importation
of their products into this country should, if possible, be
guarded against with the same provident spirit of caution
which enforces a strict observance of quarantine by
vessels which arrive from countries infected with the
plague.^^
Such attacks in the press were a product of the atmosphere of
cultural xenophobia and government repression that diverted
Godwin into writing children's books and forced Holcroft to
seek his literary fortunes in translation. Once noted for their
interest in German and Continental literature generally, in the
late 1790s the Monthly Mirror and the Critical and Monthly
Review abruptly stopped the practice of reviewing German
books. In the face of officially sanctioned harrassment of
Dissenters and radicals, Taylor dropped out of the reviewing
business altogether for nearly a decade, and it is not until 1808
that we find him once again reviewing German literature for
the Monthly Review. Despite being twice marginalized as it

Anti-Jacobin Review (3:207).
Antijacohin Review (4:vifl5.
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were, by his preference for Kotzebue over Goethe,^® and by
government-sponsored literary terrorism, as one of the first
intermediaries between English and German culture Taylor
must be credited for performing a valuable service. Since
unmediated experience of foreign texts is not possible for the
reader who only has English, the foreign text first must be
appropriated, annexed, domesticated, and "Englished" by the
translator or critic. Far from simply introducing the readers of
the Monthly Review to a new taste in literature, Taylor was
among the most important cultural intermediaries in dissenting,
radical circles.
After arriving in London in 1760 Henry Fuseli led an
aggressive campaign to introduce the cultural riches of the
German language to England. Not merely was Fuseli au
courant in German thought and literature, having produced the
first English translation of Winckelmann's Geschichte der Kunst
des Alterthums in 1764, he had been educated in Zurich, a
leading center of proto-romantic German culture in the late
eighteenth century, and was a confidant of Bodmer and Lavater.
Encouraged to write in English by his intimate friend Joseph
Johnson, Fuseli's influence can be felt in the pages of the
Analytical Review where the writings of Kotzebue, Wieland,
Schiller, and Goethe were reviewed on a regular basis.^' He
Taylor was not alone in failing to recognize that Goethe's writings represented
a radical new departure in taste and sensibihty. One must not foiget that while
in Germany during 1799-1800, Coleridge anachronistically beat a path to
Klopstock's door and that in a letter to Josiah Wedgwood he expressed his
intention to write a study of Lessing's life and works: "What have I done in
Germany?—I have learnt the language...! have read & made collections for an
history of the Belles Lettres in Germany before the time of Lessing...and very large
collections for a Life of Lessing;—to which I was led by the miserably bald &
unsatisfying Biographies that have been hitherto given, & by my personal
acquaintance with two of Lessing's Friends [Klopstock and Heyne?]" (in Collected
Letters of S. T. Coleridge, ed. Earl LesUe Griggs [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956],
I, 518). Esteeming Kotzebue's energy and Schiller's accent on the sublime as
primary literary values, Taylor carmot be blamed for missing the greater subtlety
of Goethe's less spectacular qualities of naturalism and digression.
See Ernst Witz, Die literarische Tdtigkeit des Malers J. H. Fiijtli (Unpublished
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also wrote the first authoritative history of German literature
in English, which was unfortunately lost in a fire in 1770. Also
contributing to Fuseli's influence in the Godwin Circle was the
background he shared with the Dissenters and their fellowtravellers Wollstonecraft and Holcroft. Like Godwin, he was
initially trained as a minister (in the liberal Zwinglian sect) but
early on he abandoned that vocation in favor of a career in
literature and the arts. He also passed through phases of
enthusiasm for and subsequent disillusionment with Rousseau
(whom he met in 1767) nearly identical to Wollstonecraft's.
Fuseli was better positioned than anyone else in England at the
time, and certainly more advantageously placed than anyone,
including Coleridge, before Henry Crabb Robinson to interpret
German culture for English readers. The charismatic Fuseli also
attracted disciples, and none was more important as an
intermediary in her own right than Mary Wollstonecraft. Her
interest in German culture suggests the need to reassess the
traditional attribution to Fuseli of some eighty reviews
published in the Analytical, including the famous review of
Goethe's dramas Stella and Clavigo,^° possibly to transfer several

dissertation, Univeisity of Basle, 1922): "It is owing to Fuseli's influence that the
Analytical Review (1788-98) devoted so much attention to German Uterature, in
which he still took a lively interest." Quoted in Eudo Mason, The Mind of Henry
Fuseli (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), 18. In fact, in the Analytical for
April 1791 it is conceded that German hterature has heen "shamefully neglected
in this country" (DC: 569).
This review appeared in August 1798 (XXVIII: 170, 175. Fuseli comments on
the pecuhar character of Goethe's achievement: "The merits of invention...Goethe
enjoys in common with many of his contemporaries. The distinguishing excellence
of this celebrated writer is the display of exquisite enthusiastic passion. His pencil,
dipped in the how of heaven, sometimes exhibits a strength and brilliancy of
colouring that dazzles 'the mind's eye'; and sometines...displays the softest shade,
the most delicate and tender touches...Goethe is entitled to no vulgar merit for the
judgment which his displays in the choice of his subjects: aware that his powers
are most successfully apphed when the softer sensibiUties of our nature are to be
excited, when tenderness and pity are to be called forth, he avoids all intricacy of
plot, and generally selects for the foundation of his drama some simple and
affecting story of domestic life, which may come home to the bosom of us all."
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o£ them to his protegee. The seven reviews of German works
or adaptations of German works (such as The Confidential
Letters of Albert; from his first attachment to Charlotte to her
death) in the Analytical attributed to Wollstonecraft by Todd
and Butler seems an insufficient number considering Wollstonecraft's competence in German and the frequency with which
German works were reviewed there.
"Wollstonecraft's major achievement as a translator appeared
in 1790. Elements of Morality for the use of children was freely
adapted from the German text by Christian Gotthilf Salzmann,
who was a highly influential educational writer. Salzmann's
importance was noted by Lavater, Herder, and Goethe, among
others, and his Moralisches Elementarbuch was reprinted
throughout the nineteenth century; the 1785 edition was
reprinted as recently as 1980. Wollstonecraft's Elements of
Morality is not a mechanical translation or mere hackwork; on
the contrary, it represents a pathbreaking exercise in the
transposition of a foreign text into a domesticated form
intended to make it more acceptable to a English audience.
There are also strong ideological and stylistic ligatures
connecting Elements of Morality to Wollstonecraft's other works
of a pedagogical and didactic character, including Thoughts on
the Education of Daughters (1787), The Female Reader (1789)—a
compilation of pieces by many hands, which is precisely
Salzmann's organizational rs\eth.od 'm Moralisches Elementarbuch,
Original Stories (1788)—as well as A Vindication of the Rights of
Woman (1790), Mary (1788), and The Wrongs of Woman (1798).
Wollstonecraft's novel Young Grandison (1790) is, like Elements
of Morality, essentially a reworking of a foreign work. In this
case the appropriated text is De kleine Grandison, a novel by the
Dutch writer Maria Geetruida van de Werken de Cambon.^'
In ch. 5 of William Godwin's Memoirs of the Author of "The Rights of Woman
(1798; rpt. Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1987), we read that Wollstonecraft "newmodelled and abridged" this work from an earher translation (226). Charles Kegan
Paul in William Godwin quotes a Johnson note left in manuscript: "A translation
from the Dutch of 'Yoimg Grandison' was put into her hands, which she almost
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Such interconnections between Wollstonecraft's original work
and her translations anticipate the instrumental function that
the transmission of German culture served in the careers of
women writers in the early to mid-nineteenth century in
England and America, including Sarah Austin, Margaret Fuller,
and Geoi^e Eliot.^^
No doubt with Fuseli's encouragement, Wollstonecraft had
begun an abridged translation of Lavater's Physiognomische
Fragmente in the late 1780s, but when Holcroft's translation
appeared in 1789 it was abandoned.
Holcroft's slightly
abridged translation from the German, Essays on the Physiog
nomy designed to promote the knowledge and love of mankind,
appeared in the same year as the Rev. Henry Hunter's complete
edition which was based on Mme de la Fite's complete French
translation, Essai sur la Physiognomie (Paris: La Haye, 17811803). That Hunter's was the "official" translation is clear; he
travelled to Switzerland and obtained the author's imprimatur
and he even accepted Fuseli as a supervisory editor over both
the translation of the text and the selection and production of
re-wrote" (I, 193). De kleine Grandison (n.p., n.d) was a product of the Grandison
craze on the Continent that emei^ed in the wake of Samuel Richardson's The
History of Sir Charles Grandison (1754).
Margaret Fuller's involvement with German literature was encouraged by the
Harvard Germanophiles Geoige Ripley and Frederic Henry Hedge. She published
translations of Eckermarm's Conversations with Goethe (1839), Bettine Brentano's
Gunderode (1842), and Goethe's lasso (published posthumously in 1860). Her
biographical and critical essay, "Goethe," formed the core of her plarmed fulllength biography which, had it been completed, would have antedated G. H.
Lewes's Life of Goethe (1855). Sarah Austin is best remembered for two major
translations—Characteristics of Goethe from the German of Talk, Von MMler, Etc. (3
vols., 1833) and Fragments from German Prose Writers (1841). Her Germany, from
1760 to 1814, or. Sketches of German Life From the Decay of the Empire to the
Expulsion of the French (1854) is a compilation of reviews of memoirs by Joharma
Schopenhauer (the mother of the philosopher), Karl Heinrich, Ritter von Lang,
Immerman, Jacobi, Steffens, Chamisso, and Von Ense. George Eliot's major
essays, reviews, and translations include "German Wit: Heinrich Heine" (1856),
"The Natural History of German Life" (1856), "The Morality of Wilhelm Meister"
(1855), David Friedrich Straidl's Life of Jesus (1846), Ludwig Feuerbach's The Essence
of Christianity (1854).
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plates. Fuseli also wrote the "Advertisement," which contains
a vivid biographical sketch of Lavater, a friend in his youth. In
contrast to Holcroft's edition, which was published for the mass
market. Hunter's edition was published by subscription and
appeared in three expensive volumes (1789, 1792, 1798) priced
at £30 each. The list of subscribers included other intermediar
ies of German culture, William Taylor, the translator of
Goethe's Iphigenie (1793), and Matthew Gregory Lewis, who
played an important role in the domestication of the German
Schauerroman in England.^^ On the strength of its splendid
engravings and attractive binding, one reviewer considered it
"the finest printed book which has ever appeared in this or any
other country."^'^ Intensifying the rivalry between the two
editions, Holcroft's translation was based on an authorized
German abridgement (published by Winterthur, 1783-7) made
by another intimate of Lavater's circle, the academic J. M.
Armbruster. The changes he made were approved by Lavater
himself in a letter dated April 7, 1783.^^ Complicating matters
even further, Holcroft's edition received more favorable
attention from the critics than Hunter's. Especially praisewor
thy were the notices in the European Magazine (XVII, XVIK)
and the Critical Review (LXVm, LXDC). The reviewer for the
latter incorrectly identified Holcroft's as the first complete
version of Lavater's work to appear in English. This could
only have provided an additional irritant to Fuseli. This
attitude is reflected in his reviews of Holcroft's translation (in
the December 1789 and April 1790 issues of the Analytical)
which indicate quite correctly that the Holcroft translation was

As a boy of seventeen, Lewis met Goethe, "the celebrated author of Werter [sic],"
in Weimar in 1792. Reporting this event to his mother, he warned her therefore
that "you must not be surprised if I shoot myself one of these mornings." Letter
of 30 July 1792 in The Life and Correspondence of M. G. Lewis, ed. Mrs. BaronWilson (London, 1839), quoted in Violet Stockley, German Literature as Known
in England 17S0-1830 (1929; rpt. Port Washington: Kermikat, 1969), 295.
^ Monthly Magazine (K, 1800), quoted in Stockley, 27.
Stockley, 28.
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a full volume shorter than Hunter's, and offer a list of
Holcroft's mistakes and maladroit passages. Certainly, Fuseli's
adverse critique was motivated in part by his support first for
Hunter's and then Wollstonecraft's rival translations; but
another likely cause of his disapproval was his proprietary
interest in the Physiognomische Fragmente. Along with Goethe
and others, Fuseli had contributed a number of aphorisms and
sketches of heads that were included in the first German edition
(1775). The success of Holcroft's translation also inspired
avaricious copycats, including one Samuel Shaw, whose pirated
one-volume edition of Holcroft's work appeared in 1792, and
an anonymous editor of the first American edition which
appeared a year later. Despite any lingering bad blood between
Fuseli and Holcroft, the reviewer for the Analytpresumably Fuseli—excoriated Shaw's theft as "one of
those contemptible catchpennies, which cannot be too severely
reprehended" (XHI, 427). (In 1792 Robinson, Holcroft's
publisher, responded to the threat of further piracy with a onevolume abridgement that featured none of the inaccuracies that
marred Shaw's hastily produced edition.) Hunter's beautifully
printed translation from the French was in turn pirated by
another clergyman, the Rev. C. Moore, whose edition was
published in 1797. And yet, in both legal and pirated editions,
Holcroft's translation remained the standard English version of
Lavater's Fragmente throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
Not all of Holcroft's translations created internecine rivalry
in the Godwin Circle, and his work as a translator was, as a
rule, distinguished by an unerring knack for selecting texts with
commercial appeal. Not untypical was the success enjoyed by
his adaptation of The Marriage of Figaro, entitled Follies of the
Day, which was performed on December 4, 1784, at Covent
Garden with Holcroft in the lead role. Other French authors
he translated included Madame de Genlis, Savary, and Sauvigny.
Another successful play, Holcroft's 1790 translation of J. C.
Brandes's The German Hotel, was frequently performed and
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reprinted throughout the decade. Holcroft also enjoyed success
•with the first English translations of Frederic Leopold Count
Stolberg's Travels through Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Sicily
(1796y^—Fuseli's review appeared in the Analytical Review
(December 1797, vol. XXV^—and the Life of Baron Frederick
Trench (1788),^^ which was reprinted as recently as 1927. (The
demand for such works was such that two other translations of
Trench's novelistic, exotic memoirs were published—anony
mously—in the same year.) Holcroft's selection of these texts
exemplifies the special nature of his relationship as translator to
German literature; both texts offered him opportunities for
masked, submei^ed self-expression in the colorful careers of two
liberal members of the German aristocracy, which he donned
in place of his own identity as an exiled, impoverished Jacobin
author, subject to censorship, who was persona non grata in
England following the treason trial. These texts—as encounters
with foreign otherness—also reflect the suppression of
Holcroft's voice in place of other "voices"; they also served as
paradigms for his own Travels from Hamburg, through
Westphalia, Holland, and the Netherlands, to Paris, 2 volumes
(London: G. G. and J. Robinson, 1804) and occupy an intertextual relationship with this text. Holcroft's own encounter
with Northern Europe must therefore be mediated by his
translations of others' travel writing—and possibly also by his
reading of Wollstonecraft's A Short Residence in Sweden,
Norway, and Denmark (1796). Holcroft's translations of
Stolberg and Trenck indicate that for him, translation func
tioned as a displacement of original writing—an extreme sign of

" A friend of Goethe, Stolberg's career (1750-1819) formed a bridge between the
Sturm und Drang of the 1770s and German Romanticism. He was a translator of
Homer (1778), Plato (1796/97), Ossian (1806), and a prominent member of the
"Gottinger Dichterkreis" led by L. C. H. Holty (1748-76).
Trench's Life, which is subtitled HiS ADVENTURES AND CRUEL AND EXCESSIVE
SUFFERINGS DURING AN IMPRISONMENT OF TEN YEARS in the fortress of Magdeburg,
by command of the late King of Prussia, surely inspired Godwin's bleak portrayal
of St. Leon's confinement in Bethlem Gabor's castle in St. Leon (1799), vol. HI.
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cultural maiginalization—and represent an appropriation of an
"alternative" culture in place of the official state-sponsored
literary culture in England from which Jacobins, Dissenters,
women, and others felt excluded or in relation to which they
were situated on the margins. Referring to "the occasional
dilemmas of the Translator," the Preface to Stolberg's Travels
gives some indication of Holcroft's insecurity; the following
passage is highly self-referential in disclosing the difficulties faced
in mediating the terra incognita of Stolberg's experiences: in
"following his erratic and devious path...the Translator has not
infrequently found himself in a labyrinth, from which to
extricate himself, and never lose sight of his author, was a task
of difficulty and address." As for his confrontation with the
poet's German he speaks of its "complex construction,
indefinite grammar, licentious orthography, and perplexed
idiom.'""
Holcroft's most important translation in literary-historical
terms—and his greatest challenge of this kind—is that of
Goethe's epic poem, Hermann und Dorothea (1801), which was
the first to appear in England. With this translation Holcioft
belongs to a select company of Goethe's intermediaries in
England, including Taylor, Scott, Crabb Robinson, Carlyle,
Sarah Austin, and G. H. Lewes. As an alternative to disclosing
the otherness of the existing order in England and the alienation
that he and his fellow radicals and dissenters experienced on the
margins of their native culture—the positing of such otherness
that had characterized his activity as a novelist, playwright, and
journalist before his arrest—the translation of Goethe's text
served as an exercise in centering himself in another, a foreign
otherness. This otherness is nonetheless not entirely unfamiliar
to him, since the conflict facing Hermann's family in the poem
is similar to the cultural dilemma confronting Holcroft and
other members of the Godwin Circle in the wake of war
hysteria and government reaction: how does one adjust to the

Stolbei^, Travels, vi, vii.
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chaos—and otherness—of war thrust upon their settled existence
by French invaders? And yet the means appear for restoring
the shattered idyll and reconciling Hermann and his parents to
life, and this means comes to them in the form of Dorothea the
refugee, who emerges out of the otherness of violence and
bloodshed. She offers a critique of the way things are while yet
offering a good deal of idealistic rhetoric about the possibility
of repairing the damaged fabric of society which will lead to the
reconciliation of the alienated individual with society and the
State. Indeed, Goethe's poem extols many of the values
embedded in the program of English religious and political
Dissent. But because of his status as an outsider in English
culture even before his arrest, Holcroft was never in his own
novels or plays able to attain the state of unified perception
between subject and object—the self and the social world—vis
ible in his translation. This condition, which Bakhtin describes
as "transgredience," is seen to emerge when "the whole
existence of others is seen from outside not only their own
knowledge that they are being perceived by somebody else, but
from beyond their awareness that such an other even exists."''
Holcroft thus approached the task of translating Hermann und
Dorothea as an attempt to attain "transgredience" between the
author of the original work and himself as mediator of its
otherness.
Goethe himself noticed this characteristic in Holcroft's
translation. In a letter to Holcroft dated May 29, 1801,"*° he

Michael Holquist, Dialogisnv Bakhtin and his world (London: Roudedge, 1990),
33.
•*° Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Briefe der Jahre 1786-1814 in Gedenkausgabe der Werke,
Briefe und Gesprdche, ed. Ernst Bender (Zurich und Stuttgart: Artemis Verlag,
n.d.):
Indem ich die mir mitgeteilte Ubersetzimg von Hermaim und Dorothea
mit Dank zuriicksende erlauben Sie mir, wertgeschatzer Herr, einige
Betrachtungen.
Man kaim wie es mir scheint, nach zweierlei Maximen iibersetzen,
eimnal weim man seiner Nation den reinen Begriff eines fremden Autors
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distinguishes between two approaches to translation: the first,
in which the translator tries "to convey the pure meaning of a
foreign author and the foreign context" to the non-native
reader. Alternatively, the translator may choose to treat the
original text as "eine Art Stoff," that is, pliable material that
may be modified in such a way "that it becomes more familiar"
to the translator's readers, even to the point where "his readers
will be able to read it as an original," as though the text's
otherness had been neutralized. The latter, Goethe insists, is
Holcroft's method, which is in keeping with the description of
his procedure in the Preface and Notes to the translation:
iiberliefern, fremde Zustande derselben anschaulich machen will, wobei
man sich denn genau an das Original bindet; man kann aber auch ein
solches fremdes Werk als eine Art Stoff behandebi, indem man es, nach
eignen Empfindungen und Uberzeugungen, deigestalt verandert, dafi es
unserer Nation naher gebracht und von ihr gleichsam als ein Originalwerk
aufgenommen werden konne.
In dem letzten Falle scheinen Sie sich zu befinden. Sie haben zwar im
ganzen den Gang meines Gedichtes beibehalten, aber durchaus, soviel ich
beurteilen kann, die dramatisch charakteristischen, lafilichen Aufierungpn
meiner Personen strenger, auffallender, didaktischer iiberliefert, und die
gemachliche epische Bewegung in einen ernsteren gemefinern Schritt
verwandelt.
Nach meiner wenigen Einsicht in die enghsche Literatur darf ich
schliefien dafi Sie hierbei den Charakter Ihrer Nation vor Augen gehabt,
und es ist mir um so angenehmer eine voUige Aufklanmg hiertiber in der
Vorrede und den Noten, welche Sie Direr Arbeit beizufiigen gedenken,
nachstens zu erhalten.
Ubrigens kann ich die meisten Abweichungen vom Original aus
meinem gefafiten Standpunkte ziemlich beurteden, nur vermag ich nicht
einzusehen warum Sie die Stelle, vom hundertsechsundzwanzigsten Vers
Ihrer Ubersetzungen an, bis zum hundertzweiundvierzigsten, auf den
ehemaligen Brand des Stadtchens gedeutet, da, im Original, dieser langst
veigangenen Begebenheit nur im Vorbeigehen erwahnt und eigendich die
Beschreibung des Zuges der Ausgewanderten durch diese Stelle fortgesetzt
wird. Doch erhalte ich wohl auch hieruber einige Belehrung und ergreife
vieUeicht irgend eine Gelegenheit fiber die vier, nunmehr von mir
hegenden, Ubersetzungen meines Gedichtes oflenthch meine Gedanken zu
sagen.
Der ich recht wohl zu leben wfinsche und mich zu geneigtem
Andenken empfehle. pQX, 409-10)
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In moral sentiments, poetical feeling, and idioms of
speecli, each people have their peculiarities. To these I
have not unfrequently dared to render my author subject;
and indulge in such variations as I imagined he would
have been likely to have adopted, had he written to the
English Nation...[The translator] will not honour his
author by being too much his slave; though continual
attempts to be his equal are but continual disappoint
ments: at least, such honours are rarely attained, and
short of duration; and even while he seeks them, he
exposes himself to the dangers either of just censure or
pedantic cavil.'^'
Holcroft's commentary on Goethe's poem also contains an
implicit theory of translation that suggests parallels with
TTazlitt's "gusto" or Keatsean "intensity"; clearly, for Holcroft,
the focus of the translator is on replicating emotional authentic
ity rather than word-for-word accuracy: "A poet can never be
translated with any due degree of the enthusiasm with which he
wrote, unless the translator excites in himself the same kind of
ardour. He will then, while he breathes spirit and feeling of his
author, generally forget his author's words. The excellence of
all translations will indeed rather consist in the feeling and the
spirit than in the words.The process of selection and
arrangement of suitable voices and garb for the transformation
of the foreign text into something new and yet non-alienating
is itself perhaps a more adequate definition for the search for a
specific framework from a multitude of possible responses.

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Hermann and Dorothea, trans. Thomas Holcroft
(London: Longman, 1801), xii, 181.
Goethe, Hermann and Dorothea, 180. Holcroft makes the same point in his
Preface to Stolberg's Travels: "Imagination...holds a looser rein; her track is aerial;
and, though dazzling, closes instantly upon the view. To trace her capricious
course in an exact line is impossible; and those who translate poetry must not pore
over the words of the author, but imbibe his feelings, animate themselves with the
same fires, and soar on the same daring wing" (ix).
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And here, in Goethe's translated text, at a significant site of
cultural interaction in the Romantic age, Holcroft appears to
have attained reciprocal unity between subject and object to a
degree that eluded him in his career as novelist, playwright, and
journalist.

PROPHECY AND SENSIBILITY
Mary Wollstonecraft in
Frankenstein
Syndy M. Conger

very recently, students of Mary Shelley assumed
^•^^^Cthat she adored her father and husband but disowned
s^^^'lher mother—the woman both men adored, Mary
"Wbllstonecraft, famed in her lifetime, savagely defamed just
after her death.^ This essay attempts to correct the impression
by discovering some of the many filial tributes to her mother
Shelley embedded in her first and most famous literary work,
Frankenstein (1818). From the outset, such a project is doubly
haunted by absence, for Shelley's first novel is ostensibly a book
about men in general and literary and genetic fathers in
i

^ Alan Richardson, "From Emile to Frankenstein-. The Education of Monsters,"
European Romantic Review 1 (1991): 147-62; Marc A. Rubenstein, "'My Accursed
Origin': The Search for the Mother in Frankenstein," Studies in Romanticism 15
(1976): 165-94; Janet Todd, "Frankenstein's Daughter: Mary Shelley and Mary
WoUstonecraft," Women and Literature 4, 2 (1976): 18-27; and Joyce Zonana,
"'They Will Prove the Truth of My Tale': Safie's Letters as the Feminist Core of
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein," Journal of Narrative Technique 21 (1991): 170-84. All
consider Frankenstein for its Wollstonecraftian materials. Meena Alexander,
Women in Romanticism (Savage: Barnes & Noble, 1989), emphasizes the contrasts
between mother and daughter.
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particular; it pays little heed to the women's causes that
Wollstonecraft championed throughout her life and no overt
attention whatsoever to Wollstonecraft herself. Susan Lanser
hears few and faint women's voices in the novel and draws a
representative conclusion: Shelley, like Victor Frankenstein,
"could not compose a female."^ Faced with such a text, the
increasing number of critics interested in the mother in
Frankenstein, according to Susan Wolstenholme, "tend to write
in a different register from those who stress the presence of the
father."^ Many talk about the maternal as an abstract principle:
some look for signs of literal motherhood in the noveF; others,
for signs of literary motherhood;' still others investigate the
maternal from a psychoanalytic perspective as a haunting,
sought after, yet "unrepresentable, ineffable presence."^
This study investigates specific signs of a textual Wollstone
craft in Frankenstein, not Wollstonecraft as she actually was
(who, of course, cannot be known) but as her daughter would
have known her: only as mediated by documents, portraits,
and anecdotes by Wollstonecraft herself, her family and friends,
and the press. Redundant occurrences of such mediated signs
^ Susan Sniader Lanser, Fictions of Authority (Ithaca; Cornell University Press,
1992), 143.
' Susan Wolstenholme, Gothic (Re)Visions (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), 55.
Many of these essays pay tribute to EUen Moer's pioneer study of Frankenstein
as birth myth, origmally a part of a chapter in Literary Women (Netv York:
Doubleday, 1963), among them the arresting studies of Alan Bewell, "An Issue of
Monstrous Desire: Frankenstein and Obstetrics," K:/e Journal of Criticism 1 (1988):
105-28; and Paul Yotmgquist, "Frankenstein: The Mother, the Daughter, and the
Monster," Philological Quarterly 70 (1991): 339-59.
' See especially James Carson, "Bringing the Author Forward: Frankenstein
Through Mary Shelley's Letters," Criticism 30 (1988): 431-53; Barbara Johnson,
"My Monster/My Self," Diacritics 12 (1982): 2-10; and Mary Poovey, The Proper
Lady and the Woman Writer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 114-71,
who are all following a precedent set by Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar in
The Madwoman in the Attic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 221-47, in
assummg that the novel is about, on some level, Mary Shelley's often frustrated
literary ambitions.
' Wolstenholme, 55.
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in the novel suggest not only an unflagging admiration for her
mother on Shelley's part but also a keenly felt and sympathetic
understanding of her mother's posthumous misfortune. By this
means Frankenstein can be read both as a covert homage to
Wollstonecraft and a lament of her fate written in an enigmatic,
fantastic—in a prophetic—code.
When Wollstonecraft grew angry in Letters from Norway at
the "invectives" heaped on Denmark's "unfortunate" princess
Matilda after her death (who was "censured, with the most cruel
insinuation, for her management of her son," "chained with
licentiousness," and even blamed "for her very charities"), she
could not have known that her own reputation would suffer
similar posthumous treatment in the anti-Jacobin press. Just a
few scathing but well-placed attacks on Wollstonecraft's
character after the publication of Godwin's Memoirs of her life
in 1798 shuttled her into oblivion for most of the nineteenth
century. Godwin had not attempted to hide—though he had
tried to explain—his wife's unconventional life, especially her
amours and her attempted suicides. "A philosophical wanton,"
gloated the European Magazine in April of 1798, and "a warning
to those who fancy themselves at liberty to dispense with the
laws of propriety and decency." Their review bristles with
killing terms—ignominy, licentiousness, disgust, detestation,
indignation. The Anti-Jacobin Review reinforced that view:
their key terms were concubinage and prostitution; and they
elaborated the theme in a poem titled "The Vision of Liberty"
that jumbled together accusations of treason, whoredom,
henpeckery, blasphemy, license, and hack writing.^ By 1803
^ Actually, the Anti-Jacobin's poem was one of three devastating poetic satires
aiotmd this time touching on Wollstonecraft and Godwin; the other two were
Richard Polwhele's "The Unsex'd Females" (1798) and T. J. Mathias's "The Shade
of Alexander Pope on the Banks of the Thames" (1799). The information in this
paragraph was gleaned from two sources: Chapter X of Ralph Wardle's Mary
Wollstonecraft; A Critical Biography (Jincola; University of Nebraska Press, 1951),
and W. Clark Durant's Supplement to his 1927 edition of Godwin's Memoirs (rpt.
New York: Gordon Press, 1972).
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even Wollstonecraft's staunchest allies had grown timorous.
Her friend Mary Hays, for example, left her out of a fivevolume Female Biography, and the British Critic could pro
nounce her "already almost foi^otten."' The demonization of
Wollstonecraft was now effectively complete; she had been
transformed from a respected woman of letters, in the words of
Claire Tomalin, into "a bogey, flanked by the spectres of
revolution, irreligion, and sexual anarchy."'
Godwin reportedly tried to shield Wollstonecraft's young
daughters Fanny and Mary from this material.^® If he succeeded
in doing so until Mary eloped with Percy, it must have been a
shock to the sensitive teenager to encounter these attacks;
according to her journal, Shelley read "anti-Jacobin poetry"
some time in 1817. Orphans bereft of mothers typically
experience a complex of emotions and form idealized visions of
those mothers"—add to this, Shelley's implication in her
mother's death and her mother's subsequent defamation, and
the potential complexities increase exponentially. Why else,
asks her biographer Emily Sunstein, would she develop a fear
of scandal so thorough it became a virtual fear of visibility?
When Shelley urges Edward Trelawney to leave her out of his
planned biography of Percy Shelley, for example, or better yet,
not to write it at all, it is hard not to believe she is also voicing
her continuing revulsion at the fate of her mother:
* British Critic 21 (1803): 690-91, as cited in Janet Todd's Mary Wollstonecraft: An
Annotated Bibliography (New York: Garland Press, 1976), 12.
' Claire Tomalin, The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, 1974; New York: NAL, Meridian, 1983), 246.
This theory is Wardle's, 329, 332-3; in contrast, Emily Sunstein {Mary Shelley:
Romance and Reality [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989], 53), who
has written Hves of both mother and daughter, beheves that Shelley had read all
of her mother's works and the Memoirs by the time she was fifteen and thus
"learned her mother's history in more intimate detail than if Wollstonecraft had
hved."
" "Thoughts on the Aggression of Daughters" by U. C. Knoepflmacher in the fine
collection titled The Endurance of Frankenstein, ed. Geoige Levine and U. C.
Knoepflmacher (Berkeley: Univenity of California Press), 88-119, is very illtmunating on the subject of maternal deprivation.
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There is nothing I shrink from more fearfully than
publicity...! should be terrified at rouzing the slumbering
voice of the public...This is weakness—but I cannot help
it—to be in print—the subject of men's [her italics]
observations—of the bitter hard world's commentaries, to
be attacked or defended!—this ill becomes one.
(1 April 1829; Letters 11.72)
Notwithstanding her public silence about her mother,
Shelley's journal, private letters, and posthumous papers contain
poignant signs of the value she placed on being the daughter of
"Wollstonecraft, whose maiden name she chose from the outset
to be part of her pen name ("Mary Wollst^ Shelley"). Her
journal reveals that she read or reread nearly everything her
mother wrote during the years before she wrote Frankenstein P
"When told in 1823 that she resembled her mother in "Man
ners," she confided to Leigh Hunt, "this is the most flattering
thing any one c'' say to me." Certain rituals in the Godwin
household may have increased her desire for such a resem
blance. Each year, about two weeks after her birthday,
Godwin made a pilgrimage with her and Fanny to their
mother's grave in St. Pancras' churchyard, probably thereby
reinforcing her sense of connectedness to her mother and her
mother's fate; St. Pancras' Churchyard, in any event, allegedly
became Shelley's favorite retreat as she grew up. Friends of
Godwin reportedly sometimes asked her to stand under John
Opie's portrait of her mother [Figs. 1 and 2] to study the
two faces. She was evidently clinging to superstitious notions
of connection and likeness when she wrote Claire in late Aug^ According to her Journal she read Letters from Norway and Mary in August of
1814; Wrongs of Woman, Posthumous Works, and Elements of Morality in October
of 1814; at least Percy read Rights of Man in November of 1814; View of the
French Revolution by M. W G. in December of 1814; and Rights of Woman in
1816. In many cases, her biographers seem to assume, this would have been a
rereading.
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Figure 1: John Opie, Portrait of Mary WoUstonecraft (1797).
National Portrait Gallery.
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Figure 2: Reginald Easton, Miniature of Mary Shelley.
The Bodleian Library.
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ust of 1833: as nothing can do that but my obict I expect it. I
shall just be the age of my mother and have arrived at my
[grand] first climacteric."" This voiced conviction that she
would re-enact her mother's fate may well have been reinforced
by the suicide of Wollstonecraft's first daughter Fanny, bearing
her mother's initials on her clothing, on 9 October 1816.
To Frances Wright, who wrote to her in 1827 as the famed
Wollstonecraft's daughter, she offered a rarely expressed, but
wholly unqualified, confession of loyalty to her mother: "the
memory of my Mother has always been the pride and delight
of my life, and the admiration of others for her, has been the
cause of most of the happiness I have enjoyed."" Her private
catalog of her mother's virtues is glowing: "greatness of soul,"
"energy of character," genius, sound and clear understanding,
toleration, intrepidity, sensitivity or sympathy. This list
constitutes Shelley's idealized Wollstonecraft, apparently selfselected from texts and tales at her disposal:" Wollstonecraft's
many self-portraits emphasizing the virtues of true sensibility,
critical acumen, and courage;" Mary Hays's posthumous
tribute stressing her "endearing qualities of heart"; an
anonymous biographer's (1803) highlighting of her heroism, her
genius, her independence of spirit, and her "most comprehen
sive benevolence"; the grieving Godwin's dominant memories
of his wife's "trembling delicacy of sentiment" and "luxuriance
" Letters 11.193; written to her stepsister Claire [Jane] Clairemont and dated 24-6
August 1833.
Letters 1.376 and n.3-4.
" This hst was compiled from three sources: an entry in her journal dated 21
October 1838 (cited by Blumberg, 54-5), a letter to Maria Gisborne dated 30
October 1834 (see Letters 11.215), and a brief biographical sketch found in her
posthumous papers with sketches for a biography of her father (cited by Jane
Dtmn, Moon in Eclipse: A Life of Mary Shelley [New York: St. Martin's Press,
1978], 56, from C. Kegan Paul, William Godwin, His Friends and Contemporaries
[London, 1876; rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1970], 1.231).
" Catherine N. Parke, "What Kind of Heroine is Mary Wollstonecraft?" in
Sensibility in Transformation: Creative Resistance to Sentiment from the Augustans
to the Romantics, ed. Syndy McMillen Conger (Toronto: Associated Univenity
Presses, 1990), 103-19.
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of imagination" rather than the "Amazonian temper" she
exhibited in the Vindication of the Rights of Woman f of
Wollstonecraft as a melancholy "female Werter" with uncanny
powers of intuition and a well-developed tragic consciousness.^'
Pinally, to put a face on all these word-pictures, as a girl Shelley
always had Opie's late portrait of her mother to study, once
described by Kegan Paul as
"quite handsome"...tender, wistful, childlike, pathetic
beauty, with a look of pleading against the hardness of
the world...the complexion, rich, full, healthy, vivid...the
clear brown eyes, and the masses of brownish auburn
bair.^'
This portrait, a visualization of the gentler side of Wollstonecraft's nature, seems to have been the schema through which
Shelley filtered information about her mother, the image she
introjected and then projected onto fictional characters. Her
own considerable contribution to the image was to overlay
upon it her dominant impression of her mother as a Cassandra
figure.
Cassandra is a key figure in this investigation. As the tragic
prophetess of Greek legend doomed to see the truth, to say it,
to go wholly unheeded, and at last to be dishonored, she seems
to have represented all that Shelley most admired about her
mother and most lamented about her fate. Wollstonecraft had
alluded to Cassandra once in Letters from Norway (1796)^°
William Godwin, Memoirs of Mary Wollstonecraft (London: Constable, 1927), 55.
Godwin, Memoirs, 72-3, 125. All these images of Wollstonecraft are reviewed
by Ehirant in the Preface to his 1927 edition of the Memoirs. Mitzi Myen,
"Godwin's Memoirs of Wollstonecraft: The Shaping of Self and Subject," Studies
in Romanticism 20 (1981): 299-316, offers keen insight into the motives behind
Godwin's idealized picture of Wollstonecraft: he created the romantic heroine he
needed most to recuperate for and in himself.
Cited in Durant's "Preface" to his edition of Godwin's Memoirs, xxxvii.
2° Throughout this essay I use the short titles of Mary Wollstonecraft as they
appear in her daughter's journal. The full title of the cited travelogue is Letters
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while trying to persuade Gilbert Imlay to consider the claims
of the heart as well as those of commerce;
A man ceases to love humanity, and then individuals, as
he advances in the chase after wealth...every thing must
give way; nay, is sacrificed...all the endearing charities of
citizen, husband, father, brother, become empty names.
But...I must say farewell, Cassandra was not the only
prophetess whose warning voice has been disregarded.^'
For Wollstonecraft, an inveterate mythoclast all her life, this
was a throw-away trope, a spontaneous, one-time self-portrait
drawn for rhetorical effect and just one more among the many
literary masks she donned in her career. For Shelley, in
contrast, who was an inveterate mythmaker all her life, the
Cassandra figure came to play a much more central and steady
role, shaping her self-image as well as her idealized mother
image and her fictions. Here, for example, is Shelley's letter to
Teresa Cuiccioli written on the occasion of Lord Byron's death.
Teresa's loss reminded her of her own loss of Percy just two
years before:
How much you feared this voyage! every day I am more
certain that Cod endowed us with the power to foresee
our misfortunes. But we are all Cassandras, and we are
so blind that we do not give heed to the silent voice that
makes itself heard within our soul. We then know the
truth when the prophecies are fulfilled.^
Written during a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.
Mary Wollstonecraft, Letters Written during a Short Residence in Sweden,
Norway, and Denmark, ed. Carol H. Posion (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1976), Letter XXE, 190. References to this work will hereafter be cited in
the text.
^ "A part of the Elect," vol. 1 of The Letters of Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, ed. Betty
T. Bennett (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 16 May 1824, 421.
References to this work will hereafter be cited in the text.
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Shelley's notion of prophecy here, nearly identical to her
mother's in Letters from Norway, entails gifted women,
hopelessness, and irrevocable misfortune. At the same time, the
pronoun "we" also forges a rhetorical link between her
perceived sense of herself and her mother, who, like all women,
was a Cassandra. In the first decade of her literary career,
Cassandra remained a preoccupation for Shelley. She created a
series of Wollstonecraft-like Cassandra figures in her first three
novels^; she periodically represented herself in Cassandran
terms in private letters^"^; and she or her characters often
employed, whether consciously or not, persuasive strategies
similar to her mother's, and ones long associated with
prophecy, the veiled "rhetoric of obscuration" and the satiric
"rhetoric of threat"^^.
Shelley's impression of her mother, if mythologized, was
nevertheless both original and arguably accurate;
for
Wollstonecraft self-consciously engaged in secular prophecy
^ The Last Man has its Cumaean sibyl and also Peidita; Valperga has Beatrice (and
her deceased mother, Wilhehnina). Mathilda in the novel of the same name shows
some prophetic propensities as well. See Barbara Jane O'Snlhvan, "Beatrice in
Valperga-. A New Cassandra," in The Other Mary Shelley; Beyond Frankenstein, eds.
Audrey F. Fisch, Anne K. Mellor, and Esther H. Schor (New York: Oxford •
University Press, 1993), 140-58.
See the following self-characterizations: to Maria Gisborne on 3 May 1823
talking of Valperga-. "Is not the catastrophe strangely prophetic. But it seems to
me that in what I have hitherto written I have done nothing but prophecy what
has arrived to" {Letters 1.336); to Jane W. H. Arundel on 13 October 1827, "but
-were not my prophesies of last year strange and true?—Now in vain would I exert
my Sibylline propensities." {Letters 11.15); to Claire on 24-26 August 1834,
"something will happen this year to me to change my fate" {Letters 11.193). For a
good discussion of the increasing importance of the Cassandra figure to nineteenthcentury feminism, see Elaine Showalter, "Miranda and Cassandra: The Discourse
of the Feminist Intellectual," in Tradition and the Talents of Women, ed. Florence
Howe (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), 313-27.
^ Herbert Marks, "On Prophetic Stammering," Yale Journal of Criticism 1, 1
(1987): 4-5. I am additionally indebted to Thomas Jemielity, "The Prophetic
Character: Good, Heroic, and Naive," Journal of Literature and Theology 5 (1991):
37—48, for enhancing my understanding of some of the hterary and rhetorical
features of prophecy.
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from at least the time of her Vindication of the Rights of Woman
(1792)^^: "Rousseau exerts himself to prove that all was right
originally," she boasted in chapter 1, "a crowd of authors that
all is now right: and I, that all will he right."^^ In the rest of
the treatise, Wollstonecraft first isolated what she believed to be
the causes of woman's current state of degradation, then
sketched out suggestions to reverse that trend; and throughout
she relied on prophetic strategies that infuse her analysis with
a sense of urgency.
At a few important junctures in her argument she utilized
prophecy's "rhetoric of obscuration" in the form of waking
visions. The best extended example is her mountaintop vision,
reminiscent at once of experiences of Moses^^ and Milton's
Adam. The vision appears in the most important extended
polemic in the book in chapter 5, offering brief respite from her
angry attacks on contemporaries whose advice she believed had
"Rendered Women Objects of Pity, Bordering on Contempt."
By describing herself as stepping back and up to "survey" "as
from an eminence...the world stripped of all its false delusive
charms," she established (at least rhetorically) a more detached
point of view, declared her spirits at last calm, and then told an
allegorical tale of the genesis of reason and virtue in the
passions and the imagination at "the dawn of life"—apparently
to emphasize that all these faculties must be present to foster
Secular prophecy was widespread in England just after 1789 according to Marilyn
Butler. Not only political figures like Edmund Burke and politically engaged
clei^men like Richard Price felt authorized to speak of "futurity"; even poets and
novelists, geologists, historians, and population experts were ready to tell
"narratives of the destruction and construaion of worlds" (Marilyn Butler, "Telling
it Like a Story: The French Revolution as Narrative," Studies in Romanticism 28
[1989]: 354).
Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, ed. Charles W.
Hagelman, Jr. (New York: Norton, 1967), 43. References to this work will
hereafter be cited in the text.
Orrin N. C. Wang, "The Other Reasons: Female Alterity and Enhghtenment
Discourse in Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman," Yale
Journal of Criticism 5 (1991): 140-4.
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the development of the human personality (170). Here and
elsewhere in the treatise, Wollstonecraft offered her versions of
human "genesis" as alternatives to prevailing myths about
origins, which she also directly challenged, by Moses, Milton,
and Rousseau.^'
In such mythoclastic challenges Wollstonecraft frequently
added the prophetic rhetoric of satiric confrontation to veiled
prophetic speech, embedding her accusations, threats, and
occasional promises in metaphors of chains, cages, and bonds,
playing—and seemingly relishing—the role of an enlightenment
feminist Jeremiah. She brusquely dismissed Milton's story of
Eve as sensualist nonsense: "in the true Mahometan strain, he
meant to deprive us of souls" (50). Shortly thereafter, she
challenged Moses's version of the fall, working to demystify the
story she understood to be the central textual authority for
many misogynistic arguments, first by literalizing and ridiculing
it, then by wresting it into a new metaphoric context:
as very few, it is presumed, who have bestowed any
serious thought on the subject, ever supposed that Eve
was, literally speaking, one of Adam's ribs, the deduction
must be allowed to fall to the ground; or, only be so far
admitted as it proves that man, from the remotest
antiquity, found it convenient to exert his strength to
subjugate his companion, and his invention to show that
she ought to have her neck bent under the yoke. (59)

^ On this point Mary Wilson Carpenter's "Sibylline Apocalyptics: Mary
Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Woman and Job's Mother's Womb,"
Literature and History 12 (1986): 215-28, is most useful. She believes that in her
treatise Wollstonecraft "attempt[s] to appropriate prophetic discourse thus had to
contend with two levels of oppression at once: the gendered construction of
language itself, as she recognizes in phrases such as 'the language of men,' and the
suppression in biblical prophecy and its institutionalized interpretation of what
might be called the woman's story" (216).
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As she neared the conclusion of her treatise, her exhortations
grew more frequent, more acerbic, and more hyperbolic, even
fantastic. Consider, for example, the very last paragraph:
"Be just, then, O ye men of understanding! and mark not
more severely what women do amiss, than the vicious
tricks of the horse or the ass for whom ye provide
provender—and allow her the privileges of ignorance, to
whom ye deny the rights of reason, or ye will be worse
than Egyptian task-masters, expecting virtue where nature
has not given understanding! (287)
The Rights of Woman was Wollstonecraft's last Jeremiad;
however, another less confrontational, more visionary prophetic
voice rang through her later works and grew dominant in the
Letters from Norway. More reminiscent of the ancient ecstatic
than the confrontational prophetic tradition, this was a
prophecy of sensibility and melancholy, of apocalyptic
premonition and helplessness. As Wollstonecraft's journey
through Scandinavia and her disillusionment with Imlay both
progressed, the occasional critical remarks about "commerce"
began to coalesce into a vision of societies undone by rampant
materialism. Once this fusion took place, Wollstonecraft was
able to iterate a slight variation on a Biblical maxim as her own
prophetic theme and to rally her remaining observations around
it: "under whatever point of view I consider society, it appears,
to me, that an adoration of property," she concluded threequarters of the way through her book, "is the root of all evil"
^tter XDC, 158). Boating along Norway's barren coast, she
had a sudden vision of the future as stark and apocalyptic as
that to be envisioned by her daughter later in The Last Man:
I anticipated the future...to advance a million or two of
years...and pictured the state of man when the earth could
no longer support him. Where was he to fly to from
universal famine.' Do not smile: I really became
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distressed for these fellow creatures, yet unborn. The
images fastened on me, and the world appeared a vast
prison. (Letter XI, 102)
Copenhagen, Wollstonecraft's last stop, unfortunately rein
forced her gathering gloom. To her the manners of Denmark's
citizens were rudimentary and their morals debauched precisely
because they were too engrossed in the dubious twin enterprises
of preserving and increasing their wealth. The ruins from two
recent city fires of 1794 and 1795 were apt emblems, she
decided, of the fruits of such labor:
A gentleman, who was a witness of the scene, assured
me...that if the people of property had taken half as much
pains to extinguish the fire, as to preserve their valuables
and furniture, it would soon have been got under.
(Letter XVIH, 151)
Soon after the fire, these same citizens descended to new depths
of "knavery," in her eyes, by resorting to "plunder" (Letter

xrx, 158).

Although a number of themes and moods from the literary
works of this remarkable mother intersect those of her
daughter—including Wollstonecraft's persistently dim, and often
satiric or apocalyptic, view of the current state of human
society^®—it is the Wronging of Wollstonecraft that most
informs the women characters in Shelley's early novel,
Frankenstein. Each in her own way re-enacts a part of the tale
of the Cassandra-like double death of Shelley's mother: death
of body, death of honor. In this respect, if the horror at the
^ Themes most often discussed are Romanticism, education, and the oppression or
rights of women by men in general or the men in Mary Shelley's life in particular.
Anne K. Mellor's Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters (New York:
Routledge, 1988) is the most thoughtful and thought-provoking source for the
consideration of parallels between mother and daughter. For essays on the same
topic, see n6.
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heart of Frankenstein is Shelley's matrophobia, as more than
one critic has suggested,^' then it is of a very special kind: not
simply fear of the mother, but fear of the fate of her mother.
And if there is a desire to possess or recover the mother at the
heart of the novel, also a favored reading,^^ then it is the desire
to recuperate her mother in the sense that Adrienne Rich had
in mind when she talked about how women read other
women's texts:
to "retrieve" them from oblivion, and
"communicate" or "connect" with them, to make sense of
them.^^ There is one unambiguously clear homage to a mother
in Frankenstein. Shelley had her hero speak it, but it expresses,
in addition to grief, that touch of denial and hope of retrievability that she as an orphaned daughter might have felt as she
penned her first novel:
I need not describe the feelings of those whose dearest ties
are rent by that most irreparable evil, the void that
presents itself to the soul, and the despair that is exhibited
on the countenance. It is so long before the mind can
persuade itself that she...can have departed for ever—that
the brightness of a beloved eye can have been extin
guished.^'*
Of all the doomed women characters in Frankenstein,
Elizabeth Lavenza bears the greatest likeness to Shelley's ideal
of her mother. Her character almost seems a mosaic of traits
Mary Jacobus, "Is There a Woman in this Text?" in Reading Woman: Essays in
Feminist Criticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 98-103, 108-9;
Elissa Marder, "The Mother Tongue in Phedre and Frankenstein," IS/e French
Studies 76 (1989): 59-77.
Rubenstein's '"My Accuned Origin'" is the best example of this interpretation.
" Patrocino Schweickart, "Reading Ourselves: Toward a Feminist Theory of
Reading" (1984), reprinted in Contemporary Literary Criticism, ed. Robert Con
Davis and Rondd Schleifer (New "Ibrk: Longman, 1989), 131.
Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, or The Modem Prometheus (The 1818 Text), ed. James
Rieger (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), 38. References to the work will
hereafter be cited in the text.
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culled from textual sources in Shelley's memory; a selfless
devotion to the service of others; a playful and affectionate
nature; strong, deep feelings; an exquisite sensibility and
extraordinary understanding were all traits often attributed to
"Wollstonecraft by her friends. Godwin had singled out her
"luxuriance of imagination" for praise; Shelley says of Elizabeth
that her "imagination was luxuriant, yet her capability of
application was great" (30).
Percy Shelley contributed to Elizabeth's description in words
that strongly suggest that he saw Elizabeth as a self-portrait of
his wife.^' This may seem at first to be a complication, but it
may also be read as a clue. Since Shelley's letters make it clear
that she identified with her mother and her fate, it is certainly
possible that she had, in Elizabeth, constructed a fictional
composite of her mother and herself, an hypothesis born out by
various other passages in the text. In this description of
Elizabeth after the death of Victor's little brother William, for
example, known features of Wollstonecraft and Shelley merge
to create a single Opie portrait of the two: a Mary Shelley,
except for her dark hair, so to speak, or a Mary Wollstonecraft,
except for her hazel eyes and slight and graceful figure:
She was now a woman in stature and expression of
countenance, which was uncommonly lovely. An open
and capacious forehead gave indications of a good
understanding, joined to great frankness of disposition.
Her eyes were hazel, and expressive of mildness, now
through recent affliction allied to sadness. Her hair was
of a rich dark auburn, her complexion fair, and her figure
slight and graceful. (75)^^
35 Here is the passage editor Rieger singles out as Percy's contribution: "I delighted
in investigating the facts relative to the actual world; she busied herself in
following the aerial creations of the poets. The world was to me a secret, which
I desired to discover; to her it was a vacancy, which she sought to people with
imaginations of her own" (30).
3^ In all instances this essay cites the 1818 version of the text, which is closer to
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What ties Elizabeth to mother and daughter more closely
than her physical appearance, however, is her melancholy
sensibility, soon to blossom in the story into a tragic prophetic
consciousness. Doubly distraught by the murder of William
and the arrest of her beloved servant, the "poor guiltless
Justine" for the crime, she confides to Victor, "If she is
condemned, I never shall know joy more" (76). As her keen
sense of injustice at Justine's conviction expands into an
apocalyptic vision of society, her gloom seems Wollstonecraftian. Her pained witness to the scapegoating of another woman,
however, sounds more like the pain of Wollstonecraft's
daughter, deprived as she was not only of a mother but of the
privilege of speaking of that mother, and wondering every
moment when she, too, would suffer the same treatment:
Alas, who is safe, if she be convicted of crime?...When I
reflect...on the miserable death of Justine Moritz, I no
longer see the world and its works as they before
appeared to me...now men appear to me as monsters
thirsting for each other's blood...Alas! Victor, when
falsehood can look so like the truth, who can assure
themselves of certain happiness? I feel as if I were
walking on the edge of a precipice, towards which
thousands are crowding, and endeavouring to plunge me
into the abyss. (76, 88)
Victor's narration of the trial as well as Elizabeth's senti
ments underscore Justine's resemblance to a wronged
Mary Shelley's experienced loss of her mother than the 1823 and 1831 versions,
something that becomes especially significant in the case of this passage. It was
considerably altered—drastically generalized—in the 1831 edition as if to erase all
traces of the mother's presence and of any composite portrait: "altered her since
1 last beheld her; it had endowed her with loveliness surpassing the beauty of her
childish years. There was the same candour, the same vivacity, hut it was aUied
to an expression more full of sensibility and intellect." All citations are from the
1818 text with variant readings edited by James Rieger; this last variant reading
occurs in his notes (245).
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Wollstonecraft, both of them destroyed by circumstance and
calumny:
all the kindness which her beauty might otherwise have
excited, was obliterated in the minds of the spectators by
the imagination of the enormity she was supposed to have
committed. (77)
Even Justine herself begins to think that she is the "monster"
she has become in the eyes of others; under priestly "siege,"
she at last confesses to the crime she did not commit (82).
Justine, it bears noting, is presented as unequivocally innocent,
the charges against her as utterly false. She dies disgraced,
however, all the same. Justine's resemblance to Wollstonecraft,
in its turn, underlines Elizabeth's to Shelley as a helpless
witness to her mother's condemnation. At the trial Elizabeth
watches in horrified disbelief as Justine's character witnesses.
melt away, until at last she feels compelled, despite her reserve,
to speak out in court in a desperate attempt to set the record
straight:
It may therefore be judged indecent in me to come
forward on this occasion; but when I see a fellowcreature about to perish through the cowardice of her
pretended friends, I wish to be allowed to speak. (79)
If the circumstantial evidence by means of which Justine is
condemned is considered, however, then she, too, begins to
look like a mother-daughter composite. After the murder of
Victor's brother, a locket with the miniature portrait of
Victor's mother that had been around the child's neck
unaccountably turns up in Justine's pocket. Justine insists that
she has no idea how it got there, though the reader eventually
knows that the creature fiendishly planted it there after
strangling William in order to implicate Justine. The authori
ties assume that she is lying and that her possession of the
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locket verifies that she killed the child. She is condemned, so
to speak, by association with a mother's miniaturized (trivial
ized.?) portrait, something Shelley may well have feared could
happen to her as well.^^
Elizabeth's Cassandran percipience remains with her as she
approaches her wedding night: "a presentiment of evil pervaded
her" (189), which she articulates in the diction and syntax of
Wollstonecraft, then brushes aside: "Something whispers to me
not to depend too much on the prospect that is opened before
us; but I will not listen to such a sinister voice...What a divine
day! how happy and serene all nature appears!" (190). Shortly
thereafter, having disregarded her own prophetic voice, as
Shelley would later say 'we all do,'^® Elizabeth is dead, her
body draped across her wedding bed "lifeless and inani
mate...head hanging down, and her pale and distorted features
half covered by her hair" (193), in a manner reminiscent of
Henry Fuseli's famous picture titled "The Nightmare" [Fig. 3].
The visual allusion to Fuseli may also be an allusion to
Wollstonecraft, whose infatuation with the married artist was
the first of several incidents recounted in Godwin's Memoirs
that contributed to the death of her reputation. This vignette
could be Shelley's gesture not only toward Fuseli's Nightmare
but also towards anti-Jacobin cartoon appropriations of it done
to satirize her parents; if this is true, it further solidifies the
connection between Elizabeth and Wollstonecraft, the one the
victim of murder, the other of slander.
Neither Justine nor Elizabeth, it should be added, are usually
Jacobus, 102; Marder, 71.
" 7ii22. On the Wollstonecraft/Fuseli connection, see Wolstoneholme's 'The
Woman on the Bed {Frankenstein)," ch. 3 of Gothic (ReJVisions, 37-56.
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Figure 3: Henry Fuseli, The Nightmare (1782).
Courtesy D. H. Weinglass.
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first-choice representatives in Frankenstein for Wollstonecraft
and Shelley: they are too passive, too inarticulate, too
victimized. They reflect too little cognizance of the intellectual
prowess of the mother, or the survival and language skills of the
daughter. The two characters most often selected as the
Wollstonecraft-Shelley figures in the book are Felix De Lacey's
Safie and her mother, the latter a courageous defender of
woman's right to "aspire to higher powers of intellect, and an
independence of spirit" in a Muslim world (a favorite metaphor
in Rights of Woman), the former a daughter with her mother's
lessons "indelibly impressed" on her mind, who is quite
determined to realize them in her own life (119). The parallel
is undeniable; but while Safie and her mother may be Shelley
and her mother as she hopes they will appear to posterity,
Elizabeth and Justine are rather obviously daughter and mother
as th^ are (think of Godwin's subtitle for Caleb William^.
Safie's wish-fulfillment, pastoral cottage life is dream-like and
ultimately quite fragile: she escapes destruction with her
adopted family when the Creature sets their cottage ablaze, but
she also disappears from the story at that point and leaves not
a trace behind^'. Elizabeth's and Justine's world, in contrast, is
fantastically nightmarish, but all too credibly unjust and
durable.
There is one other character in Frankenstein of the same
unsettling composite type whose story re-enacts the tale of the
wronged Wollstonecraft, and that is the much allegorized
creature. True, its sex is indubitably male;'*" but its situation
is arguably that of a woman, specifically, that of a typical
eighteenth-century woman as presented, and deplored, in
Wollstonecraft's Rights of Womam judged solely on the basis
" Zonana, "'They Will Prove,'" is a provocative discussion of the disappearance of
the correspondence of Safie and Felix as an ominous yet telling sign of Mary
Shelley's endorsement of a feminist poetics of silence in Frankenstein.
^ This position is persuasively taken both by Todd, "Frankenstein's Daughter,"
27n7, and Bette London, "Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, and the Spectacle of
Masculinity," PMLA 108 (1993); 256, 265n5.
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of external appearance; isolated; declassed; and excluded from
education, the public sphere, owning property, or having a
spousal relationship based on likeness or equality.'^' Lanser puts
it most succinctly: the creature is a "metaphor for, rather than
a representation of, a woman.'"^^ She adds, by way of
explanation, "the monster may figure a woman's anguish, but
a woman is not a monster." I would add, for reasons that
should soon become clear, no, a woman is not a monster, but
she can be made monstrous. At times the creature seems to be
a figural representation of Wollstonecraft as imaged by her
friends or of her orphaned and angered daughter, but at other
times the creature bears a close resemblance to Wollstonecraft
as caricatured by her worst enemies.
At its first awakening, the creature has much in common
with Shelley's positive mother image. Its original impulses seem
to be thoroughly good ones: it is grateful to its maker, gentle,
exquisitely sensitive, intelligent, keenly sympathetic and
idealistic. Many of these noble traits are implied in that first
famous act of its life: to rush to its creator's chamber, pull
back the bedcurtain, fix Victor with its eyes, "if eyes they may
be called," stretch out its hand and grin in a double communal
gesture, and "mutter," as Victor puts it, "some inarticulate
sounds" (53). The eyes, the outstretched hand, the prophetic
stammer are all mantic gestures promising extraordinary
capabilities, offering visible proof as well of Victor's success.'*^
The gentle side of its nature is best exercised while it remains
the passive observer of life in the DeLacey's country cottage;
there, by eavesdropping, it receives its sentimental education.
Lanser, Fictions of Authority, Poovey, The Proper Lady, and Margaret Homans,
"Bearing Demons: Frankenstein's Circumvention of the Maternal," in Bearing the
Word (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 106 all entertain this
interpretation of the creature. Gilbert and Guhar, Madwoman, see all the
characters as "females in disguise," 227.
Lanser, 168.
Barbara Freeman, "Frankenstein with Kant: A Theory of Monstrosity, or the
Monstrosity of Theory," Substance 52 (1987): 25-7, is suggestive on the prophetic
nature and behaviors of the creature.
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When it witnesses domestic affection, it is overwhelmed with "a
mixture of pain and pleasure" so keen it must withdraw from
its observation post "unable to bear these emotions" (103-4).
The cottagers inspire the creature to read, to perform acts of
selfless kindness, and, despite its discovery of its "miserable
deformity" (109), to dream of a better life, idealistically
convinced, as was the younger Wollstonecraft, that in order to
achieve that life, it simply needed to strip people of their
outmoded prejudices (130).
In these earlier phases, the creature also figures the neglected
or angry child to many critics, and to some, very specifically,
the child of Godwin and Wollstonecraft.'''^ The creature itself
hammers home this message when it finally rediscovers Victor
in the glaciated mountains near his home (it has not seen him
since the night of its "birth"). While Victor tries to banish it
from his sight with a string of epithets designed to stress its
alienness—devil, insect, demon, monster, fiend, enemy—it
stresses in reply its filial relationship like a prophet's refrain to
convince Victor to "hear its tale": "you, my creator," "thou
hast made me," "I am thy creature," "I am thy creature," "I am
thy creature," "you, my creator" (all this within the space of
two pages, 94-5). So appealing is this side of the creature that
although Victor is frequently arraigned in the courts of criticism
for being an unnatural or neglectful father, very few have
ventured to condemn the creature for the monstrous shape it
allows its filial ingratitude to take. For once it determines that
it is doomed to be "solitary and detested" (126), it cuts a swath
of murder through its single parent's life. Only an intrepid few
critics have carried the parallel between Shelley and the
Creature this far and read the novel as an expression of her filial
^ Already cited sources stressing the rebelliousness of Mary Shelley as daughter
(either against mother or father) are Blumberg, Mary Shelley's Early Novels,
Knoepllmacher, "Thoughts on Aggression," and Youngquist, "Frankenstein-. The
Mother, the Daughter, and the Monster." The idea of the creature as unwanted
or negleaed child is most eloquently stated, however, by Joyce Carol Gates,
"Frankenstein's Fallen Angel," Critical Inquiry 10 (1984): 543-54.
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rage. The parallel between daughter, mother, and monster can
be pursued without indicting Shelley for unconscious matricidal
or parricidal impulses, however, by considering the focus of the
book to be not a family plot so much as conspiracy theory.
As the creature's grotesque monstrous side unfolds—as its
words and deeds transgress all the boundaries of filial and
spiritual piety, as it rails prophetically against things as they are,
as it destroys two family circles (DeLacey's and Victor's) and
then demands of its maker a creature to "mate" with in "the
wilds of South America'"*' that must share its defects—it begins
to seem suspiciously like a dark parody, in the form of a
grotesque literalization, of the monstrous Wollstonecraft as
presented in the anti-Jacobin press. "By allowing women but
one way of rising in the world, the fostering of the libertinism
of men," Wollstonecraft had written in Wrongs of Woman,
"society makes monsters of them.'"*' Her political enemies had
twisted her words and turned them against her posthumously,
the far too self-assertive woman they feared. Now, twenty
years after the publication of Godwin's Memoirs, Wollstonecraft's daughter was to tell the story of their crime in the form
of a fantastic parable, absolve her mother of guilt, and turn the
words again on the detractors, but in a way so subtle that only
she would know, in the "rhetoric of obscuration." She herself
dons her mother's Cassandra mantle, then, not just in her
private letters, but in her capacity as author of Frankenstein.
Reconsider, in this context, for instance, the creature's
origins and education. Self-educated but not self-made, it is
presented as a man's brain child already posthumous at birth:'*^
Does this recall Godwin's description of Wollstonecraft's "Amazonian temper"
(55 of the Memoirs)}
Mary Wollstonecraft, TTse Wrongs of Woman: or, Maria, A Fragment, ed. Gary
Kelly (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 137.
Most critics assume that the creature is a projection of some sort of Victor's
mind (or state of mincQ, hut at the same time most of them assume that Victor
represents either oppressive man in general, or Romantic idealism in general, or
Percy Shelley in particular. See, for example, Romans, "Bearing Demons," 117,
who cites Gates's "Frankenstein's Fallen Angel," 552, on the same subject. I am
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botched together in a "filthy workshop" from remnants of the
dead in the vicinity of Ingolstadt, a city imagined by antiJacobins to be the birthplace of the French Revolution/' Its
education is an anti-Jacobins's worst nightmare: its sentimental
training they would have considered highly suspect; what it
reads they might have placed on a list of books to ban, unless
read with the proper moral guidance. Proof enough of the
creature's dangerously radical education, for the anti-Jacobins
would have lamented its rebellious discontent with things as
they are and its recklessly destructive way of problem solving.
The first book it encounters is Volney's Ruins of Empires, a
book Marilyn Butler glosses as a history fashioned to present
revolution in the best possible light; English radicals favored it
and conservatives consequently viewed it with great distrust.'"
From Volney the creature learns a Jacobin's disrespect for
"immense wealth and...rank, descent, and noble blood" (115).
Subsequent books read—T^e Sorrows ofWerter, Plutarch's Lives,
and Paradise Lost (124-5)—recall not only, in some cases, books
that Wollstonecraft had actually reviewed, but also other of the
major anti-Jacobin accusations made against her: suicide,
adultery, godless blasphemy. The creature's monstrification,
begun unwittingly by Victor, now accelerates, a process of
suggesting, however, that the creature is indirertly the "hideous progeny" of
WiUiam Godwin, who sent Mary Wollstonecraft's image into the world of 1798
to be made monstrous by his and her political enemies. I am not suggesting, as
does Jane Blumbeig, Mary Shelley's Early Novels (Iowa City: University of Iowa
Press, 1993) that Shelley is thereby executing a general critique of Godwin's
philosophy, but is rather lamenting that his Memoirs fell into the world when they
did. Mellor's studies of the Shelley manuscripts reveal that Percy Shelley revised
the creature's tale least of all, which means that, for once, what we read is what
she wrote {Mary Shelley: Her Life, 44).
The best example of such catastrophic anti-Jacobin fantasies, all three volumes
of which were read by Mary Shelley in 1815, was Augustin Barruel's Memoirs pour
servir d'histoire du Jacohinisme (1797), trans. R. Clifford as Memoirs Illustrating the
History ofJacobinism (1797-98). (See vol. 1 of The Journals of Mary Shelley 1814-44,
ed. Paula R. Feldman and Diana Scott-Kilvert [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987J,
90).
Butler, 361-4.
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which it is occasionally acutely conscious itself. Such a moment
occurs when it discovers and reads Victor's journal, which
minutely described...[e]very thing...which bears reference
to my accursed origin; the...disgusting circumstances
which produced it...[and] my odious and loathsome
person...! sickened as I read. (126).
Like a Justine listening to her confessor, or a Wollstonecraft
returned from the grave to read the anti-Jacobins' poetry, or a
Mary Shelley reading Godwin's Memoirs and its excoriating
reviews, the creature stands poignantly appalled at the power of
its grotesque appearance to "obliterate" all awareness of its
internal beauty in the minds of observers.
Despite its original goodness, however, the creature seems
doomed to follow the anti-Jacobin script, to fulfill its promise
as an "odious" and "accursed" being. It strangles, it stalks, it
haunts, it spies; it rails against wealth and privilege; it destroys
domestic tranquillity; it represents, in one sense, scientific
progress but in effect reverts to primitive savagery. At last, like
a horrific false prophet, it promises to avenge itself if denied its
request, to "glut the maw of death, until it be satiated with the
blood" of Victor's "remaining friends" (95, 94); and besides
that, to wreak havoc on thousands far beyond the borders of
Geneva (96). It is a fabricated disciple, as another critic has
already noted, of the Anti-Jacobin Terror.^® Quite appropri
ately, this projection of a monstrous Wollstonecraft—haunted
by "spectres of revolution, irreligion, and sexual anarchy"—does
away with all three of the ideal Wollstonecrafts in the story:
it frightens Safie away, it frames Justine, and it strangles
Elizabeth. It also destroys its creator's family, friends, and peace
of mind as well, perhaps a clue that Victor could be construed
Lee Sterienbutg, "Mary Shelley's Monster: Politics and Psyche in Frankenstein,"
in The Endurance of Frankenstein, ed. George Levine and U. C. Knoepflmacher
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 143-71.
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as a loving but misguided Godwin, responsible for reconstruct
ing his wife's life after her death, but then finding, after her
resuscitation, that he is appalled by what she and he have
become in the eyes of others.
I would never suggest that this interpretation is the only one
possible of this most ingenious of literary figures. The creature
is ultimately a text in Roland Barthes's sense of the woid, a
palimpsest of traces of stories of injustice or neglect whose
origins are obscure, all so evocative and parabolic in nature that
every new reader reads herself into its plot. I do believe,
however, that Wollstonecraft's story is one of those traces. The
creature contains signs of Shelley's ideal Wollstonecraft, a
person of piety, eloquence, exquisite sensibility, intelligence,
benevolence, and idealism; but it also shows signs of the
Wollstonecraft demonized posthumously by her enemies:
grotesque, unnatural, masculine, impious, destructive of family
values, misanthropic, perhaps lecherous. In the nightmare
world it inhabits, an enormity, a monstrous lie, periodically
eradicates a shining, gifted, innocent woman. "We are all
Cassandras," Shelley seems to say, "and none of us is beyond
the reach of her agony or her infamy." "I am afraid you are a
Wollstonecraft," Godwin once wrote to his daughter when he
realized she was succumbing to paralyzing depression after the
death of a child." Perhaps she, too, was afraid.
" This is reported in Wardle, 336.

A KANTIAN SUBLIME
IN SHELLEY
Respect for our Own Vocation
in an Indifferent Universe
Christoph Bode

sublime, it seems, is en vogue. Following Jeanl^^Franfois Lyotard's original, if not to say slanted reading
of Kant, many have welcomed the term as a kind of
catch-all for all sorts of phenomena or experiences that defy, or
seem to defy, verbal expression, thereby mistaking a collateral
aspect of the eighteenth-century sublime, which is, at best, only
a necessary feature, for a sufficient, defining one. This watering
down of a hitherto powerful philosophical and aesthetic concept
to a stale cliche has predictably led to an inflation in the use of
the term—now, almost every time words fail, the sublime is
invoked—a process that was considerably helped by the
additional willful yoking together of Kant's das Erhabene (the
sublime) and Freud's die Sublimierung (sublimation), an
association that admittedly may seem less far-fetched in
languages other than the original German.
But as in other areas, the price of inflation is a decline in
purchasing power. Gradually emptied of the discriminating
power of a philosophical concept, the sublime stands in danger
329
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of becoming all but meaningless—a useless tool. The following
essay, in contrast, uses the term rigorously, that is, as a clearly
definable, if historically differentiated concept that can help us,
by this very differentiation, to understand crucial modifications
in the aesthetic-philosophical and poetical discourses of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Shelley's "Mont Blanc" is indisputably one of the key poems of
his overall oeuvre. No matter what line of interpretation they
prefer, all critics are agreed that it holds a strategic position for
the characterization of Shelley's poetological, ideological and
philosophical profile in his middle years, and as the exact nature
of this middle phase is itself highly controversial, "Mont Blanc"
can be seen as a text whose interpretation vitally affects the
assessment of Shelley's entire career.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that "Mont Blanc," "the
most difficult of Shelley's shorter poems," "has received more
diverse interpretations than any other.'" The stakes are high.
There is, it is true, a certain consensus that "Mont Blanc," just
like Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey," is a highly complex
philosophical poem, which takes a specific topography only as a
starting point for an extended discussion of the relationships
between mind and world, consciousness and matter, subject and
object—a philosophical deliberation poetically dramatized. But
it is far from being settled what the actual outcome of Shelley's
exertions is. For a while, the Platonists held "Mont Blanc,"
declaring it proved Shelley to be a genuine idealist. These
forces of yesteryear have long withdrawn into distant valleys,
and their rearguard fighting hardly impinges upon the current
critical debate any more. Others have read "Mont Blanc" in a
materialist vein, arguing that it shows a godless universe
' Kenneth Neill Cameron, Shelley:
University Press, 1974), 244.

The Golden Years (Cambridge:

Harvard
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governed by Necessity. Others again have held that Shelley
evidently couldn't quite make up his mind and that the poem
is therefore full of tension and downright contradictions.
Today, the ruling orthodoxy undoubtedly is that Shelley was
a skeptic, though that designation seems to have become an
ultra-liberal umbrella term, sheltering all sorts of philosophical
positions, from the idealist skepticism of Berkeley to the
empiricist skepticism of Hume, from the special brand of
William Drummond to the contention that Shelley was so
skeptical that he had hardly any convictions of his own, but
spent his life—a deconstructionist avant la /ettre—exploding
those of others.^
It may seem presumptuous to claim that after all this
something new—and possibly something new and of impor
tance—can be said about "Mont Blanc." But I should neverthe
less like to suggest a new reading, one that re-defines the
philosophical core of the poem by differentiating between its
implied ontology, on the one hand, and its epistemology, on the
other and then proceeds to show how the two are poetically
linked.
^ There is, in addition to Frank Jordan, ed.. The English Romantic Poets: A Review
of Research and Criticism, 4th ed. (New York: MLA, 1985), a short survey of the
varieties of interpretation in Earl Wasserman, The Subtler Language; Critical
Readings of Neo-Classk and Romantic Poems (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1959; rpt. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), 195-240. The classical,
though meanwhile dated study of Shelley's supposed Platonism is James A.
Notopoulos, The Platonism of Shelley: A Study of Platonism and the Poetic Mind
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1949). Cameron (nl) is more materiahstically
inclined, as seems Richard Holmes, Shelley: The Pursuit (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1974). I. J. Kapstein, "The Meaning of Mont Blanc" (1949; rpt. in
Patrick Swinden, ed., Shelley: Shorter Poems and Lyrics—A Casebook [London:
Macmillan, 1976], 165-77), emphasizes the tensions of the poem. Whereas C. E.
Pulos, The Deep Truth: A Study of Shelley's Scepticism (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1954, rpt. 1962), is still the best introduction to Shelley's
skepticism, Terence Hoagwood, Skepticism and Ideology: Shelley's Political Prose and
Its Philosophical Context from Bacon to Marx (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press,
1988), attempts a more radical reading.
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"Mont Blanc" was written in late July 1816, when Shelley,
Mary Godwin, and Claire Clairmont visited the valley of
Chamonix. It was the same trip on which Shelley described
himself as "Democrat, Philanthropist, and Atheist," "destination
I'enfer" in possibly three hotel registers or visitors' books. As
we know from his diary letters to Peacock, Shelley was
overwhelmed by the alpine scenery and especially by the sight
of the Mont Blanc massif. His poem takes its origin from this
overpowering experience and is at the same time an attempt to
create in language the equivalent of its occasion, as Shelley
himself explained in his preface to the first edition of "Mont
Blanc" in 1817:
It was composed under the immediate impression of the
deep and powerful feelings excited by the objects which
it attempts to describe; and, as an indisciplined overflow
ing of the soul, rests its claim to approbation on an
attempt to imitate the untameable wildness and inaccessi
ble solemnity from which those feelings sprang.^
The verbal echoes of Wordsworth's "Preface to Lyrical Ballads"
are quite distinct, but so are the differences: whereas
Wordsworth defines poetry as "the spontaneous overflow of
powerful feelings" and adds significantly, "it takes its origin
from emotion recollected in tranquillity,'"* it seems that Shelley
intended a direct, as it were, iconic presentation of those
"powerful feelings," without the mitigating filter of a "recollec
tion in tranquillity." And this might explain why "Mont Blanc"
begins with such enormous power and thrust, with a
' Percy Bysshe Shelley, "Preface" to History of a Six Weeks' Tour, The Complete
Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, eds. Roger Ingpen and Walter E. Peck (New York:
Gordian Press, 1965), 6:87-8.
•* William Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800/1850), The Prose Works of
William Wordsworth, ed. W. J. B. Owen and Jane Wortington Smyser (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1974), 1:118-59, here 148-9.
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momentum that carries its periods over the line endings like a
mountain stream in schuss:
The everlasting universe of things
Flows through the mind, and rolls its rapid waves,
Now dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloomNow lending splendour, where from secret springs
The source of human thought its tribute brings
Of waters,—with a sound but half its own.
Such as a feeble brook will oft assume
In the wild woods, among the mountains lone.
Where waterfalls around it leap forever.
Where woods and winds contend, and a vast river
over its rocks ceaselessly bursts and raves. (1-11)'
As William Keach has brilliantly analyzed "Mont Blanc"'s
highly complex rhyme scheme and metrics,' I can confine
myself to remarking that in this first stanza—which is surpris
ingly abstract after the topographical title—Shelley makes a
clear, unequivocal philosophical statement on the relation of
mind and the world of objects: The human mind is flown
through by the never-ceasing stream of the world of objects and
delivers but a moderate contribution of its own, a contribution
whose share is often overestimated, as Shelley makes clear by a
simple analogy in lines 7ff.: "the universe of things" and
"human thoughts" stand in the same relation to each other as
"vast river" and "feeble brook" do. This has the clarity of a
mathematical equation:
universe of things
human thought

vast river
feeble brook

' All Shelley texts, unless otherwise stated, are quoted from Shelley's Poetry and
Prose, eds. Donald H. Reiman and Sharon B. Powers (New York: Norton, 1977).
® See Wilham Keach, Shelley's Style (New York: Methuen, 1984).
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Although this is as clear as it can be, Earl R. Wasserman says
that "Mont Blanc" begins with "a set of strikingly paradoxical
statements,"^ and Seymour Reiter paraphrases in incomprehensi
ble reversal, "the physical universe brings its tribute of waters
to the source of human thought, which is in the mind,'" and in
spite of the clear subordination sketched in these initial lines
Angela Leighton can see "no hierachical discrimination between
the status of the mind and that of the everlasting universe of
things."'
As if he had foreseen this and as if he wanted to forestall all
misunderstanding, Shelley once more underlines his view of
things by adding another extended analogy in the second stanza:
"thus thou" signals unmistakably that he regards the deep ravine
of the river Arve as yet another concrete illustration of the
relationship defined in stanza 1. The ravine—all passive—is run
through by a river that is the symbol of an active power
("Power in likeness of the Arve comes down" [16]). The ravine
is an entirely passive receptacle, or rather duct, even what it
gives back is only the echo of a perpetual dynamics that has its
source elsewhere:
Thy caverns echoing to the Arve's commotion,
A loud, lone sound no other sound can tame;
Thou art pervaded with that ceaseless motion.
Thou art the path of that unresting sound
Dizzy Ravine! (30-4)
For those who still cannot see how the roles are distributed,
where Shelley puts activity and where passivity, the following
' Wasserman, The Subtler Language, 198. It should be noted, however, that
Wasserman does not uphold this remarkable contention in his later study Shelley;
A Critical Reading (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).
* Seymour Reiter, A Study of Shelley's Poetry (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1967), 29.
' Angela Leighton, Shelley and the Sublime: An Interpretation of the Major Poems
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 63.
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lines should be an eye-opener because he describes the
relationship of subject and object as a continuously dialectical
one, but one in which the object pole is clearly dominant:
and when I gaze on thee
I seem as in a trance sublime and strange
To muse on my own separate phantasy,
My own, my human mind, which passively
Now renders and receives fast influencings.
Holding an unremitting interchange
With the clear universe of things around. (34-40)
If one compares this to the opposite passage in Wordsworth's
"Tintern Abbey," which also renders the relation between mind
and world as a dialectical one, the difference is immediately
evident: "I am still," we read in Wordsworth's poem,
A lover of the meadows and the woods.
And mountains; and of all that we behold
From this green earth; of all the mighty world
Of eye, and ear,—both what they half create.
And what perceive. (103-7)^°
In Wordsworth, consciousness projects the world and is actively
involved in the constitution of reality, whereas here in "Mont
Blanc" the "unremitting interchange" has an obvious tilt
towards the object pole. The backflow that consciousness
returns is only seemingly active, even its supposed giving is,
strictly speaking, anything but—note: "which passively / Now
renders and receives." Consciousness is embedded in a total
continuity, which can hardly be called dialectical any more
because it does not allow autonomy. Consciousness is absorbed
in this continuity, in which subject and object are fused on the
The Norton Anthology of English Literature, Fifth Edition, eds. M. H. Abrams et
al. (New York: Norton, 1986), 2:154.
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terms of the latter. This conception will be maintained till the
end of "Mont Blanc." Even the following passage—indeed one
of the most difficult and controversial ones of the poem—
which is full of ambiguous grammatical references and equivocal
metaphors and deals with the question how, under these
circumstances, something like creativity can take place at all,
does not significantly modify Shelley's model.
Instead, he now turns in stanzas 3 and 4 to the origin of that
enormous power—the unmoved mover or primum mobile
behind the perpetual cycle of existence and decay (see lines
84-95)—in his imagery: Mont Blanc. But majestic as its
summit rises ("Still, snowy, and serene"), the scenery below is
one of utter devastation and destruction. Superhuman forces
have here formed a landscape that is harsh, hostile, and
repulsive:
Its subject mountains their unearthly forms
Pile around it, ice and rock; broad vales between
Of frozen floods, unfathomable deeps.
Blue as the overhanging heaven, that spread
And wind among the accumulated steeps;
A desalt peopled by the storms alone.
Save when the eagle brings some hunter's bone.
And the wolf tracts her there—how hideously
Its shapes are heaped around! rude, bare, and high.
Ghastly, and scarred, and riven.—Is this the scene
Where the old Earthquake-daemon taught her young
Ruin? Were these their toys? or did a sea
Of fire, envelope once this silent snow? (62-74)
This is the likeness of a nature that in its very greatness and
material power is absolutely indifferent to humanity, heedless
of its existence. Nature—and therein lies its terror—stands for
the inconceivable, the Other, the non-human that breaks into
man's life:
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The glaciers creep
Like snakes that watch their prey, from their
far fountains,
Slow rolling on; there, many a precipice.
Frost and the Sun in scorn of mortal power
Have piled: dome, pyramid, and pinnacle,
A city of death, distinct with many a tower
And wall impregnable of beaming ice.
Yet not a city, but a flood of ruin
Is there, that from the boundaries of the sky
Rolls its perpetual stream; vast pines are
strewing
Its destined path, or in the mangled soil
Branchless and shattered stand: the rocks,
drawn down
From yon remotest waste, have overthrown
The limits of the dead and living world.
Never to be reclaimed. The dwelling-place
Of insects, beasts, and birds, becomes its spoil;
Their food and their retreat for ever gone.
So much of life and joy is lost. The race
Of man, flies far in dread; his work and dwelling
Vanish, like smoke before the tempest's stream,
And their place is not known. (100-120)
Shelley presents a view of nature, of creation, in which man
holds no privileged status but is brutally and helplessly exposed
to the rage of its elements. Overawed, he recognizes its
superior strength, thrown as he is into a world that was not
built for him but to which he has to accommodate. That the
majestic river can work beneficently in distant countries (124)
only supports the idea that this power is to be conceived of as
essentially indifferent-, that is, it does not exist with regard to
humanity, it is not concerned with it. This is the lesson of the
sublime and awful scene:
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Power dwells apart in its tranquillity
Remote, serene, and inaccessible:
And this, the naked countenance of earth.
On which I gaze, even these primeval mountains
Teach the adverting mind. (96-100)
This universe cannot be conceived of as being anthropocentric,
and the only consolation it holds is an indirect one: compared
to the dimensions and time periods of geology and the cosmos,
the injustices and cruelties of political tyranny and despotism
vanish like nothing. A recurrent topos in Shelley's political
thinking—well known from Queen Mab, "Ozymandias" and
Prometheus Unbound, to say nothing of his prose writings—is
thus introduced at the end of stanza 3: The very proportions
of nature expose social orders and formations as but passing,
inessential deviations. Paradoxically, it is through its nonhuman dimensions that material nature opens up the revolu
tionary perspective that we are still in the pre-history of man
kind—history proper has not yet begun:
The wilderness has a mysterious tongue
Which teaches awful doubt, or faith so mild.
So solemn, so serene, that man may be
But for such faith with nature reconciled;
Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal
Large codes of fraud and woe; not understood
By all, but which the wise, and great, and good
Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel. (76-83)"
" For the problematics of "But for such faith" see Cameron, 249-50; John Rees,
"'But for such faith': A Shelley Crux," Review of English Studies 14 (1964): 185-6;
Timothy Webb, Shelley: A Voice Not Understood (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1977), 137; John Kinnaird, "'But for such faith': A Controver
sial Phrase in Shelley's 'Mont Blanc,'" Notes and Queries 213 (1968): 332-4; Gerald
McNiece, "The Poet as Ironist in 'Mont Blanc' and 'Hymn to Intellectual Beauty',"
Studies in Romanticism 14 (1975): 311-36, 320; Judith Chernaik, The Lyrics of
Shelley (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1972), 59; plus Harold
Bloom's minority view in Shelley's Mythmaking (New Haven: Yale University
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When I said above that Shelley's conception or model of the
relation between mind and the world of things would be
maintained till the end of the poem, that was, I confess, a
deliberately ambiguous phrasing. For although the determina
tion of human thought by outside forces is emphasized yet
again in lines 139-41:
The secret strength of things
Which governs thought, and to the infinite dome
Of heaven is as a law, inhabits thee!
there is, in the last three lines of "Mont Blanc," a totally
unexpected, incredible and brilliant reversal:
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea.
If to the human mind's imaginings
Silence and solitude were vacancy.' (142-4)
That is the decisive point: The human mind alone invests the
world with meaning and significance. Mind may be a part of
nature, subject to its laws—but nature is only meaningful, it is
Nature writ large, because there is a consciousness for which
even silence and solitude are not vacancy, not emptiness and
nothing. Human consciousness does not create the flow of the
"everlasting universe of things"—quite the contrary, it is based
upon it—but it structures it and invests it with meaning and
significance. It is in the human mind that the world becomes
conscious of itself. And if one were looking for an example of
this essentially human ability to "see things as" to find meaning
even in dead matter and understand StUle as Schweigm—well,
Shelley's "Mont Blanc" is a wonderful specimen: it illustrates
its own thesis, it practices what it preaches.
It remains to discuss whether Shelley understood this great
continuum, in which subject and object are fused, in which the
Press, 1959), 32fF.
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former is conditioned by the latter, but the latter named and
interpreted by the former, in an idealist sense as a spiritual one
or in a more empirical sense as a material one—or whether he
transcended this alternative in "Mont Blanc." And it is, I should
like to suggest, specifically the notion of the sublime that helps
to elucidate Shelley's highly original position in this question,
because it is, as I will attempt to show, in the concept and in
the experience of the sublime that Shelley finds a paradigmatic
and genuinely aesthetic solution for a philosophical antinomy
that had haunted him for quite a while.

The concept of the sublime which derives from the rhetorical
treatise Peri Hypsous of Pseudo-Longinus of the first century
after Christ, is—it is trivial to observe—of an immense
importance to eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century
discussions of art and literature in Britain. The first translation
of Peri Hypsous into English dates back to 1652 0ohn Hall), but
it was only the translation of Boileau's somewhat idiosyncratic
rendering of the tract (1674, trans. 1711-13, 1736, 1752) and the
new translation by William Smith in 1739 that spread its
influence decisively.'^
Now the interesting thing about the eighteenth-century
sublime in Britain is that the originally rhetorical term—it
designates a textual quality that points to the greatness of the
soul of its author—is first stretched in the opposite direction;
it comes, after Boileau, to mean the treatment of a theme and
its effect on the reader, the feeling it evokes, and then, finally,
For an understanding of the history of the concept I deem the old studies still
indispensable: Samuel H, Monk, The Sublime: A Study of Critical Theories in
Eighteenth-Century England (New York: MLA 1935); Walter John Hippie, Jr., The
Beautiful, the Sublime and the Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic
Theory (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1957); Marjorie Hope
Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory: The Development of the Aesthetics
of the Infinite (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959).
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applied to a set of feelings that are aroused by nothing literary
at all, viz., by the grandeur and majesty of nature as it is
manifested in the sea, the sky, or high mountains. This shift in
meaning—for which the names of Thomas Burnet, John Dennis,
Joseph Addison (all of whom did know the thing but did not
use the term for it), and of Edmund Burke may stand—is,
curiously enough, a British and German phenome- non," the
French retain the rhetorical meaning, so that Laurence Sterne
could write in his Sentimental Journey in 1768:
I confess I do hate all cold conceptions, as I do the puny
ideas which engender them; and am generally so struck
with the great works of nature, that for my own part, if
I could help it, I never would make a comparison less
than a mountain at least. All that can be said against the
French sublime in this instance of it, is this—that the
grandeur is more in the word-, and less in the thing.. 14
This shift toward the natural sublime and the concomitant
emphasis on the subject's reaction to nature's objects culminates
toward the end of the century in Immanuel Kant's analysis of
the sublime in his third critique. The Critique of Judgment
(1790)—of which more later. Shelley's "Mont Blanc" gives us
in an almost classical manner an image of the natural sublime
as both quality of an object and subjective experience at the
same time. The alpine landscape, the feeling of being overpow
ered and a strange feeling of fusion or unity with the surroundFor this see Monk, Hippie and Nicolson, as well as, of course, the entries in the
OED. Compare also Frederick Staver, "'Sublime' as Applied to Nature," Modem
Language Notes 70 (1955): 484-7; Christian Begemann, "Erhabene Natur: Zur
Ubertragung des Begriffs des Erhabenen auf Gegenstande der auBeren Natur in den
deutschen Kunsttheorien des 18. Jahrhunderts," Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift fur
Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 58 (1984): 74-110. For a different though
not very convincing opinion, see Theodore Wood, The Word "Sublime" and Its
Contexts: 1650-1760 (The Hague: Mouton, 1972).
Laurence Sterne, A Sentimental Journey & Journal to Eliza (New York: Signet,
1964), 58.
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ings, these are all commonplaces of the eighteenth-century
British discourse on the sublime. And yet, the specific way in
which Shelley handles and combines these elements in "Mont
Blanc" is, for all I know, entirely unique in British Romanti
cism. A closer scrutiny of the second element—the feeling of
being overpowered—can help to answer the question of
Shelley's ontology, a philosophically informed reading of the
third—the feeling of union or fusion—will clarify Shelley's
epistemology, and these two points having been established, the
full originality of Shelley's solution to his philosophical crux
will, it is hoped, become apparent.
First, how far does Shelley's depiction of the overpowering
experience of Mont Blanc and its glaciers give us a clue as to
whether he saw "the great continuum" as a material or a
spiritual one? It is a topos of the discourse of the sublime in the
eighteenth century to regard the overpowering experience of
nature's immensity as a proof of the existence of God and the
fundamentally spiritual nature of reality. Samuel Taylor
Coleridge's "Hymn before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni,"
published in the Morning Post and Poetical Register in 1802 and
reprinted in The Friend in 1809, is a textbook example of this:
The natural landscape proves God, he is the author behind the
work. "Who would be," thus Coleridge on the message of his
poem, "who would be, who could be an Atheist in this valley of
wonders!"^® He obviously could not foresee the possibility of a
R B. Shelley. For especially when seen in contrast with
"Hymn before Sunrise," it is evident how demonstratively
"Mont Blanc" is written against a firmly established literary,
philosophical, and religious tradition, how determinedly it
denies—confronting the same scenery!—any transcendental
transfiguration of the horror. Whereas Coleridge's "Hymn"
—partly plagiarized from Friederike Bruns "Chamounix beym
Sonnenaufgange" (1791), not even written in the vale of
" Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Poetical Works, ed. Ernest Hartley Coleridge (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1973), 377.
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Chamonix and disparagingly qualified by William Wordsworth
as "a specimen of the mock sublime"'^—whereas this hymn
praises God, "Mont Blanc" is a document of the overpowering
experience of a material force threatening bodily annihilation.
Just as the human mind is confronted with something that
surpasses its capacities ("the very spirit fails"), so man as a
physical being is threatened to be annihilated by "Nature as
Might" (Kant), and he realizes his utter impotence in view of
these material forces when he sees that "to offer some resistance
to [them]...would be quite futile."'^ This second aspect of the
sublime—called the dynamically sublime by Kant in contrast to
the mathematically sublime—seems to me to be foregrounded
to such a degree in stanzas 3 and 4 of "Mont Blanc" that the
impression it gives is one of unalloyed materiality. Here,
Shelley's sublime is, as in an admittedly ambiguous passage in
Keats, "a material sublime."^^ In its evocation of terror in view
of an indifferent, godless universe, to which man as a physical
being is only peripheral and accidental, "Mont Blanc"—espe
cially when seen against the backdrop of the tradition it breaks
with—is a manifestation of an ontological and matter-of-fact
materialism.
But things look different in regard to epistemology, and it is,
as I indicated, the concept and the experience of the sublime
that allows Shelley to bridge the apparent philosophical hiatus.
The third commonplace of the sublime mentioned above is the
peculiar experience of unity, the fusion of subject and object.
For the Romantics especially, the sublime is a relational
phenomenon, that is, it is neither to be located exclusively as a
quality inherent in the object nor exclusively as a psychological
See Stuart Curian, Poetic Form and British Romanticism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), 60.
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1992), 110. Page references preceded by Qf are to this edition.
" The poem is "To J. H. Reynolds, Esq." For a discussion see Louise Smith, "The
Material Sublime: Keats and Isabella," in Keats; The Narrative Poems—A Casebook,
ed. John Spencer Hill (London: Macmillan, 1983), 105-18.
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effect in the beholder. William Wordsworth makes this veryexplicit in his fragment "The Sublime and the Beautiful"
(1810/11), a text that was probably intended to form part of
what was to become A Guide Through the District of the Lakes
(1835) because it treats, again, of the experience of the sublime
in a mountainous region. Wordsworth says
[that] [t]o talk of an object as being sublime or beautiful
in itself, without reference to some subject by whom that
sublimity or beauty is perceived, is absurd...The true
province of the philosopher is not to grope about in the
external world and, when he has perceived or detected in
an object such or such a quality or power, to set himself
to the task of persuading the world that such is a sublime
or beautiful object, but to look into his own mind and
determine the law by which he is affected.^'
But this affection of the mind results from "the notion or image
of intense unity, with which the Soul is occupied or
possessed."® Again, it was Kant who explained, much better
than Wordsworth could, how a feeling of failure (the failure to
grasp that which is "great beyond all comparison") is finally
transformed in the two-phase experience of the mathematically
sublime to its very opposite, a feeling of sublime grandeur.
Suffice it here to say that in the state Wordsworth talks about,
subject and object are fused, melt into each other in such a way
that it makes little sense to differentiate between external object
and internal experience because both coincide, and the real
experience of the sublime constitutes the sublime.
But this—and this is the crucial point here—makes the
experience of the sublime paradigmatic of an idealist epistemology because it shows—although it is "merely" a borderline
experience—that all we perceive and know is only given as a
" Wordsworth, Prose, 2:349-60; here 357.
Wordsworth, Prose, 2:355.
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presence in our consciousness, as a state of our own mind. Was
that Shelley's position at the time? Without any doubt. The
brilliant closing lines of "Mont Blanc" say nothing but that it
is human consciousness that projects the world according to its
categories, actively structures the flow of sense impressions, and,
most important of all, transcends the world thus experienced by
giving it human significance.^^
But there is also external evidence, in Shelley's essay On Life
(formerly dated 1812 to 1814, then 1815, now December 1819),
that has to be adduced because it has often been cited to present
"Mont Blanc" (with which it is often coupled) and Shelley as
being idealist through and through. It is true that in On Life
Shelley writes "nothing exists but as it is perceived" and he
distances himself from his youthful materialism;
"This
materialism is a seducing system to young and superficial minds.
It allows its disciples to talk, and dispenses them from
thinking."^ When he continues, "Each is at once the centre and
the circumference; the point to which all things are referred,
and the line in which all things are contained," this reads like
a prose paraphrase of "Mont Blanc'"s last three lines. In his
epistemological idealism he cancels, as was to be expected, the
demarcation line between object and idea when he reiterates,
"Nothing exists but as it is perceived," and then continues, "The
difference is merely nominal between those two classes of
thought, which are vulgarly distinguished by the names of ideas
and of external objects."^^ And in an ultimate intensification he
seems for a moment to become an absolute idealist, when he
says:

Already the "-witch of Poesy" passage, here only mentioned in passing, in which
the finding of the right image for the ravine of the Arve is greeted with an
emphatic "Thou art there!," can be understood as an instance of philosophical
ideaUsm.
" Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 476.
Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 477.
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Pursuing the same thread of reasoning, the existence of
distinct individual minds, similar to that which is
employed in now questioning its own nature, is likewise
found to be a delusion. The words I, you, they, are not
signs of any actual difference subsisting between the
assemblage of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely
marks employed to denote the different modifications of
the one mind....I am but a portion of it.^'*
What a field day for those who would like to pocket Shelley as
an unadulterated idealist! Is it possible to imagine a more
definite statement of one's philosophical idealism? But doesn't
that mean that the thesis here presented of Shelley as an
ontological materialist is obsolete? Not at all. For On Life is
not yet at an end, and just as Shelley puts an idealistic
epistemology on top of his materialist ontology at the very end
of "Mont Blanc," he bases, at the end of On Life, his idealism
on a full-grown materialism. Essay and poem are inverse twin
texts:
that the basis of all things cannot be, as the popular
philosophy alleges, mind, is sufficiently evident. Mind, as
far as we have any experience of its properties, and
beyond this experience how vain is argument, cannot
create, it can only perceive. It is said also to be the
Cause? [sic]...[But] [i]t is infinitely improbable that the
cause of mind, that is, of existence, is similar to mind.^®
That is the last sentence of On Life. Or rather, it was, until
Donald Reiman and Sharon Powers in their edition of the essay
introduced the following, which had formerly been taken to be
a part of Shelley's Speculations on Metaphysics—it reads: "It is
said that mind produces motion and it might as well have been
Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 477-8.
Shelley's Poetry and Prose, 478.
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said that motion produces mind." But this only underlines the
message because it reminds us of d'Holbach's witty remark,
aimed at Descartes, in the Systeme de la Nature (which Shelley
knew) that rather than say there is something separate from
matter that can think, it would have been more consistent to
conclude that matter can think. A cutting application of
Ockham's razor. Mind is highly organized matter in motion
—Shelley continued to believe this, as can be seen from another
essay of his. On a Future State.
Shelley's universe is decidedly a material one, which does not
exist for man but confronts him indifferently. This realization
overwhelms him and would leave him helpless if it were not for
the insight that such knowledge and such self-knowledge is
possible only in his mind, this new quality of the universe, and
that there alone the world exists as a meaningful one. In "Mont
Blanc"—and this will go on for years—Shelley is an ontological
materialist and an epistemological idealist at the same time.
Isn't that philosophically dubious.' Maybe less so than it
seems at first sight, and a second look will be taken in the
concluding section. But we can say already that Shelley
was—whatever he thought about himself and in spite of his
stupendous reading and never-waning interest—no systematical
philosopher and that "Mont Blanc," after all, is a poem. As a
poet, it was enough for him to have reconciled (or aufgehohen)
the philosophical contradictions of his position in a genuinely
aesthetic category: the sublime.
And that he really saw them reconciled is borne out by a
simple, unassuming little word at the beginning of the third line
from the end of "Mont Blanc," a word whose placement is
evidence of Shelley's incredible poetic genius. It is the word
"and"—which here, quite unlike the expected "but," signals the
poetic Aufhehung of a philosophical antinomy. It is, by the
way, the same "and" that we find in the last sentence of On
Life. Shelley's materialism and his idealism are reconciled, their
opposition is transcended, in the aesthetic concept and in the
experience of the sublime, which he uses as a poetically
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dramatized bridge, or rather poetically dramatized hinge,
between two fundamentally opposed conceptions of the mindworld relationship. Here in Shelley the sublime is a phenome
non of dialectical turnover and we accept the proffered
reconciliation of the seemingly incompatible simply on account
of the sheer force and impetus of the dramatic reversal staged
in the last three lines of "Mont Blanc." Apparently, there are no
precursors for this in English poetry, nor, for that matter, in
English philosophy—but there is one in "continental"
philosophy, a man whose radical re-definition of the sublime
was only part of his greater, more encompassing enterprise to
transcend and overcome the sterile opposition of materialism vs.
idealism in what is now commonly called critical idealism:
Shelley's one precursor, by some sixteen years, in the strikingly
original handling of the sublime is, of course, Immanuel Kant.

Any "evolutionary" account of the changes in the discourse of
the sublime in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centu
ries—that is, avant et apres la lettre—lays itself open to the
chaise of a teleological reading of the evidence, especially so. if
the sketch culminates in Kant, as for example in Monk's now
much detracted classic, which states right at the beginning that
"it may be said that eighteenth-century aesthetic has as its
unconscious goal the Critique of Judgment, the book in which
it was to be refined and re-interpreted."^^
But the chaise is unfair and out of turn, since the prepara
tion, for heuristic purposes, of a line of development in the
history of an idea (or a discourse) in no way—it should be trite
to say so—presupposes, let alone asserts, a real teleology, and it
is exactly this kind of preparation that is indispensable for any
appreciation of Kant's achievement.
Monk, 6.
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In Thomas Burnet's The Sacred Theory of the Earth (Latin
1681; English 1684-90) we can already find the unmistakable
signs of a deep ambivalence about the experience of the
sublime. For Burnet, high mountains are a disgrace, they
disfigure the face of the earth and can only be explained as the
ruined remnants of the antediluvian world that was destroyed
by the great flood. Through this interpretation Burnet reads
high mountains as testimonies to man's sinfulness and prepares
the ground for an orthodox Christian resolution of his deeply
ambivalent attitude, "combining violent disparagement of the
ugliest objects in nature with an almost lyrical rhapsody on the
exalted emotions he had experienced among the Alps."^ The
religiously based resolution of his dread of and fascination with
high mountains is that they are read allegorically, as finite
representations of the infinite: "whatsoever hath but the shadow
and the appearance of INFINITE, as all things have that are too
big for our comprehension, they fill and overbear the mind
with their Excess, and cast it into a pleasing kind of stupor and
admiration."^®
So as early as in Burnet we can see that the sublime is a twophase phenomenon: a strong initial uneasiness or anxiety is
transfigured, by religious reasoning, into a reassuring calm. The
sublime is the unity of this initial distress and its consecutive
rational dissolution—a relaxation that is attributed to the insight
into the emblems of God's presence in the universe.
This handling of the experience sets the dominant tone for
the following century. "Delightful Horror," "terrible Joy"
—these coinings by John Dennis ("Sir Tremendous Longinus")—bespeak the same deep ambivalence we find recorded in
Burnet, and as with him so in Dennis the ambivalence is finally
resolved through reference to a transcendental signifier whose
ubiquitous presence is confirmed, or so it seems, by the awful
Nicolson, vii.
Quoted in Ernest Lee Tuveson, "Space, Deity and the 'Natural Sublime,"
Modem Language Quarterly 12 (1951): 20-38; here 34.
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scenery. The experience of the sublime in nature is read and
presented as a natural theodicy.
In his Essay on the Pleasures of the Imagination (originally in
Spectator Nos. 409, 411-21) Joseph Addison follows the same
line of reasoning when he writes on the pleasures that arise
"from the sight of what is Great"^'—but with a significant
difference: He is the first to spell out, at least in one passage,^"
that when we deal with "that which is great beyond all
comparison" (Kant), it is "the understanding" or "Reason" that
comes to the aid of the baffled imagination^^ and helps to
integrate that which our limited and defective imagination could
not grasp.Kant will take the cue.
But it is Edmund Burke, the first to actually use the term
"sublime" as an aesthetic concept, who also makes the decisive
step toward a Verdiesseitigung of the idea, toward the cutting of
its transcendental ropes. In his Philosophical Enquiry into the
Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), the
beautiful and the sublime are equivalent categories—equivalent
but opposed and asymmetrical, for whereas the beautiful causes
pleasure as it were directly, the sublime evokes a more
complicated, by now familiar, two-phase reaction in the
beholder: its final result is the delight or relief we feel when
^ The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965), vol. 3, 540.
Spectator, 567.
Addison's use of "understanding" and "Reason" is, of course, not identical with
Kant's.
Ironically, for Addison it is the defective and limited faculty of our imagination
that God makes the prime tool in exercising his power over us: "In short, he can
so exquisitely ravish or torture the Soul through this single Faculty, as might
suffice to make up the whole Heaven or Hell of any finite Being" (Spectator,
579-80). Addison refrains from asking the heretical question what would happen
if we applied the reflexive, distancing power of reason to put our imaginative
horrors in perspeaive. This reticence about a glaring inconsistency and a
theological skandalon—i.e. that God uses an inferior and potentially delusive
faculty to impress us—is the price Addison has to pay for the rehgious foundation
of his aesthetics of the not-beautiful. For a more detailed discussion see Christoph
Bode, And what were thou...? Essay iiber Shelley und das Erhabene (Essen: Blaue
Eule, 1992), 32-8.
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the initial pain, danger, or terror is removed or realized to be
unfounded. Again, there is a dialectical turnover: Delight—as
opposed to pleasure—occurs when we realize that the threat is
not real:
"the sublime is an idea belonging to selfpreservation.""
Moreover, Burke translates the sublime into physiology.
Our feelings can be explained as changes in our nervous and
vascular systems. "Love" acts as vasodilation, or rather,
vasodilation results in what we call "love." In this physiological
framework, the beautiful is associated with relaxation and the
sublime with tension. But how could tension by itself be
delightful.^ For reasons of symmetry Burke skips over this
conspicuous inconsistency, knowing that delight is (as he was
earlier ready to admit) of course due to the relaxation after the
tension. The sublime is basically a heterogeneous feeling, a
compound, a two-stroke.
And it is, in Burke, decidedly a bodily phenomenon. The
alternation between tension and relaxation is consequently
compared to physical exercises:
Now, as due exercise is essential to the coarse muscular
parts of the constitution, and that without this rousing
they would become languid, and diseased, the very same
rule holds with regard to those finer parts we have
mentioned; to have them in proper order, they must be
shaken and worked to a proper degree.
Given this decidedly physical view of the sublime, as a laxation
of a blockage, it is easy to see why A. W. Schlegel jokingly
described Burke's sublime as a kind of laxative, "eine Art
vornehmer Pui^anz."" In spite of passages Burke inserted only
Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime
and Beautiful, ed. Adam Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 79.
Burke, Enquiry, 123.
" See Carsten Zelle, "Angenehmes Grauen": Literaturhistorische Beitrdgezur Asthetik
des Schrecklichen im achtzehnten Jahrhundert (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), 194.
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later, God has no systematic place in his aesthetics. In Burke,
for the first time, the discourse of the sublime has found an
entirely secular language.
Kant's famous discussion of the sublime in §§23-29 of The
Critique of Judgment begins with some similarities and
distinctions of the beautiful and the sublime. When Kant says
that the sublime—contrary to the beautiful which produces
direct Wohlgefallen (delight)—is attended by "a pleasure that
only arises indirectly, being brought about by the feeling of a
momentary check to the vital forces followed at once by a
discharge all the more powerful,"^^ Burke's influence is palpable.
But the main difference, according to Kant, between the two
phenomena is that
that which...excites the feeling of the sublime, may
appear, indeed, in point of form to contravene the ends
of our power of judgment, to be ill-adapted to our
faculties of presentation, and to be, as it were, an outrage
on the imagination, and yet it is judged all the more
sublime on that account. ifOJ 91)
The sublime in objects of nature has no finality in form
"making the object appear, as it were, preadapted to our power
of judgment" {CJ 91). From which it follows—and here Kant
for the first time formulates his revolutionary turnthat we express ourselves on the whole inaccurately if we
term any Object of Nature sublime....For how can that
which is apprehended as inherently contra-final be noted
with an expression of approval.^ All that we can say is
that the object lends itself to the presentation of a
sublimity discoverable in the mind. For the sublime, in
the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in any
sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason.
Kant, 91.
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which, although no adequate presentation of them is
possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that
very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous
presentation. (CJ 91-92.
This is the core of Kant's theory of the sublime, presented in
the very first paragraph of his deliberation, to be elaborated in
the following ones. The sublime resides in the becoming aware
of an idea of reason, to which we are provoked by the
experience of the ultimate inadequacy of our sensuous faculties
and the imagination. It is the failure of these powers that
directs us to the instance that can record the failure: reason. It
is not, Kant maintains in provocative opposition to the
established discourse on the sublime, the objects themselves that
are sublime:
Thus the broad ocean agitated by storms cannot be called
sublime. Its aspect is horrible, and one must have stored
one's mind in advance with a rich stock of ideas, if such
an intuition is to raise it to the pitch of a feeling which is
itself sublime—sublime because the mind has been incited
to abandon sensibility, and employ itself upon ideas
involving higher finality. {CJ 92)
Sublimity resides in us as beings of reason.
This becomes even clearer in §24 where Kant explains the
necessity of differentiating between the "mathematically
sublime" that we encounter when we are confronted with "what
is beyond all comparison great" {CJ 94), on the one hand, and the
"dynamically sublime"—"nature as might"—on the other. In the
former it is again our insight into the inadequacy of any
standard of our senses or the imagination that points to a
superior faculty—"The sublime is that, the mere capacity of
thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every
standard of sense" {CJ 98)—and beyond that to our destination
or vocation {Bestimmun^ as beings whose proprium lies beyond
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the sensuous. The classical formulation by which Kant stands
the theory of the sublime on its feet follows in §27:
The feeling of our incapacity to attain to an idea that is a
law for us, is RESPECT. Now the idea of the comprehen
sion of any phenomenon whatever, that may be given us,
in a whole of intuition, is an idea imposed upon us by a
law of reason, which recognizes no definite, universally
valid and unchangeable measure except the absolute
whole. But our imagination, even when taxing itself to
the uttermost on the score of this required comprehen
sion of a given object in a whole of intuition, (and so
with a view of the presentation of the idea of reason,)
betrays its limits and its inadequacy, but still, at the same
time, its proper vocation of making itself adequate to the
same idea as a law. Therefore the feeling of the sublime in
nature is respect for our own vocation, which we attribute
to an Object of nature by a certain subreption (substitution
of the respect for the Object in place of one for the idea of
humanity in our own self—the Subject) [this emphasis
added]; and this renders, as it were, intuitable the
supremacy of our cognitive faculties on the rational side
over the greatest faculty of sensibility. {CJ 105-6)
The experience of thesublime is a "displeasure'Vpleasure"—mix
that highlights "the supersensible side of our being" {CJ 106) as
it were by detour, through an exposition of the limitations of
our sensuous and imaginative faculties.
After this, Kant needs far less room to explain the corre
sponding experience of the dynamically sublime (§28). Here
the feeling of sublimity sets in once we realize that although as
physical beings we should be entirely impotent and helpless if
directly exposed to "nature as might," there is yet something in
us that allows us to see us as apart from the physical world, to
see that in us the idea of humanity cannot be violated if
something inessential is taken from us:
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Now in just the same way the irresistability of nature
forces upon us the recognition of our physical helpless
ness as beings of nature, but at the same time reveals a
faculty of estimating ourselves as independent of nature,
and discovers a pre-eminence above nature that is the
foundation of a self-preservation of quite another kind
from that which may be assailed and brought into danger
by external nature. This saves humanity in our own
person from humiliation, even though as mortal men we
have to submit to external violence....Therefore nature is
here called sublime merely because it raises the imagina
tion to a presentation of those cases in which the mind
can make itself sensible of the appropriate sublimity of
the sphere of its own being, even above nature [in
German: "in welchen das Gemiit die eigene Erhabenheit
seiner Bestimmung, selbst iiber die Natur, sich fiihlbar
machen kann"]. {CJ 111)
Summing up, Kant says at the end of §29 that "Sublimity,
therefore, does not reside in any of the things of nature, but
only in our own mind, in so far as we may become conscious
of our superiority over nature within, and thus also over nature
without us (as exerting an influence upon us)" {CJ 114).
According to Kant, the sublime is the dialectical self-recognition
of man as a rational being in confrontation with the otherwise
humanely incommensurable. It is an act of appropriation, even
subjugation of the other, an act in which impotence is
transformed into omnipotence.^^ Kant's sublime is the Endsieg
of the Enlightenment. When he introduces, at the end of §29,
the idea of God, he makes it clear that we owe this Being
respect not so much for "the mere display of its might in
nature" as for "the faculty which is planted in us of estimating
See Hartmut Bohme and Gemot Bohme, Das Andere der Vemunft: 2ur
Entwicklung von Rationalitdtsstrukturen am Beispiel Kants (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1983).
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that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted
above it" {CJ 114). God receives an honorable mention. He is
of no systematic importance to Kant's theory of the sublime.
In Kant, the sublime is re-defined as a moment of self-recogni
tion of consciousness in opposition to the absolutely great and
immeasurably powerful, the moment when we say, defiantly
claiming our status as beings who invest an ostentatiously
indifferent universe with meaning—and be it the meaning of
recognized futility—"And what were thou, and earth, and stars,
and sea / If to the human mind's imaginings / Silence and
solitude were vacancy.'"
If space permitted it could be shown that Kant's critical
idealism in a philosophical way successfully attempts the same
reconciliation of materialism and idealism that Shelley strove to
achieve poetically; that the traces of materialism and idealism
in the fields of ontology and epistemology respectively are
distributed equally in Shelley and Kant; that, most important
of all, it is no contradiction that Shelley sees the imagination as
the highest human faculty, whereas Kant uses the deficiency of
that faculty to inaugurate reason as the prime mover. Shelley's
term "imagination" virtually encompasses the same realm and
serves the same function that Kant assigns to "indetermined
ideas of reason" (^unbestimmte Vemunftideerf), the difference is
merely one of words.
A re-reading of Shelley's "Mont Blanc" against the back
ground of Kant's Critique of Judgment would show that the
congruence of the two concepts of the sublime is almost
uncanny: Mont Blanc is an instance of the mathematically
sublime because the immensity of the massif cannot be
grasped—"the very spirit fails" the moment "Far, far above,
piercing the infinite sky, / Mont Blanc appears,—still, snowy,
and serene—." As mountain pierces sky, two infinities meet, and
to spatial infinity Shelley adds temporal with "all seems eternal
now" (75) and "the everlasting universe of things" (1). The
For an extended discussion of this see Bode, "And what were thou...?," 69-93.
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dynamically sublime is introduced as Shelley ingeniously pans
down the mountainside, offering its "flood of ruin"—a material
threat, nature as might: "The race / of man, flies far in dread"
etc. (llZfl), until the very end when the omnipotence of an
indifferent Power is first exalted to an extreme—
The secret strength of things
Which governs thought, and to the infinite dome
Of heaven is as a law, inhabits thee! (139-41)—
and then dialectically tipped over into an affirmation of the
sublimity of the human mind:
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea.
If to the human mind's imaginings
Silence and solitude were vacancy? (142-4)
One last time the whole catalogue of the natural sublime is
invoked (mountains, sky, and oceans), only to be repudiated-.
Shelley insists, as Kant did, that contrary to the common
subreption ("substitution of a respect for the Object in place of
one for the idea of humanity in our own self—the Subject"), the
sublime resides in the human mind {Gemiii) as "respect for our
own vocation."
Strictly speaking, of course, Kant's radical re-definition of the
sublime—its Verdiesseitigung—is the exact opposite of a
Copernican revolution, since it does not decenter the subject
but, quite the contrary, installs it at the center of an experience
that was formerly believed to prove the supremacy of
something extraneous to the human mind. It should therefore
be obvious that the assertion, in Shelley's "Mont Blanc," of an
indifferent or even hostile universe and the simultaneous
assertion of the sublimity of "the human mind's imaginings" is
by no means a mere coincidence but a structural necessity. It
marks the secularization and subjectivization of a concept that
will, far later, be defined as linguistic incommensurability.
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Especially since there is no evidence for a direct influence of
Kant on Shelley, so that we are invited to regard both, the
one's philosophy and the other's poetry, as independent
manifestations of the same shift of paradigm, it follows, I
believe, that each could be used with profit to shed some
illuminative light on the other. Considering the almost
provocative neglect and ignorance of Kant in recent studies of
Romanticism,^' one can only deplore the careless forfeit of that
chance. Kant these days, it seems, remains to be re-discovered
for the study of Romanticism.
It hardly matters whether right at the beginning of a study on the sublime in
English poetry and painting between 1770 and 1850 the author declares that "I am
going to neglect almost totally the philosophical and psychological contributions
of the Germans" 0ames B. Twitchell, Romantic Horizons: Aspects of the Sublime
in English Poetry and Painting, 1770-1830[Columbia: University of Missouri Press,
1983], x), or whether in another study Kant is mentioned but in such a way that
one has reason to doubt that the author is familiar with the philosopher at all
(Leighton, 17-18). The way was led, I believe, by Theodore Wood, who,
obviously acquainted with Kant only through an essay by Iris Murdoch, ventures
to say: "This theorizing by Kant is all very well when taken as a part of a
systematic whole, but I do not think it even necessary to point out that it tells us
very little that we really want to know about esthetics" (43).
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John Shawcross, John Milton: The Self and the
World (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1993). Pp.358. $35.00.
Reviewed by Anna Battigelli
State University of New York, Plattsburgh
In A Writer's Diary, Virginia Woolf records being struck by
the difference between Paradise Lost and any other poem; that
difference, she wrote, lies in its "sublime aloofness and
impersonality of...emotion." She concludes her entry by
admiring the beauty of Milton's poetry, conceding "that even
Shakespeare after this would seem a little troubled, personal,
hot and imperfect." Woolf's comments highlight the formida
ble task of reconstructing a Miltonic "self: many readers of his
sublime poetry do not particularly want a personalized self
behind the poetry; like Charles Lamb, these cherish the image
of a vatic poet for whom "Lycidas" arrived complete, mapping
out the trajectory of his poetic career. John T. Shawcross's
recent biography, John Milton: The Self and the World, offers a
few jolts for such readers, beginning with the claim that "the
359
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trend of this biography is psychological—Milton as anal
personality, Milton conditioned by oedipal influences, and
Milton as one caught in conflict between his self and his world"
(5). The Jungian and Lacanian psychological study that follows
may, at times, strike some as indelicate, but it cannot be
dismissed. Shawcross examines the poet, the historian, the
religious and political polemicist, and, most importantly, the
son, identifying the psychological substructs at work within
Milton's mind, informing his work. The analysis is learned and
original, providing a valuable reconstruction of the elusive
Miltonic "self."
At the heart of Shawcross's analysis is a Miltonically revised
oedipal struggle first fully articulated in "Ad Patrem" (1638), a
key poem in this account of Milton's life. For Shawcross,
Milton reached the decision to become a poet hesitantly, some
months after his mother's death on April 3, 1637. Milton's
mother's death, argues Shawcross, allowed Milton a fuller
individuation from his father, an individuation in which his
decision to become a poet plays a defining role. The relation
ship between father and son suggested in "Ad Patrem" is not
merely one of "calm acceptance of the father, it is a rejection
too. It ushers in a new world for its author, as much as the
fresh woods and pastures new. And it plays upon the feminine
within the father, who too had pursued the arts. The decision
to be a poet and the tardy moving, not into the ministry, not
into the world of business or government, and not into family
life, but into the uncertain poetic world, must have been a blow
to Milton Senior" (189). Complicating this oedipal struggle is
Milton's concept of God as Father, which revises the standard
Freudian oedipal complex; "for Milton, the emulation [of the
father] does not involve envy and overdoing, but praise and
imitation" (20). Thus, the closing lines of "Ad Patrem," in
which Milton, the son, hopes his poem might preserve both his
praise for his father and his father's name, find a suggestive
parallel in "God the Father, who in his manifestation through
the Son is constant example to future generations" (87).
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Emulation of the father is sublimated in the theological doctrine
of subordinationism.
The sublimation allowed by subordinationism informs
Shawcross's readings of the major poems and prose. Thus,
Milton's claim in Of Education, that "the end of learning is to
repair the ruins of our first parents," fulfills a duty to the
Father. In Paradise Lost we see "a residue of Milton's father's
rebelliousness against his [Catholic] grandfather in Satan's
rebellion against God, and its sublimation in his loving
accedence to his father in the Son's functioning as surrogate for
the Father" (248). In a variation on this theme, Samson is
unable to obey God the Father until he dismisses the advice of
his father, Manoa.
Central to the doctrine of subordination is hierarchy, and
the famous lines in Book IV of Paradise Lost describing Adam
and Eve reveal a chiasmically ordered and thus necessary union
even at they imply a hierarchy: "For contemplation bee and
valour formd, / For softness shee and sweet attractive Grace."
Just as Christ holds a subordinate, though not inferior, role to
God, Eve holds a subordinate, though not inferior, role to
Adam. It would be difficult to argue with Shawcross here.
Some will argue, however, with his claim that Milton was not
a radical because "his psychological being [was] built upon
acceptance of, emulation of, and accommodation to the
father/God rather than upon rebelliousness" (237). Although
many have acknowledged, as Shawcross does, the difficulty of
aligning Milton with any specific religious sect or political
ideology, the vexed term "radical" suits Milton's religious and
political vision, even if psychologically he was not a rebellious
son.
Some of Shawcross's claims (for example, that Milton's
youthful friendship with Charles Diodati was homoerotic) seem
tenuous. But the careful readings, the precise chronologies, and
the learned attention to symbol from etymology to archetype
make this biographical account of Milton one that scholars will
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have to both wrestle with and, for the most part, accede to,
however reluctantly, for a long time to come.

Gale H. Carrithers, Jr., and James D. Hardy, Jr.,
Milton and the Hermeneutic Journey (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1994). Pp. xii +
256. $35.00.
Reviewed by Robert Entzminger
Rhodes College
For the last decade or more, the trend in Milton studies as
in most areas of literary criticism has been to provide readings
"against the grain," to examine texts not in terms of what they
represent as focal, but rather in terms of those issues they
attempt to suppress, elide, or banish to the margins. The
insights yielded by attending to questions of gender, politics,
and psychic conflict, to cite prominent examples, have been
provocative and invigorating. While neither unconversant with
nor unsympathetic to these approaches. Gale Carrithers and
James Hardy, professors of English and of history respectively,
demonstrate the continuing vitality of the more traditional
critical project, that of accepting the text on its own terms, of
reading with the grain. Rather than submitting Milton's poetry
to a relentless interrogation designed to expose what it would
prefer to veil, they engage it in a subtle and open-ended
dialogue, paying Milton the compliment of taking his theology
seriously even as they reread it in the light of poststructuralist
hermeneutics, principally as advanced in the writings of Paul
Ricoeur and Hans Georg Gadamer.

Book Review Comer

363

The theological context in which the authors place Milton
is the broad one of Augustinian Christianity, particularly in its
stress on divine grace and love, and its recuperation by
seventeenth-century Protestants (7);
and they locate its
congruence with late twentieth-century hermeneutics in the
emphasis both place upon understanding as a process of dialectic
between faith and knowledge, part and whole, past and present,
time and eternity (19). The project thus is deliberately one of
synthesis, relying upon a unifying perspective or trope, and in
its scope and ambitions recalls such magisterial works of Milton
scholarship as Mary Ann Radzinowicz's Toward Samson
Agonistes (Princeton, 1978) and Louis L. Martz's Poet of Exile
(Yale, 1980). Such an undertaking necessarily entails the
revisiting of territory that Milton scholars, not to mention
historians and theologians, will find familiar. The titles of
chapters two through five, the ones focusing on Paradise Lost,
represent something of a survey of the most prominent
landmarks in the Miltonic intellectual landscape; "The Fallen
Understanding," "The Dynamics of Nature and History,"
"Movement and Dynamism," "Knowing and Naming: Adam,
Eve, and Bard." Moreover, in organizing their treatment of
these topics the authors deploy the Neoplatonic scale of being
as it was codified for modern scholars in Arthur O. Lovejoy's
The Great Chain of Being (Harvard, 1936). The debts to
previous scholarship as a consequence are large, and the authors
are scrupulous in acknowledging them, gracious in registering
occasional disagreement.
The familiarity of the topics and the organizational paradigm
notwithstanding, Carrithers and Hardy offer neither a rehearsal
of theological commonplaces nor a programmatic application of
contemporaneous ideas in a reductive attempt to "explain" the
text. What they do provide are subtle descriptions of important
episodes and topics, especially those in which hermeneutic
issues are at stake: the Satanic embrace of power rather than
love, the paradoxes of the felix culpa and of human freedom
within providential certitude, the differences between Adam and
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Eve. In each of these as well as the other subjects they address,
the authors resist schematic conclusions or ingenious resolutions
of paradox, stressing instead the "radical ambiguity" (27) such
moments disclose, their relation to the hermeneutic journey
toward an ever-fuller understanding of divine will, love, and
grace. The book's primary strength thus lies not so much in
providing new interpretations of individual passages as in its
effort to register the full complexity of the poetry as a whole
through re-ambiguating precisely those issues that have seemed
most settled. Thus the ironies of Adam's statement of the
Fortunate Fall in Book 12, for instance, are recovered in the
authors insistence that the culpa is at once felix and infelix, no
less a tragedy from a human perspective for our recognition
that it will ultimately be revised as a divine coniedy (80-92).
Paradise Lost becomes then not a monument to dead ideas, "but
the record of the struggle with the paradoxes and ambiguities
that beset human existence, what the authors refer to as
"hermeneutic middleness" (21). Only in their comparison of
Adam and Eve do they relax their resistance to what they call
"determinate" readings (11), attempting to resolve one of the
poem's most complex issues simply by declaring a winner:
"The striking qualitative disparity between the dream visions of
Adam and Eve indicates to us that Milton saw a disparity in the
capacities of the two, and that Eve's was the greater" (119).
The very occasional lapses into determinacy aside, some
readers will be surprised, and perhaps distressed, that not even
in the first chapter, in which the procedures and assumptions
are set forth, is there a full exposition of the hermeneutic
theories being invoked, and that despite the use of the word
"journey" in the book's title, the organization is neither
chronological nor teleological. Faithful to the implications of
their approach, the authors avoid abstract explanations,
adopting a style that is often refreshingly colloquial though
sometimes over-qualified, and themselves enact "hermeneutic
middleness" by addressing first Paradise Lost before turning in
successive chapters to the 1645 Poems and finally to the last
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works. Their title notwithstanding, they are less interested in
charting a development in the poems than in describing the
hermeneutic experience as it occurs in each of the three
volumes of poetry Milton published. Middles, beginnings, and
endings comment upon and illuminate one another, but not in
a strictly linear fashion.
The final chapter, on Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes,
returns to the question of love and power that the authors had
first raised with regard to Satan in chapter two, with the
emphasis in Paradise Regained of course being on the reaffirma
tion of love, the resistance to the temptations of power.
Samson Agonistes, however, becomes a more problematic text
from this perspective. Departing from the critical consensus in
their stress upon the tragedy's difference from Milton's other
works, Carrithers and Hardy find its protagonist plunged into
the confusions and frustrations of human existence without the
benefit of Christian revelation. In this reading it becomes a
darker work, concluding Milton's career on a note of decidedly
limited affirmation.
Valuable as the discussions of the major poems are, the most
successful chapter, the one that uses the hermeneutic approach
to best effect, is chapter six, "Youth to Maturity: Journey's
Early Perils." Discussing the volume of poems Milton pub
lished in 1645 and, with revisions, in 1673, the authors
demonstrate how the individual poems engage in a rich and
subtle dialogue with one another, revealing individually and
collectively Milton's ongoing concern with the hermeneutic
issues his theology raises. "Milton's early journey," assert
Carrithers and Hardy, "was not a separate road but a stage on
the same hermeneutic loop" (152), the record of "a hermeneutic
exploration toward theodicy as love and self-commitment in
history" (179).
The authors make a persuasive case for hermeneutics as a
defining trope in all of Milton's poetry, but perhaps their more
significant achievement is to illustrate that the theoretical
questions posed by late twentieth-century criticism are not
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necessarily incompatible with a broadly sympathetic reading of
texts, even those from the seventeenth century that insist upon
foregrounding theological issues. And in accepting "hermeneutic middleness" as the defining quality of the critical enterprise,
Carrithers and Hardy have moved Milton scholarship a step
further along in its journey.
%

Stanley "Wells, Gary Taylor, John Jowett, and
"William Montgomery, eds.. The Oxford Shakespeare:
Histories (I), Comedies (II), and Tragedies (III)
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987; rpt. 1994).
3 volumes, ill. Paper, $35.85 ($11.95 each).
Reviewed by Kenneth S. Rothwell
University of Vermont
The extraordinary 1986 Clarendon Press one-volume William
Shakespeare: The Complete Works has now been made more
generally available for readers in these three handsomely printed
paperbacks. Its introduction by Stanley Wells sums up the
dilemma confronting the modern editor: "should he offer his
readers a text which is as close as possible to what Shakespeare
originally wrote, or should he aim to formulate a text
presenting the play as it appeared when performed by the
company of which Shakespeare was a principal shareholder" (I,
xxix)? In taking the latter road, the one less traveled, the
Oxford editors privilege theatrical over literary values. That
decision avoids some but not all of the quandaries raised by the
multiple textual variations between the quartos printed in the
bard's lifetime (1564-1616) and the 36 plays of the 1623 Folio,
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posthumously published by fellow shareholders, John Heminges
and Henry Condell.
In this current edition, the quarto texts have been viewed as
drafts for the more disciplined Folio theatrical versions. The
editors even go so far as to print both the 1608 quarto version.
The History of King Lear, and the 1623 Folio, The Tragedy of
King Lear, in the radical belief that the former represented the
play Shakespeare "first conceived" (m, 1233), and that the latter
embodied a text possibly dictated by "theatrical exigencies" or
authorial "dissatisfaction" (m, 1271). Typically, past editors,
assuming that variants stemmed from printing house errors,
conflated the two King Lears to achieve a single, synthetic text.
This bold Oxford approach becomes a wakeup call that tugs
editing policies into the late twentieth century. Not that
innovation doesn't raise hackles and invite brickbats, as when
Gary Taylor's claim of a few years ago that he'd discovered a
lost Shakespearean poem, "Shall I die.'" ("A Song," I, 405), set
off an avalanche of choleric letters to editors. Likewise, in these
three volumes there's something heretical to anger almost
everyone: the substitution of "Sir John Oldcastle" for "Sir John
Falstaff"; the omission of Hamlet's 1604 quarto soliloquy,
"How all occasions do inform against me" (relegated, I hasten
to add, to the "additional passages" section); or the insistence on
the long-winded 1600 quarto title. The Comical History of the
Merchant of Venice, or Otherwise Called the Jew of Venice.
In many respects these volumes are user-friendly, yet in
other ways, curiously unfriendly.
Spellings have been
consistently modernized, masterful brief introductions to the
individual plays added, but annotations for baffled readers made
more or less inaccessible. In volume two's Troilus and Cressida,
for example, the Folio "Princes Oigillous" has been simplified
to "princes orgulous" (If 749, Pro. 2), well and good. However,
those readers unlucky enough not to know the meaning of
"orgulous" need to track down the glossary in a different
volume (the third). For full editorial apparatus, truly dedicated
scholars must hasten hence to the library to ferret out the
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conjunctive but separately published Textual Companion,
Complete Works: Original Spelling Edition (New York: Oxford,
1987), and Stanley Wells's Re-editing Shakespeare for the Modem
Reader (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).
Without these companion volumes at hand, the reader may
be unaware of silent editorial interventions in matters of
punctuation and spelling. Macbeth's "Making the Greene one.
Red" (Folio) loses the comma in the Oxford "Making the green
one red" (HI Mac. 2.2.61). The 1604 quarto reading seems to
drive Hamlet's "O God, O God, / How weary, stale, flat" (III
Ham. 1.2.132), rather than the more emphatic Folio version, "O
God, O God! / How weary, stale, flat." At the same time,
quarto "wary" gets updated to "weary." Nitpicking perhaps,
but such interventions may nudge an actor toward a pre
determined idiolect. Again, the quarto acts as the yardstick for
correcting Shakespeare's Folio syntax. As predicate for "weary,
stale, flat and unprofitable" an agreeable "seem" (III Ham.
1.2.134), replaces the Folio's disagreeable "seemes." To make
matters even more complicated, however (and at this point a
call for headache powders is justified), in the quarto "seem" is
actually spelled "seeme" (see The Three-Text Hamlet, ed. Paul
Bertram and Bernice Kliman [New York: AMS Press, 1991],
221). Multiplied by hundreds these examples would furnish
some insight into the heroic labor behind the finished work.
The Oxford editors have democratically invited, indeed
challenged, all of us to participate with them in deciding how
Shakespeare's plays emerged in the Elizabethan playhouses, not
how they looked in his lost manuscripts. Consequently, we are
both liberated and enslaved—liberated from the oppressive myth
of the Holy Grail of the ideal text, but enslaved to a Tantalusian quest of endlessly receding possibilities. Will future
Shakespeare editions in the twenty-first century follow this trailblazing path, or again take the road more travelled?
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Carlo Goldoni, The Holiday Trilogy.
Three
Comedies. Translated with a Note by Anthony
Oldcorn; introduction by Franco Fido (New York:
Marsilio, 1992). Pp. xlv + 303. $28.00.
Reviewed by Jackson I. Cope
University of Southern California (Emeritus)
The once dominant voice of the eighteenth-century theater
popularly survives only in the dubious adjective "Metastasian";
his humbler coeval on the Italian stage remains there still, as
Carlo Goldoni's comedies continue a vibrant life in countless
Italian and other continental productions of our time, brilliant
season after season, while the shelves of critical and historical
commentary expand exponentially at a rate surpassed only by
Dante and Boccaccio among the ma^iori of Italian literature.
Indeed, the most recent addition to the critical shelf is a thick
volume on the eminent productions of Goldoni's comedies by
twentieth-century directors (Paolo Bosisio's II teatro di Goldoni
suite scene italiene del Novecento). Yet this greatest playwright
of the eighteenth-century is a closed book to most of even the
most literate English and American readers. If they have read
Goldoni in the few translations of scattered plays, they have
been puzzled by his continental and contemporary reputation;
if they have seen one of his comedies mounted in production,
they have been extraordinarily surprised by serendipity. It has
been this way from the first.
In the eighteenth century, Goldoni's name evoked the
admiring tribute of Voltaire as the prolific painter of nature.
Prolific Goldoni was, leaving some nearly two hundred
dramatic pieces to be published during and after his lifetime,
including over one hundred full-length comedies in both verse
and prose, in Italian, Venetian, and French—the last language
adopted after Goldoni moved from his native Venice to become
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the major writer collaborating with the Comedie Italienne.
Admired, read, and staged across the European continent in his
own time, Goldoni's works went virtually unrecognized in
England. One cause was the circumstance that Goldoni, like
Voltaire, had adapted Richardson's Pamela for the stage; the
English came to know it in a literal language-text translation of
what was, even at its Italian best, a tepid version of their own
favorite epistolary novel. It was a phenomenon that did not
encourage further English translations of the more characteristic
comedies rooted in northern Italian social settings. Paradoxi
cally, La buona figliuola, Goldoni's adaptation of his own prose
comedy on Pamela, became the most popular of Italian
operettas in England throughout the century, beginning with its
Haymarket premier in 1766—but like the two dozen other
Goldonian libretti produced and translated in England, La
buona figliuola became associated with the composer (in this
instance, Niccolo Piccini), rather than with its creator Goldoni
(see my "Goldoni's England and England's Goldoni," Modem
Language Notes 110 [1995]).
William Dean Howells may be said to have discovered
Goldoni for Americans by way of the critical panegyrics that
resulted from his youthful consular residency in Venice
throughout the Civil War and his abiding appreciation of the
city and its culture. Vernon Lee's Studies of the Eighteenth
Century in Italy served a similar function in England not much
later, and H. C. Chatfield-Taylor's biography of Goldoni
written in English in 1913 was the most thorough at the time,
and remains a valuable quarry. Even so, neither in America
nor in England were there more than scattered translation
attempts, usually partial and uniformly uninformed from both
literary and theatrical standpoints. Eleanora Duse's English
tour in 1894 staged a mangled version of La locandiera, which
found public print, but it was not until 1922 that Clifford Bax
and the Far)eons combined to issue a collection of four stilted
versions ("You may be able to do whatever you please in this
village, but you can do nothing at all in my matrimonial
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affairs," etc.). Two of these versions were reissued in 1961
along with a respectable rendition of I rusteghi as a little
anthology with which Cambridge University Press apparently
hoped to corner a small market. This commercial illusion was
dispelled by the issue in the widely distributed "Penguin
Classics" of four plays by Goldoni in the translations of
Frederick Davies. These represent only half of Davies's
versions of Goldoni, the others being issued by "Heinemann
Educational" carrying photos of the productions staged at
Pensby County Secondary School for Boys, Heswall, Cheshire.
These pseudo-translations manage to be simultaneously tui^id
and curtailed. This sorry roster of failure was relieved only by
Edward Dent's very effective 1928 Servant of Two Masters,
produced at Cambridge with a young Michael Redgrave as the
innamorato; that Dent's version was not produced more
frequently was probably owing to the international success of
Strehler's perennial productions of this earliest Goldonian
masterpiece, with its commedia dell'arte aura of breakneck farce.
I have recited this depressing history of anglophonic
ignorance to emphasize the significance of Anthony Oldcorn's
achievement in finally giving us a text that transports the
Venetian scene to the ear and psyche of an English-speaking
audience. These are dramatic translations in every sense, the
first that provide us a view of Goldoni at the height of his
maturity, when he takes his own most complex view of the
human cost that paid for the great construction of that society
which was Venice before Napoleon.
Professor Oldcorn has translated, under the innocuous rubric
of "the Holiday Trilogy," a trio of plays: "Off to the Country"
[Le smanie per la villeggiatural, "Adventures in the Country" [£e
awenture delta villeggiatura\, and "Back from the Country" [//
ritomo dalla villeggiatura]. The plays originally were produced
in series, each production being separated from the other parts
of the sequence by only a few evenings during the Venetian
season of 1761. When they were published for the first time in
a volume of the luxurious collected edition of his comedies a
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dozen years later, Goldoni said in an introduction that "they
were composed in such a way that each of them can stand on
its own, while all three fit together perfectly." The tri-part plot
can be summed up simply; Goldoni uses the Venetian custom
of removing to the mainland country villas for long vacations
that stretched through the late autumn months to focus the
affected punctilios of style, the extravagant potlatch rituals of
entertainment, the gambling mania at the ubiquitous card tables
and in the brokered marriage contracts, which both maintained
and revealed the precariousness of Venice's rigid class system.
Indeed, so clear is his focus, that Goldoni nominally screens his
critique by transporting Venetian habits to Livorno and its
environs. But these are plays as radically Venetian as any of
those Goldoni wrote in the dialect of his native city. In a
hubbub of jealous bickering about rival wardrobes, travel
seating arrangements, and devil-may-care borrowing for this
expensive vacationing, two families and their guests and
hangers-on prepare to depart for the country. They are, not
unexpectedly, intertwined through the marital prospects of a
young woman in each group. The second play reveals their
behavior once they have arrived in the country setting, where
they are joined by two new groups of marital aspirants, a
fatuous and wealthy old dowager and her young mercenary
suitor, and a nubile pair of innocents being drawn into marriage
by an equally mercenary guardian. These, though, serve to set
into context the crossed loves of Giacinta, the young woman
who, rashly betrothed to one innamorato, finds in the fresh
perspective offered by the country freedoms that she is in love
with another. The final play transports the entire group back
to the city where Giacinta's sense of reputation and duty to
social expectations interact with the financial disasters that the
"villeggiatura" has brought down on all parties, leading her to
embrace with bitter clarity a respectable, and inevitably
unhappy marriage to Leonardo, the man she does not love.
Strehler's near-legendary Piccolo Teatro group from Milan
in 1954 produced the first modern production of the whole by
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trimming the trilogy to the length of two plays condensed into
less than four hours of playing time; the production achieved
great success not only in Italian, but in French and German
versions later performed by Strehler's company. The result was
an anachronistic Chekhovian affect; Oldcorn includes Strehler's
account of this production and his own strictures upon it in an
appendix. He also includes the director Mike Alfreds's account
of a British National Theatre production in London during
1987-88 which admittedly adapted Strehler's Chekhovian focus
and which consumed nearly five hours of playing time; this text
was never published. In this same year, the first play of the
trilogy in an early draft of Professor Oldcorn's translation was
produced in Utah in conjunction with the annual professional
congress of the American Association of Teachers of Italian.
Oldcorn's Holiday Trilogy is distinguished from the Strehler
and Alfred versions in presenting a full, uncut and unembellished translation of Goldoni's text; nothing has been altered
but the Italian notation of a new scene at each entrance or exit.
The result is a remarkably producible text that faithfully reflects
the remarks in the "translator's note." A Venetian that has
always been less dialect than language was Goldoni's native
speech, at a time when "Italian" was in many respects a literary
artifact based in the Tuscan tradition that was the inheritance
from Dante, an artifact related only by lai^e overlap with the
lingua franca that served as a common communication medium
to speakers of the varied peninsular dialects. Italian was a
language created by books and elaborated through the
Renaissance and Baroque epochs of rhetorical self-consciousness
in display. Yet Goldoni was, in a now famous phrase of the
great philologist Gianfranco Folena, "the least literary and least
grammatical of Italian authors." This was meant as admiring
homage to Goldoni's style, homage less gnomically stated by
Oldcorn when he says that Goldoni's "plays represent the most
successful invention of a nonacademic Italian language since
Dante...the Italian his characters speak is more in the nature of
an ideal koine, a conventional theatrical language...than a
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realistic transcription of localized speech" (xlii). Goldoni's style
is plain because much of the dramatic impact is communicated
by what is not quite spoken—the suppressed, the implied, the
half-articulated—in such a style of dramatic interchange there is
no room for the anachronistic, for the not always resisted
temptation in dealing with eighteenth-century texts "to translate
into a stylized, fastidious, foppish, cocked-little-finger type of
English, a medium that...invites the reader to take a superior
ironical distance from the characters as a group" (xli). Oldcorn
has, I think with affective success of a high order, met his stated
aim; "the target language of the translation ... is our fin de
siecle standard nonvulgar American English." His characters,
who are Goldoni's, converse with us as they were intended to
do. Presumably my judgment is shared, as Oldcorn's prepublication version was given a Kayden prize for translation
awarded by the University of Colorado.
These, as I said, are producible texts, and I would be
surprised if they did not encourage some experimental
productions of this fresh English Goldoni. But for most of the
anglophone audience this must remain an opportunity to
become acquainted with the mature Goldoni as readers. Franco
Fido, the Venetian-born critic who for several decades has
interpreted Goldoni and eighteenth-century Italian drama from
Brown, and now Harvard University, has written an introduc
tory essay for this edition that is aimed to set Goldoni's trilogy
in its contemporary context and to point to some important
guideposts to reading through a condensed presentation of his
own earlier critiques of theater and theme (see my "Franco
Fido's stiidi goldoniani: A Modern Cicerone Maps the Corpus,"
Italica 64 [1987]).
Fido reminds us that Goldoni's prolific output for the
Medebach troupe at the Sant'Angelo theater in Venice between
1748 and 1753 was successful in accomplishing a recognizable
theatrical revolution that came to be known as Goldoni's
riforma. This reformed comedy gradually weaned the actors
and audience from the rigid roles of the commedia dell'arte
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masked types, playing out tired combinations of farce and
romance from sketchy scenarios with a hybrid form of
improvisation and moveable set speeches serviceable for a
number of generic situations. In their place, Goldoni offered
commedie premeditate, plays, as Fido says, "entirely written
down by the author and committed to memory by the actors,
dialogue by dialogue, speech by speech . . . stocked with
characters taken from the everyday life of Venice: merchants
and housewives, middle-class young people of both sexes,
gondoliers, and the like" (x). But the reform of the theater was
intimately entangled with Goldoni's optimistic vision of a
reform of society. Goldoni soon found himself challenged by
the rival, and more traditional Pietro Chiari who took
Goldoni's place as playwright for the Sant'Angelo theater.
Goldoni moved to another company and another theater where
he engaged in a number of experiments, returning finally to
realism that characterized his early Venetian plays. But by the
time he came to write the villeggiatura trilogy, "he sees the
middle-class characters of his final comedies as victims of a crisis
in values: the older generation too narrow-minded and
insular...and the young men and women over-frivolous,
imprudent, and headstrong" (xi). In brief, Fido argues that the
play reveals the dilemma of these ordinary Venetians when
their "privacy," their insulation that is one positive aspect of
insularity, is sacrificed to emulation of the looser high-society
style of the patrician upper classes, with their ruinous gambling
mania at the ridotti, their conversazioni that invite dangerous
liaisons, with their cultivation of cicisbei, those gigolos whom
society, and husbands, engaged in their own affairs, rationalized
as a necessary convenience. Fido, providing a sketch of the
contemporary attitudes toward woman in Venetian society,
makes a feminist reading that finds Giacinta rejecting love not
for duty—as in the love vs. honor dilemmas of Heroic drama—
but from a strong self-image of her personal and social
integration: "Forsaken by the father, the traditional middle-class
merchant values are salvaged by the daughter, who attempts to
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assert her intelligence and independence from inside the system
they stand for" (xxxiii). Such a rough summary does not
pretend to do justice to Fido's essay, although even in fully
developed form it is intended as no more than a stimulus to the
new readers' curiosity about the plays and their contexts. For
instance, they might be stimulated to discover that "privacy"
was precarious in Goldoni's Venice, a city whose walls were
ornamented with lion heads into whose jaws one could
surreptitiously drop denunciations of one's neighbor for the
security police; where every campiello, every little open piazza,
had its local spies at work, and where Casanova served as a
government spy and Goldoni was in the files of the denounced.
In Goldoni's country trilogy, every move seems to be observed:
Giacinta's aunt smugly indicates that she knows the young
woman's secret love; the servants report every gesture of
symbolic body language as the vacationing groups dine together;
Guglielmo's "private" encounter with Giacinta is invaded by his
rival Leonardo; and the latter escapes the creditors who wait in
his antechambers only momentarily by employing a secret
door. In another place ("Goldoni's Secrets," Theatre Survey 31
[1990]), I have suggested that the first play is a farce with all the
dizzying incremental speed of II servitore di due padroni, focused
upon the problems and vacillations of Leonardo; that Le
avventure is a comedy of manners focused by the hyperbolic
ethical punctilios of Guglielmo; and that II ritomo dalla
villeggiatura is in an open-ended tradition of anti-Plautine comic
structure peculiar to Italian drama. This suggestion is but a
straw in the fresh critical wind that has swept new life in a new
language into Goldoni's trilogy, with which Professor Oldcorn
has gifted his English-speaking fellows.
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Thomas Jemielity, Satire and the Hebrew Prophets
(Louisville: "Westminster/John Rnox Press, 1992).
Pp.256. $17.99.
Reviewed by Mark S. Lussier
Arizona State University
This relatively small but intriguing and thorough study
seeks, in the author's words, to "examine systematically the
connection between prophecy and satire in a way that neither
biblical nor literary scholarship has yet pursued it, namely by
considering both in their shared status as "forms or expressions
of critical discourse" (11, 15). Drawing on Northrop Frye's
categories from The Anatomy of Criticism, as well as a wide
range of critical assessments of satire and theories of satire,
Thomas Jemielity offers a comparative consideration capable of
altering any reading of the classical Hebrew prophets and
eighteenth-century practitioners of satiric literature. The text
is written with an eye for detailed confluence and a sensitivity
to categorical departures, and the insights that emerge success
fully extend Jemielity's previous publications on this matter and
realize his aim to broaden the perspective of both "biblical
scholars who are interested in applying literary criteria and
paradigms to the biblical text" and "scholars of satire [concerned
with] expanding an awareness of the origins and evolution of
satire" (16, 17).
In its opening section (chapters 1-3), termed "The Message,"
the text begins its anatomy by assessing the degree to which
both prophecy and satire deploy a rhetoric of shame to critiqueempowered cultural institutions and individuals. The text
uncovers extensive links between the classical Greek and Roman
satirists and the classical Hebrew prophets, where ridicule,
humiliation and curse are articulated in a quasi-legal language to
create a sense of cultural shame: "Prophecy and satire
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deliberately equate suffering and its attendant disgrace with
punishment. They announce, then, a form of justice, even as
revenge" (40). Having established this commonality in a wide
range of classical prophets and satirists, Jemielity broadens the
applicability of these categories by exploring works by Pope,
Dryden, and Johnson.
The second chapter discusses the mixed generic states of
prophecy and satire, where "the form and subject matter of
prophecy and satire provide thus another significant likeness
between them" (51). Thus, the text becomes a mise en abyme,
where form mirrors content:
"The weird, grotesque,
misshapen, half-shapen, parodied, borrowed, altered and abused
forms used by the prophets and the satirists embody the
formless, anarchic, moral dysentery each chastises and exposes"
(54). Of course, given this shared mission, prophecy and satire
encounter severe resistance, whether the overt hostility leveled
at a prophet like Jeremiah or a satirist like Pope, from within
their immediate historical circumstances. This concern for the
historical would seem to conflict with the most common
definition of prophecy as prediction, and Jemielity's deconstruction of this claim for prophecy (for example, as reproduced in
Dr. Johnson's dictionary definition) clearly establishes that
prognostication is a poor definition of what Hebrew prophets
undertake in their mission. Actually, prophecy, like satire, is
primarily concerned with the historical present and only
secondarily concerned with an imaginary future.
The rhetorical trope least common to prophecy and satire,
irony, is explored in chapter 3. Certainly, prophecy and satire
share a tendency to shock and outrage by deploying an earthy
language of the sexual and excremental. This observation
positions eighteenth-century satire in a rhetorical tradition that
extends from Hosea, Ezekiel, Jeremiah through Juvenal and
Horace to Swift and Pope. As Jemielity argues, "Nowhere do
satire and prophecy prove more outrageously shocking and
more outrageously funny than in their use of the ordinarily
tabooed subjects of sex and excretion, whose use as images can
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prove wondrously effective medicine for shocking satiric and
prophetic victims into a healthier, albeit diminished view of
themselves" (98). Of Frye's three categories of irony, only the
third, that of life as '"unrelieved bondage'" (110), demonstrates
extensive conjunction, since this phase of irony was "a necessary
mode in the faith of Israel" (111).
The second part of the book (chapters 4-5) turns to "The
Messenger" and the verbal wars in which prophets and satirists
engage. For those familiar with Dryden or Pope's clashes with
their contemporaries, this insight comes as no surprise, but
equally the prophets, too, from their usual positions on the
margins of culturally empowered institutions like cult and
court, conducted an on-going war with paid prophets hired to
provide messages of comfort to kings and priests. Quite often,
prophets were seen as mad, malign, and subversive, and
Jemielity's analysis repeatedly connects prophetic and satiric
attacks on religious complacency across the wide gap of history:
"The prophetic text attributed to Jeremiah and to Ezekiel offers
several diatribe-like castigations of fellow prophets, in theme
and development very much like the satire of religious selfdeception in Swift and Blake" (124). This analysis does not just
explore individuals but considers concepts as well, as when the
author links the Hebraic term ruah (breath) with eighteenthcentury notions of enthusiasm. Of course, the attacks against
the Hebrew prophets are more sustained and more perilous
than those experienced by their eighteenthrcentury counterparts.
After all, when Blake is considered mad or subversive, the result
is the poet's cultural marginalization, leaving him without an
audience; when Jeremiah is accused of madness and treason, he
is brought before the king for imprisonment and possible
execution.
The concluding chapter addresses the voice in which
prophets and satirist speak and write: "The prophet and the
satirist are 'voices within a text.' Prophecy is the word, the
dabar, of Yahweh. Satire, as Horace knew, is the sermo. Both
are the word" (149). Such utterances carry within them a
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compulsion to speak against cultural dissolution, where the
motivation is one of frustration and moral outrage. Although
Blake's Marriage is not cited, one thinks of that section where
Ezekiel and Isaiah suggest that the voice of God is the voice of
honest indignation. Equally, the speakers through their call to
utterance, whether prophets or satirists, become exemplars,
functioning as lightning rods for cultural authorities: "Since the
customary is often the enemy of prophet and satirist, iconoclasm is each critic's fate and danger" (157). Lurking within the
ethical stance established by prophecy and satire is a sense of
something beyond the condemnation, an "ideal" state of things
that both seek to reveal and revive. Thus, both offer a twopronged method by offering "a layer of attack and a layer of
'ideal norm'" (163), where attack becomes exhortation to aspire
to this higher ideal. This higher ideal is quite often constructed
within or out of prior articulations through which both
prophet and satirist can insulate themselves from attack and
justify their stances against current positions of authority.
This evoked ideal and the tradition out of which it emerges,
finally, renders both prophecy and satire salvific, since both
offer corrective under the guise of condemnation. "Prophecy,
thus, claims to be one of the healing arts, like satire, a moral
potion, however disagreeable to drink. The promised healing
assuages fear of the technique" (181). So, too, Jemielity's text
can equally function as corrective, since its exploration of the
considerable confluence between methods of prophetic and
satiric utterance allows eighteenth-century scholars to re
examine their sense of satire's origins and allows biblical
scholars to broaden their sense of prophecy's legacy.

w
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Carl Hill, The Soul of Wit Joke Theory from Grimm
to Freud (Lincoln and London: University of
Nebraska Press, 1993). Pp. 244. $35.00.
Reviewed by Franklin E. Liehenow, Jr.
Chicago State University
Carl Hill's subtitle suggests that The Soul of Wit is a study of
theories about jokes from Grimm until the appearance of
Freud. Instead, Hill's book primarily offers a reading of
Freud's Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. The key
phrase in Hill's reading is "social psyche." Hill proposes that
the object of Freud's analysis, the jokes and theories with which
Freud works, constitute "a culturally and historically condi
tioned social psyche" (10). Somewhat inconsistently. Hill
describes Freud's text itself "as the analysis of a social psyche"
in which competing psychological and social forces interact (90).
Notwithstanding this slippage, the broad contours of Hill's
argument emerge.
Freud not only interprets jokes from the perspective of
certain timeless and universal psychological processes, but he
also interprets them from the perspective of certain social
phenomena, such as the erotic or aggressive purposes of jokes
and the need for audience participation for their completion.
Hill argues that Freud, in attempting to account for the social
nature of jokes, either diminishes or suppresses their political
implications. The three chapters that constitute the body of
Hill's book supply the biographical and socio-economic as well
as the political subtexts both of the jokes that Freud selects and
of Freud's commentary. In "The Economics of WitzJ Hill
claims that the principle of psychic economy, which Freud
develops to account for the pleasure of jokes, is shaped by
material and cultural "factors." In "Witz, Women, and Jews,"
he contends that Freud's apolitical analysis of jokes about

382

1650-mO

women and Jews perpetuates sexist and anti-Semitic attitudes.
In "At Witz End," he points out that Freud's distinction
between jokes and the comic is problematic and that Freud
takes an apparent pleasure in gallows humor. Hill concludes in
an epilogue that poststructuralist criticism of Freud's text has
given insufficient attention to its historical antecedents.
Integral to his reading of Jokes and Their Relation to the
Unconscious is the political history of theories about jokes and
wit from the early Enlightenment through Jin-de-siecle Vienna
that Hill advances in his initial three chapters. For him,
previous joke theories carry "traces" of political engagement
that guide his interpretation of Freud's theory. Throughout its
history, Witz, according to Hill, has been used in power
struggles, variously upholding or subverting oppressors and the
oppressed. He needlessly complicates his own historicizing of
Freud's text in two related ways: he inadequately differentiates
the meanings of the elastic term Witz, and he assembles a
history of Witztheorie from fragments of different kinds of
discourse in which Witz denotes, for instance, a mental faculty,
the quintessence of satiric poetry, or jokes.
In his introductory chapter, "Vorspiel," Hill excerpts about
twenty brief quotations from the many examples that the
Grimm brothers choose for supporting and illustrating the set
of definitions under their entry for Witz in the Deutsches
Worterhuch. By giving quotations without definitions from the
Worterbuch, Hill furnishes little of the Grimms' philology of
wit, much less any theory of jokes. Hill's treatment of these
excerpted quotations, several of which antedate the Enlighten
ment, parallels his treatment of the jokes that he takes from
Freud's text. The quotations are made to speak for themselves,
and they tell about Hill's themes. Similarly, Hill believes that
Freud sets up a "textual dynamic" between joke and joke theory
that gives readers "an opening to make their own contributions"
(94). The contributions that Hill makes include finding in the
jokes that Freud quotes, as well as in Freud's theorizing about
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them, "all the big issues" of "class, race, gender, war and peace,
Utopia and apocalypse" (228).
Hill's late twentieth-century ideology governs his selection
and evaluation, not only of Freud's interpretation of jokes, but
also of the discussions of wit and theories of jokes that
purportedly generate and constrain Freud's theorizing. Because
Hill relegates writings from the seventeenth through the
nineteenth centuries to an anticipatory status. The Soul of Wit
does not invite the attention of students and specialists
interested in German literature and concepts of wit during the
early modern era. One should not expect to find, for example,
an exposition of Jean Paul's complex theory of humor. Hill's
most appreciative readers will be scholars interested in the
challenges of integrating the claims of a version of New
Historicism into the continuing critical discourse on Jokes and
Their Relation to the Unconscious.

Marie-Helene Huet, Monstrous Imagination (Cam
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). Pp. x +
316. $19.95.
Reviewed by Joel Weinsheimer
University of Minnesota
Huet's new book is a page-turner. As compellingly as any
work without a plot, it rivets the reader's attention and sustains
interest to the very end. The topic is a natural, of course.
Defying the laws of historical relativity, monsters exercise a
universal, perennial fascination, no less on us than on the
Renaissance and Enlightenment physicians whose imaginist
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theories of generation Huet surveys in the first half of her
study. That the mother's imagination can form, and therefore
also deform, the fetus was a theory virtually impervious to
challenge before 1800. Perhaps the most famous case was that
of the "hirsute virgin"—a girl whose hairiness was attributed to
her mother's gazing during conception on an icon of John the
Baptist clothed in animal skins. In the second half of the book,
dominated by intensely interesting—one is tempted to say
"gripping"—studies of Frankenstein and Madame Tussaud, with
supporting studies on Hawthorne, Villiers de I'Isle-Adam, and
others, Huet shows that even after 1800, when it had lost all
factual credibility, the supposed tie between imaginative
representation and monstrosity enjoyed a metaphorical afterlife
that reaches to the present.
This linkage makes its appearance not just in the novel (that
"loose, baggy monster") where Huet concentrates her attention,
but also and especially in literary theory (the topic, as it were,
of her book's missing last chapter). Derrida's name, the nom du
phre, appears nowhere, though his mark is discernible every
where in Huet's Monstrous Imagination. In particular, the
reader cannot help recalling the conclusion of "Structure, Sign
and Play in the Sciences of Man," where Derrida points, Johnthe-Baptist-like, to "the as yet unnameable which is proclaiming
itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is
in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the
formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity."
Difference, deviancy, monstrosity preoccupy us now perhaps
more intensely than ever.
Huet's great merit consists in the way she organizes diffuse
masses of recondite details drawn from the most diverse and
esoteric sources. Her scholarship on matters both ancient and
modern is impressive, her style is graceful and limpid, her
material of intrinsic interest. If anything at all detracts from
the reader's pleasure, it is Huet's occasional interpretive
excesses. For example, "The monster thus represented the
terror of a signifier detached from its legitimate origin, just as
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it bore no visible resemblance or relationship to the father who
conceived it" (54). Here and elsewhere is just too much
theoretical melodrama, too much of the grade B horror flick.
It is almost enough to make one yearn for the bad old days of
"positivist" criticism, when it was not the critic's ingenuity but
the interest of the material itself that was assumed to suffice—as
it certainly does here, where the subject matter continually
upstages the critic. Virtually nothing that Huet can do or say
will make monsters more interesting than they already are.
Theoretical ingenuity amounts to no more than intrusion and
distraction.
The problem of overinterpretation is compounded when,
sidestepping the question of moral monsters and limiting herself
to monstrosity by birth, Huet confines herself to gender politics
as the master signified of her story. According to the classical
theory, monsters evidence the dangerous power of the maternal
imagination by displacing (Huet prefers to say "erasing") the
father's role in conception. Then, when "fathers" of modern
science such as Camille Dareste reverse this erasure by creating
monsters artificially (without mothers) and debunking the
theory of maternal imagination, Huet reads this development
allegorically, as a pathetic tale of patriarchal oppression and
revenge: "Just as the legitimate father has been 'erased' from his
progeny by an inscription that superimposed on his likeness
that of a foreign image, the mother was now excluded from the
development of the embiyo to which she had given life. She
was banished from Dareste's laboratory, her existence no longer
necessary" (121-2).
What can explain such license.' Allegoresis, according to the
Church Fathers, is justified when the literal sense of the text is
false or absurd. Something of the same kind is the case here,
for Huet adopts the modern, liberal attitude toward physical
monsters: there aren't any. They are figments of a monstrous
imagination. Thus, when moderns read premodern descriptions
of monstrous births, which cannot be literally true, they are at
liberty—indeed compelled—to take them allegorically. Even in
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analyzing genetic explanations of monsters that would seem to
have some truth value, Huet finds deep meaning: "Independent
of all scientific context, the most intriguing aspect of these texts
on heredity is the parallel drawn between cellular systems and
political organization" (106). By fictionalizing the texts,
stripping them of their "scientific context," Huet brackets their
surface truth value and thereby discovers allegories in which,
for instance, the "hierarchical relation between cells" parallels
"the hierarchical society of the Old Regime."
I have focused unfairly on the questionable aspects of what
is an overwhelmingly excellent piece of work—learned,
sophisticated, and intensely readable. But it may be worthwhile
to suggest that Huet's study still leaves room for a less
allegorical, less modern, but perhaps more radical reading of
monsters. After all, under one's bed, in one's closet, when the
lights are out, there are things more terrifying than detached
signifiers.

Robert Wokler, Rousseau (Oxford:
University Press, 1995). Pp. 132. $7.95.

Oxford

Reviewed by Megan Conway
Louisiana State University in Shreveport
Robert Wokler's Rousseau belongs to a relatively new and
ambitious series from Oxford entitled "Past Masters," whose
goal, as stated on the back cover of the book, is to be a "series
of concise, lucid, authoritative introductions to the thought of
leading intellectual figures of the past whose ideas still influence
the way we think today." In its scope, the collection is
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reminiscent of Iwayne's "World Author Series," which has
successfully carved its own niche by providing concise, reliable
information on major and minor literary figures and their
works. Since the series stresses thinkers as opposed to
authors—among fifty-seven published titles from Aquinas to
Wycliff we find The Buddha, Jesus, and Muhammad—it is not
surprising that the chapter headings are according to area of
thought rather than by work, as in the Twayne series.
While this format is certainly justified in the volume on
Jesus, it is perhaps less successful in the case of Rousseau. If the
series is intended for student use (as the excellent price would
indicate), few students are familiar enough with Rousseau's
works to determine that a discussion of the first Discourse will
be found in the chapter on "Culture, Music, and Corruption."
Certainly, the index will provide students a series of page
numbers to aid them in their search for the major works, but
such an arrangement threatens to fragment what is, in truth, a
wonderfully cogent explication of a difficult and problematic
work. Since the chapters often refer to several works and
sometimes overlap in time periods, I am disappointed that the
series includes no chronology for handy reference. To be sure,
Oxford desires to emphasize its difference from Twayne, but
those differences should not be at the expense of the reader.
Aside from these minor disappointments, Wokler certainly
fulfills Oxford's stated purpose. He outlines Rousseau's
immense contributions in the fields of intellectual history,
music theory, political thought, education, literature, and
religion but does so in such a way that the separate works are
all woven into a vast, coherent tapestry rather than presented
as individual threads of information. The works are discussed
in a more-or-less chronological order, though Wokler constantly
refers to previous and later pieces to show the unity and
evolution of Rousseau's thought. Chapter 2 describes the
foundation for his later works laid by Rousseau's two initial
bombshells that launched both his career and great contro
versy—the first Discourse and the inflammatory Letter on French
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Music. Wokler argues that music could not possibly be exempt
from Rousseau's views of the corrupting effects of civilization,
since, as propounded in the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences,
"the corruption of human morality was most clearly manifested,
according to Rousseau, in the history of the development of
music" (29). As Wokler indicates, music is tied to our first
languages, whose evolution parallels the degradation of society,
a theory that Rousseau was to pursue further in his Essay on the
Origin of Languages and in the last chapter of "The Relation of
Languages to Government."
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, Wokler presents Rousseau's major
works—the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, the Social
Contract, and Emile—z^zin placing them in an historical and
philosophical context. The second Discourse is shown as an
answer to, rejection, correction, or even partial corroboration
of the ideas of other writers, such as Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke
and Buffon. Moreover, Wokler suggests Rousseau's influence
on early anthropology and on Engels, Marx, and Hegel. The
Social Contract "seems to pursue the central theme of the
Discourse on Inequality in reverse" (56); instead of pointing out
the corruption of society, here Rousseau will offer a plan by
which citizens can regain their lost liberty. Again, Wokler aids
the reader by describing both Rousseau's debts and his
influence, particularly the enthusiasm that the Social Contract
inspired among France's revolutionaries. Yet, when the Social
Contract first appeared, it was not its political content that
caused an outcry, but Rousseau's views on a civil, non-Christian
religion, views repeated in Emile, which was published at the
same time. Wokler gives an effective resume of Rousseau's
theories of education, morality, and sexual roles based on Emile,
Letters from the Mountain, the New Heloise, and the Letter to
D'Alembert.
The last chapter, "Vagabond Reverie," ties up loose ends
and comments on Rousseau's later works, principally the
Confessions and the Reveries, placing them in perspective with
the rest of the author's works. In this chapter, the reader gets
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an idea of the tensions that had been building for years between
Rousseau and his contemporaries and how Rousseau's
persecution complex shaped the Confessions and the Dialogues.
His last work, the Reveries, tranquilly depicts his estrangement
from society and, while discussing it, Wokler skillfully
manipulates the reader into seeing what he does not state
outright—that Rousseau's ultimate belief in the innate, original
goodness of man shows as clearly in his last work as it did in
his first.
It is unfortunate that "Wbkler's masterful synthesis of
Rousseau's work is undermined by an opening chapter whose
omissions must startle even the most casual student of
Rousseau. Although disciples and detractors have taken sides
for and against Rousseau since the first appearance of the
Discourse on the Arts and Science, it seems only fair to expect an
objective account of the philosopher's life in a reference book
such as this. But Wokler has chosen to leave out critical
information concerning Rousseau's background, thereby
rendering the controversial and eccentric Citizen of Geneva a
bland, white-washed figure. A student with no prior knowledge
of Rousseau might well assume that the motherless Rousseau
grew up idyllically in the company of his "well-read" father
"who inspired him with a love of Nature and books" and
"encouraged his own fascination with literature, in a cultivated
manner" (2).
At fifteen, Wokler tells us, Rousseau was
"introduced to Madame de Warens who lived at Annecy in the
Duchy of Savoy, just west of Geneva" (3).
From this
biographical sketch of Rousseau's early life, the reader could
easily infer that Jean-Jacques lived a relatively normal,
middle-class childhood surrounded by books and comfort and
that, as a young man entering society, he was presented to
Madame de Warens.
This is a potentially critical misconception, for it leaves out
vital factors that influenced Rousseau's work. For example,
although Wokler uses the adjective "irascible" to describe the
father, nothing is mentioned of what amounts to the senior
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Rousseau's psychological abuse of Jean-Jacques, whom his father
accused of "causing" the death of his mother from a post-childbirth fever. Nor does Wokler indicate that, at the age of ten,
Rousseau was abandoned to the care of country pastor for two
(albeit happy) years, when his father was exiled as the result of
a quarrel. After Jean-Jacques returned to Geneva, he was
unhappily apprenticed to an engraver, whom he described as
cruel and brutal. Of course Rousseau was, at the time, no
angel, either. Certainly, he was rebellious and lazy, and one
Sunday afternoon in 1728, when the wandering apprentice
returned late .from a walk and found Geneva's city gates firmly
shut, instead of facing the wrath of his master, he ran away.
When Madame de Warens welcomed him in Annecy, no doubt
the errant and penniless boy was delighted to become Catholic
in order to obtain food and shelter. No account is made of
Rousseau's troubled relations with Madame de Warens. Therese
Levasseur, the woman with whom Rousseau lived half his life,
is referred to as "far less well educated" (3) than Madame de
Warens, but Wokler omits the fact that she was a servant girl
in an inn and very likely illiterate. Although these and other
facts are perhaps not essential to an understanding of Rousseau's
thought and philosophy, the potential for misinterpreting
Rousseau's life is problematic.
Leaving aside Rousseau's life and concentrating on Wokler's
presentation of the philosopher's works, this book is a valuable
tool for scholars as well as students. Few of us have the time
or inclination to read all of Rousseau's writings. Wokler makes
it possible for the reader to bring to the book whatever
knowledge of Rousseau's philosophy she or he possesses and see
just how that piece fits into Rousseau's entire scheme. For
readers with no familiarity of Rousseau, Wokler makes the
eighteenth-century thinker's widespread influence quite clear.
Wokler details, with striking clarity, the evolution of
Rousseau's thought, his relationships with his contemporaries,
and the ideas of those philosophers and political theorists from
whom he borrowed as well as the ideas of others whom he

Book Review Corner

391

influenced. For a concise reading of Rousseau's entire corpus,
the reader would be hard-pressed to find a better source. For
a good biography, go elsewhere.

w
Joel Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics and
Literary Theory (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1991). Pp. vii + 173. $21.00
Reviewed by Ellen Breerwood Chauvin
Nicholls State University
For those of us withering in the intellectual desert of
postmodernism, choked by the Saussurean sands of signs that
do not signify, Joel Weinsheimer's latest book reveals a
philosophical oasis. Of course, those who run in hermeneutic
circles already know that the desert is merely a dune within this
all-encompassing oasis, but every traveler, whether worldly or
world-weary, will no doubt discover that the water of meaning
here is sweet and that the terrain is indeed expansive.
Initially tracing the origin of hermeneutics to its roots in
classical philology and biblical exegesis, Weinsheimer begins his
excursion into "understanding understanding" with a survey of
modern hermeneutics from Schleiermacher—its eighteenthcentury progenitor who first sought to reconstruct and
methodize understanding for correct interpretation—to Ricoeur
—its twentieth-century explorer who seeks an "instrument of
thought for apprehending...the conversion of system [language]
into event [speaking]." The overview allows Weinsheimer to
illuminate the protean nature of hermeneutics as he charts its
various manifestations in history, especially as these have been
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shaped by philosophical developments in philology, epistemology, ontology, phenomenology, archaelogy, and teleology.
Central for this book is the work of Gadamer, which provides
support for Weinsheimer's contention that philosophical
hermeneutics and literary interpretation are inextricably
linked—and both, Weinsheimer demonstrates in his final
chapter, are indispensable to analytical and pedagogical progress.
The last chapter, in fact, evinces the sheer efficacy of
hermeneutic reasoning, for in addressing the questions of the
classic versus the canon and Scripture versus Text, Weinsheimer
actually returns to the very dawn of hermeneutics itself. In
tracing the lines of force in the conflict between "catholic
democratic" pantextualists such as Scholes and "Catholic
royalist" formalists such as Eliot, Weinsheimer explores the
many subtle philosophical distinctions that arise (but arfe seldom
examined) in polemical debates about the canon. For instance,
can we say that the canon of literature is canonical in the same
sense as the Biblical Canon.' Is this really the position of
formalist critics? Do poststructural critics caricature the
formalists' position by pretending to treat the canon as if it
were the Canon? What (or whose) purposes are served by
refusing to distinguish "the meanest graffito" from the sacred?
Another outstanding point on Weinsheimer's circumference
includes the question implicitly posed in chapter 2: which came
first—the theoria or the praxis} Weinsheimer responds indirectly
by drawing upon Cadamer's critique of hubristic attempts to
foi^e an omniscient, omnicompetent Method.
Making
reference to Nietzche's governing concept—"the will to
power"—which itself radically undermines the Enlightenment
project of universal objective knowledge, Cadamer and
Weinsheimer go beyond Nietsche to show that this elemental
force of self-aggrandizement likewise finds its limits in external
reality. One limiting factor on any project advancing objective
knowledge or subjective power is the determinative force of
prejudice, especially as it channels the subject's consciousness in
ways he may never realize. Again, Weinsheimer's final chapter
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illuminates and addresses the issues raised here. Weinsheimer
poses the following provocative challenge to those self-styled
academic reformers whose attention to the political motivations
of formalist critics and classical authors has granted them so
much cachet in recent years: "Every orthodoxy must repress
the questions that threaten it, and the new orthodoxy of
suspicion must silence the classic. For if truth is in every case
the deluded expression of power, the question of the classic is
whether power, for just that reason, is the unwitting accomplice
of truth" (157).
Scholars of the Enlightenment are likely to find Weinsheimer
most intriguing when he follows Gadamer in taking Kant's
notion of aesthetic judgment as a model of historical conscious
ness—a model rich in significance for all areas of interpretation.
Because, like the individual object of art, the particular
historical event is important for its particularity and finally
resists all efforts at subsumption under a mechanistic Newto
nian rule or abstraction, any proposed Method must fall short
of success. In place of Method, Gadamer adopts Kant's concept
of taste as a determinative principle in historical consciousness.
As Weinsheimer explains, "aesthetics offers a promising way of
thinking about historical understanding because both aesthetics
and historiography address themselves to the particular, the
concrete phenomenon" (43).
Weinsheimer also seconds Gadamer's critique of Kant—
mainly Kant's refusal to grant truth value to particular objects
judged according to aesthetic consciousness.
Instead,
Weinsheimer and Gadamer insist upon the centrality of
individual exemplary particulars to the discovery of truth.
They also resist Kant's suggestion that disinterestedness is
possible, pointing out that in history there are not spectators,
only participants. Weinsheimer explains, "In principle, every
historical particular, like every genuine artwork, possesses the
capacity to challenge received universals, to enlarge the whole,
and to expand the horizon of what can be understood. The
historian who discloses the historic nature of the particular
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event by realizing its capacity to reveal a new world belongs to
the continuing history of that event...Both art and history are
modes of the unconcealment of truth: in the aesthetic Gadamer
finds a symbol of effective history" (63). And in Weinsheimer
we find a place of respite amid the polemical fury of the
academic culture war, a cooling oasis of philosophically
reflective interpretation.

w
Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the
Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics, with a
forward by Arthur C. Danto (New York: Colum
bia University Press, 1994) Pp. xiv + 200. $29.50.
Reviewed by Joel Weinsheimer
University of Minnesota
The fundamental question Martha Woodmansee addresses is
this: "how to account for the momentous shift from the
instrumentalist theory of art to the modern theory of art as an
autonomous object that is to be contemplated disinterestedly"
(32). Broadening the issues raised in her well-known article on
copyright, included here as chapter 2, she asks why it was that
utile and dulce, those time-honored criteria of aesthetic value,
came to be considered suspect and even unartistic. This shift,
Woodmansee argues, is due not to Kant's discovery of the real
nature of art, but instead to the "far-reaching changes in the
production, distribution, and consumption of reading material
that marked the later eighteenth century" (32). In surveying
Kant's precursors and successors in England and Germany,
Woodmansee finds that autonomy and disinterestedness are not

Book Review Corner

395

"timeless and universal facts of aesthetic experience" (6), but
rather conceptual weapons that one side (the victorious side)
deployed to notable advantage in the culture wars of the late
Enlightenment.
In particular, the rapid expansion of the reading public that
occurred through increased literacy and the production of cheap
(often pirated) books meant that literary art was necessarily
impelled out of the exclusive patronage system and into a
market economy. Within this economy, the traditional
Horatian, reader-based aesthetic values came to justify popular
art, as opposed to the high-brow, difficult, unpopular art of the
kind produced and therefore defended by the German and
British poets and critics whose names that still today typify
high Romanticism. What the latter needed was a theory of art
and aesthetic experience that would disqualify low-brow art and
lazy, low-brow readers who wanted art to fulfill their vulgar
needs and petty purposes. Of course, these readers were, in
fact, most readers; hence the strategic usefulness of a formalist
aesthetic that made value seemingly inherent in the work itself
and autonomous from any readers whatever—while actually
legitimating high-brow readers.
By means of this forceful and persuasive argument,
Woodmansee exposes the "interests of disinterestedness." Even
readers who are convinced by it, however, may be left
wondering where this masterly argument leaves them.
Admitting (what some might dispute) that "philosophers of art,
in denial of their history, [have presented] Kant's achievement
as a hard-won triumph of pure philosophical reason" (144-5),
what would follow if these troglodytes now reinserted Kantian
aesthetics back into the marketplace and conceded its place "in
the larger debate over culture in which it originally functioned"
(7)? Briefly put, how does an idea's genesis affect its validity.'
This is no easy question, and the answer is complicated by the
fact that Woodmansee never does discuss Kant. Even if she had
analyzed the Critique of Jtidgment, however, and carefully
distinguished Kant from Schiller and Coleridge, whom she does
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consider in detail, it would remain unclear how understanding
the polemical context of the Critique affects its truth value. If
Kant in fact promotes his own or others' interests in advocating
a theory of aesthetic disinterestedness, does it follow that this
theory is suspect? Not necessarily. Kant's claim, after all, is
that the judgment of art as art is disinterested, not that aesthetic
theory is. And if we deny Kant's definition, as we well might,
would it follow from the fact that no judgment of art is
disinterested that there's no such thing as art? Or if there is
such a thing, what then does distinguish aesthetic judgments
from all other (interested) judgments? These are questions it
would take a philosopher to answer, and Woodmansee disavows
all claim to be one.
Of course, it's not just philosophers who serve particular
interests. What if it could be shown that Woodmansee's own
argument is interested? The task presents no difficulty because
she makes no attempt to hide her allegiances in the cultural
wars of the present. In her excellent final chapter, for instance,
she deplores Coleridge's "uniformitarian impulse," his search for
the one fundamental quality that would be the criterion for all
art criticism; and she celebrates by contrast "the associationists'
joyful affirmation of diversity" (136) implicit in their refusal to
transcend the empirical recipient of art. The fact that
Woodmansee has her own agenda really does not vitiate the
quality of her insights at all.
It remains the case, then, that this is a book to be reckoned
with—well worth reading and even rebutting. Woodmansee is
undoubtedly right to say that "historians of aesthetics and
criticism need to become more sensitive [to the] interplay
between legal, economic, and social questions on the one and
philosophical and aesthetic ones on the other" (47). That she
is herself more sensitive to the former questions makes her
book all the more valuable to those like myself who are more
attuned to the latter.
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Ronald Paulson, Hogarth. Volume 1: The "Modern
Moral Subject", 1697-1732', Volume 2: High Art
and Low, 1732-1750', Volume 3: Art and Politics,
1750-1764 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press; Cambridge Lutterworth Press, 1991-1993).
$24.95 per volume.
Reviewed by Peter Wagner
Universit'dt Koblenz-Landau
With Hogarth, Ronald Paulson offers us the revised version
of Hogarth's "life, art, and times" (the subtitle of the first
edition, published in 1971) as a result of what he terms a
"rethinking" of Hogarth. Lai^ely augmented, this biography
cum study aims to "establish—within the coordinates of time
and place, character and society—the man and his works (and
the man in his works) and to sort out...what Hogarth thought
he was doing from what he was so immersed in his times or in
his own unconscious as to not know he was doing" (l:xviii)—a
mighty task indeed. If the ambitious venture fails tragically, as
I think it does, it is paradoxically because Hogarth really
delivers what Paulson promises, by remaining "on the side of
the battling ego who shapes...discourses to his own end" (ibid.).
Unlike Paulson, I do not believe that a biographer must remain
on that side, and, like some previous reviewers, I see the kind
of shaping Paulson perceives, not as Hogarth's genial work but,
rather, as Paulson's idiosyncratic reconstruction. The constric
tions and pitfalls of the genre in which Paulson writes prove,
once again, that biography, brilliantly written though it may be
in this case, is the (post)modern form of hagiography. It is a
discursive form of veneration that depends on the concept of
the almighty author (the substitute for the medieval saint and
the Romantic genius) who, reconstructed by the hagiographer.
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is the ultimate authority when it comes to making sense with
his works.
Before discussing this issue, however, let me comment on the
technical aspect of the three volumes that, unfortunately, show
many signs of shoddy editing. In view of the reverence for
editorial precision that Professor Paulson acknowledges in
volume 1 (xviii), one could have expected fewer errors and
misprints. Although the quality of the reproductions of
Hogarth's works is generally good, a great number of illustra
tions are reproduced in such a small size that one has great
difficulties reading lettering and details (for example, volume 1:
figs. 16, 25, 26, 35, 74; volume 2: 41-5; volume 3: 14-18, and
passim). The numbering of the illustrations in volume 3 is
incorrect between figures 57 and 65: surely, the editors should
have noticed such howlers. And the appended notes in volume
2 (450) make one wonder about the use of modern computer
technology at Rutgers University Press.
The number of misprints and errors, still relatively small in
volume 1, increases considerably in 2 and 3. Lichtenberg's
Ausfiihrliche Erkldrung is consistently misspelled (without 'h')
throughout the three books. The errors in 2 and 3 include the
title of Nancy Armstrong's monograph (2: xvii: Dramatic
instead of Domestic), the spelling of James McArdell as
McCardell (2: 169; correct again in the index of 3); an
incorrect date (2: 427n3); misspellings of German names/words
(1: 223: "Charlottenberg"; 2: 404n83: "Jurgen"; 407n28:
"Werk"); the words "ballad" and "bootblack" (2: 318; 440n52);
"Barnell" for "Barrell," and John Camden Rotten as "Hooten"
(3: 451n33; 513n20). There is a reference to Rouquet's Tableau
in 2:450n35, but the French source is listed in neither this nor
the other volumes. The index in each volume is unreliable as
to authors and critics discussed and again contains misspellings
(for example, 3:452: "Bertelsen"); missing entries include,
among others, Acteon and Werner Busch in volume 2; and
references to Thompson (412 nil and 440), and Wagner,
discussed (460-1) in volume 3. A reviewer of volume 1
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complained about the many irritating repetitions (partly a
consequence of the insertion of material Paulson has published
over the last twenty years: see James Stevens Curl's critique in
Literary Review, July 1992, 19-20); such repetitions also occur
in volumes 2 and 3 (for example, 2:209, 360, 374). While
adapting the new sections culled from his own publications,
Paulson has not cared to update references: in 2:412nll and
440n49-50, for instance, the new edition of E. P. Thompson's
major work should have been mentioned; and in 3:445, the
recent critical editions of Smollett's novels (for example, by
Paul-Gabriel Bouce) are not listed. Downright mistakes include
3:23 (the fishwives in Beer Street do not read the king's speech),
and 3:351-61 (the role of Hogarth in the Sign Painters'
Exhibition in 1762: see the article by B. Krysmanski in the
volume of essays ed. by F. Ogee for the University of Delaware
Press, 1995).
Professor Paulson makes no mention of the important work
of some Anglo-American Hogarthians, for example, David
Bindman {Hogarth, 1981) and Mary Klinger-Lindberg (articles
on Hogarth and the theater), nor does he seem to care very
much about foreign languages and critical literature not written
in English. In l:364n30, a quotation from Roger de Piles
appears without "sic" (it should be: joue son role)-, and in 2:64,
a work by Picart appears with a faulty title {religieuses). This
becomes a great problem when French, for instance, is used in
Hogarth's writings or prints: the garbled French in plate 3 of
Marriage A-la-mode (in the quack's book) remains uncommented
upon. Critical studies by H. J. Schnackertz and W. Kemp (on
narratology in Hogarth) as well as publications by the German
art historian Werner Busch (on iconographic aspects) are not
mentioned. On the few occasions when Paulson deigns to refer
to the work of continental European scholars, he does so in a
condescending manner (for example, 2:407n28; 3: 461n66).
Nothing useful on Hogarth seems to have come from France or
Italy.
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These merely technical problems disturb the appreciation of
what Paulson has to say on Hogarth, at least for those who
accept his approach. As far as it goes, this critical commentary
is the best that is available on Hogarth at the moment, and it
is precisely because Paulson is such a thoughtful reader of
Hogarthian images that I find it regrettable to have to part
company with him on what might be termed the ekphrasis of
Hogarth's art. Paulson has been taken to task by several
reviewers of Hogarth. Thus, Graham Reynolds (who refers to
Lichtenbeig as "Lichtenstein") is reluctant to accept Paulson's
determination "to read a reference to the Choice of Hercules
into every threesome in Hogarth" in what Reynolds sees as a
late twentieth-century attempt to rescue Hogarth from the
moral reading of the Reverend Trusler (see the Times Literary
Supplement, 5 February 1993, 18, and 24 December 1993, 16).
John Barrell criticizes Paulson's overreading of nubile
Hogarthian women as versions of the "multi-breasted Diana of
Ephesus"; Barrell finds it difficult "to grasp the rules of
evidence that apply to Paulson's writing" {London Review of
Books, 7 April 1994, 18). Richard Dorment waged a hostile war
with Paulson, partly conducted ad hominem, in The New York
Review (summer and autumn 1993): for me, their bitter battle
over Hogarthian "intention" was hilarious precisely because it
is superfluous. Although I, too, disagree with Paulson's view
of Hogarth, I think he deserves more and better credit for the
remarkable, if controversial, work he has done. Paulson's
reading of Hogarth's art is almost always firmly grounded in
social and/or ideological (cultural) contexts. Unlike Barrell and
Reynolds, I find Paulson's approach, as far as this aspect is
concerned, penetrating and full of new insights. But the
problem is that he cannot go far enough on the reception side
of his critical business because, at some point along the
ekphrastic way, the author (intention) blocks his way. In
volume 2 (387n5) Paulson asserts that he has "found Foucault
and his followers endlessly stimulating, more in the terminology
of discourse than of imprisonment, but in need of subordina-
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tion to relentlessly historical facts." He does not specify which
of Foucault's works he means (and who are Foucault's
"followers";^) and, then, tellingly, discusses Althusser as seen by
Eagleton (rather than as seen by Paulson). Although he does
admit that Hogarth is, in some degree, an "historically
constructed subject," he believes that "Hogarth's subject itself
is ideology...He is constantly commenting on the general or
dominant ideologies of his time, or what he took them to be,
and showing how they warp the lives of characters—if not of
himself" (2:xvii).
The crux lies in the final, semantically ambiguous, clause,
which can be read either as exclusive or inclusive. The three
volumes suggest an exclusive meaning, as Paulson speculates for
pages on end what Hogarth may have intended, revealing,
ultimately, not so much Hogarth's intention as Paulson's
erudition. It could be aigued that Paulson might have achieved
the same result without such risky speculations on Hogarth's
aims. For who can tell us what Hogarth really intended.^ (For
a different Hogarth, "written," as it were, by the cultural
discourses of his day and age, see John Solkin, Painting for
Money, 1993, a view rejected by Paulson in his review of the
monograph: London Review of Books, 4 November 1993:
42-3). Hogarth is dead, and even his own written words are
unreliable, as Paulson admits himself; if Hogarth "expressed his
radicalism only in images, never in words" (3:32), if, in other
words, the images are ambiguous, highly ironical and contradic
tory, why, then, does Paulson limit their potential indetermi
nacy through a recourse to author intention, that chimera of
hermeneutic criticism?—Because he wants to "make meaning"
within the confines of the traditional hermeneutic circle that, as
Nietzsche once remarked, first hides meaning somewhere in the
bushes (that is, the work of art) and then triumphantly goes in
search of it.
I take Paulson's reading of Hogarthian images to be
erroneous on two accounts, despite his impressive situating of
the works in an extraordinarily detailed cultural context of
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London life (which constitutes the real value of the three
volumes): firstly, Paulson's reading sells us a critic's sophisti
cated view as authorial intention, and secondly, as a conse
quence, it relegates to a secondary semantic level all the other
voices in a given picture in order to favor the allegedly 'central'
voice of that master manipulator of discourses, William
Hogarth. Ironically, Paulson proves that Foucault was right, in
1969, when he attacked such procedures (in the essay, "Qu'estce qu'un auteur.'") because they "make sense" at a high cost:
they silence or suppress those voices that may contradict the
author's, proving him to be one among many others of equal
importance.
Making Hogarth's ostensible intention (that is, Paulson's
critical opinion) the ultimate decisive point in his reading,
Paulson obviously champions the idea of a genius, an artist who
stood both above and outside the mentalities of his age: thus,
for instance, the Paulsonian Hogarth was neither Puritanical
nor anti-Semitic; he was always against the high and mighty,
and on the side of the Nobodies. Instead of being "written" by
his age in the Foucauldian sense (which is not as limiting as
Paulson would have it), Paulson's Hogarth is a (post)modern
revenant of the nineteenth-century genius and, ultimately, of
the saint in hagiography. Paulson would have done his own
critical work—and Hogarth—a better service, had he considered
theory after the New Criticism, theory (originating in France)
concerned with reading images and ekphrasis. Derrida's
concept of "differance," for instance, would have been ideally
suited for Paulson's enterprise, as he tries to place the
Hogarthian word-image constructs in an intertextual network
of codes from various fields. Another example that comes to
mind is the more traditional work of Gerard Genette on the
"paratexte," the functions of all the rhetoric that comes before
or after the main part of a work of art (in the case of Hogarth's
work: titles; accompanying texts; quotations in the frame;
words in the images). But Paulson will have no truck with
poststructuralist models of reading images that endanger his
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notion of a Hogarth in control of any kind of verbal or visual
discourse: Foucault is "adapted," Althusser rejected, and
Derrida totally ignored. So are the scholars in America who
have drawn on these French pioneers, notably W. J. T. Mitchell
and Norman Bryson. Instead, Paulson champions an ekphrastic
and heuristic model that yokes intentionalism to culturalmaterialist criticism. He thus fashions for us a Hogarth (the
man from below who strikes it rich but always remains
conscious of his lowly origins) who is the nonpareil judge of the
sense we make with his images.
Hogarth's work, it seems to me, must be defended against a
reading that creates hierarchies of meaning by selling us the
critic's opinion as authorial intention. In this sense, Mark
Roskill (see The Interpretation of Pictures, 1989, 13-16) has
shown how Paulson repeats earlier ekphrastic models (see also
my essay on ekphrasis in volume 2 of this journal). Paulson's
Hogarth lacks the inverted commas that indicate that (as in
Mieke Bal's penetrating Reading "Rembrandt" [Cambridge,
1991]) it is critical discourse that necessarily (re)creates artists
and their intentions. In the final analysis, Paulson's Hogarth
tells us much about the critic's frame of mind. What we really
need, however, is a reading of Hogarth's art without Paulson's
intentional fallacy.

Rhodri Windsor Liscombe, Altogether American:
Robert Mills, Architect and Engineer, 1781-1855
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Pp.
372. $45.00.
Reviewed hy Fermand Garlington, II
University of Houston
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Robert Mills, often considered the first native-born
professionally trained architect in America, pioneered a
distinctly American architectural style through the blending of
neoclassical and Southern Palladian designs. Trained in
architectural design by Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Henry
Latrobe, Mills designed both public and private structures. His
life's desire was to promote American idealism through the
monumentality, utility, and humanity of his constructions. The
monumentality of his monuments to George Washington is
unquestioned, as is the utility of his Treasury Building (which
introduced America to the height of neoclassical design) and
General Post Office (which made the nation realize the
brilliance of Italianate architecture). With a genuine concern
for the health and comfort of the ill of his native Charleston,
Mills designed such structures as the Charleston Marine
Hospital, combining ably the utilitarian with the aesthetically
pleasing and psychologically soothing. He also employed
similar techniques in his prison designs, for Mills believed that
such institutions were not only for retribution and punishment,
but for rehabilitation and reform as well.
Fireproofing and acoustical design also reflect Robert Mills's
pioneering spirit.
His Fireproof Building (Charleston)
demonstrated his commitment to the construction of facilities
capable of surviving the blazes then so destructive to wooden
structures. Mills was also concerned with improving the
acoustical qualities of churches and courthouses throughout
America, as is evident in his efforts to improve the acoustics of
the Old House of Representatives.
Structural acoustics and fireproofing numerous public
facilities were, of course, not the only concerns of Robert Mills.
Perhaps because of the influence of Jefferson, Mills was, though
a Southerner, opposed to slavery. Toward the latter portion of
his life, a period when sectional controversy would eventually
lead to civil war, he sought to unify the nation through his

Book Review Corner

405

architecture, an architecture promoting the strength of a united
America.
Rhodri Windsor Liscombe illustrates brilliantly each stage
and concern of Mills's life and career in this superbly written,
well-researched book. As the author of The Church Architecture
of Robert Mills (1985) and Robert Mills's Courthouses and Jails
(1982), Liscombe's knowledge of Mills's work is impressive.
Divided into six chronologically significant periods of Mills's
biographical and architectural development, the text vividly
recounts both the triumphs and the frustrations of the architect.
Of especial interest are the discussions of Mills's appointment
as Architect of the Public Buildings in 1836, and his subsequent
dismissal from that position six years later. Liscombe also
provides the reader with rich details of Mills's architectural
designs. Altogether American is thus an altogether fine
contribution to the study of American architecture.

Lawrence E. Klein, Shafieshury and the Culture of
Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in
Early Eighteenth-Century England (Cambrid^:
Cambridge University Press, 1994). Pp. xiii + 217.
$49.95.
Reviewed by D. N. DeLuna
The Johns Hopkins University
The writings of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third earl of
Shaftesbury—his Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions,
Times (1711) in particular—have frequently been mined for ideas
in such diverse areas of inquiry as ethics, aesthetics, and
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religious heterodoxy. Consequently, Shaftesbury has been
considered a "major minor" figure in eighteenth-century British
intellectual history. Lawrence Klein locates a recurrent and
unifying focus of concern in his ceuvre and makes a case for his
undisputed major status as a philosophical writer and thinker of
his age. Shaftesbury was, Klein declares, Britain's premier
"philosopher of politeness" (2).
Introductory pages of Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness
stress the importance of politeness as a "new cultural paradigm"
(10). In a post-revolutionary era in which norms of conduct
were guided less and less by Church and Court, the polite ideal
"of decorous, gentlemanly sociability" (8) emerged, according to
Klein, as the dominant model and standard for organizing social
life—emerging also when a new Town landscape of coffeehouses
and a deregulated press were producing nightmares of
"unsuperrised association and rampant conversability" (11).
Thus, Klein aims to provide a window to the age as he points
up the coherence and historical significance of Shaftesbury's
corpus of writing.
His book is in two parts. Part One traces Shaftesbury's
maturation as an innovative philosopher who claimed
ontological grounding for polite human relations and eventually
developed polite modes of doing philosophy, modes that, in
Klein's view, represented an effort to induce as well as theorize
about moral philosophy's goal of self-knowledge. Shaftesbury's
project of philosophizing on politeness, on continuous display
in his writings, is early on bound up with his persistent belief
that the human condition is always already mediated by
virtuous social affections that are in keeping with God's design
of a goodly universe of cooperative parts and groupings. True
politeness, philosophically defined by Shaftesbury, refers to a
virtuous condition of striking a proper balance between
autonomy and relatedness.
But, as Klein goes on to argue, Shaftesbury came to have
doubts and anxieties about this theory of polite existence as
abstractly articulated in these early works, for his notebooks
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record his struggle to register its truth in an existential way.
And this he accomplished, according to Klein, through
dialectical criticism, by which he would measure the value of
the sociable life by the standard of autonomy and vice versa,
finally recognizing the value of a synthetic "higher politeness"
(78) that steered a middle course between the extremes of
isolation and hypertrophied, or merely theatrical, sociability.
The notebooks are also said to exhibit a new literary style of
doing philosophy, which Shaftesbury felt might be used to
communicate his polite philosophy to others with transform
ative effect: self-dialogue that mirrored the dialectical process
and was modeled after the activity of gentlemen conversing
with one another easily and on a level.
A concluding chapter of Part One concentrates on how this
style is taken up in the Characteristicks, a work that is, we hear,
an anti-monologic essay collection in which the reprinted
Inquiry is ironically framed. The piece in the Characteristicks
said to command prestige of place is the reprinted "Moralists,"
which, in addition to being written in dialogue and being
"highly dialogic" (116), contains the character of Palemon, who
is described in the work as a gentleman inhabiting both the
fashionable and learned worlds, "the only well-bred Man who
wou'd have taken the Fancy to talk Philosophy in...a Circle of
good Company...in the Park" {Characteristicks
Robertson
ed., 11:179). As Klein sees it, "Palemon in the Park" is
something of an icon, figuring forth Shaftesbury's project of
joining philosophy to polite exchange (34-36, 115-16).
In today's academic context, the terms "dialogue" and
"conversation," along with the idea of opening philosophy to
dialogic forms, are likely to conjure images of populistic
inclusiveness. But the scene of Palemon's philosophical
conversation, in "a Circle of good Company" "in the Park" is,
Klein stresses, a reliable indicator of Shaftesbury's intention of
relocating philosophy into a sociable environment inhabited
only by an exclusive group of male aristocrats and other
gentlemen at the upper reaches of the social scale. Character-
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isticks, first published in a handsome folio edition and
containing innumerable instances in which Shaftesbury utilizes
classical learning as an intellectual resource and source of
rhetorical counters, was clearly intended to reach this audience.
Part Two elucidates how Shaftesbury in his Characteristicks
and other writings was concerned not only with making these
men wise and autonomous but also, and at the same time, with
"remaking the world in a gentlemanly image" (7). As Klein
presents it, Shaftesbury, drawing on the conceptual framework
provided by the civic humanist discourse of post-Restoration
oppositionalist politics, apparently became convinced that a
nation of socially elite men, transformed through dialectical
criticism into autonomous subjects and then grown proficient
in practicing this criticism in conversation with one another,
would galvanize great achievement in learning and the arts in
Britain. So Klein finds in Shaftesbury an early thinker on the
public sphere, and one for whom the concept meant something
quite different from Habermas's bourgeois sphere fostering
political constitutionalism: it was Britain's future ascendancy
in the sphere of high culture that depended on the formation of
a public critical sphere, and this sphere was envisioned as
comprising gentlemen of means refining one another's opinions
and tastes through verbal '^amicable Collision" ("Sensus
Communis," Characteristicks, Robertson, 1:46).
Kdein stresses that it was critical expression and enquiry,
rather than the acts of flattery and awed deference, which were
at the center of Shaftesbury's polite ideal. Indeed, a good deal
of Klein's book is given over to showing Shaftesbury to be an
exemplary practitioner of critical commentary, but on a level
beyond that of the catty debunking and sneering tone so
familiar to his modern readers. Klein demonstrates, for
example, that his polite philosophy took on the "egocentric"
philosophies of Hobbes and Locke, and that his theory of the
rewards to society at large challenged the familiar assumption
that cultural advancement was attendant on the support and
patronage provided by the institutions of Court and
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Church—and, moreover, as Klein shows, here, he was engaging
in partisan political polemic because he associated this
assumption with a Tory outlook and, in effect, tendered his
own theory as a new and specifically Whiggish cultural politics.
Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness is an original and
richly informative book. It will join the work of R. L. Brett,
A. O. Aldridge, and Stanley Grean as a classic study of
Shaftesbury. What is more, if we agree that politeness, however
variously defined by contemporaries in post-revolutionary
England, assumed the status of a compelling and widely
embraced ideal of personal conduct and social organization, it
follows, then, that Klein's Shaftesbury, conceiving of politeness
along philosophical and even visionary lines, should ensure that
the age is never again casually dismissed as quaint. We should
be grateful for this contribution to eighteenth-century studies
and intellectual history.

Greg Clingham,/izwies Boswelh The Life of Johnson.
Landmarks of World Literature (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992). Pp. xviii +
131. $34.95.
Reviewed by John J. Burke, Jr.
University of Alabama
There is no denying that the winds of change have been
sweeping through the field of literary studies, sometimes with
hurricane force. Anyone who might like to observe what
results those winds of change have brought us in the field of
Boswell studies need look no farther than Greg Clingham's

410

1650-1850

newly published volume on Boswell's Life of Johnson for the
Cambridge University Press's Landmarks of World Literature
series. What we have here is a book that bills itself as a new
introduction to a much beloved, much admired eighteenthcentury text, a work we once celebrated as a masterpiece of
English literature, and one that we would almost certainly
expect to qualify as a landmark of world literature. And what
does Greg Clingham have to tell us about Boswell's Life of
Johnson as a landmark of world literature? Basically, that we
need not bother with it any more, except, perhaps, as an
historical curiosity (124-7).
But why shouldn't we bother with it? What can possibly
account for the de-canonization of what we once thought was
one of the eighteenth century's most superb literary texts?
According to Clingham, the problem with Boswell's Life is
precisely the success it has enjoyed as literature. It has become
an end in itself rather than a means to an end, and so is the
principal reason we have the wrong idea of Johnson. The real
Samuel Johnson, that is, Johnson as he is revealed to us in his
writings, was, as far as Clingham is concerned, "a radically
different kind of man and thinker from the one portrayed by
Boswell" (94). In Clingham's view, Boswell was not intellectu
ally up to the task he had set for himself in his biography. His
was a pedestrian mind that never could quite deal with the
competing and perhaps contradictory demands of an art that
was at once both fictional and factual. Boswell's weakness as a
biographer of Johnson becomes especially evident in those
instances when he tries to act as a critic of Johnson's published
writings. Boswell, for instance, gets Rasselas all wrong. He
does this because he manages to confuse the whole with a part,
reducing the fullness of Johnson's meaning to Nekayah's
apparent endorsement of Christian teaching at the end of the
tale (86). Such moments of blindness tip us off to the basic
problem in the Life-. Boswell's inability to see beyond himself.
Johnson was, in fact, only an excuse for Boswell to talk about
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himself. Hence, his biography of Johnson has real value only
as thinly disguised autobiography.
This is evident, according to Clingham, even in the best
moments of the Life, such as the famous dinner with John
Wilkes that took place on May 15, 1776. Much as this has been
celebrated as an instance when Boswell shows us a Johnson who
was much latter—more relaxed, more sociable, more open—
than the typical stereotypes of him as narrow-minded and illtempered, this is not the case. Boswell's real purpose, according
to Clingham, was to belittle Johnson while enlarging himself
(70). What we really see in this scene is how easily Johnson
was manipulated by the vastly more intelligent and socially
adept James Boswell (70-2).
But here it seems to me is one instance where Clingham has
clearly missed the point of Boswell's text. At end of the scene,
Boswell quite carefully and quite consciously allows Johnson to
turn the tables on himself, and on John Wilkes, too. Boswell
is not belittling Johnson; he is, rather, clearly enlarging him.
Should anyone be interested in the details of how another
scholar can come to such an opposite conclusion about the very
same incident, he or she would be welcome to consult my
essay, "Talk, Dialogue, Conversation, and Other Kinds of
Speech Acts in Boswell's Life of Johnson,^ in Kevin Cope's
Compendious Conversations ([Peter Lang, 1992], 65-79).
Clingham misreads others things, too. He makes much of
the fact that Boswell turns our eyes away from Johnson during
the death scene (106). But the truth is Boswell did not himself
witness the death scene. He was in Scotland at the time of
Johnson's death, some 400 miles away. So he had to rely on
the testimony of others for his account of Johnson's death. But
this is only part of a larger failure on Clingham's part to take
into account how much testimony from others is included in
the Life. Boswell's Johnson is not, in fact, just Boswell's
Johnson. He is, rather, a compilation of the testimony of many
others, including Frank Barber, Sir Joshua Reynolds, Bennet
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Langton, the Rev. William Adams, Edmund Burke, Dr. Richard
Brocklesby, and John Hoole, to mention only a few.
Nor is it true to say—as Clingham does—that Boswell "took
every opportunity of doing down both Mrs Thrale and
Hawkins as serious biographers of Johnson" (59). He did
object, with good reason, to the "dark, uncharitable cast" of
Hawkins's biography and to Hester Thrale Piozzi's inaccuracies,
but he never really had to say much more. Their own
biographies were the best possible cases against them. Nor,
might I add, has Donald Greene proved that Boswell fabricated
many of the sayings he attributes to Johnson, as Clingham
claims on more than one occasion (45, 124-5), and no one
knows that better than Donald Greene himself. What might be
said to be true is that Greene has succeeded in raising doubts
about the full authenticity of a few of Johnson's more
notorious quips (most notably, "The woman's a whore, and
there's an end on't"). But by no stretch of the imagination can
we say that Greene has proved that Johnson did not say these
things. And that for a very good reason. Donald Greene was
not and could not have been present at the moments when
those things are reported to have been said, so he is in no
position either to confirm or deny what was or wasn't said with
certainty, much less with absolute assurance.
But Clingham's willingness to accept as proof what clearly
is not proof is but one more instance of his disturbing eagerness
to seize on any information that is unfavorable to Boswell.
And that in itself is but a symptom of what is really wrong
with his book. According to Clingham's view of the world,
people respond to Boswell's Life either as Boswellians or as
Johnsonians (5). The Boswellians are those who are delighted
with the literary picture of Johnson they are presented with in
the Life, and think no more about it. Johnsonians, on the
other hand, are appalled by the Life because in it they see the
man they revere reduced to a mere caricature. It may well be
that there are some on the extremes who fit such character
izations, but it is far more likely that many of us, possibly most
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of us, don't fit into either camp. Yet Clingham—perhaps
because he is so clearly himself a Johnsonian—seems unable to
conceive of a world where readers might be both Boswellians
and Johnsonians, that is, fully able to appreciate what both
writers have to offer us even if it is quite different, and what is
more able to feel all the richer precisely because we live in a
world that is both/and rather than either/or.
For all the things that seem to be wrong with Clingham's socalled introduction to the Life of Johnson, there is one point on
which he and I do agree. He points his finger at the gap he
says exists between our imaginative experience with Johnson in
Boswell's biography and our reading experience of him when
we devote ourselves to his best work as a writer. I agree. That
gap does exist. I have felt it myself, so has Clingham, and so
have many others. To come upon, say, any one of several
Rambler or Idler essays, or The Life of Savage, or the Preface to
Shakespeare, or the Dictionary as a whole or in parts, or A
Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, or even or maybe
especially Johnson's brief review of Soame Jenyns's Free Inquiry
into the Nature and Origin of Evil, is to experience a sudden
jolt. For these pieces by Johnson are far denser, far more
stimulating, and much more richly satisfying than anything we
might be led to expect after reading in Boswell's Life.
On this count, then, I agree with Clingham. The gap is
there. How to account for that gap and what to make of it are
challenging theoretical problems. But Clingham only seems to
want to find in that gap the evidence he needs for a final
condemnation of Boswell's L^^. It does not, he says, lead us
into Johnson's works; instead, "the Life has convinced readers
of the possibility of understanding Johnson fully without taking
into consideration his works" (3). But if that is so (and I am
not entirely sure that it is), the problem is with readers, not
with the Life. What is more, to ask Boswell's Life to lead
directly to Johnson's writings is to ask it to do what no other
biography has ever done or perhaps could ever do. It's like
asking the Empire State Building to be the Brooklyn Bridge.
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why should Boswell's biography—or any other biography for
that matter—be asked to do what it was never designed to do?
Or does Clingham have a quarrel with the very nature of
biography? Boswell wrote his biography for an audience that
was, by and lar^e, familiar with Johnson's published work.
There was no need to quote from pieces already familiar to the
public. Boswell included instead those items with which the
public was not likely to be familiar, a good many of his familiar
letters, excerpts from his diaries, and, of course, his own record
of Johnson's talk and conversation.
What is missing in this most recent introduction to Boswell's
Life of Johnson is a necessary sense of balance. To read
Clingham is to enter into a kind of Manichaean critical world
where light and darkness, good and evil, struggle with one
another for the soul of the reader. Boswell pulls on us from
one direction, and Johnson's writings pull on us from another.
If Boswell proves the more powerful of the forces, then
darkness has indeed swallowed up the light. But this is the stuff
of fairy tales. Clingham, I am sure, would want to classify me
as a Boswellian, but though I certainly value Boswell as a
writer, I would not want to find myself in the position of
having to defend everything that he ever said or did. As a
matter of fact, he did and said things that I do not like and, in
a few cases, he did and said things that I find positively
embarrassing. His sophomoric ode on the supposed upcoming
nuptials between Johnson and the newly widowed Mrs. Thrale
is one example that springs readily to mind. Others, I am sure,
would like to classify me as a Johnsonian because they know
that, like Clingham, I believe Johnson to be one of the greatest
writers in English literature. But much as I admire Samuel
Johnson the writer, I would certainly not want to defend
everything that he ever wrote. It may be easy enough to
defend the Johnson of the Ramblers that Clingham is so fond
of quoting, or the Johnson of Rasselas, or perhaps even Johnson
the great critic, but there is much more to Johnson than those
works, and some of it certainly proves awkward.
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There is, after all, another side to Johnson, a side that
Clingham keeps carefully out of sight. We may esteem Johnson
as a great critic, but we are also forced to admit that, though he
thought poorly of Milton's "Lycidas," somewhat strangely, he
thought very highly of Richard Savage's poetry. We may also
get uncomfortable when we remember that, much as we value
him as a critic of Shakespeare, he also made clear that he
believed Shakespeare's comedies to be far superior to his
tragedies, a notion that has not found many adherents in the
more than two hundred years that have followed the publica
tion of that opinion in his Preface to Shakespeare.
But perhaps we should turn to Johnson's Lives of the Poets.
Clingham has much to say in praise of these pieces in his book,
so I am presuming he would rather send a new generation of
readers here. But what I would like to know is, would he be
willing to send them to Johnson's Lives of Blackmore, Watts,
Pomfret, and Yalden? I ask about them rather than about the
Lives of Milton, Dryden, or Pope because these were the names
Johnson added to the list of poets he received from the
publishers. That action—which had nothing to do with
Boswell—virtually commands us to look anew at the poetry
that so won Johnson's esteem. Yet, somehow or another I
doubt that Clingham would be very excited about sending a
new generation of readers to these parts of Johnson's Lives of
the Poets. Those Lives, I more than suspect, don't really
illustrate the Johnson he has in mind. These four poets were
all noted for their public commitment to Christianity, and that
seems to have been Johnson's principal reason for trying to
bring them within the canon of English poetry. But Johnson's
own very public commitment to Christianity does not seem to
be one of Clingham's favorite topics. On more than one
occasion he speaks of Boswell's notion of Johnson as a
Christian hero with some discomfort and even with a hint of
disdain (79-80, 86-8, 97, 118). Clingham seems to believe that
Boswell put too much emphasis on Johnson's Christianity;
hence, no doubt, his distaste for Boswell's interpretation of
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Rasselas. But is it really possible to screen out Christianity and
still deal fully and honestly with Johnson's writings?
And then there is the matter of Johnson's political writings,
of which we have been hearing so much in recent times.
Perhaps Clingham would like to send a new generation of
readers to one of Johnson's political pamphlets, say, to Taxation
No Tyranny. Or, perhaps even better, to The False Alarm. In
that pamphlet, a new generation of readers can watch the writer
Clingham believes should be their hero defending the cause of
law and order in late eighteenth-century Britain. I am sure they
will be duly inspired by the logical twists and turns involved in
declaring Henry Luttrell "lawfully elected" to the British
Parliament in an election where he received 296 votes, while
John Wilkes received only 1,143. Such arithmetic would
certainly give new meaning to any idea of representative
government. Greg Clingham faults Boswell's Life of Johnson
because it does not, he says, lead its readers directly to
Johnson's writings. But, I ask, is that really such a bad thing?

w
E. P. Thompson, Witness Against the Beast: William
Blake and the Moral Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993). Published but not released;
price and final pagination to be announced.
Reviewed by Mark Houlahan
University of Waikato
Soon after first reading Witness Against the Beast, I attended
a conference where I was introduced to a visitor from England
as someone who worked on "seventeenth-century mad people."
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On that occasion I was speaking of Diggers, and have been
known to rant in public. Nevertheless, I bridled at this
dismissal both of my own endeavors and those of early modern
pamphleteers. In its small way, this offhand comment struck
me as a clear example of "the enormous condescension of
posterity" from which E. P. Thompson attempted, throughout
his writing life, to rescue "the poor stockinger, the Luddite
cropper, the 'obsolete' hand-loom weaver, the 'utopian' artisan,
and even the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott" (see
Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class, 12). He
was a pioneer, of course, in writing such histories "from
below." Moreover, he specialized in what we might call
"history from within," for his various rescue attempts are
marked by an empathy both for the socio-economic plight in
which his subjects found themselves and for the ways they
sought to understand and change that milieu. In other words,
he was a pioneer also of what, in English departments, is now
called "cultural studies" and what historians call mentalites:
"ambience...a whole vocabulary of discourse, of legitimation and
of experience" (see Thompson's Customs in Common, 2). As
the code word "discourse" suggests here, Thompson was also
profoundly interested in the texts with which his artisans and
croppers structured their world. He and Christopher Hill seem
to me still unrivalled in their ability to evoke the force of those
texts. Thompson's first book was a study of William Morris;
now, fittingly, his last returns to the literature of history and
the continuing power of the writings of William Blake, "a plank
in the floor upon which the future must walk" (228).
Blake is one of the literary heroes of the Making of the
English Working Class, where Thompson suggests that Blake's
"own beautiful vision of Jerusalem...in its modification of
attitudes and nourishment of new aspirations...was perhaps as
long-lasting in its influence as the ailments of Tom Paine"
(130). Clearly, Blake nourished Thompson's own historical
imagination for decades. Witness Against the Beast is not so
much a magisterial account of that nourishment as it is a series
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of essays exploring the sources and force of Blake's "own
beautiful vision." This vision Thompson places squarely within
the milieu of his own counter-Enlightenment heroes; one of the
book's strongest chapters is entitled "Anti-hegemony." Here,
Blake is linked with those whom Thompson has studied with
such passion, whose antipathy to the emergent capitalism in
eighteenth-century England (and the consequent failing of the
pre-capitalist moral economy) was expressed in the language of
Protestant dissent. In particular, Thompson claims Blake as an
antinomian, committed to the doctrine of free grace being
sufficient for salvation, freed thereby from the doctrines of
Works, Morality and Legality, which could be found in settled
dissenting churches as well as in Anglican parishes throughout
England. To reject these ideologies was, in Thompson's terms,
to reject also the social structures that those ideologies so
effectively propped up. The best chapter of the book, to my
mind, shows how these anti-hegemonic impulses framed the
searing cadences of Blake's "London," which Thompson finely
describes as "a literal poem and...also an apocalyptic one; or, we
may say that it is a poem whose moral realism is so searching
that it is raised to the intensity of apocalyptic vision" (187).
Thompson shows, in other words, how the rhetoric and
imagery of apocalypse illuminates the specific oppressions of
counter-revolutionary London of the early 1790s.
That combination links Blake with the apocalypticists of the
1650s, the Ranters, the Diggers, the early Quakers and, of
course, the Muggletonians. For Thompson's claim is not just
that the crisis of the 1790s called forth social critiques voiced in
the language of Christian prophecy, just as it did in the 1650s,
but that there is also a direct link between these two periods.
Throughout the long eighteenth century, those attitudes are
kept alive by being passed from one witness to the next, and
key texts from the 1650s are available in London throughout
the 1790s. In particular, Thompson tracks the pronounced
similarities between Muggletonian doctrine and Blake's socioreligious theories. His unprovable hunch is that Blake's

Book Review Corner

419

mother, Catherine, may have come from a Muggletonian family
and, through "crooning...to baby William on her lap" (105),
provided the basis of Muggletonian imagery and symbolism
from which Blake's poems emerged.
The Muggletonian archive, which Thompson himself
rediscovered, proves that Blake was not a card-carrying member
of the Muggletonian church; Thompson depicts Blake not as
endorsing its literal doctrines but as deploying its imagery "as
a fund of imaginative possibilities and as intellectual footholds
for an anti-Enlightenment stance" (105). Now, Muggletonian
doctrines are puzzling and arcane (though no more so than
Blake's own prophetic books), and this specific theory must
remain as tentative as it was when Thompson gave the
Alexander lectures in Toronto in 1978, of which this book is a
much-delayed and much-expanded version. Even if one
discounts Blake's mother, one must still deal with the cogency
of Thompson's vision of Blake and of the long eighteenth
century: that "a tract of secret history, buried like the Great
Plain of Gwaelod beneath the sea" (542), links the rhetoric of
revolution from 1650 through to 1790; that Blake drank deep
of that rhetoric, acquired from familial and social sources rather
than from the arcana of scholarship, from lived reality as much
as recondite libraries, and that Blake's resulting texts are
compassionate, apocalyptic and deeply humane.
This last claim, of course, could also be made of Witness
Against the Beast. It shows just how powerful the "old"
historicism can be, and what a fine writer Thompson himself
was. Its conclusions will, I suspect, be too bold for Blakeans to
adopt holus-bolus, but Witness will still bear reading both as a
passionate contribution to Blake scholarship and as a lucid
summation of Thompson's own "good old cause."
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David M. Whalen, The Consolation of Rhetoric
John Henry Newman and the Realism of Personalist
Thought (San Francisco and London: Catholic
Scholars Press, 1994). Pp. xii + 257. Cloth: $59.95.
Papen $39.95.
Reviewed by Terry G. Harris
Louisiana State University in Shreveport
The title The Consolation of Rhetoric is perhaps not likely to
attract a wide audience of readers, but this book deserves a very
wide audience indeed. As the foreword by Ralph Mclnerny
and the preface by Dennis Quinn suggest, David Whalen's
study of John Henry Newman gives both life and contempo
rary relevance to the work of this major nineteenth-century
literary/cultural figure. Some will no doubt conclude that in
seeming to limit Newman to rhetorical analysis, the book's
focus is too narrow, but in reality the rhetorical analysis
becomes the means by which the reader can come to a greater
appreciation of all aspects of Newman's life and work. Thus,
this book will properly appeal to students with wide-ranging
interests, including literature, religious studies, linguistics, and
philosophy. It is a study of Newman, but it is also a study of
intellectual history.
Whalen opens his study with an anecdote that serves as a
springboard for the overriding assertion of his book: "New
man's thought was so profoundly rhetorical, that rhetorical
modes of reasoning dominated his thought about virtually any
subject throughout his life" (3). This statement allows Whalen
to distinguish his study of Newman's rhetoric from those who
see that rhetoric lai^ely in terms of stylistic art only, and he
continues to establish the boundaries and framework of his
analysis by surveying the various traditions in which Newman
has been read, most notably Newman as philosopher or
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Newman as theologian. While claiming that Newman is
neither an Aristotelian nor a Thomist, Whalen nevertheless
argues that to read Newman in these two traditions illuminates
the true, rhetorical nature of Newman's thought. Aristotle
serves as Newman's "keystone and touchstone of formal
reasoning" (13), and the Thomistic tradition "allows his
understanding of knowledge and truth to stand clearly in its
proper relation to being, intellect and personality" (15).
Whalen thus stakes out his territory, distinguishing his study
from critical, philosophical readings that see Newman as skeptic
(Harold Weatherby is prominently mentioned in this regard) or
Newman as phenomenologist (for example., Edward Sillem, A.
J. Boekraad, J. H. Walgrave).
Additionally, Whalen carefully distinguishes his study from
Walter Jost's relatively recent analysis, which also, in Whalen's
words, "attemptfs] a radically rhetorical synthesis of Newman's
thought" (4). But Jost, by aligning Newman with twentiethcentury "epistemic" rhetoricians such as Kenneth Burke,
Richard McKeon, George Campbell, Stanley Fish, Nicholas
Lash, Chaim Perelman, and Steven Toulmin, suspends
Newman's thought "upon the twin horns of epistemic,
moderate relativism: certainty without determinacy, truth
without demonstrability." The result is an undermining of "the
very real epistemic force of [Newman's] mind and writings" (5).
Much of the discussion of the distinctions between Whalen's
study and these others occurs later in the body of the book, but
the opening chapter splendidly establishes the book's thesis,
outlines its objectives, and places it in relation to other studies
of Newman.
The next nine chapters form three sets of three chapters
each, though nothing in the numbering or organization of the
chapters indicates such an arrangement. The first group of
three examines, in order, the goal of Newman's rhetorical
knowledge—truth, the purpose of his habit of mind—as a pastor
of souls, and the means by which he shares his thought,
knowledge, and insight—personal identification with others.
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The next group of three examines the rhetorical tradition,
beginning with the patristic and medieval eras, moving into the
Renaissance, and, finally, into the eighteenth century. The goal
of the survey is to reveal the wrong turns in the history and
thus demonstrate that "Newman's intellectual mission was
largely an attempted restoration of the highly personal modes
of rhetorical knowledge and discourse" (127). The last group of
three examines Newman's Philosophical Notebook and Grammar
of Assent to show that even in works with an admitted
philosophical component, Newman's habit of mind remains
deeply rhetorical. Throughout the study, Whalen argues that
Newman's rhetorical approach applies to everything he wrote,
but Whalen privileges the Grammar of Assent as the "single
text" in which Newman brings together "his theory and
practice of rhetorical personalism, the purposive character of his
life's work, and his vision of fallen man in quest of rectification
of mind and soul" (161).
As evidence of the order and control Whalen has over his
presentation, the concluding paragraph of each chapter provides
an excellent summary and a forecast of what is to come in the
next chapter. As the book progresses, these summaries gain
cumulative force. However, if one were to read only these
summary paragraphs, then one would miss the carefully detailed
analysis. In this study, the trip is as much fun as arriving at the
destination.
A major focus of the concluding chapter is the study of
Newman's rhetorical thought by Walter Jost. By explaining the
differences between Jost's view and his own, Whalen both
identifies Jost's deficiencies and recapitulates his own argument.
As he rounds off his discussion, Whalen brings the reader full
circle fifty years later. Whereas he opened the study with an
anecdote detailing a meeting between Newman and Dr. Thomas
Arnold, he concludes with an anecdote detailing a meeting
between Newman and the adult Matthew Arnold. In both
instances, the anecdotes allow him to emphasize the personal
level upon which Newman's rhetorical approach depends.
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Although Whalen includes biographical details throughout
his analysis, the liveliness with which he relates the opening and
closing biographical anecdotes and the ease with which he
integrates them leave the reader wishing for more such
biographical exposition. Perhaps Whalen might want to
consider a biography as his next project. In any case, his
writing throughout is thoughtful, lucid, and, above all,
understandable. It is true that some of the terminology of
formal, classical rhetoric finds its way into the discussion, but
even readers without significant background or training in
rhetoric will be able to follow the explanations. That is indeed
refreshing in these days of studies that seem to depend upon
code language of fashionable schools of critical thought. By
focusing on rhetoric, Whalen infuses his study with a reason
ableness that underscores its believability. In short. The
Consolation of Rhetoric is now and will remain a valuable and
significant contribution both to Newman studies and to the
history of ideas.

w
David A. Hollinger and Charles Capper, eds., The
American Intellectual Tradition: A Sourcehook. 2nd
ed., 2 volumes (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993). Volume I: Pp. xv -f- 467; Volume II: pp.
xiii + 429. Cloth, $39.95 each volume. Paper,
$18.95 each volume.
Reviewed by Stephen C. Brennan
Louisiana State University in Shreveport
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In this expanded anthology for college courses in American
intellectual history, David A. Hollinger and Charles Capper
have collected more than eighty primary texts that document
the "family of disagreements" (I:vii) making up the American
intellectual tradition. The editors have organized the selections
around eight topics. Volume I, covering the period from 1630
to 1865, has five sections: "The Puritan Vision," "Republican
Enlightenment," "Evangelical Democracy," "Romanticism and
Reform," and "The Quest for Union." Volume II, covering the
period from 1865 to the present, has only three sections:
"Toward a Secular Culture," "Social Progress and the Power of
Intellect," and "To Formulate the Modern." A two- or threepage introduction, including a selective but reasonably extensive
bibliography, establishes the context for each section, and a
headnote with bibliography does the same for each author.
Appendices list year by year important American documents,
European documents, and political, social, and cultural events.
The headnotes, which seldom run much more than half a page
for even major figures such as Emerson, often seem too brief to
"highlight the dense interiority of each document as well as the
setting in which it was produced" (I:viii), but since the editors
offer the collection as a sourcebook and not a systematic
interpretation, this brevity is a minor drawback. The last
section on the modern is something of a loose bag; nevertheless,
the collection is an excellent text for courses in American
intellectual history, and it offers teachers of American literature
a fresh look at familiar works in a broader context.
Volume I of The American Intellectual Tradition contains
many works often found in literature anthologies: Winthrop's
sermon "A Modell of Christian Charity," Franklin's scheme of
moral perfection from The Autobiography, Emerson's "SelfReliance," Fuller's "The Great Lawsuit," Thoreau's "Resistance
to Civil Government." But the familiar story of Puritan fervor
declining into rational enlightenment and reemei^ing in
romanticism takes on broader implications as one reads through
the sections on "Evangelical Democracy" and "The Quest for
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Union." In the former, Charles Grandison Finney's 1835
lecture "What a Revival of Religion Is" makes for especially
interesting reading. Insisting that man's will is impotent
without grace, that God employs "the ordinary rules of cause
and effect" (1:195) in regenerating man's will, and that individu
als should not only achieve an understanding of their duty but
"put it in practice, and go to work" (l:20l), Finney seems a
transitional figure offering a rationalized Puritanism ending in
Emersonian self-reliance. Equally interesting in relation to the
political question of union is the selection from John C.
Calhoun's A Disquisition on Government from the late 1840s.
In a curious defense of individual inequality, Calhoun argues a
theory of the state as an "organism" (1:368) that can act only
with the unanimous consent of all interest groups, yet he asserts
that each interest group is sovereign and can exercise an
absolute veto power over all other groups. And so Calhoun
curiously manages to extend the romantic paradox of the
individual as part and particle of God to the defense of states'
rights and slavery.
If the story implicit in volume I is the triumph of romanti
cism, the story of volume II is largely the triumph of humanism
and pragmatism. Josiah Royce's 1898 essay "The Problem of
Job" carries forward the tradition of romantic idealism in
identifying human suffering as necessary to the "perfected" life
of the "Absolute Being" (6:68), yet it also anticipates Teddy
Roosevelt in celebrating a "strenuous" life of "triumphant
warfare" and "endless service" (11:74). William Graham Sumner
may sound the Social Darwinist's warning against breaking
natural laws by helping the weak and unfortunate, but the
dominant voices—from William James, W. E. B. DuBois, and
Meridel LeSueur to Martin Luther King, Adrienne Rich, and
Betty Friedan—speak out for the possibilities of effecting social
change and humanizing the world.
One finishes these essays with the sense that America has
failed many of its citizens—blacks, women, homosexuals—but
one also has an inspiring vision of an American that reconciles
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the one and the many. The emotional climax is Richard
Rorty's 1986 essay "Science as Solidarity." Going beyond
Thomas Kuhn in arguing the dependence of science on culture,
Rorty offers a pragmatic view of all "objective truth," scientific
and other, as "intersubjective agreement" (11:361). In Rorty's
Utopian "heyday of the fuzzy," academia would be something
of a multicultural paradise in which academic disciplines
"denote communities whose boundaries were as fluid as the
interests of their members" and whose numbers' ultimate
loyalty was to "the latter community" devoted to "the
preservation and enhancement of civilization" (11:368). If the
collection has a major drawback, it is that the concluding halfdozen selections do not reflect recent intense disagreements over
just this question of multiculturalism. Our intellectual
tradition, Mr. Hollinger and Mr. Capper inform us, is "a family
of disagreements." They would more accurately represent the
current state of the family if they were to give voice to
conflicting opinions about how to make one culture out of the
American many.

Arthur Versluis, American Transcendentalism and
Asian Religions (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993). Pp. 355. $48.00.
Lenore Thomas-Ealy
The Johns Hopkins University
Space and time, the dimensions in which we live, are
comprised of similarly paradoxical fabrics. Travel far enough
to the West, we cross the international dateline and suddenly
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find ourselves in the East. The opposite ends of time, too, can
appear to meet when examined through human history. The
paradoxical relationships between past and future, between East
and West, emerge in Arthur Versluis's comprehensive account
of the Orientalism of the American Transcendentalists.
Versluis' study steps into a void left by Edward Said's landmark
Orientalism (1978), which attended not at all to the engagement
of the Transcendentalists with Oriental religious texts and
traditions. Versluis draws upon Said both for his starting point
and for part of his interpretive framework and offers us a broad
account of the ways in which the Transcendentalists read,
assimilated, and popularized the increasing amount of informa
tion made available to them about Eastern religions.
Versluis has delved deeply into Transcendentalist literature
reaching from the 1830s to the 1880s, from Emerson and
Thoreau to Samuel Johnson and Moncure Conway. Essays,
sermons, monographs, periodicals, personal correspondence, and
newspaper accounts of Transcendentalist discussion clubs
comprise a vast body of literature. From these, Versluis has
constructed an account of Transcendentalism in which
increasing encounters with non-Judeo-Christian religions seem
to have catalyzed the movement of Protestant Christianity
through Unitarianism to its radical conclusion in a rejection of
tradition and an embrace of universal religion. Emerson and
Thoreau are shown to have assimilated Eastern religious
language sympathetically and judiciously in their construction
of a largely literary religion, finding felicitous expressions in
Asian religions of their owii emphases on moral discipline and
self-transcendence. Versluis finds in later Transcendentalism
less positive assimilation and more of a tendency to interpret
Asian religions from within a worldview governed by notions
of progress, evolution, and a millenialist-inspired expectation of
an imminent golden age of a true universal religion.
In Transcendentalist journals and writings of the second-cycle
Transcendentalists such as Lydia Maria Child and James
Freeman Clark, Versluis shows the tensions that arose when
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Transcendentalists tried to synthesize the concepts of universalism and progress. Were non-Judeo-Christian religious traditions
merely evidences of ancient primitive superstitions past which
Christianity, then Protestant Christianity, then Unitarian
Transcendentalism had progressed, or did they provide
insightful truths that would be absorbed and manifested in the
emerging universal religion.? Transcendentalist authors were
neither agreed on nor consistent in these matters, but Versluis
suggests that, for the most part, they were more positive in
their uses of Asian religions than were orthodox and evangelical
Christians, who generally denigrated foreign traditions. Versluis
helpfully compares the treatment of Asian religions in generalinterest American magazines and Transcendentalist journals and
suggests that the Transcendentalists' readings of Asian religions
marked an important step toward positive Orientalism and
religious pluralism in an increasingly heterogeneous American
culture.
The concepts of positive and negative Orientalism can be
traced back to Said, who has recently reflected in The Times
Literary Supplement (February 3, 1995, 3-6) on the fate of his
Orientalism. There, he has clarified his objections to what he
calls "Orientalism," noting that his criticism arises when the
study of "Oriental languages, societies and peoples" is expanded
into a system and "approaches a heterogeneous, dynamic and
complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist
standpoint." Such an approach, Said claims, "suggests both an
enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring
Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar and, so
to speak, from above." Versluis adopts briefly, backs away
from, and finally adapts Said's use of "colonialism," in which
scholarship is seen as a tool of political and, especially,
imperialist expansionism. The Transcendentalist embrace of
progress implicitly endorsed the concept of Western superiority
and was supportive of manifest destiny. Nevertheless, Versluis
concludes that Transcendentalism proved more a congenial kind
of literary colonialism. The individualist tendencies of the
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Transcendentalists, even of those whose motives began to shift
from religious to social concerns, made them incapable of
establishing anything resembling a "school," and by the 1880s
there was no longer what could be even considered a coherent
Transcendentalist conversation.
If Versluis's book provides an important complement to
Said's work, it misses several opportunities to contribute even
more to our understanding of the intellectual atmosphere that
led to the American Civil War. Important studies, especially
the work of Eugene Genovese, which have begun to read
seriously antebellum Southern authors, are showing that the
Civil War disrupted an important American debate over
progress. Progress needed to be both material and moral, and
Northerners and Southerners were engaged in sometimes
radically divergent efforts to link the two with both economic
and theological arguments. Versluis points to the tensions
between mercantilism and industrialization and religion as he
explores Emerson's and Thoreau's discomfort with the ideology
of progress, but he doesn't capitalize on the opportunity to
explore more fully how readings of Asian religions contributed
to a heterodox and Northern critique of the emerging modern
economy and its perceived social and personal ills.
Versluis's short chapter on the Transcendentalist dissenters
Melville and Brownson is particularly welcome, but it again
tempts us to expand our horizons and consider Brownson's
rejection of Transcendentalist individualism and appropriation
of Eastern teachings in the broader context of contemporary
American social thought. Furthermore, Versluis's claim that
the Transcendentalists efforts were directed toward religious
pluralism suffers from an insufficient definition of pluralism.
The expectation of a universal religion and the use of Asian
religious beliefs to demonstrate the moving wheels of progress
seem less to lay the groundwork for religious pluralism than to
seek the dissolution of independent religious traditions.
Brownson's critique at least implies this point about Transcen
dentalism, but Versluis doesn't draw it out. The assertion sits
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uncomfortably in a treatment that is sufficiently literary but less
thematic and theoretical than desired by this reader.
As a whole, American Transcendentalism and Asian Religions
is a significant contribution, providing an abundance of material
to introduce students of literature and comparative religion as
well as historians and political theorists to an important aspect
of the thought of the Transcendentalists. Though this study
does not itself bridge geography and time and allow us to
interpret American Unitarianism and Transcendentalism as
outgrowths of problems stemming from the Renaissance (which
issued in the modern vision of a pluralist world) and the
Reformation (which initiated the fragmentation of Christianity),
it does set a pylon on which other scholars can begin to build
that bridge. Versluis's work reinforces Said's recent assertion
that "cultures and civilizations are so interrelated and interde
pendent as to beggar any unitary or simply delineated
description of their individuality." The Transcendentalists'
appropriation of Asian religions within what might be called a
Renaissance-Platonic vision of the ultimate unity of truth can,
perhaps, teach us a thing or two about the possibility of
pluralism without succumbing to the dangers of relativism or
dogmatism. As West and East have infused one another across
space, so our knowledge of the past and our expectations for
the future join to shape our understandings of the present time.
Versluis's study provides insights and raises questions to expand
our inquiries in both dimensions.

EDITOR'S CHOICE
Underapplauded Books

Malcolm Jack, ed., The Episodes of Vathek (Sawtry,
Cambridgpshire: Dedalus, 1994). Pp. 207. $9.95.
Never a leading vehicle in the fast-lane of academic trends,
"Beckford studies" has always Been a kink in the road for
scholars who, like Beckford's mad-mother character Carathis,
are eager to race straight ahead into the infernal "Eblis" of
critical with-itness. On the one hand, Beckford would seem to
epitomize that most diffuse of contemporary critical ideals,
"inclusivity." Beckford's zeal for the exotic, his mastery of
third-world literature, his numerous and vacillating sexual
orientations, his disdain for authority, his fascination with
paranormality, his diabolism, his psychological complexity, his
attraction-repulsion complex regarding religion—all these savor
of "multiculturalism." Alas, on the other hand, the sheer
facticity of Beckford—the fact that he really was a non-conform
ist in life as well as in theory—have made him a dangerous
commodity for devotees of mainstream revolutionary criticism.
So does Beckford's defiance of postmarxist stereotypes:
plutocrat Beckford, after all, lived at the center of the
establishment, yet he did far more anti-establishment deeds than
any old streetcorner bluestocking. It is far easier to imagine
Beckford building (or, more likely, hiring Philippe de Louther431
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bourg to build) a monster than it is to imagine dainty Mary
Shelley patching together Frankenstein's body parts, let alone
inviting Boris KarlofF for tea.
Three calamities have resulted from the outcasting of
Beckford by both revolutionaries and reactionaries; first, even
Beckford's "major" works, despite widespread admiration by
canonical writers from Byron to Goethe, are hard to come by;
second, Beckford is remembered only as the author of Vathek,
the remainder of his admittedly scattered oeuvre falling into
oblivion; third, college curricula omit or distort the career of
this influential author. Like some benevolent version of
Beckford's jinns or afrits, Malcolm Jack has now materialized
with a sovereign remedy for all these academic ills: a handsome
yet inexpensive edition of Beckford's Episodes of Vathek.
True, the motivationally challenged Beckford spent a good
deal of his life clipping scandalous stories about buggering
priests from the yellowed pages of rural tabloids. Yet Beckford
was far from finishing his serious literary career with the
composition of Vathek. Although paranoid Beckford denied
even friends the opportunity to read his unpublished Episodes,
the reputation (or, more accurately, the legend) of these
companion pieces to Vathek spread far and wide during
Beckford's lifetime. Readers of Jack's enticing edition will
encounter in these "minor" works numerous compelling
recollections and echoes of Beckford's first masterpiece.
Vathek's arid plain of black sand reappears after a rain:
At last we reached the Miry desert. But there our hearts
failed us, so evil and horrible was the place. Picture to
yourself an immense tract of land covered with thick
black mud
^neither pathways, nor trees, nor any
beasts save certain swine that wallowed in the filth, and
added to its horror. (144)
The Caliph of Fonthill has obviously not abandoned the
masterful mixture of sublimity and bathos, horror and irony

Editor's Choice

433

that made Vathek into a famously neglected serio-comic classic.
Indeed, Beckford's skill at searingly serious satire seems to have
overleapt the generations. Jack's "Introduction" evidences some
of the same engagingly sardonic, darkly brilliant wit:
Throughout the adventures of all these actors, surrounded
as they are by evil spirits (afrits), ghostly creatures, and an
array of eunuchs, negresses, and priests always found in
attendance in Beckford's stories, the progress of human
evil is charted. (13)
One could scarcely ask for a more Beckfordian ragout of
antiquarian detail, neoclassical precision, gentle Johnsonian
mockery, sober didacticism, early modern cartography, moral
explication, and good-natured erudition.
Like Beckford's densely scholarly bagatelles. Jack's "Introduc
tion" abounds with evocatively understated information. Into
a two-page summary of Beckford's life Jack packs an amazing
amount of instruction: accounts of Beckford's awkward family
relations, of his numerous scandals, of his travels, of his
psychological difficulties, of his preoccupation with the oriental
tale, of his eccentric and to some extent abortive education, and
of the bibliographical details of his publications. The open
umbrella of Jack's easygoing style is able to cover everything
from the Shakespearian influence (Carathis as Lady Macbeth) to
Beckford's exile in Switzerland (on the run from sodomy
charges). Rather than getting caught up in sunimarizing all the
Episodes, Jack wisely chooses The Story of Prince Alasi and
Princess Firouzkah as his paradigm case, allowing readers to
extrapolate from his interpretative suggestions while indepen
dently studying other stories. Jack's elegant preliminary
discussion lays out with Palladian clarity the stark, basic
themes—good and evil, the inevitability of damnation, the
universality of perversity, the alienation and boredom inherent
in modern life, the unexpected synonymy of fantasy windowdressing with anguished melancholy—that drive Beckford's
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relentless prose. Amidst all this largesse, Jack works in plenty
of useful comments about Beckford's reputation and influence
over the centuries.
Even an author so committed to imprudence as Fonthill's
self-styled "Abbot" must face up to the practical and material
side of publishing. Jack's edition fills a crying need in both
eighteenth-century scholarship and eighteenth-century pedagogy:
it makes works that often elude university libraries available to
a large audience, and it does so cheaply, without any compro
mise in quality. From its exotic but wittily postmodern
"Ganesha-meets-a-newly-empowered-female-citizen-of-the-thirdworld-at-a-decentered-30°-angle" cover design to its splendid
typography and on to its superior economy paper, this book is
a pleasure to use and to handle, even for demandingly sensuous
Beckfordians. It is instructive that Jack's publisher bills itself
not as a scholarly house but as "the UK's leading publisher of
literary fantasy," an indication that Beckford may have a large
popular market. Certainly this serendipitous association with
Dr. Who, Bilbo Baggins, and possibly Captain Kirk would
amuse the mordant Sultan of Bath. It is to be hoped that the
aptly named Dedalus Press will follow the overweening Vathek
by defying precedent, in this case by bringing out editions of all
of Beckford's neglected writings.
Jack's The Episodes of Vathek belongs at the top of the list of
required reading for just about everyone who has a free and
inquiring (if slightly whimsical) mind. Jack's is a book that is
equally eligible for classroom adoption, for collector's shelves,
for Dungeon-and-Dragon players' resource files, and for
professional dix-huitiemistes. A landmark in scholarship. Jack's
Episodes is a wry monument to the antimonumentality of the
early Romantic period—a leaning tower of Pisa that tantalizes
us with tales of collapse, devastation, and apocalypse but that,
in its careful integrity and perdurable conception, will never
fall. — KEVIN L. COPE

PROFESSIONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Newly Founded

THE BECKFORD SOCIETY
encourage interest in the life and
I® works of William Beckford (1760-1844),
best known for Vathek and the building
of Fonthill Abbey, an international Beckford
Society has been formed.
The Society will publish an annual journal.
The Beckford Journal^ and occasional newslet
ters; will hold lectures and seminars; and will
encourage research relating to Beckford and his
circle.
Further information may be obtained from
Sidney Blackmore
15 Healey Street
London NWl 8SR
United Kingdom.

INDEX
[NOTE: Items that are the principal topic of an
essay are listed only once, and are followed by an
"ff."; for example, an essay on the topic of Samuel
Tissot in which the first mention of that physician
occurred on page 117 would produce the entry,
"Tissot, Samuel, M. D., llZff." Italicized page
numbers indicate illustrations. Reviews are not
indexed.]

Aubrey, Mary, 102
Austin, Sarah, 292, 296
Aymard, Maurice, 101n31
Babylonian Captivity, 234
Bach, Johann Christian, 283
Bach, Johann Sebastian, 283
Backscheider, Paula R., 12nl9,
25n41, 189nl
Bailey, Richard W., 197n9
Baine, Rodney M.,
272n2,
280nll
Barber, Mary, 130, 131, 133, 135,
137, 138, 146, 147
Barber, Rupert, 146n25
Barrett, Elizabeth, 183nl8
Barruel, Augustin, 326n48
Barry, Dr. Edward, 142nl9
Barthes, Roland, 29, 198nl0, 328
Bastian, E, 189nl, 196n9
Baudrillaid, Jean, 191n4
Baxter, Richard, 5n5, 11

Abel, Karl Friedrich, 283
Academy of Phanar, 246
Addison, Joseph, 30ff., 341, 350
Agrippa, Menenius, 90
Akademos (Grove), 245
Albert, Judith Fay, 177nl5
Alexander, Meena, 301nl
Alkon, Paul, 16
American Revolution, 251
Anatolia, 242
Andreadis, Harriette, 93n21
Anti-Jacobin Review, 287, 288,
303
Applebee's Journal, 20
Appleby, Joyce, 205, 206
Apuleius, 155
Armbruster, J. M., 293
Arnold, Matthew, 281
Art Journal, 175
Arundel, Jane W. H., 311n24
Ascham, Roger, 110
Ashton, Rosemary, 272nl

437

438

mO-1850

Beaumarchais, Pierre Augustin
Caron de, 279
Beaver, Harold, 264nl9
Begemann, Christian, 341nl3
Bender, John, 13n21
Bennett, John, 121, 122
Bentham, Jeremy, 64-5
Berkeley, George, 331
Berthold, Dennis, 259nl2
Betterton, Thomas, 44
Bewell, Alan, 302n4
Bible, 219,225-6, 248
Biggs, Penelope, 59n3
Blake, William, 283
Blasters (Club), 143
Blewett, David, 27n43
Bloom, Harold, 338nll
Bode, Christoph, 350n32
Bodmer, Johann Jakob, 289
Boening, John, 272nl
Bohme, Gemot, 355n37
Bohme, Hartmut, 355n37
Boileau, Jacques, 340
Bonneville, Benjamin Louise
Eulalie de, 278
Bordieu, Pierre, 32n6
Boswell, James, 76
Boys-Mizener first-line
index,
135
Bradbury, Malcolm, 251ni
Brady, Robert, 116, 127
Braun, Theodore E. D., 221n3
Brentano, Bettine, 292n32
Briffault, Robert, 156
British Critic, 304
Brooks, David, 253n4
Brooks-Davies, Douglas, 166
Brown, Charles Brockden, 252ff.,
262nl5
Browning, Robert, 171ff.
Bmns, Frederike, 342
Burger, August, 285

Burke, Edmund, 280, 341, 350flF.
Burnet, Gilbert, 10nl5
Burnet, Thomas, 341, 348
Butler, Marilyn, 277, 312n26,
326n48
Byron, George Gordon, Lord,
310
Cambon, Maria Geetruida van de
Werken de, 291
Cameron, Kenneth Neill, 330nl,
331n2
Canfield, J. Douglas,
190n3,
211n23, 211n24
Cantemir, Dmitrie, 239ff.
Caravaggio, 177
Carlyle, Thomas, 273n5. 282,
285, 296
[Queen] Caroline, 146
Carpenter, Mary Wilson, 313n29
Carson, James, 302n5
Charles II, 113
Charleton, Walter, 113
Charlton, Kenneth, 103n37
Chaucer, Geoffrey, 77
Cherel, Albert, 220n2, 238n9
Cherniak, Judith, 338nll
Christophersen, Bill, 263nl7
Chrysostom, St. John, 157
Gibber, Colley, 35, 131, 167, 283
Citrin, Jack, 269n24
Clairemont, Claire, 308, 311n24,
331
Cohen, Murray, 203nl8
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 113,
178, 278, 290, 342
Columbus, Robert, 27n43
Cook, Thomas, murderer, 11
Constantius, 121
Cooper, James Fenimore, 254n6
Cope, Kevin L., 190nl, 209n22
Cotterell, Sir Charles, 103

Index
Cowie, Alexander,
TbhvJ,
263nl7
Cowley, Abraham, 77, 79, 90
Critical Review, 288, 293
Curran, Stuart, 343nl6
Curtius, Ernst Robert, 155
D'Alcamo, Cielo, 171ff.
Dameron, J. Lasley, 264n21
Dante, 88, 89, 179
Davis, Garold, 282nl6
Davis, Herbert, 131
Deering, Sir Edward, 103
Defoe, Daniel, 3ff., 189ff., 239ff.
Delany, Patrick, 135-6, 146
De Moigues, Odette, 105
Denham, Sir John, 77
Dennis, John, 341, 349
Devil, The, 113
Diderot, Denis, 276
Dobson, Michael, 31, 44n21,
45n23, 52
Donne, John, 78, 155
Douglas, David C., 122nll
Drew, Philip, 176nl2
Drummond, William, 331
Drury, Elizabeth, 155, 157, 166
Dryden, John, 43, 44, 46-7, 48,
49, 99, 110, 112fr., 160,
211n24
Dublin Hell-fire Club, 143
Dubouig, Matthew, 139
Duck, Stephen, 130
Duffo, Fr. Albert, 221n3
Dunkin, William, 131
Dunton, John, 191n5
Durant, W. Clark, 303n7
D'Urfe, Honore, 104
D'Urfey, Thomas, 164
Dyche, Thomas, 200nl3
Eagle Tavern, 143
Eaves, T. C. Duncan, 146n25
Edinburgh Review, 285

439

Edwards, Jonathan, 11
Ehret, Geoig Dionys, 283
Eliot, George, 292
Elliot, Robert C., 162
Elyot, Sir Thomas, 110
Engell, James, 272nl
Etherege, George, 35, 211n24
Eumenius, 118
European Community, 282
European Magazine, 293, 303
Eusebius, 118
Evans, Willa M., 83nll
Evelyn, Sir John, 192n6, 197n9
Exclusion Crisis, llOff.
Faguet, Emile, 220n2
Fahrenheit, Daniel Gabriel, 282
Ferguson, Arthur B., ,109nl
Feuerbach, Ludwig, 292n32
Fiedler, Leslie, 253
Fielding, Henry, 283
Finch, Robert, 224n6
Fischer, John Irwin, 137nll
Fite, Mme de la, 292
Foote, Jesse, 54n36
Forster, John, 171, 175
Foucault, Michel, 29, 86, 92n20,
198nl0
Franz, Marie-Louise, von, 154
Eraser's Magazine, 172, 285
Freeman, Barbara, 323n43
Freeman, Edmund, 197n9
French Revolution, 251, 277
Freud, Sigmund, 268n22, 329
Frederick the Great, 273, 279
Fuller, Margaret, 292
Furnivall, F. J., 174
Furst, Lillian, 272nl
Fuseli, Henry, 272nl, 273, 274,
275, 283, 284, 289, 290, 293,
294, 320
Fussner, F. Smith, 109nl

440

1650-1850

Gallery of Illustrious Literary
Characters, 172n5
Galliard, John, 283
Garber, Marjorie, 43n20
Garrick, David, 52-5
Gates, Bernard, singer, 140nl5
Gay, John, 283
Genesis, 22
Genest, John, 142
Genlis, Comtesse de, 278, 294
Gentleman's Magazine, 1%7
Gilbert, Sir John, 143n22
Gilbert, Susan, 302n5, 322n41
Gilchrist, Alexander, 283
Gildon, Charles, 43nl9, 52n30
Gillies, Robert Pearse, 284
Gillray, James, 278
Gisborne, Maria, 308nl5, 311n24
Godwin, Mary Jane, 278, 328
Godwin, "William, and his circle,
- 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278,
290, 303, 305, 317, 320, 322,
324, 325, 326n47, 327, 331
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von,
273, 282, 285, 286, 289, 290,
291,292n32,293,295n36, 296,
297, 298, 299
Goldsmith, Elizabeth C., 102n33
Giaffan, Hugh, 140-1, 144
Granville, Geoige, 45-7, 49, 50
Great Chain of Being, 57ff.
Greenblatt, Stephen, 243, 253n5
Greene, Charles E., 179nl7
[Saint] Gregory, 118
Gregory, Allene, 272n2
Grierson, Sir Herbert, 136
Griffin, Dustin, 31
Griffin, W. Hall,, 172n2, 177nl5
Griffiths, Ralph, 132
Grotius, Hugo, 5, 6n6
Grub Street, 26, 201nl5
Grundy, Isobel, 130

Gubar, Susan, 302n5, 322n41
Guccioli, Teresa, 310
Haak, Theodor, 282
Hagenbiichle, Roland, 252n2,
257n8
Hagstrum, Jean, 177nl3
Hall, John, 111
Hall, Stuart, 269n24
Haller, Albrecht von, 282
Halsband, Robert, 130
Hammond, John, 194n7
Hammond, Henry, 5n5
Handel, Geoig Friedrich, 282
Harding, M. Ester, 156, 159
Hardy, Thomas, 276, 277, 278
Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 254n6
Hays, Mary, 304, 308
Hazlitt, William, 276
Hedges, William, 257n8, 259nll
Hegel, Geoig Wilhelm Friedrich,
255
Heidgegger, J. J., 283
Heinrich, Karl, 292n32
Helgerson, Richard, 80, 99n28
Heywood, Eliza, 35
Henrietta Maria, Queen, 104
Henry HI, 113
Herder, Johann Gottfried, 291
Herschel, Sir William, 282
Hickes, George, 115ff.
Higham, John, 268
Hippie, Walter John, 340nl2
Hirsch, David H., 264nl9
Hoagwood, Terence, 331n2
Hobbes, Thomas, 35, 194n7
Hobby, Elaine, 98n25
Holbach, Paul Henri Thiery,
Baron D[e], 346
Holcroft, Thomas, 272fF.
Holinshed, Raphael, 111
Holquist, Michael, 297n39
Holty, L. C. H., 295n36

Index
Holmes, Richard, 331n2
Homans, Margaret,
322n41,
325n47
Homer, 295n36
Hooker, Richard, 5
Horsefield, J. Keith, 205nl9
Hotel de Rambouillet, 104
Hudson, Nicholas, 209n22
Hume, David, 331
Hunt, Leigh, 305
Hunter, Rev. Henry, 292, 294
Hunter, J. Paul, 8nlO, 10, 37nl5,
133, 191n5
Imlay, Gilbert, 310
Inchbald, Elizabeth, 286
Isaacs, Jacob, 132
Jacobins and Jacobinism, 272
Jacobus, Mary, 316n31, 320n37
Jakobsen, Roman, 268n22
James 11, 110.
Jameson, Fredric, 79, 92
Jemielity, Thomas, 311n25
Jenyns, Soame, 58ff.
Jephson, Robert, 131
Johnson, Barbara, 302n5
Johnson, Joseph, 289
Johnson, Dr. Samuel, 16, 57ff.,
113, 203nl8
Johnson, Rev. Samuel, 115ff.
Jones, D. W., 189nl
Jones, John, 200nl3
Jones, Richard Foster, 161
Jordan, Frank, 331n2
Juhl, P. D., 26n42
[Emperor] Julian, 154
Jung, C. G., 153ff.
Kant, Immanuel, 329ff.
Kapstein, I. J., 331n2
Karlin, Daniel, 183nl8
Karlowitz Peace, 242
Kaufmann, U. Milo, 98n26
Keach, William, 333

441

Kelly, Gary, 272n2, 280n21
Kemble, William, 51
Kendrick, Walter, 51
Kernan, Alvin, 30n3
Killigrew, Anne, 78n2, 107-8
Kimpel, Ben D., 146n25
Kinnaird, John, 338nll
Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb,
279, 285, 289n28
Kneller, Sir Godfrey, 283
Knoepflmacher, U. C., 304nll,
324n44
Koonce, Howard, 15n22, 27n43
Korshin, Paul J., 8nlO
Koonce, Howard, 15n22
Kotzebue, August von, 285, 286,
287, 289
Kramnick, Isaac, 127nl2
Krause, Sydney, 256n7, 258nl0,
259nl2, 261nl4
Krier, William, 4n2
Kroll, Richard W. E, 192n6
Kutchuk-Kaynardii Treaty, 242
Lacan, Jacques, 268n22
Lacy, John, 142n20
[The] Ladies Monthly Museum, 286
Lampe, Johann Friedrich, 283
Lang, Ritter von, 292n32
Langbaine, Gerard, 45
Lanser, Susan,
302, 322n41,
323n42
Lapanto Defeat of 1571, 242
Lavater, Johann Caspar, 273,
289, 291, 292
Laslett, Peter, 205nl9
Law, William, 5n5
Lawes, Henry, 83, 84, 85
Lawes, William, 84
Leibniz, Gottfried, 282
Leighton, Angela, 334
Lens, Peter Paul, 143n22
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 289

442

1650-m0

Levin, Harry, 264nl9
Levy, F. J., 109nl
Lewes, G.H., 292n32, 296
Lewis, Matthew Gregory, 275,
293
Lewis, Wilmarth, 130
Libanius, 120
Locke, John, 153, 205
Lockhart, Gibson, 284
Lodge, David, 268n22
Loewenstein, Joseph, 30n3
London, Betty, 322n40
Luce, A. A., 143n22
Lueck, Beth L., 259nl2
Luther, Martin, 22
Lynch, Rev. John, 135n6
Lyotaid, Franfois, 329
Maclise, Daniel, 171
Malraux, Andre, 275
Manley, Frank, 155
Marder, Elissa, 316n31
Marks, Herbert, 311n25
Marsh, Charles, 52n30
Martines, Lauro, 83n9
Mathias, T. J., 303n7
Maurer, Michael, 284
May, James E., 147n27
Maynard, John, 177nl5, 179
McFarlane, James, 251nl
McNiece, Gerald, 338nll
McVeagh, John, 10nl5
Mellor, Anne K., 315n30
Mercier, Louis Sebastien, 276,
278
Meredith, Edward, 120n8
Miege, Guy, 196n9
Miller, Nancy K., 77n2, 103n36
Milton, John, 77, 78, 79ff., 129,
157, 158, 312, 313
Miner, Earl, 77nl, 79
Mist's Weekly Journal, 20
Mitchie, J. A., 27n43

Moldovitsa Fresco, 248
Monk, Samuel Holt, 340nl2, 348
Monroe, B. S., 197n9
Montague, Lady Mary Wortley,
130
Montaigne, Michel de, 64-5,
67n27, 102
Monthly Mirror, 288
Monthly Review, 284, 288, 289
Moore, Rev. C., 294
Moore, John Robert, 190nl
Moritz, Karl Philipp, 280
Morning Post, 342
Moses, 312313
Mountford, William, 164
Miinster Swift Symposium, 135
Muiat I, 242
Murdoch, Iris, 358n39
Nazianen, Gregory, 119
Nebrija, Antonio de, 249
Neumann, Erich, 154, 156, 158,
165, 168-9
Newton, Isaac, and Newtonianism, 221
Nicolson, Marjorie Hope,
340nl2, 349n27
Notopoulos, James A., 331n2
Novak, Maximillian,
8nlO,
15n23, 18, 27n43, 213n25
Nussbaum, Felicity, 152, 153,
214n26
Gates, Joyce Carol,
324n44,
325n47
Odell,D. W, 40nl8
Oldenburg, Heinrich, 282
Oldham, John, 77
Opie, Sir John, 305, 309
Ormond, Richard, 172n4
O'Shaughnessy, Toni, 262nl5
Ottoman Empire, 241
Owen, Anne, 102
Paine, Thomas, 276, 278

Index
Park, Dr. Samuel, 278
Parke, Catherine N., 308nl6
Parliament, 114
Parsons, Robert, lOnlS .
Patriarchs of Constantinople,
245
[Saint] Paul, 118
Paul, Charles Kegan, 272n2, 309
Paulson, Ronald, 161
Payne, Deborah, 190n3, 191n5
Payne, William, 12
Peacock, Thomas Love, ^ 332
Peirce, Carol, 266n21
Pendarves, Mary, 136
Pepusch, Johann Christopher,
283
Peter the Great, 240, 242
Peters, J. S., 191n5
Petrarch and Petraichanism, 94,
105
Philips, Katherine, "The Match
less Orinda," 77ff.
Phillips, Edward, 107
Pilkington, Laetitia, 130ff.
Pilkington, Matthew, 137, 144
Plato, Platonism, Platonists, 245,
295n36, 330
Plutarch, 155
Pocock, J. G. A., 109nl, 111,
214n26
Poe, Edgar Allen, 252ff.
Poetical Register, 342
Pollack, Ellen, 153
Polwhele, Richard, 303n7
Polydore Vergil, 111
Pompignan, Jacques Le Franc de,
219
Pope, Alexander, 35, 68, 70, 99,
105, 129, 146,152fr., 241, 283,
303n7
Popish Plot, 111
Porter, Roy, 49n27

443

Powers, Sharon, 346
Powell, Samuel, 141
Prevost, Abbe, 276
Price, Richard, 312n26
Proper, C. B. A., 272n2
Pseudo-Longinus, 340
Pufendorf, Samuel von, 5, 6
Pulas, C. E., 331n2
Pye, Henry J., 285
Radcliffe, Ann, 275
Rees, John, 338nll
Reiman, Donald, 346
Reiter, Seymour, 334
[The] Review, 19
Riche, Adrienne, 316
Richardson, Alan, 301nl
Richardson, Samuel, 34, 57fF.,
131, 132, 134n5, 239
Ringe, Donald, 256n7, 258nl0,
263nl7, 266n21
Ritvo, Harriet, 60
Robichez, Guillaume, 221n3
Robinson, Henry Crabbe, 290,
296
Rochester, John Wilmot, Earl of,
10nl5, 211n23
Roper, Alan, 112n5, 113
Rose, Alexander, 266n21
Rose, Mark, 30
Rosenthal, Bernard, 257n8
Rosenthal, Laura, 30n3
Ross, Malcolm Mackenzie, 89nl7
Rossetti, Dante Gabriel, 172n2,
179nl7
Roirsseau, Jean-Jacques, 276, 290,
312, 313
Rowe, John Carlos,
264nl9,
265n20, 268n22
Royal Academy of Mmic, 283
Royal Society, 101, 113, 197n9,
282

444

1650-1850

Rubenstein, Marc, A., 301nl,
316n32
Rumbold, Valerie, 152, 157
Said, Ed-ward, 281
Sale, William M., 134n5
Salvaggio, Ruth, 153
Salzmann, Christian Gotthilf,
291
Samuels, Shirley, 257n8
Sanhedrin, 114
Santayana, George, 176nl2, 187
Savage, Richard, 30
Sauvigny, Guillaume de Bertier
de, 294
Savary, Jacques, 294
Schiller, Friedrich, 285, 286, 289
Schmalz, Wayne, 72
Schopenhauer, Johanna, 292n32
Schweikert, Patrocino, 316n33
Scott, Walter, 285, 296
Schlegel, A. W, 351
Shakespeare, William, 30ff., 129
Sha-w, Samuel, 294
Shell, Marc, 201nl4
Shelley, Mary, 273n4, 301ff.
Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 273n4,
304, 317, 325n47, 33011.
Showalter, Elaine, 311n24
Sidney, Sir Philip, 90
Smith, Louise, 343nl8
Smith, R. J., 109nl
Smollett, Tobias, 152, 159
Souers, Philip W, 85nl4, 103n35
South, Robert, 5n5
Spacks, Patricia, 152, 159
Spectator, 176
Spenser, Edmund, 156, 158
Spiegel, Marjorie, 66
Stallbaumer, Virgil R., 272n2
Stallybrass, Peter, 30n3
Staves, Susan, 211n23
Sterne, Laurence, 341

Sterrenburg, Lee, 327n50
Stockley, Violet, 272nl
Stolberg, Frederic Leopold
Count, 279,295,296
Sunstein, Emily, 304
Sutherland, James, 27n43
Sutherland, Joan, 3nl
Swift, Jonathan, 75, 129, 131,
146, 161, 162, 163, 169
Taylor, Jeremy, 5, 102, 103
Taylor, William, 273, 274, 275,
284, 286, 289, 293, 296
Thompkins, J. M. S., 272n2
Thompson, James, 190n3
Tindal, Nicholas, 240
Todd, Janet, 93, 301nl, 322n40
Todorov, Tzvetan, 240
Toles, George, 259nl2
Tomalin, Claire, 304
Tooke, John Home, 276, 277,
278
Traister, Daniel, 133
Trenck, Friedrich Freiherr von
der, 295
Trelawny, Edward, 304
Tucker, Bernard, 131, 133
Turim, Maureen, 269n24
Tusiani, Joseph, 179nl7
Tuveson, Ernest Lee, 349n28
Twitchell, James B., 358n39
Upham, Alfred A.,
103n37,
104n38
Upsarokas Indians, 263
Van Ghent, Dorothy, 27n43
Veevers, Erica, 104
Verlaine, Paul, 223
Veysey, Laurence, 269n24
Vico, Giambattista, 243
Vier, Jacques, 2221n3
Volney, Constantin Franfois,
326

Index
Voloshin, Beverly R., 257n8,
262nl5
Voltaire, 75, 238n9, 276
Voss, Johann Heinrich, 279
Vulgate, 227, 230, 232
Walker, William, 153
Wall, Cynthia, 190nl
Wallace, John M., 112n4
Walpole, Edward, 143
Walton, Izaak, 94
Walzer, Michael, 91
Wang, Orrin N. C., 312n28
Waple, Edward, 12
Wardle, Ralph, 303n7, 328
Warfel, Harry R., 256n7
Wasserman, Earl, 331n2, 333
Waterhouse, Edward, 207n21
Waterhouse, Gilbert, 282nl6
Watt, Ian, 4, 27n43, 33
Webb, Timothy, 338nll
Weber, Max, 100
Wedgwood, Josiah, 289n28
Weekly Examiner, 287
Weinsheimer, Joel, 33n8, 36
Weldon, Roberta E., 257n8
Wellek, Rene, 272nl
Wesley, John, 283
Whigs, 113, 123
White, Allon, 30n3
Whyte, Laurence, 130
Wieland, C. M., 276, 285, 289
Williams, Aubrey, 152, 166, 167
Williams, Harold, 131, 136
Williams, Raymond, 47n26
Wilson, Angus, 63

445

Winchilsea, Lady, 108
Winckelmann, Johann Joachim,
289
Winn, James, 43n21
Winstanley, John, 146n25
Witz, Ernst, 289n29
Wolff, Christian Freiherr von,
282
Wollstonecraft, Fanny, 304, 308
Wollstonecraft, Mary,
273ff.,

301fr.
Wolstenholme, Susan,
302,
320n37
Wood, Theodore,
341nl3,
358n39
Woodmansee, Martha, 30n3, 38
Woolf, Virginia, 20
Wordsworth, William, 330, 332,
335, 342, 343
Worsdale, James,
138, 142,
143n22
Wotton, William, 163
Wright, Frances, 308
Young, Edward, 30
"ibungquist, Paul, 302n4
Zagorin, Peter, 211n23
Zanger, Jules, 252n2
Zelle, Carsten, 351n35
Zeus, 158
Ziegler, Caspar, 5, 6
Zimmerman, Everett, 27n43
Zinzendorf, Graf, 283
Zionkowski, Linda, 30n3, 39
Zollman, Philip Heinrich, 282
Zonana, Joyce, 301nl, 322n39

